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PLUTARCH (Plutarchus), ca. ad 4^-1 20, 
was born at Chaeronea in Boeotia in cen- 
tral Greece, studied philosophy at Athens, 
and, after coming to Rome as a teacher 
in philosophy, was given consular rank by 
the emperor Trajan and a pro curator ship in 
Greece by Hadrian. He was married and 
the father of one daughter and four sons. 
He appears as a man of kindly charac- 
ter and independent thought, studious and 

Plutarch wrote on many subjects. Most 
popular have always been the 46 Parallel 
Lives, biographies planned to be ethical ex 
amples in pairs (in each pair, one Gree 
figure and one similar Roman) , though t) 
last four lives are single. All are invalual 
sources of our knowledge of the lives ; 
characters of Greek and Roman statesn 
soldiers and orators. Plutarch's many c 
varied extant works, about 60 in nur 
are known as Moralia or Moral Essays, 
are of high literary value, besides be 
great use to people interested in p 
phy, ethics and religion. 

The Loeb Classical Library editic 
Moralia is in sixteen volumes, vol 
having two parts. Volume XVI is ? 
hensive Index. 

(Q kU 








LCL 470 

Digitized by the Internet Archive 
in 2013 








Copyright © 1976 by the President and Fellows 
of Harvard College 
All rights reserved 

First published 1976 
Reprinted 1993, 1997, 2004 

LOEB CLASSICAL LIBRARY® is a registered trademark 
of the President and Fellows of Harvard College 

ISBN 0-674-99517-1 

Printed and bound by Edwards Brothers, Ann Arbor, Michigan 
on acid-free paper made by Glatfelter, Spring Grove, Pennsylvania 




Introduction 369 

Text and Translation 412 


Introduction , 606 

Text and Translation 610 


Introduction 622 

Text and Translation 660 

index 875 


The following are the manuscripts used for the edi- 
tion of the six essays in this volume and the sigla 
that refer to them : 

A=Parisinus Graecus 1671 (Bibliotheque Nationale, 

Paris)— a.d. 1296. 
B=Parisinus Graecus 1675 (Bibliotheque Nationale, 

Paris) — 15th century. 
E-Parisinus Graecus 1672 (Bibliotheque Nationale, 

Paris) — written shortly after a.d. 1302. 
F=Parisinus Graecus 1957 (Bibliotheque Nationale, 

Paris) — written at the end of the 11th century. 
J =Ambrosianus 881 - C 195 inf. (Biblioteca Am- 

brosiana, Milan) — 13th century. 
X = Marcianus Graecus 250 (Biblioteca Nazionale di 

S. Marco, Venice) — the first part (containing the 

De Stoicorum Repugnantiis) written in the 11th 

century, the second part (containing the Pla- 

tonicae Quaestiones) written in the 14th century, 
d = Laurentianus 56, 2 (Biblioteca Laurenziana, 

Florence) — 1 5th century, 
e - Laurentianus 70, 5 (Biblioteca Laurenziana, 

Florence) — 14th century, 
f = Laurent. Ashburnham. 1441 (not 1444 as in Hubert- 

Drexler, Moralia vi/1, pp. xvi and xx) (Biblioteca 

Laurenziana, Florence) — 16th century. 


g = Vaticanus Palatinus 170 (Bibliotheca Apostolica 
Vaticana, Rome) — 15th century. 

m=Parisinus Graecus 1042 (Bibliotheque Nationale, 
Paris) — 16th century. 

n = Vaticanus Graecus 1676 (Bibliotheca Apostolica 
Vaticana, Rome) — 14th century (cf Codices 
Vaticani Graeci : Codices 1485-1683 rec. C. Gian- 
nelli [1950], pp. 441-443). 

r= Leiden B.P.G. 59 (Bibliotheek der Rijksuniver- 
siteit, Leiden) — 16th century (see p. 150, n. h 
in the Introduction to the De An. Proe. in Ti- 

t = Urbino- Vaticanus Graecus 100 (Bibliotheca Apo- 
stolica Vaticana, Rome) — a.d. 1402. 

u = Urbino- Vaticanus Graecus 99 (Bibliotheca Apo- 
stolica Vaticana, Rome) — 15th century. 

v =Vindobonensis Philos. Graec. 46 (Nationalbiblio- 
thek, Vienna) — 15th century. 

z =Vindobonensis Suppl. Graec. 23 (Nationalbiblio- 
thek, Vienna) — 15th century. 

a =Ambrosianus 859 - C 126 inf. (Biblioteca Am- 
brosiana, Milan) — finished in a.d. 1295 (cf. 
A. Turyn, Dated Greek Manuscripts of the Thir- 
teenth and Fourteenth Centuries in the Libraries of 
Italy [University of Illinois Press, 1972] i, pp. 81- 

/? = Vaticanus Graecus 1013 (Bibliotheca Apostolica 
Vaticana, Rome) — 14th century. 

y — Vaticanus Graecus 139 (Bibliotheca Apostolica 
Vaticana, Rome) — written shortly after a.d. 

8 = Vaticanus Reginensis (Codices Graeci Reginae 
Suecorum) 80 (Bibliotheca Apostolica Vaticana, 
Rome) — 15th century. 



e = Codex Matritensis Griego 4690 (Biblioteca Natio- 
nal, Madrid) — 14th century. 

Bonon. = Codex Graecus Bononiensis Bibliothecae 
Universitatis S6S5 (Biblioteca Universitaria, 
Bologna) — 14th century. 

C.C.C. 99= Codex Oxoniensis Collegii Corporis 
Christi 99 (Corpus Christi College, Oxford)— 
15th century. 

Escor. 72 = Codex Griego 2M-12 de El Escorial (Real 
Biblioteca de El Escorial) — 15th and 16th cen- 
turies (ff. 75 r -87 r , which contain the De An. Proc. 
in Timaeo, were written in the 16th century). 

Escor. T-ll-5=Codex Griego T.11.5 de El Escorial 
(Real Biblioteca de El Escorial) — 16th century. 

Laurent. C. S. 180 = Laurentianus, Conventi Sop- 
pressi 180 (Biblioteca Laurenziana, Florence) — 
15th century. 

Tolet. 51, 5 =Toletanus 51, 5 (Libreria del Cabildo 
Toledano, Toledo) — 15th century. 

Voss. 16 = Codex Graecus Vossianus Misc. 16 (I) = 
Vossianus P 223 (Bibliotheek der Rijksuni- 
versiteit, Leiden) — 15th century. 

In such matters as accent, breathing, crasis, elision 
and spelling I have followed without regard to the 
manuscripts the usage explained in the Introduction 
to the De Facie {L.C.L. Moralia xii, pp. 27-28). 

The readings of the Aldine edition I have taken 
from a copy that is now in the library of The Institute 
for Advanced Study (Princeton, New Jersey) and 
that has on the title-page the inscription in ink, 
— : Donati Jannoctii : — Ex Bibliotheca Jo. Huralti 
Borstallerii : Jannoctii dono ; and from the margins 
of this copy I have cited the corrections or con- 
jectures which in a note at the end of the volume 



(pp. 1010 f.) ° written in the same ink as the inscrip- 
tion on the title-page are ascribed to Leonicus and 
Donatus Polus. 

For the editions and other works to which there is 
frequent reference in the apparatus criticus and notes 
the following abbreviations or short titles are 
used : 

Amyot =Les ceuvres morales et philosophiques de 
Plutarque, translatees de Grec en Francois par 
Messire Jacques Amyot, . . . corrigees et aug- 
mentees en ceste presente edition en plusieurs 
passages suivant son exemplaire, Paris, Claude 
Morel, 1618. 6 

Andresen, Logos und Nomos = Carl Andresen, Logos 
und Nomos : Die Polemik des Kelsos wider das 
Christ entum, Berlin, 1935. 

Armstrong, Later Greek . . . Philosophy — The Cam- 
bridge History of Later Greek and Early Medieval 
Philosophy, edited by A. H. Armstrong, Cam- 
bridge, 1967. 

Babut, Plutarque de la Verta JSthique = Plutarque de la 
Verba £thique : Introduction, texte, traduction et 
commentaire par Daniel Babut, Paris, 1969 (Biblio- 
theque de la Faculte des Lettres de Lyon XV). 

a It is the same note as that quoted by R. Aulotte {Amyot 
et Plutarque [Geneve, 1965], p. 180) from the end (p. 877) 
of the Basiiiensis in the Bibliotheque Nationale (J. 693), the 
title-page of which, he says, bears the inscription Donato 

b This definitive edition has been compared with the first 
edition, Les ceuvres morales et meslees de Plutarque . . ., 
Paris, Michel de Vascosin, 1572, and with (Euvres Morales 
et Milees de Plutarque traduites du Grec par Jacques Amyot 
avec des Notes et Observations de MM. Brotier et Vaul- 
villiers, Paris, Cussac, 1784-1787 = Tomes XIII-XXII of 
(Euvres de Plutarque . . ., 25 vols., 1783-1805. 


Babut, Plutarque et le Stoicisme - Daniel Babut, Plu- 
tarque et le Stoicisme, Paris, 1969 (Publications 
de TUniversite de Lyon). 

Basiliensis -Plutarchi Chaeronei Moralia Opuscula . . ., 
Basiliae ex Officina Frobeniana per H. Frobenium 
et N. Episcopium, 1542. 

Benseler, De Hiatu=G. E. Benseler, De Hiatu in 
Scriptoribus Graecis, Pars I : De Hiatu in Oratori- 
bus Atticis et Historicis Graecis Libri Duo, Friber- 
gae, 1841. 

Bernardakis = Plutarchi Chaeronensis Moralia recogno- 
vit Gregorius N. Bernardakis, Lipsiae, 1888- 
1896 (Bibliotheca Teubneriana). 

Bidez-Cumont, Les Mages Hellenises = Joseph Bidez 
et Franz Cumont, Les Mages Hellenises, 2 vol- 
umes, Paris, 1938. 

Bolkestein, Adversaria = Hendrik Bolkestein, Adver- 
saria Critica et Exegetica ad Plutarchi Quaes- 
tionum Convivalium Librum Primum et Secundum, 
Amstelodami, 1946. 

Bonhoffer, Epictet und die Stoa = Adolf Bonhoffer, 
Epictet und die Stoa : Untersuchungen zur stoischen 
Philosophic, Stuttgart, 1890. 

Bonhoffer, Die Ethik . . . = Adolf Bonhoffer, Die 
Ethik des Stoikers Epictet, Stuttgart, 1894. 

Brehier, Chrysippe =E.mile Brehier, Chrysippe et Van- 
cien stoicisme, Paris, 1951 (nouvelle edition revue). 

Brehier, Theorie des Incorporels =fimile Brehier, La 
Theorie des Incorporels dans Vancien Stoicisme, 
Paris, 1928 (deuxieme Edition). This was origin- 
ally published in 1908 asa" These pour le doc- 
torat." It was reprinted in 1962. 

Burkert, Weisheit und Wissenschaft = Walter Burkert, 
Weisheit und Wissenschaft : Studien zu Pythagoras, 



Philolaos und Platon, Niirnberg, 1962 (Erlanger 
Beitrage zur Sprach- und Kunstwissenschaft X). 
There is an English edition, " translated with 
revisions, " Lore and Science in Ancient Pytha- 
goreanism (Harvard University Press, 1972) ; 
but this appeared too late to permit the use of it 
instead of the German original. 

Cherniss, Aristotle* s Criticism of Plato . . . = Harold 
Cherniss, Aristotle's Criticism of Plato and the 
Academy, Vol. I, Baltimore, 1944. 

Cherniss, Crit. Presoc. Phil. = Harold Cherniss, Aris- 
totle's Criticism of Presocratic Philosophy, Balti- 
more, 1935. 

Cherniss, The Riddle = Harold Cherniss, The Riddle 
of the Early Academy, Berkeley/Los Angeles, 19+5. 

Cornford, Plato's Cosmology ^Plato's Cosmology : The 
Timaeus of Plato translated with a running com- 
mentary by Francis Macdonald Cornford, 
London/New York, 1937. 

Diels-Kranz, Frag. Vorsok. 6 -Die Fragmente der 
Vorsokratiker, Griechisch und Deutsch von Her- 
mann Diels, 6. verbesserte Auflage hrsg. von 
Walther Kranz, 3 volumes, Berlin, 1951-1952 
(later " editions " are unaltered reprints of this). 

Doring, Megariker = Die Megariker, Kommentierte 
Sammlung der Testimonien . . . vorgelegt von 
Klaus Doring, Amsterdam, 1972 (Studien zur an- 
tiken Philosophic 2). 

Diibner =Plutarchi Chaeronensis Scripta Moralia. 
Graece et Latine ed. Fr. Diibner, Paris, 1841. 

Dyroif, Die Ethik der alien Stoa = Adolf DyroiF, Die 
Ethik der alien Stoa, Berlin, 1897 (Berliner 
Studien fur classische Philologie u. Archaeologie, 
N.F. 2ter Band). 



Dyroff, Programm Wurzburg, 1896 = Adolf Dyroff, 
Ueber die Anlage der stoischen Biicherkataloge, Pro- 
gramm des K. Neuen Gymnasiums zu Wurz- 
burg fur das Studienjahr 1895/96, Wurzburg, 

Elorduy, Sozialphilosophie = Eleuterio Elorduy, Die 
Sozialphilosophie der Stoa, Grafenhainichen, 1936 
( -Philologies. Supplementband XXVIII, 3). 

Emperius, Op. Philol. — Adolphi Emperii Opuscula 
Philologica et Historica Amicorum Studio Collecta 
edidit F. G. Schneidewin, Gottingen, 1847. 

Festa, Stoici Antichi -IFrammenti degli Stoici Antichi or- 
dinati, tradotti e annotati da Nicola Festa, Vol. 
I e Vol. II, Bari, 1932-1935. 

Giesen, De Plutarchi . . . Disputationibus — Carolus 
Giesen, De Plutarchi contra Stoicos Disputationi- 
bus, Monasterii Guestfalorum, 1889 (Diss. 

Goldschmidt, Le systeme sto'icien — Victor Goldschmidt, 
Le systeme sto'icien et Videe de temps, Paris, 1953 
(Seconde edition revue et augmentee, Paris, 

Gould, The Philosophy of Chrysippus = Josiah B. 
Gould, The Philosophy of Chrysippus, Leiden, 
1970 (Philosophia Antiqua XVII). 

Grilli, // problema della vita contemplativa — Alberto 
Grilli, // problema della vita contemplativa nel 
mondo Greco-Romano, Milan/Rome, 1953 (Uni- 
versita di Milano, Facolta di Lettere e Filosofia, 
Serie prima : Filologia e Letterature Classiche). 

Grumach, Physis und Agathon — Ernst Grumach, 
Physis und Agathon in der alten Stoa, Berlin, 1932 
(Problemata 6). 

II. C. = the present editor. 


Hahn, " De Plutarchi Moralium Codicibus " = 
Victor Hahn, " De Plutarchi Moralium Codici- 
bus Quaestiones Selectae," Academie Polonaise : 
Rozprawy Akademii Umiejetnosci, Wydzial Filo- 
logiczny, Serya ii, Tom xxvi (1906), pp. 43- 

Hartman, De Avondzon des Heidendoms — J. J. Hart- 
man, De Avondzon des Heidendoms : Het Leven 
en Werken van den Wijze van Chaeronea, 2 vol- 
umes, Leiden, 1910. 

Hartman, De Plutarcho -J. J. Hartman, De Plutarcho 
Scriptore et Philosopho, Lugduni-Batavorum, 

Heath, Aristarchus of Samos =Sir Thomas Heath, 
Aristarchus of Samos, The Ancient Copernicus, Ox- 
ford, 1913. 

Heath, History =Sir Thomas Heath, A History of 
Greek Mathematics, 2 volumes, Oxford, 1921. 

Heath, Manual =Sir Thomas L. Heath, A Manual of 
Greek Mathematics, Oxford, 1931. 

Helmer, De An. Proc. = Joseph Helmer, Zu Plutarchs 
" De animae procreatione in Timaeo ": Ein Beitrag 
zum Verstandnis des Platon-Deuters Plutarch, 
Wiirzburg, 1937 (Diss. Miinchen). 

Hirzel, Untersuchungen = Rudolf Hirzel, Untersuch- 
ungen zu Cicero's philosophischen Schriften, 3 
volumes, Leipzig, 1877-1883. 

Holtorf , Plutarchi Chaeronensis studia . . . = Herbertus 
Holtorf, Plutarchi Chaeronensis studia in Platone 
explicando posita, Stralesundiae, 1913 (Diss. 

Hubert-Drexler, Moralia vi/1 = Plutarchi Moralia Vol. 
VI Fasc. 1 recensuit et emendavit C. Hubertt, 
additamentum ad editionem correctiorem col- 



legit H. Drexler, Lipsiae, 1959 (Bibliotheca 

Hutten —Flutarchi Chaeronensis quae super sunt omnia 
. . . opera Joannis Georgi Hutten, Tubingae, 

Jagu, Zenon =Amand Jagu, Xenon de Cittium : Son 
Role dans V etablissement de la Morale sto'icienne, 
Paris, 1946. 

Joly, he theme . . . des genres de vie = Robert Joly, 
he Theme Philosophique des Genres de Vie dans 
VAntiquite Classique, Bruxelles, 1956 (Academie 
Royale de Belgique, Memoires de la Classe des 
Lettres, Tome XXIX, fasc. 3). 

Jones, Platonism of Plutarch = Roger Miller Jones, 
The Platonism of Plutarch, Menasha (Wisconsin), 
191 6 (Diss. Chicago). References are to this edi- 
tion, in which the pagination differs somewhat 
from that of the edition of 1915. 

Kaltwasser =Plutarchs moralische Abhandlungen aus 
dem Griechischen iibersetzt von Joh. Fried. Sal. 
Kaltwasser, Frankfurt am Main, 1783-1800 = 
Plutarchs moralisch-philosophische Werke iiber- 
setzt von J. F. S. Kaltwasser, Vienna/ Prague, 
1796 ff. 

Kilb, Ethische Grundbegriffe = Georg Kilb, Ethische 
Grundbegriffe der alten Stoa und ihre Uebertragung 
durch Cicero im dritten Buch defnibus bonorum et 
malorum, Freiburg im Breisgau, 1939 (Diss. Frei- 
burg i.Br.). 

Kolfhaus, Plutarchi De Comm. Not. =Otto Kolfhaus, 
Plutarchi De Communibus Notitiis hibrum Genui- 
num esse demonstratur, Marpurgi Cattorum, 1907 
(Diss. Marburg). 

Kramer, Arete ~ Hans Joachim Kramer, Arete bei 



Plat&ii und Aristoteles : Zum Wesen und zur Ge- 
sckichte der platonischen JQntologie, Heidelberg, 
1959 (Abhandlungen der Heidelberger Aka- 
demie der Wissenschaften, Phil.-Hist. Kl., 

Kramer, Geistmetaphysik = Hans Joachim Kramer, 
Der Ursprung der Geistmetaphysik : Untersuch- 
ungen zur Geschichte des Platonismus zwischen 
Platon und Plotin, Amsterdam, 1964. 

Kramer, Platonismus = Hans Joachim Kramer, Plato- 
nismus und hellenistische Philosophies Berlin/New 
York, 1971. 

L.C.L. =The Loeb Classical Library. 

Latzarus, Idees Religieuses = Bernard Latzarus, Les 
Idees Religieuses de Plutarque, Paris, 1920. 

Madvig, Adversaria Critica — Jo. Nic. Madvigii Ad- 
versaria Critica ad Scriptores Graecos et Latinos, 3 
volumes, Hauniae, 1871-1884 (Vol. I : Ad Scrip- 
tores Graecos). 

Mates, Stoic Logic - Benson Mates, Stoic Logic, Ber- 
keley/Los Angeles, 1953. 

Maurommates =IIXovrdpxov jrepl rfjs iv Tifiata) i/jv)(o- 
yovias, €k86vtos /cat els r^v dpyaiav avviy^eiav airo- 
KaTaaTrjcravTos 'AvSpeov A. Mavpofifxarov Kop- 
Kvpaiov, Athens, 1848. 

Merlan, Platonism to Neoplatonism - Philip Merlan, 
From Platonism to Neoplatonism, second edition, 
revised, The Hague, i960. The later " edi- 
tions " are merely reprints of this ; the first 
edition was published in 1953. 

Moutsopoulos, La Musique . . . de Platon =Evanghelos 
Moutsopoulos, La Musique dans VCEuvre de 
Platon, Paris, 1959- 

B. Miiller (1870) -Berthold Miiller, " Eine Blatter- 



vertauschung bei Plutarch," Hermes iv (1870), 
pp. 390-403. 

B. Muller (1871) =Berthold Miiller, " Zu Plutarch 
n€pl ijjvxoyovlas" Hermes v (1871), p. 154. 

B. Muller (1873) =Berthold Muller, Plutarch itber die 
Seelenschbpfung im Timaeus, Gymnasium zu St. 
Elisabet, Bericht iiber das Schuljahr 1872-1873, 
Breslau, 1873. 

Nogarola =Platonicae Plutarchi Cheronei Quaestiones . 
Ludovicus Nogarola Comes Veronensis vertebat, 
Venetiis apud Vincentium Valgrisium, 1552. 

Pearson, Fragments = A. C. Pearson, The Fragments 
of Zeno and Cleanthes with Introduction and Ex- 
planatory Notes, London, 1891. 

Pohlenz, Moralia i = Plutarchi Moralia, Vol. I re- 
censuerunt et emendaverunt W. R. Patonf et 
I. Wegehauptf. Praefationem scr. M. Pohlenz, 
Lipsiae, 1925 (Bibliotheca Teubneriana). 

Pohlenz, Moralia vi/2 = Plutarchi Moralia, Vol. VI, 
Fasc. 2 recensuit et emendavit M. Pohlenz, 
Lipsiae, 1952 (Bibliotheca Teubneriana). 

Pohlenz-Westman, Moralia vi/2 = Plutarchi Moralia, 
Vol. VI, Fasc. 2 recensuit et emendavit M. Poh- 
lenz. Editio altera quam curavit addendisque in- 
struxit R. Westman, Lipsiae, 1959 (Bibliotheca 

Pohlenz, Grundfragen =Max Pohlenz, Grundfragen 
der stoischen Philosophic, Gottingen, 1940 (Ab- 
handlungen der Gesellschaft der Wissenschaften 
zu Gottingen, Phil .-Hist. Kl., Dritte Folge Nr. 26). 

Pohlenz, ASVoa=Max Pohlenz, Die Stoa : Geschichte 
einer geistigen Bewegung, 2 volumes, Gottingen, 
1948-1949 (ii=2. Band : Erlauterungen, 4. Auf- 
lage, Zitatkorrekturen, bibliographische Nach- 


trage und em Stellenregister von H.-Th. Jo- 
hann, 1972). 

Pohlenz, Zenon und Chrysipp =M. Pohlenz, Zenon und 
Chrysipp, Gottingen, 1938 (Nachrichten von der 
Gesellschaft der Wissenschaften zu Gottingen, 
Phil.-Hist. Kl., Fachgruppe I, Neue Folge : 
Band II, Nr. 9) =Max Pohlenz. Kleine Schriften 
i, pp. 1-38. 

Problems in Stoicism ^Problems in Stoicism edited by 
A. A. Long, London, 1971. 

R.-E. =Paulys Realencyclopadie der classischen Alter- 
tumswis sense haft . . ., Stuttgart, 1894—1972. 

Rasmus, Prog. 1872 = Eduardus Rasmus, De Plutarchi 
Libro qui inscribitur De Communibus Notitiis Com- 
mentatio, Programm des Friedrichs-Gymnasiums 
zu Frankfurt a.O. fur das Schuljahr 1871-1872, 
Frankfurt a.O., 1872. 

Rasmus, Prog. 1880 =Eduardus Rasmus, In Plutarchi 
librum qui inscribitur De Stoicorum Repugnantiis 
Coniecturae, Jahres-Bericht uber das vereinigte 
alt- und neustadtische Gymnasium zu Branden- 
burg von Ostern 1879 bis Ostern 1880, Branden- 
burg a.d.H., 1880. 

Reiske = Plutarchi Chaero?iensis, Quae Supersunt, Om- 
?iia, Graece et Latine . . . Io. Iacobus Reiske, 
Lipsiae, 1774-1782 (Vols. VI-X [1777-1778] : 
Opera Moralia et Philosophicd). 

Rieth, Grundbegriffe = Otto Rieth, Grundbegriffe der 
stoischen Ethik : Eine traditions geschichtliche Un- 
tersuchung, Berlin, 1933 (Problemata 9). 

Robin, Pyrrhon =Leon Robin, Pyrrhon et le Scepticisme 
GreCy Paris, 1944. 

S.F.F. = Stoicorum Veterum Fragmenta collegit Ioannes 
ab Arnim, 3 volumes, Lipsiae, 1903-1905. 



Sambursky, Physics of the Stoics =S. Sambursky, Phy- 
sics of the Stoics, London, 1959- 

Schiifer, Ein friihmittelstoisches System - Maximilian 
Schiifer, Ein friihmittelstoisches System der Ethi/c 
bei Cicero, Munich, 1934. 

Schmekel, Philosophic der mittleren Stoa = A. Schmekel, 
Die Philosophic der mittleren Stoa in ihrem ge- 
schichtlichen Zusammenhange dargestellt, Berlin, 

Schroeter, Plutarchs Stellung zur Skepsis = Johannes 
Schroeter, Plutarchs Stellung zur Skepsis, Greifs- 
wald, 1911 (Diss. Konigsberg). 

Stephanus =Plutarchi Chaeronensis quae extant opera 
cum Latina inter pretatione . . . excudebat Henr. 
Stephanus, Geneva, 1572. 

Taylor, Commentary on Plato s Timaeus =A. E. Tay- 
lor, A Commentary on Plato's Timaeus, Oxford, 

Thevenaz, L'Ame du Monde = Pierre Thevenaz, 
L 'Ame du Monde, le Devenir et la Matiere chez 
Plutarque avec une traduction du traite \* De la 
Genese de V Ame dans le Timee" (l re partie), Paris, 

Treu, Lampriascatalog =Max Treu, Der sogenannte 
Lampriascatalog der Plutarchschriften, Walden- 
burg in Schlesien, 1873. 

Treu, Ueberlieferung i, ii, and iii =Max Treu, Zur Ge- 
schichte der Ueberlieferung von Plutarchs Moralia i 
(Programm des Stadtischen evangel. Gymna- 
siums zu Waldenburg in Schlesien 1877), ii 
(Programm des Stadtischen Gymnasiums zu 
Ohlau 1881), iii (Programm des Konigl. Fried- 
richs-Gymnasiums zu Breslau 1884). 

Turnebus, Plutarchi de procreatione -Plutarchi dialogus 



de procreatio7ie in Timaeo Platonis Adriano Tur- 
nebo interprete, Parisiis, 1552. 

Usener, Epicurea = Epicurea edidit Hermannus Use- 
ner, Lipsiae, 1887. 

Valgiglio, De Fato = Ps.-Plutarco De Fato (jrepl el- 
fxapfxevrjs) ' Introduzione testo commento traduzione 
di Ernesto Valgiglio, Rome, 1964. 

van Straaten, Panetius = Modestus van Straaten, 
Panetius : sa vie, ses ecrits et sa doctrine avec une 
edition des fragments , Amsterdam, 1946. The 
third part of this book, the text of the fragments 
(pp. 325-393), is replaced by Panetii Rhodii Frag- 
menia collegit tertioque edidit Modestus van 
Straaten O.E.S.A., editio amplificata, Leiden, 
1962 (Philosophia Antiqua V). 

Verbeke, Kleanthes =G. Verbeke, Kleanthes van Assos, 
Brussel, 194-9 (Verhandelingen van de K. Vlaamse 
Academie voor Wetenschappen, Letteren en 
Schone Kunsten van Belgie, Kl. der Letteren, 
XI [1949], No. 9) ; 

Volkmann, Philosophic des Plutarch = Richard Volk- 
mann, Leben, Schriften und Philosophic des Plu- 
tarch von Chaeronea, Zweiter Teil : Philosophic 
des Plutarch von Chaeronea, Berlin, 1869- 

Wegehaupt, Plutarchstudien =Hans Wegehaupt, Plu- 
tarchstudien in italienischen Bibliotheken, Hohere 
Staatsschule in Cuxhaven, Wissenschaftliche 
Beilage zum Bericht iiber das Schuljahr 1905/ 
1906, Cuxhaven, 1906. 

Wegehaupt, " Corpus Planudeum " =Hans Wege- 
haupt, " Die Entstehung des Corpus Planudeum 
von Plutarchs Moralia," Sitzungsberichte der K. 
Preussischen Akademie der Wissenschaften, 1909? 
2. Halbband, pp. 1030-1046. 



Weische, Cicero und die Neue Akademie - Alfons 
Weische, Cicero und die Neue Akademie : Unter- 
suchungen zur Entstehung und Geschichte des an- 
tiken Skeptizismus, Minister Westf., 1961 (Orbis 
Antiquus 18). 

Weissenberger, Die Sprache Plutarchs i and ii = B. 
Weissenberger, Die Sprache Plutarchs von Chae- 
ronea und die pseudoplutarchischen Schriften I. Teil 
(Programm des K. hum. Gymnasiums Straubing 
fur das Schuljahr 1891/1895), II. Teil (Programm 
des K. hum. Gymnasiums Straubing fiir das 
Schuljahr 1895/96), Straubing, 1895 and 1896. 

Westman, Plutarch gegen Kolotes = Rolf Westman, 
Plutarch gegen Kolotes : Seine Schrift " Adversus 
Colotem *' als philosophiegeschichtliche Quelle, Hel- 
singfors, 1955 (Acta Philosophica Fennica, Fasc. 
vii, 1955). 

Witt, Albinus =R. E. Witt, Albinus and the History of 
Middle Platonism, Cambridge, 1937 (Transactions 
of the Cambridge Philological Society, Vol. vii). 

Wyttenbach —Plutarchi Chaeronensis Moralia, id est 
Opera, exceptis Vitis, Reliqua . . . Daniel Wytten- 
bach, Oxonii, 1795-1830 (Wyttenbach, Animad- 
versiones =Vols. vi and vii ; Index Graecitatis = 
Vol. viii). 

Xylander = Plutarchi Chaeronensis omnium, quae ex- 
stant, operum Tomus Secundus continens Moralia 
Gulielmo Xylandro interprete, Francofurti, 1599. 
At the end of this volume, separately paged, 
there are Xylander's annotations followed by 
those of Stephanus and then variant readings 
ascribed to Turnebus, Vulcobius, Bongarsius, 
and Petavius as well as those of the Aldine and 
the Basiliensis. 



Zeller, Phil. Griech. =Eduard Zeller, Die Pkilosophie 
der Griecken in ihrer gesckichtlichen Ent?vicklung, 3 
parts in 6 volumes, Leipzig, 1920-1923 (last re- 
vised editions) : 1/1 and 2, 6. Auflage hrsg. von 
Wilhelm Nestle ; II/l, 5. Auflage mit einem An- 
hang von Ernst Hoffmann ; II/2, 3. Auflage (4. 
Auflage = Obraldruck) ; III/l, 4. Auflage hrsg. 
von Eduard Wellmann ; HI/2, 4. Auflage. 





Plutarch's criticism of Stoic doctrine in his extant 
philosophical essays is not confined to those the 
titles of which declare them to be polemics against 
the Stoics, a and this was probably true also of the 
works now lost b ; but the very titles listed in the 
Catalogue of Lamprias expressly designate eight 
works as directed against the Stoics and a ninth as 
dealing with both Stoics and Epicureans. This last, 

° So e.g. the Quo?nodo Quis . . . Sentiat Profectus and 
the De Virtute Morali are essentially anti-Stoic polemics, 
much of the De Facie is devoted to the refutation of Stoic 
theories, and even in the Platonic exegesis of the De An. 
Proc. in Timaeo occasion is found for express criticism of 
Stoic doctrine (1015 b-c). An elaborate study of Plutarch's 
acquaintance with Stoics and Stoic writings and of his con- 
sistently critical opposition to Stoic doctrine has been made 
by D. Babut in his book, Plutarque et le Stolcisme (Paris, 
1969). This opposition, extreme as it was in fundamental 
issues, did not imply disagreement with every Stoic attitude 
and tenet ; and Babut's account of it wants some qualifica- 
tion with more allowance made for the distinction between 
polemic and doctrinal contexts (cf. A. A. Long, Class. JRev. y 
N.S. xxii [1972], p. 28). 

b So e.g. No. 45 of the Catalogue of Lamprias> Ucpl rrjs 
els €KaT€pov inixeiprjcrccoSi probably contained the retort to 
Chrysippus to which Plutarch refers in 1036 b infra (see 
note a there) ; and what Cicero says in De Oratore iii, 65 
(S.V.F. ii, frag. 291) and i, 83 (cf S.V.F. ii, p. 95, 30-31) 
shows that No. 86, Ei aptTrj 77 p^ropiK^ must have dealt with 
this Stoic thesis. 



Selections and Refutations of Stoics and Epicureans 
(No. 148), is lost ; and of the other eight there are 
extant only two and what is called a conspectus of 
a third : On Stoic Self -Contradictions (No. 76), Against 
the Stoics on Common Conceptions (No. 77), and 
Conspectus of the Essay, " The Stoics Talk More 
Paradoxically than the Poets " (No. 79)- a 

The purpose of the first of these three is simply 
to convict the Stoics and especially Chrysippus of 
as many express self-contradictions and implied 
inconsistencies as possible, to make Chrysippus 
appear to be " a man who says absolutely anything 
that may come into his head"* ; and, although in 

a Of the other five, the subject of No. 154 (Against the 
Stoics on What is in our Control) and of the corresponding 
essay against Epicurus (No. 133), which is also lost, is 
touched upon in De Stoic. Repug. 1045 b-f, 1050 c, and 1056 
c-d (cf. De An. Proc. in Timaeo 1015 b-c and De Sollertia 
Animalium 964 c). No. 59 (Against Chrysippus on Justice) 
may be the work to which Plutarch refers in De Stoic. Repug. 
1040 d (see note e there), and No. 78 (Against the Stoics on 
Common Experience) has been thought to be intended by 
Plutarch's apparent promise in De Comm. Not. 1073 d (see 
note/ there). Of Nos. 149 and 152 even the meaning of the 
titles is uncertain. The former, Ahtai ra>v 77cpt^€po/x€Vo>v 
"Ltcuikwv, may mean not " Explanations of Current Stoic 
Doctrines " (Sandbach) but " Reasons Why the Stoics 
Vacillate " (cf. Galba vi, 2 [1055 c-d]) ; and the latter, 
Against Chrysippus on the First Consequent, probably had 
to do not with the " derivation of ethics from oiVctWis " 
(Babut, Plutarque et le Stolcisme, p. 67, n. 4) but with the 
controversy about valid inference (cf. Sextus, Adv. Math. 
viii, 112-117 ; Cicero, Acad. Prior, ii, 143 and ii, 95-98 with 
Plutarch's assertion [De Comm. Not. 1059 d-e] that the 
dialectic of Chrysippus subverts the preconception of proof 
and destroys its own principles). 

b Chapter 28 sub finem (1047 b) ; cf. chapter 14 init. 
(1039 d), where Chrysippus is said to be least concerned to 


the course of doing this Plutarch cannot refrain 
from criticism of Stoic doctrine itself, he repeatedly 
protests that this is not his present purpose and 
emphasizes the limited scope to which he professes 
to confine himself. His purpose and procedure 
were probably similar to this in the corresponding 
essay now lost, On Epicurean Self- Contradictions 
(No. 129), where he may also have used the Stoics 
to belabour the Epicureans as he here uses the latter 
to belabour the Stoics. 5 To refute a speech or 
statement by alleging that it contains self-contra- 
dictions or is contradicted by the speaker's own 
action was a procedure that had been recommended 
by manuals of rhetoric and debate c and one to 
which according to Sextus (Adv. Math, i, 281) even 
the leading philosophers were vulnerable. The 
Stoics, however, would be especially sensitive to 
such a polemic, since they proudly maintained that 

avoid self-contradiction and inconsistency when he is dis- 
puting others ; and on Chrysippus' unconcern about contra- 
dicting himself and his " sophistical " methods of defending 
his statements cf. Galen, De Placitis Illppoc. et Plat, iv, 4 
(p. 351, 3-7 [Mueller] = & V.F. iii, p. 116, 12-16 and pp. 351, 
14-352, 14 [Mueller]). 

a Cf. 1042 V (rovrajv . . . d<f><JL>iA€V, on 0€ /zdxerat . . . ris 
ovk av ofioXoyrjaciev;), 1046 e (chap. 26 sub finem), 1049 b 
(ov yap et rt fxrj Ka\a>s dXXd ova npos iavrovs hiacfropujs Xeyovoiv 
^erdoat \lovov 7rpd/c€trat), 1049 F (axnrep 17/Ltcov dXXo rt vvv npar- 
rovrcov tj rds ivavrias avrov </>ojvds /cat v7roX^ip€LS 7Tapartd€iJL^vojv) i 
1051 n (. . . ou rod napovros iori Xoyov ro £r)T€tv avros o€ . . . 
fiaxofievov ri rroiti /cat rd Xoyat /cat raj Occo). 

> e.g. in 1033 c, 1034 c (chap. 6)\ 1043 b, 1045 b-f (chap. 
23), 1046 e (chap. 26 sub finem) y 1050 c, 1052 b (chap. 38 

c Cf. [Aristotle], Rhet. ad Alexandrum 1430 a 14-22 and 
Aristotle, Soph. Elench. 174 b 19-23. 



their philosophy was a completely coherent and 
thoroughly consistent system a and that this con- 
sistency, moreover, must manifest itself in the life 
of the true Stoic. b 

It is with this last point that Plutarch begins his 
polemic. Emphasizing the necessity for a philoso- 
pher's life to be in accord with his theory (chap. 1), 
he tries to show that the Stoics in their practice 
contradict their own doctrines about the relation of 
the philosopher to society. Either they abstained 
from politics, about which they wrote so much, and 
lived a life which by their own admission is more in 
accord with the Epicurean ideal than with their own 
(chap. 2) or, if they went into politics, acted in- 
consistently with their own assertions about actual 
states, laws, and statesmen (chap. 3). Moreover, 
in their treatment of their native countries they 
differed from one another c or were irrationally 
inconsistent (chap. 4). The prescriptions of Chrysip- 
pus for the political behaviour of the sage amount 
to an admission that the Stoic theories are impracti- 
cable (chap. 5), and in regard to religious insti- 
tutions and ceremonies the contradiction between 

a See note a on 1033 a infra and cf. M. Pohlenz, Hermes, 
lxxiv (1939), p. 7 ; I. G. Kidd, Class. Quart., N.S. v (1955), 
p. 187, n. 4 ; A. A. Long, Problems in Stoicism, pp. 102-103. 

& See besides note e on 1033 b infra Epictetus, Diss, i, iv 
(14-16) and n, xix (13-28) and Encheiridion, chap. 49. 

c That Chrysippus acted differently from Zeno and 
Cleanthes, for which a work by Antipater is cited, Plutarch 
treats as by the way, saying Traptiadu), though the implication 
is that, since not all could have acted rightly, one or another 
must have acted inconsistently with Stoic doctrine. The main 
point, however, is the irrational inconsistency in the be- 
haviour of Zeno and Cleanthes, who insisted upon remaining 
loyal in name only to countries that they had deserted in fact. 



the doctrine and the practice of the Stoics is even 
greater than that for which they criticize the Epi- 
cureans (chap. 6). 

So far Plutarch has kept to a single subject, 
though without having developed it as logically as 
he might have done ° ; but now (chap. 7) without 
any form of transition he abruptly charges Zeno 
with contradicting himself on the subject of the 
unity or distinct plurality of the virtues and Chrysip- 
pus too with contradicting himself by attacking 
Ariston's position and yet defending that definition 
of Zeno's which comes to the same thing, as does 
that given by Cleanthes also. The subject of this 
chapter b might reasonably suggest that it was to 
be the beginning of a section devoted to self- 
contradictions in ethics. It is no such thing, however, 
for it is followed immediately and again without 
formal transition by the charge (chap. 8) that Zeno 
in writing against Plato, refuting sophisms, and re- 
commending the study of dialectic implicitly con- 
tradicted his own argument that it is unnecessary 

a The material of chapter 4 belongs logically at the end 
of chapter 2 in continuation of ol ye koa ras avrojv KareXnrov 
warp^as . . . (1033 e), and that of chapter 5 immediately 
after chapter 3. The material of chapter 5 might have been 
used in chapter 20 or that of chapter 20 to develop chapter 5, 
though Plutarch's purposes in the two are different : here 
to show that the Stoic theories are by their own admission 
impracticable and in chapter 20 to convict Chrysippus of 

b It is not, as Pohlenz says it is (Hermes, lxxiv [1939], 
p. 8), the exposure of " Lehrdifferenzen zwischen den 
Schulhauptern " but the explicit self-contradiction of Zeno 
and the implicit one of Chrysippus in attacking Ariston for 
espousing that one of Zeno's contradictory positions which 
both he and Cleanthes adopt. 



to hear both sides of a controversy before rendering 
a verdict ; and this in turn is followed by two 
long chapters formally unconnected with each 
other or with what precedes and follows them and 
attacking Chrysippus first (chap. 9) for contradicting 
himself about the order in which logic, ethics, and 
physics and its consummation, theology, should be 
studied and then (chap. 10) for arguing both sides 
of a question in a way that contradicts his prescrip- 
tions for doing so. a Then there is an abrupt return to 
an ethical theme (chap. 11), the inconsistencies result- 
ing from the Stoic doctrine of " right action/' right 
action being what the law prescribes but of which 
only the sage is capable and wrong what it prohibits 
but what all others than the sage cannot avoid doing. 
Had Plutarch intended to arrange his material 
by subject, chapter 9 would certainly not have been 
placed between chapters 8 and 10 or any of chapters 
8-10 between 7 and 11 ; but before chapter 7 the 
subjects of 8 and 10 would have been treated in 
sequence, b and before this the methodical confusion 
charged to Chrysippus in chapter 9 would have been 
used as an introduction to explain why the inconsis- 
tent procedure of the Stoics makes it difficult to 
present in logical order and without repetition or 
overlapping all their contradictory statements and 
inconsistencies of doctrine. As it is, chapter 7, 
though its subject is unconnected with that of chap- 

a For criticism of the prescriptions themselves Plutarch 
refers to " other writings " (1036 a-b and page 438, note a). 

6 According to this criterion the material of chapters 24 
and 29 should have been used to develop the criticism in 
these chapters or the theme of chapters 14-16, their connexion 
with which was observed by von Arnim (S. V.F. i, p. xi). 



ters 1-6, is like chapter 6 concerned with an express 
self-contradiction of Zeno's ; and so is chapter 8, 
which is connected with chapter 7 in this way and in 
this way only. Chapter 9 turns to Chrysippus, who 
in it and in chapter 10 is alone the object of attack." 
The sequence of thought connecting chapters 1 1 , 
12, and IS is clear. 6 Chapter 11. beginning abruptly, 
as has been said, with the doctrine of right action 
as prescribed and wrong as prohibited and developing 
the contradiction between this and the doctrine 
that the action of the sage is always right and that 
of the base always wrong, leads to the citation in 
chapter 12 of the work by Chrysippus on right 
actions for the contention that to the base nothing 
is serviceable, appropriate, or congenial, which he 
is then accused of contradicting by repeatedly 
asserting that from the moment of birth all have a 
natural " congeniality " to themselves, their mem- 

a Three, works by Chrysippus are quoted in chapter 9 
(*' On Ways of Living," " On the Gods," and " Physical 
Propositions "), and a fourth is paraphrased (" On Use of 
Discourse "). Two quotations from the last of these, one 
from the first, and one from the third are given in chapter 10, 
which begins with a quotation from an unnamed work by 
Chrysippus and cites but without quotation or explicit para- 
phrase six books composed by him " against common 

b This seem.s to have been recognized by Pohlenz (Hermes, 
lxxiv [1939], p. 10) but not by Sandbach (Class. Quart., 
xxxiv [1940], p. 21), who divided chapters 12-22 from 
chapters 7-11, apparently because chapter 12 has no particle 
connecting it with the preceding chapter. In taking chapters 
12-22 as a well defined " section " with chapters 14-1G as a 
" digression " he says " there is connexion between the 
majority of chapters " ; but in fact of the six chapters of 
this " section " that follow the " digression," four (17, 18, 
19, 20) begin without any connecting particle. 



bers, and their offspring but which is expressly said 
at the beginning of chapter 13 to be a consequence of 
the fundamental Stoic principle that there is no 
diiference of degree either in vice or in virtue, a 
principle adhered to by Chrysippus but contradicted, 
Plutarch contends, by many of his other statements 
and arguments. 

From these self-contradictions imputed to 
Chrysippus Plutarch at the beginning of chapter 1 4 
makes a formal transition by saying that Chrysippus 
acts this way in many places but when disputing 
others is least concerned to avoid self-contradiction 
and inconsistency. Of this he then gives four 
examples : Chrysippus attacks Plato for saying that 
one who does not know how to live had better not 
be alive, but he praises Antisthenes and Tyrtaeus 
for saying what amounts to the same thing and 
blames Theognis for not having said it (chap. 14) ; 
he censures the Platonic Cephalus for holding the 
fear of divine chastisement to be a deterrent from 
injustice, and yet he asserts that this is the purpose 
for which the gods chastise the wicked (chap. 15 
[1040 a-c]) ; he denounces Plato for calling good 
other things besides justice, saying that all the vir- 
tues are annihilated by those who do not hold that 
only the fair is good, but then in criticizing Aristotle 
maintains that the other virtues can exist as goods 
even though justice is annihilated by those who 
treat pleasure as a goal, a position which, moreover, 
contradicts his own assertion of the unity of the 
virtues (chap. 15 [1040 c — 1041 b]) a ; and on the 

a In chapter 27 Chrysippus is said to have contradicted this 
in another way by saying that the good man is not always 
being courageous or the base man cowardly or intemperate. 



ground that injustice exists only in relation to another 
than oneself he rejects as absurd Plato's notion of 
injustice within the individual soul, but elsewhere 
he argues that the wrongdoer does himself injustice 
too and so does he to whom injustice is done (chap. 

These chapters have been commonly regarded as 
a digression by which the sequence from chapter 13 
to chapter 17 is interrupted. According to Pohlenz 
chapter 17, beginning with the designation of the 
next theme as rov irepl dyaOtov kol kclkcov Xoyov, 
carries on precisely from the point where in chapters 
11-13 the discussion had reached the proposition 
jjlovov to kglAov dya86v. b Yet it is this very proposi- 
tion with regard to which in the second and larger 
part of chapter 15 (1040 c — 1041 b) Chrysippus is 

a According to von Arnim (S. V.F. i, p. xi) chapters 14-16 
(and 24 and 29 too) were taken by Plutarch from a second 
source and inserted into the organized primary source that 
he used for chapters 1 1-30 ; and Pohlenz argued that this 
" second source " was Plutarch's own work, Against 
Chrysippus on Justice, or unused material that he had col- 
lected for it (Hermes, lxxiv [1939], pp. 10-11 and 13). Sand- 
bach, accepting this as the source of chapters 15-16 but con- 
tending that the quotations in chapter 14 must have come 
from an hypothetical " formless collection of inconsistencies 
in the works of Chrysippus," the source according to him of 
most of the material that by selection and arrangement 
Plutarch transformed into the present essay, held that the 
digression thus " involves the calculated conjunction of 
elements from two sources " and that Plutarch inserted it 
here into " the longest continuous section of the essay " 
(i.e. chaps. 12-22) " for variety's sake," the literary structure 
of the whole essay being " an alternation between incon- 
sistencies heaped up without arrangement and inconsistencies 
gathered under a head " (Class. Quart., xxxiv [1940], 
pp. 21-38). 

6 Pohlenz, op. vit. (see the preceding note), p. 11. 



accused of having contradicted himself in his criti- 
cisms of Plato and Aristotle, and here this accusation 
is begun (1040 c) with a quotation already used in 
chapter 13 (1038 d) to convict him of contradicting 
himself in another way about this same proposition." 
So, if it is upon this that the theme of chapter 17 
is supposed to follow, chapter 17 should have been 
said to carry on not from chapter 13 but from chapter 
15. It carries on, however, by returning to the sub- 
ject of chapter 14, beginning with citations from the 
IlpoTp€irTLKd of Chrysippus, b the work which in 
chapter 14 is alone quoted and paraphrased. There 

° The repetition of the quotation itself was adduced by 
Pohlenz as support for his theory about the source of 
chapters 14-16 (see p. 377, n. a supra), but he did not observe 
that the proposition in question is immediately connected 
with it in chapter 13 (1038 n : dXX* et-nep fiovov to koXov dyadov 
ioTiv . . .) or that it is at all involved in chapter 15 (rf. 
1040 d and 1041 a). 

b Comparison of 1041 e with 1048 b and De Comm. Not. 
1060 D proves that by the YlpoTpeTrrtKa and rd nepl rod Upo- 
Tpinecrdai Plutarch means the same work. 

c This Sandbach adduced in support of his contention that 
the quotations in chapter 14 were taken not from the source 
of chapters 15-16 but from his hypothetical '* collection of 
inconsistencies " (see p. 377, n. a supra). In that collection, 
he conjectured, the quotations appeared in the order in which 
the compiler had excerpted them as he read through one 
book after another, and this is why in Plutarch's essay there 
are cases of adjacent inconsistencies based on quotations 
from the same work, e.g. on Trcpl BtW S' in chapters 9 and 10 
and on 'HQlkcl Z-qr-qpLara ?' in chapters 26 and 27. Both 
chapters 9 and 10, however, contain quotations from the 
nepl Aoyov Xpyoetos and the Ouo-ikcu ©e'aa? as well as from the 
TTcpl Btcov ; and Sandbach's hypothesis does not explain why 
all three works are quoted in these successive chapters but a 
quotation from the Q>vaiKal Seacts is the basis of chapter 29, 
though it is not mentioned elsewhere in this essay, and the 
ir€pl BtW is next quoted in chapter 20 and is then the first 



Chrysippus was accused of criticizing a dictum of 
Plato's on the ground that it would require us to die 
whereas even for the base it is more advantageous 
to remain alive, virtue by itself being no reason for 
our living or vice for our departing this life, and then 
of contradicting himself by subscribing to statements 
of others that imply exactly what he censured Plato 
for saying, that for the vicious and stupid not being 
alive is more advantageous than living. Now in 
chapter 17 he is accused of the same kind of contra- 
diction in his general statements about his own 
doctrine of goods and evils, which in the same work 
he said is most consistent with living and yet again 
both there and elsewhere said transcends human 
nature because it abstracts us from living as from 
something of no concern to us. The connexion with 
chapter 14 becomes specific in chapter 18, which 
begins with the attempt to reveal a contradiction 
between this doctrine of good and. evil and the 
assertion that even for the foolish and vicious it 
is more advantageous to remain alive than not to 
do so. Chapters 14-16, then, containing as they do 
the continuation of the theme of chapter 13 and the 
introduction of that continued in chapter 17-18, 
despite their common purpose of exemplifying the 
special unconcern of Chrysippus about contradicting 
himself in his criticism of others, are no more than 

of Chrysippus' works mentioned by title in chapter 30. in 
chapter 30 a passage of the IT/ooTp€7rri/ca already used in 
chapter 17 is again paraphrased (see page 533 and notes a 
and b there) ; and chapter 22 is based upon this work, 
though it is not mentioned in the interval between chapters 
17 and 22. 

a To treat here from this special point of view part of the 



some other sections of the essay an intrusion into 
an otherwise organized sequence of thought or a 
digression from it. a 

Chapter 18 continues with the argument (1042 
c-e) that in defending Chrysippus against the 
charge of contradicting his doctrine of goods and 
evils by holding it to be better to live a fool than not 
to remain alive the Stoics contradict themselves 
further, for according to this defence the criterion 
that he says makes it proper for the unhappy fool 
to continue living and the happy sage sometimes to 
commit suicide is not goods and evils at all but the 
intermediates or so-called indifferents, though none 
of these but only good and evil is an object of choice 

theme of chapter 13 and then others in the same way may 
have been suggested to Plutarch by his own remark made 
shortly after the first mention in chapter 13 (1038 o) of the 
proposition \x6vov to koXov ayadov, "... for I would not 
give the impression of cavilling at words, although Chrysip- 
pus attacks Plato and the rest tooth and nail in this way " 
(1038 e). 

a It is strange, however, that Plutarch did not put the 
second part of chapter 15 (1040 c — 1041 b) immediately after 
chapter 13 and chapter 14 immediately before chapter 17. 
Chapter 16, Chrysippus' self-contradictory criticism of Plato 
concerning injustice, follows naturally upon the end of 
chapter 15, his alleged self-contradiction concerning justice. 
The first part of chapter 15 (1040 a-c), however, is related to 
what precedes and follows it by nothing but its being another 
example of Chrysippus 1 self-contradictory criticism of a 
Platonic passage and possibly by its being based upon two 
of the works of his that are quoted and paraphrased in the 
second part of chapter 15 and chapter 16 ; and it cannot be 
said to anticipate chapter 35 or to be continued by it, for, 
though the subject there also is divine chastisement, the 
context and argument as well as the statements of Chrysippus 
used and the books from which they are drawn are all 
entirely different from those here and unrelated to them. 


and of avoidance. This contradiction in the relation 
of the sage to things good, evil, and indifferent 
suggests that in chapter 19 of the sage unaware of 
the presence of goods and the absence of evils, 
though these are asserted to be entirely different 
and all perceptible, and then that in chapter 20 of 
the tranquil, retiring, and unofficious sage who yet 
engages in politics, seeks profit, and takes precautions 
against being defrauded a ; and this is followed in 
chapter 21 by the charge that Chrysippus has the 
sage admit into his city nothing for the purpose of 
pleasure or beauty and yet in his teleological ex- 
planations ascribes this very purpose to providence, 
extolling her for providing what he censures men 
for not forgoing. Here Chrysippus is expressly 
accused of deriding nature and legislating in compe- 
tition with the lawgiver of the universe (1044 c) and 
by implication in making the sage do so of contra- 
dicting the Stoic doctrine that the sage is in perfect 
accord with nature and providence. b 

Chapter 22, which has been regarded as the 

For the relation of chapter 20 to chapter 5 see p. 878, 
n. a sup)- a. 

6 Two works by Chrysippus are paraphrased or quoted in 
this chapter, the nepl IIoAiTeta?, which is mentioned here thrice 
and not elsewhere in this essay, and the ncpl OiWcos-, which 
is mentioned here twice and is cited also in chapters 20 and 
22. This chapter begins by citing the former work and 
quoting from it part of a passage from Euripides, with an 
adaptation of which the chapter also ends. The lines 
quoted at the beginning of this chapter had already been 
quoted in the preceding chapter (1048 e), where they were 
said to have been praised by Chrysippus in many places : 
and it may have been the quotation of them there that called 
to Plutarch's mind the passage of the Trcpl TCoAiret'a? with which 
he begins chapter 21. 



beginning of an unarranged collection of miscella- 
neous inconsistencies, accuses Chrysippus of con- 
tradictory statements about using the behaviour of 
irrational animals as a paradigm for human conduct. 
For one of these statements his nporperrrLKd is 
cited and for the other the fifth book of his -napl 
<Pvoews. The latter had been quoted in the pre- 
ceding chapter also (1044 d), and it may have been 
this and the references in that chapter to irrational 
animals in Chrysippus' teleological explanations 
that led Plutarch next to the apparently unrelated 
theme of chapter 22. The material of this chapter 
is itself related, however, to that of the preceding 
chapters, for it comes from contexts concerned with 
certain actions treated by Chrysippus as being in 
themselves neither good nor evil but " indifferent " a ; 
but Plutarch uses this material to show that Chrysip- 
pus at different times passed contradictory judg- 
ments on the relevance of the same evidence. 

With this chapter 23 is connected in similar fashion. 
Inasmuch as it purports to show that Chrysippus 
contradicted his own criticism of the Epicureans, it 
might have been used as another example in ad- 
dition to the four adduced to support the charge made 
in the first sentence of chapter 14 ; but here too as 
in chapter 22 it is with regard to " indifferents " 
that Plutarch professes to find him contradicting 
his own doctrine of the non-existence of the un- 

a The actions mentioned in the UporpcnriKa cited in this 
chapter by Plutarch were treated by Chrysippus iv to> -nepi 
ahia<t>6pu)v to-tto) (S. V.F. iii, frags. 743-745). So Sandbach's 
statement (Class. Quart., xxxiv [1940], p. 21) that chapter 
22 " does not belong to the tokos rrepl dyaOcvv /cat /ca/cdW 
while true of the use to which Plutarch here puts his material, 
is not true of the material itself or its original context. 


caused and spontaneous, on the basis of which he 
criticized the Epicurean assertion of an adventitious 
force and uncaused motion manifesting itself in the 
case of indistinguishable alternatives. 

On the other hand, it is because chapter 22 does 
accuse Chrysippus of inconsistency in his treatment 
of evidence and chapter 23 of contradicting his own 
criticism of other philosophers that it is psychologi- 
cally appropriate for this to be followed by chapter 
24, for the accusation here, though the particular 
occasion of it, Chrysippus' advocacy of dialectic as 
advocated by Plato and Aristotle and others, would 
have provided a logical development of the criticism 
in chapters 8 and 10, 6 is not of self-contradiction in 
statements or doctrines but of inconsistency in 
appealing for support in one matter to the authority 
of those whose treatment of the most important 
matters is otherwise stigmatized as self-contradictory 
and mistaken. 

Without any formal transition Plutarch next in 
chapter 25 accuses Chrysippus of contradicting his 
own assertion that spiteful joy (eW^ai^eKa/aa) is 
non-existent because joy is impossible for the base. c 

a For the kind of a6ia<f>opa with regard to which Chrysippus 
is accused of contradicting his own doctrine see note c on 
1045 f infra. The statements concerning these, not so 
accessible according to Plutarch as the frequent and familiar 
assertions of the doctrine against the Epicureans, for which 
no specific work is cited, are quoted from two works by 
Chrysippus, the nepl rod Ai*af av» which is cited by title only 
here and in chapter 33, and the sixth book of the rrcpl Ka^- 
kovtos, the seventh book of which is cited in chapter 30. 

b See p. 374, n. b supra. 

€ Because of this Pohlenz said (Hermes, lxxiv [1939], 
p. 11) that the tenor of chapter 25 is the same as that of 
chapter 12. 



For this, however, the ground was the Stoic doctrine 
that the base are always thoroughly unhappy 
(cf. S.V.F. iii, frag. 671); and with this and its 
complement, the good are always thoroughly happy, 
was connected Chrysippus' contention that momen- 
tary happiness does not differ in kind or degree 
from enduring happiness and so is as much an 
object of choice as is the latter (cf. S.V.F. iii, p. 14, 
8-13), which is the doctrine that in chapter 26 he is 
next accused of contradicting. In chapter 27 he 
is charged with contradicting in another way this 
same Stoic doctrine that the good are always 
thoroughly happy and the base unhappy, for this 
was said to follow from the imperfection of the latter 
in partaking of no virtue and the perfection of the 
former in lacking none, every action of the good 
being perfect and because perfect performed in 
accordance with all the virtues a ; and this Plutarch 
here contends is contradicted by Chrysippus when 
he says that the good man is not always being 
courageous or the base man cowardly or intemperate. 
So chapters 25, 26, and 27 are connected with one 
another by the context of the Chrysippean argu- 
ments to which they all refer. b They have still 
another characteristic in common, however. The 
charge in chapter 27 that Chrysippus contradicts 

° Cf. Stobaeus, Eel. ii, 7, 11« (p. 98, 14-17 [Wachsmuth], 
the sentence that precedes S. V.F. iii, p. 14, 8-13 [At* o . . .] 
and should not have been omitted by von Arnim there) and 
8. V.F. iii, frag. 557 with Plutarch's sentence here, 1046 f = 
S.V.F. iii, p. 73, 32-34. 

b Sandbach thought that chapters 26 and 27 are adjacent 
to each other because " being based on quotations from the 
same work," 'H0i*a Zijr^fiara z\ the one followed the other 
in Plutarch's source (see p. 378, n. c supra). 



the Stoic doctrine of the unity of the virtues and 
their implication of one another is related to that in 
chapter 15, contradiction of the same doctrine in his 
criticism of Aristotle a ; Chrysippus' thesis, the 
subject of chapter 26, that happiness does not de- 
pend upon temporal duration, flatly gainsays Ari- 
stotle's assertion that for happiness a brief time will 
not suffice but a complete life is required b ; and 
his contention in chapter 25 that emxaipe/ca/a'a as 
a kind of joy is non-existent also denies what Ari- 
stotle had asserted. This characteristic common 
to chapters 25-27 is the only discernible link between 
them and chapter 28. Here Chrysippus is charged 
with reckless inconsistency not in anything related 
to ethical doctrines d but for requiring attention to 

° See 1041 a-b and p. 376, n. a supra ; and for the differ- 
ence, often disregarded, between the Aristotelian and the 
Stoic versions of the avraKoXovOla rtbv dpercov cf. R. A. 
Gauthier et J. Y. Jolif, L'lHthique a Nicomaque ii, pp. 55S- 
559 ad 1145 a 1-2. 

b Aristotle, Eth. Nie. 1098 a 18-20 and 1100 a 4—1101 a 
21 ; cf. R. Beutler und W. Theiler, Plotins Schriften iii b 
(Hamburg, 1964), pp. 465-466 on Enn. i, v and A. Graeser, 
Plotinus and the Stoics (Leiden, 1972), pp. 59-60. 

c Aristotle, Eth. Nic. 1107 a 9-10 and 1108 b 1-6; cf. 
Rhetoric 1386 b 3 A — 1387 a 3. Aristotle seems to have been 
the first to use the noun (F. Dirlmeier, Aristoteles : Magna 
Moral ia, p. 303 ad p. 32, 14). 

d Sandbach (Class. Quart., xxxiv [1940], p. 22) said that 
chapters 24 and 28 " certainly seem out of place among 
others devoted to ethical doctrines " ; and he explained their 
appearance here by observing that the books cited in both 
chapters belong to the -qdiKos roiros and supposing that 
Plutarch simply followed the order of the quotations in his 
hypothetical source, a collection of inconsistencies excerpted 
book by book (see p. 378, n. c supra). It is presumably the 
7Te/5t 'PrjropiKfjs of Chrysippus that is quoted and paraphrased 
in chapter 28 ; and, since this work had already been cited 



be given to the disposition and delivery of a speech 
and yet recommending that obscurities and even 
solecisms be disregarded, a recommendation which, 
though this is not mentioned here, is a clear rejection 
of Aristotle's canon of style. a So the four self- 
contradictions in chapters 25-28 all exemplify that 
opposition to Aristotle on the part of Chrysippus 
which in chapter 24 was said to be inconsistent with 
his appeal to the authority of Aristotle and of Plato 
for the purpose of supporting a thesis of his own ; 
and, though it is not said why they are placed 
directly after chapter 24, that this was the reason 
is strongly suggested by the nature of chapter 29, 
which follows them. 

In this chapter a statement of Plato's criticized by 
Chrysippus as an example of mistakes that should be 
avoided by reticence concerning scientific matters 

in chapter 5 and is cited nowhere else in this essay, Plut- 
arch's use of it in chapter 28 is not plausibly explained by the 
hypothesis of Sandbach. 

a Cf. Aristotle, Rhetoric 1404 b 1-3 (<hpioQa) Xtgeujs apery 
aa<j>i} elvai . . .) and 1404 b 35-37 ; 1407 a 19 (eari 8' dpxr] 
rrjs Ae£ea>s to cXArjvl^eiv) with 1407 b 18-20 (ert be irotel ooXol- 
ki&iv . . .) and Soph. Blench. 165 b 20-21 (goXoiki&iv — rfj 
\e£€i fiappapL&iv). So iXXr^viafios and aa^rjveia were treated by 
Theophrastus as primary requisites of style, whether or not 
he called them dperal Xegetos (cf. for the two sides of this 
controversy G. M. A. Grube, T.A.P.A., lxxxiii [1952], pp. 
180-181 and G. Kennedy, The Art of Persuasion in Greece 
[Princeton, 1963], pp. 274-275), and were later named the 
first two of the five dperal Xoyov by the pupil of Chrysippus, 
Diogenes of Babylon, who also specified as vices Pappapioiios 
and aoXoiKio-fios (S.V.F. iii, p. 214, 11-22), which he distin- 
guished from each other (cf. H. M. Ilubbell, The Rhetorica 
of Philodemus [New Haven, 1920] p. 295, n. 4). In defend- 
ing solecisms Chrysippus was apparently following the ex- 
ample of Zeno (cf S. V.F. i, frag. 81). 



is made the occasion of charging Chrysippus with 
violating in his own practice the very principle of 
his criticism of Plato and therewith committing a 
gross error that is refuted by specialists, whereas the 
statement of Plato's that he attacks had the support 
of competent authorities. This chapter is joined 
to chapter 28 by a connecting particle and so was 
meant to be taken with what precedes it, a and its 
affinity with chapter 24 is apparent. It has been 
observed that, as was the case there, the particular 
occasion here, Chrysippus in practice contradicting 
his criticism of Plato, could have been used to develop 
the theme of chapters 8 and 10 or of chapters 14-16 h ; 
but, as was the case there, so here the gravamen of 
Plutarch's charge is not self-contradiction in state- 

a Sandbaeh (Class. Quart., xxxiv [1910], p. 21, n. 1) 
observed that of chapters 23-30, which he called " miscel- 
laneous inconsistencies," chapter 29 alone begins with a 
connecting particle ; but he offered no explanation of this. 
He said that this chapter " clearly does not come from the 
source-book " and for this statement merely referred to 
Pohlenz (Henries, lxxiv [1939], pp. 11-12 and 32), who de- 
clared it to be beyond doubt that Plutarch had here con- 
densed his own expositions in Quaest. Conviv. 698 a— 700 b 
and 732 r. The latter of these two passages contains the 
calculation by Chrysippus and the refutation of it by Hip- 
pa rchus used in this chapter ; and the former discusses 
L'lato's assertion that liquid nourishment goes to the lungs 
and gives in support of it quotations from the same phy- 
sicians and poets named in this chapter, but of its opponents 
it names besides the speaker, Nicias the physician, only 
Erasistratus and does not mention Chrysippus or any Stoic. 
It is therefore beyond doubt that this chapter 29, in which 
Plutarch quotes the (frvaiKai (decrees of Chrysippus on the 
subject, is not just a condensation of the exposition in Quaest. 
Conviv., though for that and for this chapter Plutarch may 
have used a single source containing the materials of both. 

6 See siqyra p. 383, n. b and p. 374, n. b. 



rnents or doctrines but inconsistency in the attitude 
of Chrysippus to expert authority in general and the 
authority of Plato and Aristotle in particular.® It is 
not, then, just a collection of " miscellaneous incon- 
sistencies heaped up without arrangement " that 
chapters 22-29 contain, for a sequence of thought 
is discernible from the first through the last of these 
chapters, and the dominant theme is the inconsistency 
of Chrysippus in his treatment of evidence and 

Chapter 30 begins a new theme and a new sequence 
of thought. It begins with a bon mot of " earlier 
times " about the difficulty that Zeno created by 
" promoting " some " indifferents " and so making 
them in fact neither good nor indifferent, goes on to 
show that Chrysippus increased the difficulty by his 
self-contradictions about this " promoted " class, 
and then says that with these contradictions he 
consequently infected not only virtue but providence 
as well. This is the transition to the main theme of 
the new " section," to which all the preceding part 
of chapter 30 is the introduction. b 

° Of whom and their followers he is reported in chapter 
24 to have said " one would be willing even to go wrong 
with so many men of such stature as these " (104-6 a). In 
the light of this there would be an additional sting in Plut- 
arch's remark at the end of Quaest. Conviv. vii, 1 about the 
opponents of Plato's theory, ovk e8a npos <f>iX6ao(f>ov o6£y k<u 
bvvdfiet irpaJTOV aTravdahiaaaQai Tre.pi Trpdyfiaros aatfXov . . . 
(700 b), if, as Babut suggests (Plutarque et le Stoicisme, 
p. 52, n. 5), it applies to Chrysippus and the quotation from 
the <&vaLKal Beams in 1047 c rather than to Nicias in the 
Quaest, Conviv, 

b In chapters 18, 22, and 23 Plutarch had already used 
for other arguments material drawn from contexts that 
dealt with the indifferents and in chapters 17 and 20 several 



This main theme is begun by the argument that 
what Chrysippus said of the " promoted indifferents," 
as it would make virtue petty and stupid to busy 
itself about them, would make the gods ridiculous, 
since these are the subjects of their oracles and the 
things they are thought to bestow on men in ac- 
cordance with providence (chap. 30 [1048 b-c]). 
The gods would have to bestow these gifts, moreover, 
upon men who put them to pernicious use, for 
according to the Stoic demonstration they are 
proved not to be good by the fact that they are put 
to bad use by the stupid and virtue, which alone is 
good and beneficial, is according to the Stoics not 
given by god but an object of free choice ; and from 
this it follows that the gods either will not benefit 
man or cannot do so, a difficulty for the Stoics made 
glaringly explicit by the contradictory statements 
of Chrysippus that the state of man is utterly wret- 
ched and vicious and that it is ordered by divine 

of the very passages that for a different purpose and once 
with a different interpretation are paraphrased in chapter 30 
(see the references in the notes on 104-7 k — 1048 b infra) ; 
and it was apparently this latter fact that led both Sandbach 
and Pohlenz to take chapter 30 with what precedes it as part 
of what they call the unarranged miscellaneous inconsist- 
encies in chapters 22-30. Yet Pohlenz himself said {Hermes, 
lxxiv [1939], p. 12, parag. 2) that the subsequent unbroken 
sequence begins with Sio twv ivavncoixdroDv tovtcov ov fxovov 
rrjv dper-qv dXXd /cat ttjv irpovoiav dvaTT€7rXr]K€v (1048 b). This is 
within chapter 30, however, and clearly connects what pre- 
cedes it with what follows. What precedes it certainly goes 
back to the very beginning of the chapter, the origin of 
these contradictions in Zeno's " promoted " class ; and what 
follows it continues uninterrupted with m hk fiaXXov . . . 
j>av€pd>T€pov, the first sentence of chapter 31. The modern 
division of chapters at this point is misleading. 



providence in the best possible fashion (chap. 31). 
This self-contradiction is developed in the next six 
chapters. Chrysippus is said always to give the 
gods epithets that are humane but to ascribe to them 
deeds that are barbarously cruel (chap. 32), to make 
divinity induce the vices that pervert man to his 
ruin but to say that divinity cannot be accessory to 
anything shameful (chap. S3) and yet to insist that 
nothing at all — and so not shameful acts and vices 
either— can occur otherwise than in conformity with 
providence and the reason of Zeus (chap. 34) , a and 
then to assert that of vice, which originates in ac- 
cordance with the reason of Zeus, there is divine 
chastisement and to intensify the contradiction by 
saying that vice is not useless for the universe as a 
whole and so in effect not only that the injurious is 
not useless but that Zeus chastises that which is 
itself blameless and for the useless or useful existence 
of which he is himself to blame (chap. 35). In this 
there is further self-contradiction, for, as Plutarch 
continues (chap. 36), b Chrysippus in another passage 
says that the gods oppose some wrongful acts, 
suggesting by this that wrong actions are not all 
equally wrong, c and that the complete abolition of 

a The implications of this are compared unfavourably 
here with the desire of Epicurus " not to leave vice free from 
blame " ; see infra 1050 c and note c there with the refer- 
ences to 1045 b-c in chapter 23, where what is here called 
the device of Epicurus for liberating volition is said to have 
been criticized by Chrysippus who contradicted his own 
criticism of it. 

6 Chapter 36 is a continuation of chapter 35 and should 
not have been separated from it. Here too as in the case of 
chapters 30 and 31 the modern division into chapters is 

c See page 557, note a infra. 


vice is neither possible nor good, whereby his own 
attempt to abolish it by philosophizing becomes an 
act in conflict with his own doctrine and with god. a 
Moreover, by admitting that there are besides vice 
and its chastisements " dreadful accidents " and 
11 inconvenient things that happen to the virtuous " b 
he contradicts his thesis that there is nothing repre- 
hensible in the universe and by accounting for them 
as he does imputes to divinity negligence or in- 
competence and acknowledges necessity beyond 
the control of providence and events that are not in 
conformity with divine reason (chap. 37). 

Thus far Chrysippus has been accused of contra- 
dicting his own doctrine that all things are ordered 
by the providence of beneficent divinity, but now 
he is charged with impugning his own evidence for 
the doctrine itself. Against those who deny provi- 
dence he is said to have defended its existence by 
appealing to the common conception of divinity as 
beneficent (chap. 38 [1051 d-e]) but by what he 
says of the gods himself to controvert this same 
common conception, for according to it the gods are 
animate beings not only beneficent but also blessed 

° Cf. the charge in chapter 21 (104-4 c) that Chrysippus 
legislates " in competition with the lawgiver of the universe." 

b These are mentioned in the passages of Chrysippus from 
the 7T€pi Oecov and the nepl Qvoeaus cited in chapter 35 for the 
question of vice and its chastisement (1050 e [nore jxev tcl 
hvaXprjOTa ovfifia.LV€LV (fyqoi rots ayadois] and 1050 F [tcl Seiva 
ovfMTTTcofjLaTa]). When in chapter 37 Plutarch takes up the 
question of these " accidents " (cf, to, rotavra avp.TTTo)p,aTa in 
1051 c), he uses for Chrysippus' explanation a passage from 
his TT€pl Ovolas and does not mention as relevant to it the 
clause, K(ir y aXXrjv exovodv ttcos npos ra oXa oiKOVofiiav, in 
another of the passages that he quoted in chapter 35 (see 
note h on 1050 k infra). 



and indestructible ° and he denies to all the gods 
except Zeus, i.e. the universe, 5 indestructibility and 
self-sufficiency and therewith blessedness too (chaps. 

What follows is not unrelated to this self-contra- 
diction, not an abrupt transition to what has been 
called c a miscellany of unconnected inconsistencies 
in physics. In chapters 38-40 it was emphasized 
that according to Chrysippus except for Zeus, the 
universe, all the gods including the sun and the moon 
arise out of fire, require nourishment from without, 
and are absorbed again into fire, save for which there 
is nothing indestructible in them. It is implied 
that Chrysippus conforms with the common con- 
ception in conceiving the gods to be animate but 
that he holds them to be so only in so far as they are 
igneous, and this becomes explicit in chapter 41. 
Here he is said to have explained the process of 
animation as the subtilization and ether ealization of 
air, the sun being animate as the igneous product 
of vaporous exhalations, and to have identified the 
soul with fire, the universe when thoroughly fiery 
in the ecpyrosis " being its own soul, but to have 
contradicted himself in this by asserting that the 
vital spirit of the foetus becomes soul when at birth 

a For this Plutarch here quotes Antipater of Tarsus (1051 
■e-f and 1052 b). In De Comm. Not. 1075 e (chap. 32 hilt.) 
he ascribes it to the Stoics generally. 

b In the M diacosmesis " Zeus is the body of the universe 
and providence is his soul ; in the " ecpyrosis " this body is 
etherealized and " completely absorbed *' by the soul (1052 
c in chap. 39 [r/ 8c rod Koafiov fax?) • • . avferat . . . fUxpt ch* 
els avrrjv i£ava\a)(jr) ttjv vXrjv] and De Comrtl. Not. 1077 D-E 
[chap. 36 sub finem]). 

c Of. Pohlenz {Hermes, lxxiv f 1939], pp. 12-13) and Sand- 
bach {Class. Quart., xxxiv [1940], p. 21). 


it is chilled — and so condensed — by air (1052 f — 
1053 c), which is itself contradicted by his professed 
evidence for the generation of soul, the resemblance 
of offspring to parents (1035 c-d). This alleged 
contradiction of ascribing animation to chilling air 
instead of kindling fire leads to the further charge 
in chapters 42 and 43 that Chrysippus contradicts 
himself and Stoic doctrine in regard to the nature of 
air in relation to fire and especially in making air, 
which is said to be primarily cold because the oppo- 
site of fire and which should be inert matter, the 
habitude or power that produces the cohesion, 
shape, and character of bodies. 

In chapters 38-40 it was said that according to 
Chrysippus Zeus or the universe alone of the gods 
is indestructible and self-sufficient because it alone 
requires no nourishment but is sustained by the 
interchange of its own parts and grows by absorbing 
its own matter. There Plutarch argued (chap. 39) 
that these statements contradict one another. In 
chapters 44-45 he returns to this indestructibility 
of the universe but now to show that Chrysippus 
accounts for it in another way that contradicts his 
own enunciations of both physical and theological 
principles. According to this account the universe 

a It has been argued that these chapters 44-45 must have 
been written earlier than chapters 8-15 of De Facie and these 
in turn earlier than chapters 26-28 of De Defectu Orac. 
(H. Gorgemanns, Untersuchungen zu Plutarchs Dialog De 
facie in orbe lunae [Heidelberg, 1970], pp. 111-116, especially 
p. 112); but this argument is inconclusive at least in so 
far as it concerns chapters 44-45 of this essay. In these 
Plutarch's purpose is only to show that a particular explana- 
tion given by Chrysippus is incompatible with other prin- 
ciples that he maintains and not to refute directly any of 


is indestructible because in the infinite void it occupies 
the middle, which it is accidental to its substance 
always to have occupied. With this explanation, 
Plutarch argues, Chrysippus not only contradicts 
the argument used against Epicurus that in an 
infinite there are no limits and no middle and no 
differences of direction but also by saying that the 
universe would be dissolved if it were not in the 
middle implies that its parts would move away from 
the whole structure to the centre of space and so 
contradicts his own contention that in a void there 
is no differentiation to cause bodies to move in any 
direction and his doctrine of the cohesiveness of 
the whole, whereby the parts of the universe 
naturally move to the centre of the whole substance 
and not of space (chap. 44) ; and moreover with 
these statements he contradicts not only his physical 
theory but his doctrine of god and providence, 
leaving them as the cause of trivialities only and 
making that which is most important, the preserva- 
tion of the universe, the work of accident and not of 
destiny and providence (chap. 45). 

With his theory of destiny, Plutarch continues, 

these or to propose a different hypothesis, as is the purpose 
of the other two passages, in which moreover both Stoic 
and Aristotelian doctrines are criticized together. Con- 
sequently Plutarch might have had at his disposal all the 
material of chapters 8-15 of De Facie and chapters 26-2$ of 
De Defectu Orac. or even have already written one or both 
of these two essays and yet from this material and these 
arguments have selected as pertinent to his purpose for 
chapters 44-45 of this essay only what he does here use to 
prove that Chrysippus contradicts himself (c/. also Babut, 
Plutarque et le Stoicisme, p. 129). 

a Since importance has been attached to the presence or 
absence of connecting particles (see p. 375, n. b supra), it 


his theory of possibilities is also in conflict (chap. 46), 
and so is his way of exempting destiny from responsi- 
bility for the error and injury resulting from the 
false mental images caused by it (chap. 47). Accord- 
ing to the former many events not in accordance with 
destiny are possible ; but then, Plutarch contends, 
either destiny is not the all-prevailing force that 
Chrysippus says she is or, if she is, what is possible 
will often be impossible and everything true will be 
necessary and everything false impossible (chap. 46). 
According to the latter the assent to false mental 
images, which is necessary for action, is not deter- 
mined by destiny, which is a predisposing and not a 
sufficient cause. This, Plutarch maintains, contra- 
dicts Chrysippus' assertion that even the slightest 
event is in conformity with destiny, which unlike a 
predisposing cause brooks no impediment and so 
should determine assent also, just as his assertion 
that of particular motions there are many impedi- 
ments but of the universal motion none at all con- 
tradicts his doctrine that the latter motion extends 
to all the former a ; but moreover his device does not 
achieve its purpose, for destiny, which is the reason 
of Zeus, in not causing assent but causing false 
mental images in order to prompt action must know 
either that contrary to Stoic doctrine the mental 

should be observed that chapter 46 begins with such a 
particle connecting it with chapter 45, as that is connected 
by such a particle with chapter 44 and chapter 47 is with 
chapter 46. 

a Plutarch here uses against Chrysippus doctrines for 
which he quoted him in chapter 34, where without reference 
to the question of mental image, assent, and action the 
contradiction in the doctrine of all-pervading providence 
and divine inculpability had been developed. 



image without assent suffices or that, as Chrysippus 
insists, the action can follow only upon assent to the 
image and so in either case is by intention responsible 
for the erroneous behaviour that ensues upon the 
presentation of the image (chap. 4«7). 

As this analysis shows, the essay, which like some 
others ends without any epilogue or formal con- 
clusion, is neither a mere congeries of alleged 
contradictions nor a combination of some well 
organized sections and others that are logically un- 
connected with these and are themselves unorganized 
accumulations of miscellaneous material. It has 
seemed to be so only because it was not organized 
according to the topical disposition expected by 
modern critics. Because it does not conform to their 
preconceived notion of a proper design they have 
disregarded the sequences of thought and association 
of ideas that lead from one argument to the next b 
even in the apparently unorganized sections and give 
the whole essay a continuity seldom interrupted, 
though the several connexions themselves differ 
from one another, being sometimes the nature of the 
material used or its provenience, sometimes the 
context of the Stoic doctrines or arguments them- 

a So e.g. do be Comm. Not. and be hide. Concerning 
the absence of the epilogue in earlier literature cf. B. A. van 
(ironingen, La composition fitteraire archalqite qreeqtie 2 
(Amsterdam, 1960), pp. 70-76 and 255. 

b Too little attention has been given to the role of this 
phenomenon in Greek literature; but cf. W. J. Verdenius, 
k ' L'association des idees comme principe de composition 
dans Homere, Hesiode, Theognis," Rev, Etudes Grecques, 
lxxiii (1960), pp. 345-361. 

c Such interruptions or entirely unconnected beginnings 
occur at chapter 11 and chapter 30. 


selves, sometimes the particular use to which these 
are put by Plutarch, and sometimes only a suggestive 
term or reference. 

In so far, then, as hypotheses about the source of 
the essay rest, as do those of von Arnim and Pohlenz, 
upon the assumption that it consists in part of 
organized sections and in part of unorganized mis- 
cellanies they are all without foundation. So is the 
argument that Plutarch's source must have been an 
Academic polemic or collection composed in the time 
of Antipater because no later Stoic is mentioned by 
name in the essay and after the first few chapters 
Chrysippus is almost the only Stoic quoted, para- 
phrased, and attacked. In Plutarch's time Chrysip- 
pus was the recognized authority for Stoic doctrine ; 
and among the Stoics themselves, as Epictetus makes 
clear, erudition meant knowledge of the older Stoics 
and particularly of the works of Chrysippus, " the 
great benefactor who points the way." b If this 
supreme authority of the school could be convicted 
of self-contradiction, there was no need for Plutarch 
to trouble himself about his followers, for they 
would themselves be involved in his conviction. It 
is gratuitous also to suppose that the source of this 
essay must have been a collection of inconsistencies 

a For this reason von Arnim (S. V.F. i, pp. xn-xiv) sug- 
gested that the source of this essay and of De Comm. Not. 
also was Clitomachus, who compiled the arguments of 
Carneades. Both Pohlenz and Sandbach thought that in 
this von Arnim had gone beyond the evidence (Hermes, 
Ixxiv [1939], p. 32 and Class. Quart., xxxiv [194-01, P- 34). 

b Epictetus, Diss, i, iv, 28-32 and x, 10 and rf. i, iv, <>-9 
and xvii, 13-18 ; n, xvii, 40 and xix, 5-10 ; in, ii, 13-16 and 
xxi, 7 ; iv, ix, 6 ; Babut, Plutarque et le Stoicisme, pp. 17- 
18 ; J. B. Gould, The Philosophy of Chrysippus, pp. 12-14. 


made from the works of Chrysippus by some earlier 
compiler because Plutarch could not himself have 
collected all the passages from the books of Chrysip- 
pus that he cites here. a It has been shown that 
Plutarch even in his other works evinces knowledge 
of the writings of Chrysippus much more extensive 
and intimate than had generally been acknowledged b 
and that in this essay itself he often gives clear 
evidence of knowing the larger contexts from which 
his quotations and paraphrases have been taken, 
knowledge that he could not have got from a mere 
il formless collection of inconsistencies." c More- 
over, the comparisons with Epicurean doctrine that 
appear in this essay would not have been contained 
in such a compilation of passages made from the 
writings of Chrysippus ; and the assumption of such 
a compilation as the source of this essay would in 
consistency require the further assumption of another 
such compilation as the source of the parallel essay, 
On Epicurean Self- Contradictions (No. 129)- Such a 
multiplication of hypotheses is neither plausible nor 

It is ki^own that Plutarch kept " note-books " 

a Sane! bach. Class, Quart., xxxiv (1940), pp. 20 and £3 
(see supra p. 377, n. a). 

b Cf. Babut, Plutarque et le StoHcisme, pp. 225-238. 

6 Cf. Babut, Plutarque et le Stolcisme, pp. £8-38 (n.k. 
p. 21), notes 1 and 3 ; p. 32, n. 2). Plutarch in this essay 
frequently gives the number of the book that he is citing. 
It has been observed in other connexions that he seems to do 
this only when he has direct access to the work (C. P. Jones, 
Plutarch and Rome [Oxford, 1971], p. 83). For the wide 
range of Plutarch's reading and his own knowledge of the 
primary historical sources that he cites cf. J. R. Hamilton, 
Plutarch, Alexander : A Commentary (Oxford, 19(50), pp. 
xliii-xlvi with his references to other studies of the subject. 



(vTTojjLvrnjiaTa), to which he had recourse for relevant 
material when he wished to compose an essay on a 
particular subject. In such form probably from the 
time when he was a student in Athens he must have 
kept quotations taken from the books that he read 
and resumes of passages with comments of his own 
perhaps and those that he had heard in the Academy. 
Among the books thus read and excerpted were 
certainly Stoic and Epicurean works and the Aca- 
demic polemics against them, and from these entries 
in his note-books he might have selected the excerpts 
to be used in the present essay. It is more probable, 
however, that there was an intermediate stage, for 
he composed a work entitled Selections and Refutations 
of Stoics and Epicureans (No. 148). For this he must 
certainly have collected from his note-books all the 
relevant excerpts and refutations, arranging them in 
some order and perhaps supplementing them ; and 
it is reasonable to suppose that this compilation was 
the immediate source from which he took material 
to be used in his special polemics against Stoics and 
Epicureans, among them both the present essay and 
its Epicurean counterpart (No. 129) & and the De 

a Cf. De TranquilUtate 464 p and be Cohibenda Ira 

457 d-e. On the implications of these passages cf. H. Martin, 
Creek, Roman, and Byzantine Studies, x (1969), pp. 69-70 
and J. Hani, Plutarque : Consolation a Apollonios (Paris, 
1972), pp. 41-42 ; and see also supra p. 4, n. b in Hie 
Introduction to the Platonic Questions. 

b The contrary suggestion made by Babut (Plutarque et 
le Sto)'cisme, p. 33, n. 6), that these two essays were simply 
combined and rearranged to produce No. 148, is more than 
improbable. It does not do justice to the general title 
eVAoyat kclI eAey^oi and it leaves out of account entirely the 
existence of the uTro^v^/xara and the relation to them of all 
three essays. 



Communions Notitiis also. This would explain why in 
this last work and in the present essay many of the 
same passages of Chrysippus are quoted or para- 
phrased but often to a different extent or in a different 
fashion a and how Plutarch can indicate that they 
have been selected as alone relevant to his purpose 
from a larger context known to him while others are 
being purposely " passed over," how traditional 
Academic arguments against the Stoics can appear 
along with passages excerpted from Chrysippus by 
Plutarch himself, why in the present essay there are 
frequent comparisons with Epicurean doctrines and 
attitudes, and how it is that many of the passages or 
doctrines referred to in these essays appear sporadi- 
cally and for different purposes in other writings of 

The occurrence of such passages with variations in 
different essays, if their immediate source was a 
compilation of Plutarch's own, either the Selections 
and Refutations of Stoics and Epicureans or his note- 
books or both, cannot be used to establish a relative 
chronology of the essays in which they appear. So 
there is no cogency in the argument that Plutarch 
was an old man when he composed the two polemics 
against the Stoics because chapter 29 of the present 
essay must be a condensation of Quaest. Conviv. 
698 a— 700 B and 732 f and De Comm. Not. 1082 A 

a Cf. e.g. the statement of the contradiction in De Stoic. 
Repug. 1038 a-b, which is concise to the point of obscurity, 
and the fuller and therefore clearer exposition of the context 
in De Comm. Not. 1068 e (cf. Babut, Plutarqtie et le Stoicism*, 
p. 27, n. 2) ; and, on the other hand, the much more com- 
pendious statement in De Comm. Not. 1084 d-e (chap. 46) 
of the contradiction developed in De Stoic. Re pug. 1052 e — 
1053 d (chap. 41). 


(chap. 42) must have been written after 392 b a or in 
the argument of Gorgemann's that chapters 44-45 of 
the present essay must have been written before the 
De Facie and the De Defectu Orac. b Even that the 
present essay antedated the De Communibus Notitiis 
is only a plausible inference from the general im- 
pression made by the two works and cannot be 
supported by any decisive evidence. On the other 
hand, it is certain that even apart from the Selections 
and Refutations of Stoics and Epicureans there were 
essays earlier than the present one in which Plutarch 
openly opposed Stoic doctrine or attacked Chrysippu.% 
for in this one he refers at least twice to such earlier 
polemics himself/ 1 

His treatment of Stoicism especially in the present 

a This argument of Pohlenz's (Hermes, lxxiv [1939], 
pp. 32-33) is rejected by Ziegler (R.-E. xxi/l [1951], col. 
760, 6-19) and by Babut (Plutarque et le Stoicisme, p. 52, 
n. 5) ; see also p. 387, n. a supra and note e on De Comm. 
Not. 1082 a infra. There is, however, no more cogency in 
Babut's contention (loc. cit.) that De Primo Frigido 946 c 
must have been written later than De Stoic. Repug. 1052 f — 
1053 c and De Comm. Not. 1084 d-e or in the arguments by 
which he attempts to prove that De Stoic. Repug. must ante- 
date the De Virtute Moral) (Plutarque et le Stoicisme, pp. 49- 
50 and Plutarque de la Vertu fithique, pp. 81-83). 

b See p. 393, n. a supra. 

c What Pohlenz thought to be such (Hermes, lxxiv [1939 J, 
pp. 17-18) is inconclusive, as Babut has shown (Plutarque 
et le Stoicisme, p. 51, n. 1 ; cf. Ziegler, R.-E. xxi/l [1951], 
col. 759, 35-46); and Babut's own suggestion (p. 51) that 
De Comm. Not. 1070 f (chap. 25 subfinem) may be a discreet 
allusion to De Stoic. Repug. is no more convincing than 
Pohlenz's assertion (op. cit., p. 7, n. 3) that De Comm. Not. 
1062 e " weist auf den Eingang von Stoic. Repug. zuruck." 

d See infra 1036 p. and 1040 r> and supra p. 369, n. b and 
p. 370, n. a. 



essay and in the De Communions Notitiis has fre- 
quently been severely censured. C. Giesen in his 
dissertation of 1889, De Plutarchi contra Stoicos 
Dispntalionibus , tried to prove that the Stoics were 
for the most part not guilty of the self-contradictions 
with which they are charged in these essays ; and 
he concluded (pp. 111-112) that Plutarch like a 
malicious judge cleaves to the words and perverts 
their meaning and that consequently what he says 
about the Stoics apart from his quotations of their 
own words cannot be used to interpret their philo- 
sophy unless it is confirmed by independent and 
reliable evidence. This conclusion was approved by 
Ziegler (R.-E. xxi/1 [1951], col. 756, 2-36), for whom 
the critique of the Stoics in the present essay is 
" lacking in scientific earnestness " and characterized 
by " litigious prejudice," " genuine misunderstand- 
ing of the opponent's train of thought," and " super- 
ficial literalness " ; and it is echoed by R. H. Barrow 
(Plutarch and His Times [London, 1967], p. 105), who 
calls the essay " a most valuable storehouse of 
quotations from Stoic writers " but as a criticism of 
Stoicism " almost useless " because of Plutarch's 
" obtuse literalness " and his " inability to under- 
stand Stoicism." Seven years earlier and apparently 
unknown to Barrow quite a different conclusion had 
been reached by G. Verbeke, who of Plutarch's 
evidence about Stoicism and Epicureanism wrote : 
" wherever his reports can be controlled by evidence 
from other sources, their accuracy will generally be 
apparent. Wherever the exact account is a matter 
of guesswork Plutarch is giving his personal inter- 
pretations, drawing inferences or concentrating on 
the explanation of a term with a view to criticizing 


the doctrines he recounts ; and quite often it will be 
apparent that these interpretations and criticisms 
miss the real meaning of the doctrine considered. 
But all this does not weaken the incontestable value 
of the numerous pieces of information that our 
author gives us about the Stoics and Epicureans." a 
This estimate of Verbeke's is quoted with approval 
by Babut (Plutarqae et le Stoicisme, p. 266), who goes 
much further and, calling Giesen's conclusion 
arbitrary and unjust, says that an objective examina- 
tion of the texts can find Plutarch treating his 
adversaries unjustly only a few times and never 
ignorantly, incompetently, or in bad faith. Yet 
Babut himself admits that at least sometimes 
Plutarch does treat his adversaries unjustly, while 
Giesen at the other extreme before pronouncing his 
severe censure of Plutarch concedes to him (op. cit., 
p. Ill) a large area in which the Stoics did contradict 
themselves or expressed themselves in terms ap- 
parently inconsistent with the strict implication of 
their principles ; and these complementary con- 
cessions of the apologist and the prosecutor tend to 
vindicate the earlier and more measured judgment 
of R. Volkmann (Philosophie des Plutarch, p. 30) that 
the self-contradictions imputed in this essay to the 
Stoics and especially to Chrysippus are sometimes 
palpable but that Plutarch took a one-sided view of 
many statements which detached from their context 

a Aristotle and Plato in the Mid-Fourth Century edited 
by I. During and G. E. L. Owen (Goteborg, 1960), pp. 246- 
217. Verbeke in this article is intent upon vindicating what 
Plutarch reports — or Verbeke thinks he reports — about 
Aristotle, and it is to support this thesis that he appeals to 
the accuracy of Plutarch's evidence concerning the Stoics 
and Epicureans. 



in the Stoic system he misused for his polemic.® A 
polemic the present essay was meant to be, not an 
exposition of the Stoic system or an exegesis to 
reconcile the apparently inconsistent statements of 
Chrysippus. Plutarch's purpose in writing it was 
to convince others that, as he certainly himself sin- 
cerely believed, the Stoics and especially Chrysippus 
habitually contradicted themselves and their own 
principles ; and, if to this end he took advantage of 
every opportunity that he recognized even in their 
obiter dicta, careless expressions, and unclear formu- 
lations, b it does not follow that he was either un- 
familiar with the works of theirs in which these 
occurred or ignorant of their systematic philosophy 
and incapable of understanding what was intended 
by it. 

The harshest critic of his treatment of the Stoics 
here seems nevertheless to have had complete 
confidence in the accuracy of his quotations. Yet 
many of the passages that had been taken for 
quotations are not quotations but paraphrases d ; 
and paraphrase may always involve interpretation to 
some extent, even if it be unintentional interpreta- 

a For the ease with which the successive theses of the 
Stoic system, when isolated and detached from llic unifying 
continuity of it, can be made literally incompatible with one 
another cf. V. Goldschniidt in Jjes Sto'iciens (Paris, Bibl. de 
la Pleiade, 1962), pp. 90-91. 

b Chrysippus was notorious for his careless, involved, 
repetitious, and obscure writing: cf. Diogenes Laertius, 
vii, 180 and x, 27 ; S. V.F. ii, frags. 26, 28, 29, 28S, and 

c Cf Giesen (oj). cit. t p. 112): ". . . p'raeter ipsorum 
Stoicorum verba ab eo allata, quorum videlicet summa est 
fides atque auctoritas, . . /' 

d Cf. Pohlenz, Ihrmes, lxxiv (1939), pp. 15-17. 



tion. Moreover, as can be established in a case 
subject to verification, Plutarch, though he often 
quotes the text of Plato accurately, sometimes sub- 
stitutes for the original term a different one of his 
own and sometimes abridges the original text, 
omitting words that may have seemed to him to be 
irrelevant to the purpose of his quotation or less 
innocently something that would have embarrassed 
his interpretation but the omission of which in any 
case affects the original implication and connexion 
of what is quoted. Most of his quotations of the 
Stoics cannot now be compared with the original 
texts from which they were taken. They may be 
accurate and in default of evidence to the contrary 
must be accepted as such ; but it is always possible 
that they may not be so b and, even if accurate so far 
as they go, may be incomplete and in any case that 
in their original context they might have been seen 
to have a significance or nuance which has been 
obscured or obliterated by their isolation. Like 
Plutarch's paraphrases and interpretations his quota- 
tions of the Stoics as of others must each be judged 
for itself both in the context of his own purpose in 
using it and in comparison with all other available 
and relevant evidence. The only general conclusion 
likely to be valid for his treatment of the Stoics is the 
unspectacular one recently drawn in another case : 

a See supra p. 139, n. a in the Introduction to the De An. 
Proc. in Timaeo with the references there. 

6 Babut himself (Plutarque et le Sto'icisme^ p. 283, n. 1) 
acknowledges Plutarch's " maniere, pen scrupuleuse, de 
citer " and his " autonomic par rapport a ses sources." 
Cases of his altering the words of the author whom he cites 
have been observed in another connexion by H. Martin 
(A.J.P., lxxxii [1961], pp. 165-166). 



" sometimes Plutarch is a reliable reporter of Em- 
pedocles ; sometimes he is not." a 

A Latin translation of the present essay by- 
Edward Henryson with an appendix containing 
emendations of the text was published in 1555, the 
same year in which Cornarius published his transla- 
tion of it. 6 The most recent translation known to me 
is the French by E. Brehier revised and published 
with introduction and brief notes by V. Goldschmidt 
in Les Stoiciens (Paris, Bibl. de la Pleiade, 1962), 
pp. 87-134 and pp. 1261-1264. There is also an 
unpublished dissertation by Hans Deike, Plutarch De 
Stoicorum Repugnantiis 1-10 : Beitrage zu einem kriti- 
schen Kommentar (Diss. Gottingen, 1963), which I 
have been unable to procure but some notion of 
which may be got from the comments made by Babut, 
Plutarque et le Stoicisme, p. 24, n. 4 and p. 266, n. 3. 

Of the essay, which is No. 76 in the Catalogue of 
Lamprias and No. 66 in the Planudean order, the text 
here printed is based upon FXgdvzaA/SynEB. 
These mss. have been collated afresh from photostats, 
and their readings except for those of n are fully 
reported in the apparatus. 6 Those of n, of Toletanus 

a J. P. Hershbell, A.J.P., xcii (1971), p. 183 in his article, 
" Plutarch as a Source for Empedocles Re-examined," ibid.,, 
pp. 156-184. 

b It is the translation by Cornarius that was reprinted by 
Stephanas in his edition of 1572. For Kenryson's (Lugduni 
apud G. Rouillium, 1555), which I have not myself seen, cf. 
R. Aulotte, Amyot et Plutarque (Geneve, 1965), p. 186, 
n. 2 and p. 336. 

c The advisability of rereading these mss. and giving a 
new report of their readings was impressed upon me by the 
discrepancies between the apparatus of the new Teubner 
edition (Pohlenz, Moralia vi/ c 2 [1952] and Pohlenz -Westman, 
Moralia vi/2 [1959]) and an unpublished collation previously 



51, 5 a and other descendants of y and ^8, and of 
Vat. Reg. 80 are included only where they are of 
some special interest. 

F in its present state begins at the top of the first 
folio with the words aXX enteral 6 Xoyos (1039 c of 
this essay), over the initial a of which there is a later 
rubricated A and above which there is a later 
inscription, scarcely legible but unrelated to the title 
of the essay. It seems, therefore, that the ms. 
originally contained the whole of this essay and 
possibly also three others preceding it, since in the 
margin against the beginning of the next essay there 
is written, though in a hand not that of the scribe's, 
Xoyos e'. With this loss may be connected the large 
omission after the sixth folio, for following the last 
words there, tottov ov SlScoai (1044 c), and without 
indication of a lacuna the first words of the next folio 
are Sia<f>ep€tv, rj iTTeXevanKr) StW/xis* (1045 b). 

That the ultimate source of F and X was the same 
is most strikingly shown by the fact that in the 
original hands of both there is in the margin at 1047 e 
a scholium on Plato's statement criticized by Chry sip- 
pus in 1047 c. Of X folios 148-149, beginning rwv 
tolovtcov aroTTov fx€v ovv (1045 b) and ending rrjv 
prjTcpiKrjv opt- (1047 a), are written in a later hand 
(X 4 ) and were apparently a replacement from a 
different source for pages lost from X after the ms. 
had been corrected by two hands, b which are not 

made by F. H. Sandbach and by him most generously put 
at my disposal. 

a For the readings of this ms. I depend upon the collation 
by G. B. A. Fletcher, Class. Quart., xxi (19:27), pp. 166-176. 

b Cf. Pohlenz, Moralia i, p. xx ; Pohlenz-Westman, 
Moral ia vi/2, p. 224. In four cases, one of these being a 



clearly distinguishable from each other and so are 
indiscriminately designated X 3 . A hand similar to 
that of the original X but not identical with it wrote 
folios 153, beginning oXov ra>v t€\vwv (1050 a) and 
ending elre Troirjaas ov- (1051 a), and 160, beginning 
-vrjv at ovyKaradeaeis ylveadai Xeyovrai and ending 
with the end of the essay and the beginning of Plan. 
No. 8. 

The three mss. d, v, z all pass immediately from the 
words XpvGLTTTros iv oh (1052 e) to rod xprjOTTjpiov 
k.t.X. of De Defectu Oraculorum 412 c. Moreover, the 
passage of? 6 ao(f>ds (1044 c) . . . Kara to e^fjs aKcoXvrtos 
(1050 c) is omitted by v and z (where a large part of 
f. 175 v and all of f. 176 are left empty) and in d is 
written (from ajarrep avrivopLodercxiv in 1044 c) by 
a different hand copying from a different source, 
which was identified by Sandbach as Laurentianus 
80, 5. The defective archetype of these three mss. 
was itself descended, however, from the ultimate 
common ancestor of F and X, from which descent 
some good readings have been preserved by this 

For g a similar independent descent from the 
common Byzantine archetype was postulated by 
Pohlenz. He was criticized for this by Sandbach, 6 
who maintained that g derives from a manuscript 
copied from X after it had been corrected by X 3 and 

correction, X 4 has what would otherwise be a unique reading 
of 13. In ten cases X 4 disagrees with B, however : three of 
these are unique mistakes of B, four are unique mistakes 
of X 4 , and one is a mistake which X 4 shares with g, y, n, 
and E. 

a Hermes, lxxiv (1939), p. 6 ; Moral ia vi/3 (1952), p. vi. 

b Class. Rev., N.S. iv (1954), p. 250; cf. Class. Quart., 
xxxv (1941), p. 115. 


that its testimony is valuable only for the section 
(1045 b — 1047 a) where the original X is missing," 
although he admitted that elsewhere two unique 
readings of g are clearly correct. Pohlenz made the 
most of this admission when in reply he argued at 
more length b that g derives not from X but from a 
twin of X which was also the source of X 3 for those 
corrections of X with which g agrees. The greater 
plausibility of Pohlenz 's postulate is supported not 
only by the good readings of g upon which he insists 
but also by at least a dozen other places and among 
these especially by four, where, though X is perfectly 
legible and intelligible, g left empty spaces, as if 
unable to read the text from which he was copying : 
1041 a : Xey vac. 4 or}jw$ -g 1 (Aeyovros otjtws -g 2 ; 
Aeyei prjrcJos -X) ; 1044 D : ovkolvcltt vac. 3 ~g (ovk 
avairaXiv -X) ; 1055 F : 7tv vac. 8 avroreXelg ~g 
(jroiaxjiv avToreAcos -X) ; 1056 A : tp vac. 3 carat -g 
(ifj€v8ov$ carat -X). 

Such a source of X 3 and g might also account for 
the relation of B to X and g in this essay. B can have 
been copied neither from X before or after correction 
nor from g c ; and yet against all other mss. B agrees 
with X g 30 times, with X 3 g 38 times, with X 3 alone 
7 times, and with g alone thrice, though it should be 
observed that in 40 of these passages the evidence of 
d v z is wanting and in 13 others F is not extant. 

a Pat on had argued that in Plan. No. 68 g was copied 
directly from X after its correction by X 3 (Plutarcht Pythicl 
Dialogi Tres rec. Guil. R. Paton, Berlin 1893, pp. xvi- 

b Moralia v/3 (1955), pp. 115-1 17 = Pohlenz-Westman, 
Moralia vi/2 (1959), pp. 225-226. 

c Among many passages cf. especially 1033 b, 1033 e, 
1041 b, 1042 b, 1049 b, 1053 e, 1055 c. 



Where the evidence of d v z is available B agrees 
against all other mss. with X g d v z 9 times, a with 
X 3 g d v z twice, with X (not g) d v z thrice, 6 with 
g z twice, and with g d once ; but in 15 of these 
passages the evidence of F is missing. Against all 
other mss. B agrees with F X g d v z thrice and with 
F X g 10 times, 9 of which are passages not preserved 
in d v z. c It is probable that, if the whole essay were 
preserved in F, d, v, and z, the figures for the agree- 
ment of B X g and B X 3 g against all other mss. 
would be smaller than they are, though still not 
insignificant d ; but it is also probable that the agree- 
ment of B with Planudean mss. and without support 
of F, d, v, or z would be less frequent than it is, for 
it is now very infrequent when F, X, g, d, v, and z 
are all present. When they are present, B agrees 
with E against them only half a dozen times. It is 
certain that this essay in B was not copied from E, 
which more than a dozen times omits words or 
phrases preserved by B and other mss., though one 
omission there is common to E and B and to them 
alone (1041 d), one of the two readings in which they 
agree against all other mss. The original of E seems 

a In one further case with Xgdv (not z). 

b In one of these three cases (103G a) X 1 was changed by 
X 3 to agree with g against B d v z. 

c In one of these (1018 e) X and F and in another (1053 e) 
F were later changed to disagree with 13 g and B X g re- 
spectively. In two places, one of which is missing in F, 
B agrees with d v z and in another with z alone against all 
other mss. 

d See e.g. these passages where in the presence of F d v z 
words are preserved by X g B or X 3 g B only : 1040 u (to.), 
1043 E (AijfjLrjrpo^ . . . vhp-qxoov)* 1011 n (Bet and TnopLaros d* 
vBprjxoov)., 1050 D {kqll), 1051 E (ypa(f)Ofj.€va)V kc\ /Wyo/xevcuy), 
1052 c {ovv). 


to have been a corrected copy of y, a whereas the 
distinctively Planudean readings of B tend rather to 
be those of a or of A. 

° See e.g. 1035 a and u, 1038 f, 1030 a, 1044 a. 1057 a. 


(1033) nEPI 


1 . YIpcoTOV d£ito ttjv rtov Soy/jLOLTCov ofioXoy lav 
ev tois fiiois 8ea>p€Lor9cu' Set yap ovx ovtcds tov 
B prjTopa Kar Kloxivqv ravro <f>deyyeo6ai /cat tov 
vo\iov cos tov filov tov (f)i\ocr6<f>ov Tto Xoyco avpL- 
<j>a>vov etvac. 6 yap \6yos tov <f)iXooo<f)ov vojjlos 
avdaipeTos /cat totd? eaTiv, el ye 8rj 2 firj TratSiav /cat 
evprjO i\oyiav z eW/ca So^rjs dAA' epyov a^iov oTrovSrjs 
TrJ9 \xey Lottos, cooirep eoTiv, rjyovvTai (j)i\ooo<j>Lav . 

1 X, g, F (subscription in margin), Catalogue of Lam- 
prias ; I1EPI omitted by the rest ; ivavrtovficvcov -v. 

2 Btj -omitted by B. 

3 evp€oc\oyiav -X 3 ( ra8 -), g, d, v, z ; tvptoioXoyiav -B. 

a The Stoics emphasized the coherence and internal con- 
sistency of their system : Diogenes Laertius, vii, 40 ; Sex- 
tus, Adv. Math, vii, 17-19 ; Cicero, De Finibus iii, 74 with iv, 
53 and v, 83. Cf. Goldschmidt, Le systeme sto'icien, pp. 60-67. 

b Plato, Laches 188 c-e (cf Plutarch, Adv Cohtem 1117 
e). Zeno the Stoic was praised on this very account in the 
honorary decree recorded by Diogenes Laertius, vii, 10-11 
(S. V.F. i, p. 7, 26-27) : . . . irapabeiyna tov IStov $iov eV0et? 
OLTrauiv olkoXovOov ovTa rols Xoyots of? SteAeycro. . . . 

c Aeschines, In Ctesiphontem 16. 

d Cf. the statement in Maxime cum Princ. Philos. Dia- 
serendum 779 b that ol Xoyoi rdv (f>iXoa6<f>ojv, if inscribed in the 
minds of political leaders, vofxayv hvvapnv Xafxfiavovoiv and in 
Ad Principem Ineruditum 780 c the identification of the 
vo/mqs that should rule the ruler as Zpufjvxos atv eV avrto Xoyos. 


1 . In the first place I require that the consistency of 
men's doctrines a be observed in their way of living, 
for it is even more necessary that the philosopher's 
life be in accord with his theory b than that the 
orator's language, as Aeschines says, c be identical 
with that of the law. The reason is that the philo- 
sopher's theory is a law freely chosen for his own/ — 
at least it is if they believe philosophy to be not a 
game of verbal ingenuity played for the sake of 
glory but, as it really is, an activity worthy of the 
utmost earnestness. 6 

e Of. Cicero, Pro M-urena 62 : " haec (sell. Stoic doctrines) 
... M. Cato . . . adripuit neque disputandi causa, ut magna 
pars, sed ita vivendi." The Stoics themselves insisted that 
philosophy is the art of life (cf. Plutarch, Quaest. Conviv. 
613 b), the practice of virtuous living, and not mere in- 
tellectual virtuosity or erudition : S. V.F. ii, frag. 35 and 
iii, frags. 202 and 508 ; Seneca, frag. 17 (in Lactantius, 
Divin. Inst, iii, 15, 1) ; Musonius Rufus, frags, iii (p. 9, 13- 
16; p. 10, 6-7; p. 12, 1 1-19 [Hense]), iv (p. 19, 6-14 [HenseD, 
and vi ; Epictetus, Diss, nr, ii, x (6-16), xv (8-13), xxiv 
(78-83) and iv, iv (8-18), viii (4-20). For the connexion of 
deojpia and irpa^Ls in S. V.F. iii, frag. 202 see also Diogenes 
Laertius, vii, 126 and 130 and Seneca, I)e Otio v, 1 and 8 
and vii (interpreted differently by Grilli, // problema della 
vita contemplatively pp. 96-102 and pp. 252-257 and by Joly, 
he theme . . . des genres de vie, pp. 143-147). 



(1033) 2. 'E7T6t roivvv ttoXXol jjl€V d)s ev oXlyois 1 avrto 2 
Tsqvoivi 7ToXXa 8e KXedv9ei 3 rrXeiara 8k XpvoiTT7Tu> 
yeypa\L\iiva* rvy\dv€i rrepl 5 rroXirtias Kal rod dp- 
X^oOat Kal ap^etv Kal StKa^etv Kal prjropeveiv iv 
8e rots fitois ov8evds eoriv evpelv ov orparr]yiav, 
ov vo/jLoOeaiaVj ov 7rdpo8ov els fiovXrjV, ov ovvr\yo- 
C piav iirl 8iKaoTcov i ov orpareiav vrrep 7rarpi8os, ov 
TTpeofieiaVy* ovk imSoow aXX irrl ^evrjs tooTrep 
twos Xojtov yevcrdfievoL 7 oxoXfjs rov rravra filov ov 
fipaxvv dXXd TrafJLfJLrJKrj yevo\ievov Scr/yayov iv Ao- 
yots Kal fiifiXiois Kal Trepirrdrocs , ovk a8r]Xov ore 
rots v<j> J erepojv ypatfiopLevocs Kal Xeyopuevois /xaA- 

1 X, g, d, v, z ; XoyoLS -a, A, £, y, E, B (cf. 1036 b infra). 

2 to) -E. 3 KXtdvOrj -E. 4 yeypa.fip.eva -omitted by X, g. 

6 TTapa -d. 6 npos fiiav -g. 7 yevodfievoi Xojtov -B. 

a 1033 v-c = S.V.F. i, frag. 27 (p. 11, 5-15) and frag. 262 
(p. 61, 7-9). Zeno of Citium (ca. 336-262/1) after long study 
in Athens founded there (ca. 300) the school later called 
Stoic. He was succeeded as head by his pupil, Cleanthes of 
Assos (331-232) ; and he in turn was succeeded by his pupil, 
Chrysippus of Soli (ca. 280-206), who was called the " second 
founder " of the school. On the lives of these men see Poh- 
lenz, Stoa i, pp. 22-30 and ii, pp. 14-18 and 232 ; Verbeke, 
Kleanthes, pp. 22-27 and 50-68. 

6 For Zeno's terseness cf. Diogenes Laertius, vii, 18 and 
20 ; Cicero, Be Natura Deorum ii, 20 ; Pearson, Fragments, 
pp. 32-35. In contrast to this see for the prolixity of Chrysip- 
pus : Diogenes Laertius, vii, 180 ; S.V.F. ii, frags. 27 and 

c e.g., there were the iroXirela and the nepl vofiov by Zeno, 
and by Cleanthes a ttoXltikos* Trepl vopuajv, irepl tov Si/ca£eiv, 
and 7T€pl pacriXcias (Diogenes Laertius, vii, 4 and 175 ; Pear- 
son, Fragments, pp. 29-30 ; Verbeke, Kleanthes, pp. 87- 
89) ; and Plutarch himself later in this essay cites " by title " 
works of Chrysippus -rrepl vopov (1037 f), rrepl TroXtrelas (1044 
b and d), and -nepl rov SiKa&iv (1045 i>, 1049 e). 

d Cf. Adv. Colotem 1126 e, where similar language is 



2. Well then, a it happens that Zeno, his conciseness 
considered, b himself wrote quite a bit, Cleanthes 
much, and Chrysippus a very great deal about 
government, ruling and being ruled, and judging and 
pleading cases c ; and yet in the career of none of 
them can there be found any military command or 
legislation or attendance in council or advocacy at 
the bar or military service in defence of country or 
diplomatic mission or public benefaction, d but in a 
foreign land they tasted the lotus of leisure e and 
spent all their lives, and very long lives too, with 
talk and books and strolling in the schools. Con- 
sequently it is not unevident * that they lived con- 
sistently 9 with the writings and sayings of others 

used against the Epicureans but not, of course, to argue that 
their civic inactivity is inconsistent with their doctrine. 

* i.e. leisure, the taste of which affected them as if it had 
been the lotus of Odyssey ix, 94-97 ; cf. Leutsch, Corpus 
Paroem. Graec, ii, p. 515, 2-4 with note and add Lucian, 
De Saltatione 3-4 ; Anth. Pal. xv, 12, 8. 

/ This was technical terminology in Stoic logic (Sextus, 
Pyrrh. Ifyp. ii, 140-143 and Adv. Math, viii, 310-314; cf. 
Mates, Stoic Logic, pp. 61-63) and is probably used here 
with intentional irony. 

9 Here again an ironical twist is given to a Stoic term. 
See S.V.F. i, frag. 179, where according to Stobaeus (Eel. 
ii, p. 75, 11-12 [Waehsmuth]) the tg\o? was defined by 
Zeno as to o/itoAoyou/!xeVa>? ftjv but according to Diogenes 
Laertius (vii, 87) as to oixoXoyovfxevcos rfj (f>vo€i ^rjv (so Cle- 
anthes and Chrysippus [S. V.F. i, frag.' 552 and iii, frags. 
4 and 5] ; cf. Stobaeus, Eel. ii, p. 76, 1-8 [Waehsmuth] and 
Plutarch, De Coram. Not. 1060 d). For the simple o'/xo- 
XoyovfMcvcos Igijv—KaT* aperrjv t,7Jv = Kara (f>voa> £,fjv cf. Stobaeus, 
Eel. ii, p. 77, 16-19 (S. V.F. iii, frag. 16) ; for kclt emaT^firjv 
ofMoXoyovfxevwg t,rjv cf. 1036 a rafra (S.V.F. ii, frag. 197). 
See Pearson, Fragments, pp. 162-163 (no. 120) ; Brehier, 
Chrysippe, pp. 220-223; Pohlenz, Sfoa i, pp. 116-118 and 
ii, pp. 67-68 and 235. 



(1033) Xop rj toZs vfi avrtov 1 ofioXoyovfievcos 2 e^rjoap, rjv 


ttj to Trapajrav KaTafiicoaavres . avTos yovv* Xpv- 

G17T7TOS* €V TO) T€rdpTCp 7T€pl BtO>l> OlfSeP Ot€Tai TOP* 

oxoXaoTLKov fiiov rod rjSoviKov Siacfrepew avras 8e 
TrapadrjaofiaL ras Xe^eis' " oaot 6 §€ vTroXapifSd- 
D vovai (j)i\ou6(j>ois imfSdXXew 1 fidXtGra top a^oAa- 
gtlkop )3lop d-n dpxfjs rt 8 [lot Sokovgl Sta/xapra- 
P€tP, V7Topoovpt€s Staycoyijs twos* €P€K€p Sew 10 
tovto TTOielp rj dXXov twos TovTco TrapaTrXrjGtov 11 


€gtw, dp Ga(f)cos 12 6€ojpr)6f), rjoeais' ov yap Set Aav- 
ddpew TTjp vttopoiolp clvtcop, ttoXXcop pL€P Gd<f)djS 
tovto XeyoPTOjp ovk SXiyojp 8' dSrjXoTepop." 13 tCs 

OVP fJL&XXoP €P Tip GXoXaOTlKCp filCp TOVTCp 14 KCLT€- 

yrjpaoep rj XpvoiTnros /cat KXedpOrjs /cat Aioyeprjs 

/cat 2jT]pa>p 15 /cat *ApTL7TaTpos, ot ye /cat ras* avTCjp 

E KOLTeXiirop rraTpihas ovSep iyKaXovPTes aAA' 0770)? 

1 av^rov -g. 2 Turnebus ; ouoXoyovfievots -mss. 

3 o3v -B. 

4 Xpvm7T7ros -omitted by v 1 ; 6 yLpvocmros -g» d, z. 

5 tov axoAaartKov . . . fidXiora -omitted by A and added 
by A 2 in margin. 

6 ooovs -g ; rots' -d ; Soov -v. 

7 eVijSaActv -d, z. 

8 rt -X, g ; ov ri (or ov rt) -d, v, z, a, A 1 , /?, y, E ; ovtol 
Acorr % b, Tolet. 51, 5. 

9 Omitted by A 1 , superscript by A 2 . 

10 Omitted by g. ll tovto -napaTtXr\aiov -g. 

12 oo<f>a>s -X, g. 13 dBrjXcoTepov -g. 

14 TovTco flito -g, z, B. 15 Z^vajy kolI AtoyeV^?- d, v, z. 

Frag. 426 (Usener, Epicurea, p. 284). 
6 Frag. 11 (F. Wehrli, Die Schule des Aristoteles, x, p. 13 
and pp. 30-31.) 

c S. V.F. iii, frag. 702. On Ways of Living by Chrysip- 



rather than with their own, since their lives were 
passed altogether in that tranquillity which is com- 
mended by Epicurus a and Hieronymus. b Chrysippus 
himself at least in his fourth book on Ways of Living 
thinks that the scholastic life is no different from the 
life of pleasure. I shall quote him verbatim c : " All 
who suppose that the scholastic life is especially 
incumbent upon philosophers seem to me to make a 
serious mistake from the beginning by presuming 
that one should engage in this for the sake of some 
activity or some other similar purpose and drag out 
one's whole life in some such fashion — which, if 
accurately examined, means ' pleasantly,' for we 
ought not to miss their underlying meaning, since 
many make this assertion openly and not a few more 
obscurely." d Who, then, grew old in this scholastic 
life if not Chrysippus and Cleanthes and Diogenes 
and Zeno and Antipater ? They even forsook their 
own countries e not because they had any grievance f 

pus as a polemic against the work with the same title by 
Epicurus (Usener, Epicurea, pp. 94-96) see Joly, Le theme 
. . . des genres de vie, pp. 141 and 144. 

d The former are the Epicureans, the latter the Peri- 
patetics (cf. Zeller, Phil. Griech. iii, i, p. 54, n. 1 ; Joly, 
op. cit., p. 142). 

e Cf. De Exilio 605 b. For Zeno of Citium, Cleanthes of 
Assos, and Chrysippus of Soli see p. 414, n. a supra and 
the references there. Diogenes of Babylon (Le. Seleucia, 
cf. S.V.F\ iii, p. 210, 2-18) studied under Chrysippus, suc- 
ceeded another of his pupils, Zeno of Tarsus (S. V.F. iii, 
p. 209), as head of the school, and was succeeded in turn 
by his own pupil, Antipater of Tarsus (S. V.F. iii, p. 244, 
2-7 and p. 245, 24-34). On their lives see Pohlenz, Stoa i, 
pp. 180-181 and ii, pp. 91-92. The Zeno named by Plutarch 
here between Diogenes and Antipater is probably Zeno of 
Tarsus (cf. H. von Arnim, R.-E. v [1903], col. 773, 52-66). 

' Cf. Plato, Crito 50 c 9-d 1. 



(1033) Kad' rjavxtav iv ra> 'DtSetoj 1 /cat €7tl Zcoarrjpos 
cxoXd^ovres /cat (f)iXoXoyovvr€s 2 oiaya)Giv; 'Apt- 
GTOKpdajv yovv 6 XpvaiTTTTov fiaOrjrrjs kclI oiKelos 
eiKova xaAi<fjv avaoriqXdjoas eTreypaipe rooe ro 

top vevvov 3 XpVOlTTTTOV ' AptGroKpecov dv€0rjK€, 

rtov AKaSrjfjL€'iKOJV A GrpayyaXlocov 5 kottlool. 

tovt ovv 6 yipvGiTTTTos , 6 yeptov, 6 <J>iX6go<J)os , 6 

TOV ficLGlXlKOV /Cat TToXlTlKOV ilTaiVCJV j3iOV, TOP §€* 

cr^oAacrrt/coj; ovSev olojxcvos rod tjSovlkov 7 oia<f>e- 

3. "Oaot ye fjLrjv s TToXireca irpoaiaoiv en fiaXXov 9 

1 Salmasius ; tjSlcol -X ; IBloj -g ; ybiovL -d, v, z, a, A, £, 
y, E ; T^Seico -B. 2 <f>i,\o(jo(f>ovvT€s -V, z. 

3 A. Wilhelm ; tov vlov -X, g 1 , d, v, a 1 ; rovhe viov -z, A, 
fit y, E, B(8 € superscript -g 2 , a 2 ). 

4 Wilamowitz ; aKaSr)fjLau<a>v -g ; d/caS^ta/ca^ -all other 
MSS. 5 — t'jcov -X, g ; — ayaAifow -d, V, z. 

6 Se omitted by X, g. 

7 fiytfioviKov -g (77801^? -g 2 in margin). 

8 H. C. after suggestion by Sandbach ; ye aAA-q -X(— ^\), 
g ; yc fxrjv aAAoi avrtov -d, V, z ; 8c aAAot avraiv -a, A, j8, y, 
E, B. 9 Leonicus ; cVt/xdAAov -mss. 

a rls oZv . . . Staya><7iv=£.F.F- i, frag. 27 (p. 11, 15-19) 
and iii, p. 210, 19-23. Diogenes Laertius (vii, 184) reports 
that Hermippus spoke of Chrysippus as eV rep 'Hic>€ia> axoXd- 
t,ovTa (cf. Plutarch, De Exilio 605 a and Athenaeus, 336 e = 
Alexis, frag. 25 [ii, p. 306, Kock]). The significance of Cape 
Zoster (cf. Strabo, ix, 1, 21 [c. 398] ; Pausanias, i, 31, 1) in 
this context remains obscure, no evidence having been found 
to support Madvig's " ad quod philosophos aestivare et 
otiare solitos apparet " (Adversaria Critica i, p. 143) ; but 
the emendations thus far proposed have no plausibility. 
With this passage in particular and with Plutarch's charge 
in this chapter generally cf. Dio Chrysostom, Oratio xxx 
( = xlvii [von Arnim]), 2-3 and Seneca, De Otto vi, 4-5 and 



but in order to pass the time tranquilly lecturing and 
conversing in the Odeum and at Zoster. Aristocreon 
at any rate, the pupil and kinsman of Chrysippus, set 
up the latter 's likeness in bronze and inscribed the 
following distich : 

Of uncle Chrysippus Aristocreon this likeness erected : 
The knots the Academy tied the cleaver, Chrysippus, 
dissected. b 

So that's Chrysippus, the elder, the philosopher, the 
one who commends the life of king and statesman 
and thinks the scholastic life no different from the 
life of pleasure. 

3. As many as do enter government, however, are 
viii ; for Chrysippus' own epigrammatic apology for re- 
fraining from politics cf, S. V.F. ill, frag. 694. See Grilli, 
II problema delta vita contemplativa, pp. 90-99. 

6 s 'ApiaroKpdojv yovv . . . kottlSo.^ S. V.F. ii, frag. 3b and 
Inscription's Graecae Metricae ed. Th. Preger (Lipsiae, 
1891), 160 on p. 127. Aristocreon, who with his brother had 
been educated by their maternal uncle Chrysippus (Diogenes 
Laertius, vii, 185) and to whom the latter had dedicated at 
least nine of his works {ibid., 196, 197, and 202), himself 
wrote a book entitled at XpvaiTnrov Ta«£at (£. V.F. ii, frag. 12). 
For his distich and the later decrees honouring him (IG Ii 2 , 
785 and 786) see A. Wilhelm, Hermes, xxxv (1900), pp. 669- 
670 and *E<£. 'Apx-, 1901, cols. 50-58 (cf. B. D. Meritt, Hesperia, 
v [1936], pp. 427-428). For other references to a statue of 
Chrysippus in Athens see S.V.F. ii, frags. 1 (p. 2, 5-7) and 
3a and iii, frag. 158 and cf. V. Poulsen, Les portraits grecs 
(Copenhague, 1954), no. 46 on pp. 70-71 ; Gisela M. A. 
Richter, Catalogue of Greek Sculptures in the Metropolitan 
Museum of Art (Cambridge, Mass., 1954), no. 188 on 
pp. 97-98 and The Portraits of the Greeks (London, 1965), 
ii, pp. 190-194. 

c As Zeno, Cleanthes, and Chrysippus advised (S. V.F. i, 
frag. 271 and iii, frag. 697). On the participation of Stoics 
in government see M. van Straaten, Panetius (Amsterdam, 
1946), pp. 204-208 ; Pohlenz, Stoa i, pp. 25-26, 139-140, 
and pp. 284-286. 



p evavnovvrai 1 rots avrcov Soy/zaar /cat yap ap^ovoi 
Kal St/ca£ot;ai Kal avfjLJ3ovAevovat /cat vojjioOerovai 
/cat KoXdi^ovai /cat nptoaiv <bs rroAewv fiev 2 ovacov 
ev at? rroAirevovrai fiovAevrtov Se /cat ot/caaraij/ del 
rtov Aayxavovrtov arparrjycov oe rtov x €L P OTOVOV ~ 
fievajv vojjbojv Se rtov l&Aeiadevovs /cat AvKovpyov 
/cat HoAwvos, 01)9 cfiavAovs /cat avo^rov? yeyoreVat 3 
Aeyovaiv. ware /cat TroAtrcud/xcvot /xa^o^rat. 
1034 4. Kat /x^v AvTLTTarpos ev rep Trepl rrjs KAe- 
dvdovs 4 /cat \pvaL7TTrov Statfiopas loroprjKev on 
'Zrjvojv /cat KAeav0^9 oi)/c r)6eArjoav b 'AOrjvatoi yeve- 
oQai, fir) o6£cogi rag avrcov irarpioas dSiKelv. on 
fiev, el KaAcos ovroi, Xpvonnros ovk opOtos e7roirj- 
crev* eyypatj>els ets rr)v rroAireiav Trapeiada)' ttoA- 
Arjv Se fidyrfv Kal rro^pdAoyov e\ei ro rd acofiara 
Kal rovs fiiovs ovra) fiaKpav drro^evcoaavras rd 
ovofiara rats rrarpioi rrjpelv, coarrep el ns rrjv 
yafierr)v arroAmcov ere pa 1 Se cru^cov 8 Kal ovvava- 
rravofievos Kal TraiSorroiovfievos e£ erepas 9 fir) ovy- 
ypdcpotro ydfiov 10 ottojs dSiKelv fir] Soktj 11 rrjv tt po- 
re pav. 

1 ivavTiovrai -d, v, z. 

2 fiev -X, g, d, v, z, B ; omitted by a, A, /?, y, E. 

3 yeyoveW omitted by g. 4 KAedvBov -B. 

5 ovk rfddhqoav omitted by g (rjfiovXovTo in margin). 

6 €7TOtr)Cr€V ovk 6p6w$ -g. 

7 iraipa -d, V, z, g 2 (cu superscript). 

8 ovvcov -g. 9 iralpas -d, v, z. 

10 ya/xcDv -X 3 ( changed to co), g ; vo^ov -B. 

11 boKOL-q -X 3 (olt] over e£v [?] erased), g. 

a Cf. S.V.F. iii, frags. 354, 327, 599, 612, 617, 619; 
Diogenes of Babylon, frag. 117 (S. V.F. iii, pp. 24-1, 35-242, 
4 [text uncertain]) ; Cicero, Be Officiis iii, 16. Plutarch 
wrote separate biographies of Lycurgus and Solon, who as 
the traditional authors of the Spartan and the Athenian 


contradicting their own doctrines still more sharply, 
for in holding administrative and judicial offices, in 
acting as councillors and legislators, and in meting 
out punishments and rewards they imply that they 
are taking part in the government of genuine states 
and that those really are councillors and judges who 
are at any time so designated by lot, those really 
generals who are at any time so elected, and those 
really laws which were instituted by Cleisthenes, 
Lycurgus, and Solon, men whom they declare to have 
been base and stupid. a So when they take part in 
government they are inconsistent too. 

4. Moreover, Antipater in his book on the dif- 
ference between Cleanthes and Chrysippus b has 
reported that Zeno and Cleanthes declined to be- 
come Athenians lest they appear to wrong their own 
countries. If they did well in this, Chrysippus did 
not do right in having himself naturalized. But let 
that pass. There is, however, a violent and irrational 
inconsistency in their preserving their names for 
their countries when they had removed their persons 
and their careers so far from home. It is as if a man 
who had abandoned his wife and was living and 
sleeping with another woman and begetting children 
on her should refrain from contracting marriage with 
her for fear that he might appear to wrong the former 

constitutions respectively are often mentioned together {e.g. 
by Plato in Republic 599 d-e, Phaedrus L 25S b-c, and Laws 
858 e and by Aristotle in Politics 1273 b 30-34) ; and to 
Cleisthenes (cf. Aristotle, Politics 1275 b 34-37, 1319 b 
19-22, and Ath. Pol. xx, 1-xxii, 1) he refers as the author of 
the Athenian constitution established after the expulsion of 
the Peisistratidae {Pericles iii, 2 [153 c-d]). 

b Antipater, frag. 66 (S. V.F. iii, p. 257, 23-26). 



■g 5. XpVOLTTTTOS Se TToXlV Iv TO) TT€pl 'Pr)TOplKr]s 

ypdtpcov ovrcos pyropevcreiv 1 /cat 7roXiT€VG€G0ai 2 rov 
ao<f)6v cos /cat rod rrXovrov ovtos dyaOov /cat ttjs 
o6£rjs /cat rrjs vyizias o/xoXoyet tovs Xoyovs avrtov 3 
dve^ooovs elvcu /cat olttoXit^vtovs /cat rd Soy/xara 
Tats ^petat? dvap/xoara /cat rat? Trpd^eow. 

6. "Ert 4 Soy pa Zrjva>vo? eartv tcpd #€ojv p/i] ot- 
KoSofielv Upov yap firj rroXXov d£tov /cat aytov ou/c 
eoriv OLKoSoficov §' epyov /cat fiavavGcov ovoev iart 
ttoXXov d^iov. ol 8e tclvt eTraivovvres cbs ev e^ov- 
ra pvovvrai pev h> lepols dvafiaivovoi §' ets* d/cpd- 

77oAtJ/ TTpOGKVVOVGl 0€ rd eSr] KOLL GT€<f>aVOVG(, 5 TOVS 

C vaovs, OLKoSopicov ovras epya /cat fiavavGtov di>- 
6pd)7TOJV. etVa toi)? ^mKOvpciovs iXeyy^Gdai oo- 
kovgi dvovras dtols, avrol Se jitaAAov 6 eXeyxovrat 

0VOVT€S €7TL TtOV fiajpOW /Cat TtOV L€pa>V, d /XT^T 7 6t~ 

rat pafjT ot/co8o/.i£tcr0at §etv d^tovGiv. 

1 prjrop€V€Lv -X 3 (in erasure), d, v, z. 

2 7ToXcT€V€cr6ai -X, g, d, v, z, Aldine, Basil. 

3 avrov -a, A, ^S, y, E. 4 rt -E. 

5 oT€<f>avovoi he -X(\vith Be erased), v, z. 

6 /zdAAov £k€lvu)v -X, d, v, z, B. 

7 jLnyfl* <ayta> -van Herwerden, Mnem. t xxxvii (1909), p. 

• £. F..F. iii, frag. 698. Of. O. Luschnat, Philologus, cii 
(1958), p. 187. 

b S. V.F. i, frag. 264 (p. 61, 31-34). See also the passages 
of Clement, Theodoret, and Epiphanius included by von 
Arnim in this fragment and the passage of Origen in frag- 
ment 265. Cf. Pearson, Fragments, p. 200 and Festa, 
Stoici Antlchi i, p. 22. Clement purports to quote Zeno 
verbatim, but the koL ayiov in his last clause (p. 377, 6 
[Stahlin]) spoils the syllogism that Zeno evidently intended 
and shows that he misunderstood the kqX before ayiov in the 



5. Chrysippus, again, by writing in his treatise on 
Rhetoric that the sage will speak in public and 
participate in government just as if he considered 
wealth to be a good and reputation and health like- 
wise admits that the Stoic theories are impracticable 
and antisocial and their doctrines unfit for use and 
action. a 

6. Moreover, it is a doctrine of Zeno's not to build 
temples of the gods, because a temple not worth 
much is also not sacred and no work of builders or 
mechanics is worth much. 6 The Stoics, while 
applauding this as correct, attend the mysteries in 
temples, go up to the Acropolis, do reverence to 
statues, and place wreaths upon the shrines, though 
these are works of builders and mechanics. Yet they 
think that the Epicureans are confuted by the fact 
that they sacrifice to the gods,** whereas they are 
themselves worse confuted by sacrificing at altars and 
temples which they hold do not exist and should not 
be built. 

preceding clause, as do also those modern scholars like van 
Herwerden, Castiglioni, and Westman who propose to 
emend in one way or another the text of Plutarch here. 

c e.g. Seneca, frag. 120 (in Lactantius, Divin. Inst, ii, 
2, 14). 

d Concerning Epicurean participation in conventional 
religious ritual (Usener, Epicurea, frags. 13, 169, 386-387), 
the charge that this was inconsistent and hypocritical 
(Plutarch, Non Posse Suaviter Vivi 1102 b-c and Adv. 
Colotem 1112 c ; Cicero, Be Natura Deorum i, 85 and 123 
and iii, 3), and Epicurean retorts upon the Stoics (Philo- 
demus, De Pietate 9-19 [pp. 75-86, Gomperz, cf. Usener, 
Epicurea, p. lxxii]) see A. J. Festugiere, iSpicure et ses 
dieux 2 (Paris, 1968), pp. 86-100 ; W. Schmid, Rhein. Mus. f 
N.F. xciv (1951), pp. 133-139 and pp. 152-154; L. Perelli, 
Riv. Filologia . . . Classica, N.S. xxxiii (1955), pp. 38-52. 



(1034) 7. Aperas 6 Tsqvayv airoXeiTTei rrXeiovas Kara. 
8ia<f)Opas / wGrrep 6 HXdrajv, olov <\>p6vr\oiv av- 
8petav Ga)(f)poavvrjv oiKaioovvqv , 2 cog axcoptvrovs 
fiev ovaas irepas 8e /cat Stafepovoas aXXrjXa>v. 
iraXiv 8e opi^optvos avrcbv eKaarrjv rrjv pev av- 
hpeiav <f)rjcri etvat (frpovrjaw 3 (iv viroptveriois tt)v 
8e oa)(f>poovvr]v <$>p6vr\oiv £v alpereots rrjp S' 18icds 
Xeyopevrjv cf)povr]oiv fftpovrjaiv) iv ivepyrjreoLS* rr]v 
8e 8tKatoavvrjv (frpovrjaiv ev an ovcpryrio ls, cu^ piav 
ovaav aperrjv rats' 8e rrpos ra rrpdypara o^Lotai 
D Kara 5 ras evepyelas 8iacj)€peiv 8oKovcrav. & ov 
povov 8e 6 'Lrptiov Trepl ravra fyaiverai avrtp pa\6- 
pievos, 1 aAAd /cat 8 yLpvairnros ' Apiorajvi pkv iy- 
koXujp ore peas aperrjs o^oeis k'Xeye ra? aAAas* 
elvai* TjTjvojvi 8e ovvrjyoptov ovtcds opi^optvto tojv 
apertov eKaarrjv. 6 8e Y^XedvdrjS ev r Y7rop.vr)paai, 

1 /cat Bca(t>6povs -X(over erasure), g. 

2 hiKaioovvrjv oco(f)poovvr)v -g. 

3 d, v, z, B ; (f>p6v7]aiv elvai -all other mss. 

4 Pohlenz (Hermes, lxxiv [1939], p. 8, n. 2) ; <eV vnofievc- 
tcois ttjv hk aco(f>poovvr]v <f>p6vrj(nv> ev atpereots -Kuester ; vf. 
Hirzel, Untermchungen ii, p. 99, n. 2 (on p. 100) ; eV eV- 
tpy-qriois -X 3 (eV prefixed in margin), d corr -, z corr -, a, A, /}, 
E, B ; ivepyrjTeoLs -X, g, v, y, n, Tolet. 51, 5. 

5 /cat -g. 6 boKovaas -B. 

7 pLaxopLevos olvto) -Benseler(to avoid hiatus). 

8 /cat d -d. 9 eAeye g\€G€ls etvat ras aAAas -P. 

'Aperas . . . oia<f>€p€iv ooKovcrav= S. V.F. i, frag. 200; 
cf. Pearson, Fragments, pp. 173-175. If in referring to 
Plato here Plutarch had a single passage in mind, it was 
probably Republic IV (427 e — 135 b and 441 c— 444 a) ; 
but cf. especially Laws 963 c 5 — 964 b 7. 

6 Cf. Plutarch, De Virtute Morall 441 a (S. V.F. i, frag. 
201) and De Fort una 97 e. 

c The term eVcpy^rea seems not to occur elsewhere ; but 
for such a definition of <f>p6v7]ots in the specific sense cf. 



7. Zeno, like Plato, admits a a plurality of specifi- 
cally different virtues, namely prudence, courage, 
sobriety, justice, which he takes to be inseparable 
but yet distinct and different from one another. On 
the other hand, when defining each one of them, he 
says b that courage is prudence <in things to be 
endured, sobriety is prudence in things to be chosen, 
prudence in the specific sense is prudence) in things 
to be performed, and justice is prudence in things 
to be distributed, the implication being that virtue 
is really single but in its operations appears to vary 
with its relations to its objects. Not only does Zeno 
manifestly contradict himself on this subject ; but 
Chrysippus does so too, arraigning Ariston for as- 
serting that virtue is single and the rest are its rela- 
tive states and yet defending Zeno for defining each 
of the virtues in this way. d Cleanthes too in his 

£. V.F. i, pp. 85, 38-86, 1 and 86, 12-13 and in, p. 63, 23-24 
and 39. 

d ov fj,6vov 8e . . . €KaoT7]v=S.V.F. iii, frag. 258 (Chrysip- 
pus) and i, frag. 373 (Ariston). For the latter's doctrine 
referred to here see also S. V.F. i, frags. 374 and 375 ( = Plut- 
arch, De Virtute Moral I 440 e — 441 a) ; and for the attack 
upon it by Chrysippus see S. V.F. iii, frag. 259. Chrysippus 
objected to Ariston's placing the multitude of virtues eV ttj 
Trpos rt <jx* a€L instead of recognizing that they are dis- 
tinguished by qualities of their own (cf. S.V.F. iii, p. 60, 
3-4). It has been asserted that this objection is consistent 
with defence of Zeno's definitions (Giesen, De Plutarchi . . . 
Disputationibus, pp. 84-85), but the very point of Plutarch's 
argument is that these definitions reduce the various virtues 
to the -n-pos ri ncos lx ovTa which Ariston asserts them to be 
(cf. De Virtute Morali 440 e — 441 a) and which by Stoic 
doctrine cannot be Kara hia<j>opav {cf. S. V.F. ii, pp. 132, 37- 
39 and 133, 1-2). Cf. Galen's criticism of Chrysippus, De 
Placitis Hippocratis et Platonis vii, 2, 596-600 = pp. 592, 
2-596, 3 (Mueller). For Ariston of Chios, pupil of Zeno, 



(1034) Qvctlkols eliTtbv on TrXrjyrj 1 rrvpos 6 rovos iori, kov 
u<avos ev rfj ipvxj] yivqrai rrpos to emreAeiv tol 


Kara Ae^iv u rj 8* la)(vs avrr] koll to KpaTos, otojv 
\xkv €7rt 2 toIs <f)avelaiv* ipfieveTeois* lyyivtyrai, 

iyKpOLTeid ioTLV, OTOLV S' iirl 5 TOLS V7TOfJL€V€T€OLS , 

E avSpeta* rrepl tols d^lag 8e SiKaioavvrj- nepl Se 6 
tols aipecreis /ecu €kkAlg€ls 7 oojcjypoovvr)." 


prjBt* Slktjv hiKaarjs, TTplv ap<f>oj 9 [jlvOov aKovays 10 
dvTeAeyev 6 ZiTjvajv toiovtoj tlvI Aoyco xpai^iei/os' 

1 rr-qyr) -X 3 (A erased). 

2 eV -d, v, z, B. 

3 Hirzel (Untersuchungen ii, p. 97, n. 2) ; eVt^aveo-tv -mss. 

4 ev fxevereois -X 1 ; ev e/x/xevereots" -X 3 . 

5 van Herwerden (Lect tones Rheno-Traiectinae [1882], 
p, 121), Festa (Stoici Antichi ii, p. 124, n. e) ; ev -mss. 

6 Se -omitted altogether by a, A, /?, y, E and written after 
alpe<j€L$ instead in d, v, z. 

7 tyicXlotis ~g, Aldine, Basil. ; eyKXijaets -z, (eV — [?]) d, v. 

8 ixrjSe -Basil., Pseudo-Phocylides ; /x-qre -g, Lucian, Ca- 
lum. non tern, credendum 8 ; ^Bevl -all other mss., Aldine. 

9 mss. (av dfxcfxjj -B), Pseudo-Phocylides, Lucian (loc. cit.) ; 
dfi<j)OLV -[Plato], Demodocus 383 c 1, Corpus Paroem. Grace, 
p. 759, 14-15 ; dv d{x(f)otv -Aristophanes, Wasps 725 (see 
Schol. ad loc). 

10 aicovoets -g. 

see H. von Arnim, R.-E. ii (1896), cols. 957, 10-959, 11 ; 
Pohlenz, Stoa i, pp. 27-28, pp. 122-123, p. 163 and ii, pp. 16- 
17, p. 70, p. 72 ; J. Moreau, Rev. fit. Anciennes, 1 (1948), 
pp. 27-48. 


Physical Treatises. after saying that tension is 
impact of fire b and that, if in the soul it becomes 
adequate for the accomplishment of what is incum- 
bent, it is called strength and power, continues in so 
many words : " This strength and power, when 
present in the case of things manifestly to be adhered 
to, is continence and, when in the case of things that 
are to be endured, is courage ; concerned with 
deserts it is justice, and concerned with choices and 
avoidances it is sobriety/' c 
8. Against him who said 

Nor give your verdict till you've heard both sides d 

Zeno asserted the contrary with an argument some- 

° 6 8e KXtavBris . . . oo)<f>poovirq = S. V.F. i, frag. 563 (Pear- 
son, Fragments, pp. 301-302 ; Festa, Stoici Antichi, ii, pp. 
123-124). See Verbeke, Kleanthes, pp. 221-224. 

6 For the Stoic principle of tovos see S. V.F. i, frags. 497, 
513, 514, 563 (p. 129, 3-5 : Stobaeus, Eel. ii, pp. 62, 24-63, 
1 [Wachsmuth]) and ii, frags. 441, 444 (Plutarch, De Comm. 
Not. 1085 d), 447, 451, 546, 766, 876 ; Pearson, Fragments, 
pp. 45, 253-254, and 267 ; Pohlenz, Stoa i, pp. 74-75 and 
147-148 (cf. Edelstein, A.J.P., lxxii [1951], p. 428) ; Sam- 
bursky, Physics of the Stoics, pp. 5 and 29-33. With -rrXrjyr) 
nvpos cf. on lines 10-11 of the Hymn to Zeus (S.V.F. i, 
p. 122, 6-7) Pearson, Fragments, p. 277 ; Pohlenz, Hermes, 
lxxv (1940), p. 120 and Stoa ii, pp. 62-63 (contra : Verbeke, 
Kleanthes, pp. 244-245; Zuntz, H.S.C.P., lxiii [1958], 
pp. 294-295). 

c In S.V.F. iii, frag. 295 ifip,€V€ria are correlated with 
Gaxf)poGvvr], and €yKpaT€ia is not mentioned. For a£ta in the 
definition of justice see S.V.F. iii, p. 30, 21-24 and p. 63, 

d Pseudo-Phocylides, 87 (Theognis . . . Ps.-Phocylides . . . 
iterum ed. D. Young [1971 ], p. 102 ; Th. Bergk, Poetae Lyrici 
Graeci, ii [1882], p. 93); Hesiod, frag. 271 (Rzach) = 338 
(Merkelbach-West) ; Leutsch, Corpus Paroemiographorum 
Graecorum, ii, p. 759, 14-15. 



(1034) " elr drreSei^ev 6 irporepos elirojv, ovk aKovoreov 
rov Sevrepov Xeyovros (uepas yap e)(ei to ^rjrov- 
[xevov), eiV ovk drreSeL^ev (ojjlolov yap 1 cog el ju/^S' 
vmf^Kovoe KXrjOelg tj vrraKovoas ireperiaev 2 ). yjroi 
S' 3 drreSet^ev rj ovk aWSct^cv 4 * ovk aKovoreov dpa 
rod Sevrepov Xeyovros" rovrov Se rov Xoyov epvo- 
rrjoas avros dvreypa<f>e 5 fxev rrpds rrjv nAarcovos" 
rtoAtrctav eXve Se oo<j)iupiara, Kal rr)v SiaXeKrLK7)v 
cos rovro noielv Svvajj,ev7)v eKeXeve rrapaXajjifid- 
F veiv rovs jjba9r]r as. Kairoi rf drreSei^e FIAaTcov 
rj ovk aTTeSei^e rd ev rrj IIoAtreta, /car' ovSe- 
repov S' 7 tjv dvayKalov dvriypdcfieiv dXXd rrdvrcos 
Trepirrov Kal puaraiov. rd S' avro /cat 8 rrepl rcbv 
oo(j>io}xarojv eoriv eirrelv. 
1035 9- 'O Xpuat777ro9 oierai Selv rcbv XoyiKcbv rrpcb- 
rov aKpoaodai rovs veovs Sevrepov Se rcbv f)6iKcbv 
jxerd Se ravra rcbv <f>vocKcbv cos av reXos 9 Se rov- 
rois 10 rov jrepl Oecbv 11 Xoyov 12 eoxarov TrapaXo.fifid- 
veiv. TToXXaxov Se rovrcov vir avrov Xeyofievoov, 
apKeoei rrapadeodai rd ev rcb rerdprco rrepl Ulcov 
e\ovra Kara Xe£iv 13 ovrcos' " rrpcbrov fxev ovv SoKel 

1 ofjLoiov yap -X(over erasure) ; o/jlolov yap ... 17 ovk 
a7Teheit;€v -omitted by d. 

2 €T€p€TTlO€V 'd 2 , A, j8, y, E. 

3 S* -omitted by B. 

4 77 ovk d7r€&€i£ev -written twice in v. 

5 avreypaifie -Stephanas. 

6 et -B, Turnebus. 

7 8' -X, g, d, v, z ; omitted by all other mss. 

8 Kal -omitted by a, A, 0, y, E. 

9 Pohlenz (Hermes, lxxiv [1939], p. 9, n. 1) ; (hoa vtcos -mss. 

10 tovtois -omitted by y, E. 

11 TVJV Btcov -B. 

12 Xoyatv -g. 

13 Kara X<z£iv e^ovra -g. 



thing like this a : The second speaker must not be 
heard whether the former speaker proved his case 
(for then the inquiry is at an end) or did not prove it 
(for that is tantamount to his not having appeared 
when summoned or to having responded to the 
summons with mere gibberish) ; but either he 
proved his case or he did not prove it ; therefore, 
the second speaker must not be heard. After he had 
propounded this argument, however, he continued to 
write against Plato's Republic, b to refute sophisms, 
and to bid his pupils learn dialectic on the ground 
that it enables one to do this. c Yet either Plato 
proved or did not prove what is in the Republic, and 
either way it was not necessary but was utterly 
superfluous and vain to write against it. The same 
thing can be said about sophisms also. 

9. Chrysippus thinks that young men should hear 
lectures on logic first, on ethics next, and after that 
on physics and should get theology last as the 
termination for these studies. He says this in many 
places, but it will suffice to quote the statement in 
the fourth book on Ways of Living, which runs word 
for word as follows d : " Now I believe in the first 

S. V.F. i, frag. 78. See Pearson, Fragments, pp. 80-81 ; 
and Festa, Stoici Antichi i, pp. 115-116, who takes this to 
be a fragment, and the only one preserved, of the work 
"EXeyxoi bvo (Diogenes Laertius, vii, 4 [cf. Pearson, op. cit., 
p. 28]). Weische {Cicero und die Neue Akademie, pp. 77-78) 
assumes that Zeno's argument was directed against the 
" antilogistic method " of Arcesilaus, for which see note a 
on 1036 a infra. 

b S. V.F. i, frag. 260. See Festa, Stoici Antichi i, p. 14. 

c 8. V.F. i, frag. 50; cf. Diogenes Laertius, vii, 25 and 

d S.V.F. ii, frag. 42. 



(1035) fiOL Kara tcl opQcos vrro tlov dpxatojv elprjpLeva rpia 
yevrj tlov tov <j>iXou6cj>ov OeojprjpaTOJV elvat, tcl p,ev 

XoyiKOL TCL S' rjOiKGL TCL St tfrvGLKa 1 ' €LTa TOVTLOV 

8e?v TaTTeodai 2 rrptoTa fiev tcl XoyiKa Sevrepa 8e 
tcl TjOtKa Tpira Se tcl <j>voiKa- tcov Se tf>voiKtov 
B ea^aTo? elvai 6 rrepl tcov decov Xoyos' Sto Kal 
TeAeTCLS rrpoorjyopevoav 3 tcls tovtov* rrapaSooecs." 
dXXd tovtov ye 5 tov Xoyov, ov ecr^aroV <f>rjai Setv 

TaTT€(jdai, (t6vY 7T€pl detOV, €061 TTpOTOLTTei Kal 

TTpoeKTidrjot ttovtos t)6lkov ^r^/xaros'- oxire yap rrepl 
reXcov ovt€ rrepl SiKaioovvrjs ovre rrepl dyaOcov Kal 
KaKcov ovt€ rrepl ydfxov Kal TraiSoTpotfytas ovre rrepl 
vo/jlov Kal rroXiTelas cbaiveTai to rrapdrrav tf)6ey- 
yofjuevos, el jjltj, icaOdrrep ol tcl iprjcpLOfiaTa Tals 
rroXeoiv elo<j>epovTes rrpoypdcpovoiv 'AyaOrjv Tu^v, 
ovtojs Kal 7 avTos rrpoypdijjeie tov Aia, tt)v Et/xap- 
fjbevrjv, ttjv Upovotav, to ovveyeodai jxia Svvdfiei 

1 tcl ok cf>voiK(i, . . . bevT€pa Se to. tjOikcl -omitted by g. 

2 8elv TaTT€o9aL -X, d, V, z, B ; Setv TrpoTaTTtodai -a ; Sec 

7TpOTOLTT€Crd(H, "A, /?, y, E. 

3 Bernardakis (cf. 1053 e infra) ; -qyopevcav -mss. (which 
despite Plutarch's later paraphrase may be right, cf. Plato, 
Laws 950 e 1-2 and Kaibel, Eplgrammata Oraera, no. 258, 7). 

4 tovtov -X, g ; tovtcov -all other mss. 

5 ye -omitted by z ; yap -d, v. 

6 <tov> -Reiske. 7 Kal -omitted by y, E. 

a This tripartition of philosophy was frequently ascribed 
to Plato : Cicero, Acad. Post, i, 19 ; Apuleius, De Platone 
i, 3 ; Aristocles in Eusebius, Praep. Evang. xi, 3, 6 (and 
Eusebius himself, ibid, xi, 1, 1) ; Diogenes Laertius, iii, 56 ; 
Hippolytus, Refutatio i, 18, 2 ; Augustine, Civ. Dei viii, 4. 
Sextus Empiricus, however, makes Plato its originator only 
by implication (hwdp,ei) and ascribes its explicit formulation 
before the Stoics to Xenocrates and the Peripatetics (Adv. 
Math, vii, 16 ; cf. R. Heinze, Xenokrates, pp. 1-2 and frag. 1). 


place, conformably with the correct statements of the 
ancients, that the philosopher's speculations are of 
three kinds, logical, ethical, and physical a ; then 
that of these the logical must be put first, the ethical 
second, and the physical third b ; and that of physical 
speculations theology must be last, which is why its 
transmission has also been called 'confirmation.' " c 
Yet this very doctrine, theology, which he says must 
be put last he habitually puts first and makes the 
preface to every ethical inquiry, for it is plain to see 
that, be the subject goals or justice or good and evil 
or marriage and child-rearing o r law and government, 
he makes no remark about it at all unless in the same 
fashion in which the movers of public decrees prefix 
the phrase " Good Fortune " d he has prefixed Zeus, 
Destiny, Providence, and the statement that the 
universe, being one and finite, is held together by a 

b Cf Sextus Empiricus, Adv. Math, vii, 22-23 and 
Diogenes Laertius, vii, 39-40, where at the end, however, 
both Chrysippus and Zeno are cited for the order : logic, 
physics, ethics. See on this discrepancy Sextus, Pyrrh. Hyp. 
ii, 13 and Adv. Math, vii, 20-21 ; Pearson, Fragments, 
pp. 55-57 ; Pohlenz, Stoa i, pp. 33-34 ; Goldschmidt, Le 
systeme sto'icien, pp. 61-67. 

c Cf S. V.F. ii, frag. 1008. The untranslatable original 
means that TcAerai, the word for religious M rites " or " in- 
itiatory mysteries," is equivalent to TeAeurcua, " final," from 
rcAoSi " end " or " goal." Cf. Plutarch, Quaest. Conviv. 

718 D (. . . T7]V VOr)TT)V KOLL dtSlOV <f>VOLV, T^S" $€Cl TcAo? €OTL (j>l\o~ 

oo<f>ias olov €TT07TT€ta TtAer^?) and I)e hide 382 d-e (chap. 
77 sub finem with Reiske's emendation) ; and Plato, 
Phaedrus 249 c 6-8 and 250 b 5-c 6, where, however, reAer^ 
is connected rather with rdXeov, " perfect." 

d Cf. W. Larfeld, Ilandbueh der griechischen Epigraph Ik 
\ (Leipzig, 1907), pp. 437-438 and ii/2 (Leipzig, 1902), pp. 



(1035) tov Koa/xov eva ovra /cat Trerrepaopievov . a>v ov- 

C 8ev l €<jtl 7T€Lcr9rjvai per) Stct flddovs iyKpaOevTa 2 rots' 

<j)VoiKols Aoyot9. aKove oe a Xiyei irepl tovtojv 

€V Tip TpLTtp TT€pL 0€OJV " OV yap €OTlV €Vp€LV TTJS 

hiKaioavvrjS dXXrjv dpxrjv °^' SXh\v ye'veatv r] rr)v 
€K tov Atos* /cat ttjv e/c 3 ttjs koivtjs <j>voeojs' ivrev- 
dev yap Set irav to tolovtov tt)v dpx^v *X €iV > € ^ 
pbeXXopuev tl* £p€LV rrepl dyadtov /cat /ca/ccD^." 
rrdXtv eV 5 Tats* Ouat/cats* Qeaeoiv il ov yap eoTiv 
aAAa/s* ov8 olK€ioT€pov erreXdelv irrl tov twv dya- 
6wv /cat KaKtov Xoyov ovS inl Tas aperas* ouS' err 
evSaifjLovtav, dAA' \/>)} 6 drro 7 Trjs kolvtjs (f>vo€a>s /cat 


D avdis' " Set yap tovtols owdafjai tov rrepl dyaOtov 
/cat KaKtov Xoyov, ovk ovotjs dXXrj$ dpxrjs avTtov 
dfJLetvovos ouS' 9 dva(f>opas , ovS* dXXov twos ev€K€v 
ttjs (fivoiKfjs dcojpias rrapaXr]7TTrjs ovotjs rj 10 rrpos 
ttjv rrepl dyaOtov rj KaKtov hidoTaoiv " yiyveTai 
tolvvv (i a/xa rrpoato /cat orriato " Ttbv tjOikwv 6 
<f>voiKos Aoyos* /caret \pvotrrrrov' jjl&XXov 8e oXojs 
arropos r) rrepiTporrr) ttjs Ta^eojs el fieTa raura 

TOKT€OV €K€LVOV (Ll/ 11 KaToXafieZv Ol)8eV €K€LVOV ^a>- 

1 ovdevi X 3 , g, B. 

2 owyK pad dvra -Cobet (Novae Lect tones, p. 513); dvaKpa- 
OevTa (?). 3 4k -omitted by d, v, z. 

4 fiiliXofiev tl -Basil. ; fteXXofiev (peXXoipev -X 3 [ot over era- 
sure], g, B ; fxdWcofiev -d) epoun -MSS., Aldine ; jxcXXofiev 6p8<Zs 
Tt -Pohlenz ; </. Castiglioni, Gnomon, xxvi (1054), pp. 83- 
84. 5 eV -omitted by A, £, y, R. 

6 <-^> -Leonicus. 7 eVt -a, A, j3, y, E. 

8 Erasure between o and e -X. 

9 ouSev -y. 

10 -^ -omitted by d, v, z. 

11 ov -X 3 (<5 over erasure), g, B. 



single power, a — none of which can carry any con- 
viction for anyone who has not been thoroughly 
steeped in physical theory. Hear what he says 
about this in the third book on the Gods b : It is 
not possible to discover any other beginning of 
justice or any source for it other than that from 
Zeus and from the universal nature, for thence 
everything of the kind must have its beginning if we 
are going to have anything to say about good and 
evil." Again in his Physical Propositions he says d : 
For there is no other or more suitable way of 
approaching the theory of good and evil or the 
virtues or happiness {than) from the universal nature 
and from the dispensation of the universe." And 
further on once more : " For the theory of good and 
evil must be connected with these, since good and 
evil have no better beginning or point of reference 
and physical speculation is to be undertaken for no 
other purpose than for the discrimination of good 
and evil." According to Chrysippus, then, physical 
theory turns out to be '- at once before and behind " e 
ethics, or rather the whirligig of the arrangement is 
utterly bewildering if the former must be placed 
after the latter, no part of which can be grasped 

° S. V.F. ii, frag. 30 ; cf. ii, frag. 234 and E. Elorduy, 
Die Sozlal philosophie der Stoa, pp. 1-4. 

b S. V.F. iii, frag. 326. 

c Cf. 1050 a-d infra (S.V.F. ii, frag. 937) and S.V.F. i, 
frag. 555 and ii, frags. 599 and 1076. Identified with Zeus, 
Destiny, and Necessity, the universal nature is essentially 
the creative fire, -rrvp t€xvlkov (cf. S. V.F. ii, frags. 774, 1133, 
and 1134). 

d S. V.F. iii, frag. 68 (p. 17, 3-11) ; cf. Cicero, Be Finibus 
iii, 73 (S. V.F. iii, frag. 282). 

e Iliad i, 343 ; cf. Quaest. Romanae 279 c and An Seni 
Respublica Gerenda Sit 788 e. 



(1035) piS €GTIV Kol 7Tp68r]\oS Tj /xd^'T} TOV TOV <f)VOU<6v 

Xoyov apxy v ^ v £"'&& tov nepl dyadcbv /cat kclkcov 

TiOepievov KeXevovTos 8e pjr) rrpoTepov dAAd voTepov 

E €K€ivcov 7Tapa8i8oadai. el 1 8e tls epel yeypa^evai 

TOV \pVOl7T7TOV iv TO) 7T€pl A6yOV XprjG€ll)S OJS OV 

KaOairat; d<f>eKTeov earl tcov dXXcov toj ttjv XoytKrjv 
dvaXapi^dvovTi TTpcorrjv dAAd KaKeivoJV pL€raAr]7T- 
Teov /card to 8i86pLevov, dXrjdrj pLev epel fiepcuwaei 
8e 2 ttjv air lav /zd^erat yap irpos eavrov, orrov fiev 
eoyorrov tov rrepl Oecov 3 Xoyov dvaXapL^dvecv K€- 
Xevojv kolI reXevratov, ws Sid tovto /cat reXeryv 
rrpooayopevopievov , orrov 8e rrdXiv ev rrpo'jTOLS dpia 
/cat tovtov fj,eTaXr]rrTeov elvai Xeyojv ot^erat yap 
r) rants', 4 el rravrajv ev rraoi pLeraXapLpdveiv Setfaei. 
to 8e ptelt^oVy otl tov rrepl dyadoov /cat /ca/cojy 
F Adyou tov 5 rrepl Oewv dpxr)v rrerTocrjpievos ovk drro 
tovtov KeXevet tov tjBikov* dp£ap,evovs dvaXap^fid- 
veiv, dAA' eKelvov dvaXap,f$dvovTas tovtov p,era- 
XapL^dvecv Kara to ScSopcevov, evra pieTafiaiveiv errl 
tovtov drr* etcelvajv, 7 ov X OJ P L S ov8e pilav dpx'yjv [drr*]* 
eKeivwv ov8* e<f>o8ov elvai c^at. 9 

10. To irpos Tavavrla 8iaXeyeodai KaQoXov fiev 
ov cfyrjaiv 10 drroSoKipid^eiv s xp^j^Oat 8e tovto/ 1 nap- 

1 (Ls -d, v, z. 2 oe -omitted by a, A. 

3 Oeov -a, A, p, y. 

4 rj rdits -omitted by g. 

5 tov -X, g, B ; ri)v -d, v, z ; omitted by A, a, j8, y (tov 
TT€pl Otcov omitted by E). 

6 tov tjOlkov -X 3 ( . . . 6 . . . o over erasure), g, d, v, z, B ; 
TOiv t\Qikojv -a, A, /S, y, E. 

7 aTTO TOVTOiV €7T* GKcZvOV "g. 

8 Pohlenz's deletion anticipated by Reiske ; a-n -X, g, a, 
Aldine, Basil. ; <rV -d, v, z, A, j3, y, E, B. 

9 cj>aol -X, B ; <j>aaiv -g. 


without it ; and the inconsistency is obvious in the 
man who, while asserting that physics is the begin- 
ning of the theory about good and evil, still orders it 
to be taught not before but after the latter. Still, 
Chrysippus, it may be said, in the treatise on Use of 
Discourse has written a that one taking up logic as 
the first subject is not to abstain altogether from the 
rest but is to take such part of them also as oppor- 
tunity offers. If anyone say this, his assertion will be 
true but will confirm the accusation, for Chrysippus 
is at odds with himself in here ordering theology to 
be taken up as last and terminal, on the ground that 
for this reason it is called " confirmation " also, & and 
elsewhere again saying that part of this too should 
be taken along with the first subjects. In fact, there 
is nothing left of the arrangement, if in all subjects 
part of all will have to be taken ; but, what is more, 
after having taken theology to be the beginning of 
the theory of good and evil, his order is not that 
people begin with the former and thence proceed to 
take up ethical theory but that in taking up the 
latter they take such part of the former as oppor- 
tunity offers and then pass to the former from the 
latter, though to the latter he says there is no 
beginning at all or any access apart from the former. 
10. He says c that he does not absolutely reject 
the practice of arguing the opposite sides of a 
question, but he recommends that this be used 

° S. V.F. ii, frag. 53 (p. 20, 10-14) and cf. ii, frag. 41. 
6 See note c on 1035 a-b supra. 

c to irpos ravavrla . . . avrals Aefecriv elpuKev — S.V.F. ii, 
frag. 127. 

<j>aoiv -g. 

; ovto) -all other mss. 



(1035) atveZ ix€t tvAafieias tboirep iv roZs hiKaoT7]piois 

1036 jJLrj fiera crvvrjyoplas dXXa StaAvovras olvtojv to m- 

davov il roZs /xey yap e7ro^?)y dyovac rrepl ttclvtwv 

€TTlf5dA\€l n (f)Tj(jl " TOVTO 7TOL€LV Kdl GVV€py0V €OTL 

TTpos o fiovAovrai 1 toZs 8* eVtcxTTy/xTp ivepya^ofjie- 
vois 2 kolO' TjV ofJLoXoyovfJievtos fiitoGOfjieOa, rdvavrta, 
GToiyziovv koI Karar^iyi^iv 3, tovs elcrayopLevovs 
air* apxfjs fi€%pi 4 tcAovs, e<£' tov Kaipos earc jivr)- 
oOrjvac Kal rcbv evavriojv Aoycov, SiaAvovras avra>v 
to TTidavov KaOdrrep Kal iv rots' oiKaorrjpLois " '• 
ravrl yap avraZs h Ae^eaiv etprjKev. 6 on fiev ovv 
(XT07709 7 ion tovs <j>iAooo<f>ovs rov ivavriov Aoyov 
olopievos* heZv ndevai firj fxerd owqyopias dAAd 

1 Kal ovvepyov . . . o fiouXovrat -omitted by g. 

2 £pya£,OfjL€i>ois -&■> z -> H. 

3 H. C. (cf. S.V.F. ii, p. 15, 25 and p. 16, 7-9 ; Wytten- 
bach's revision of Xylander's version : lk eosque quasi 
sepimento nmnire ") ; Karacrrixi^iv -X, 2:, d, v, z ; Kara- 
otolx^lv -all other mss. ; Karao^aXlieiv -Pohlenz (Hermes, 
lxxiv [1989], p. 9, n. 2) ; rd ev avrfj gtolx€lovv, /cat /caraarot^t^etv 

-Bourgeaud et Roussel, Rev. fitudes Grecquea^ Ixxxii (19(59), 
pp. 71-75. 

4 dxpi -d, v, z. 

5 iv rats -g, d, B. 

6 tiprjKa -g. 

7 aro-rros -X, g ; droirov -all other mss. 

8 ol6fM€vos -X, g ; olofievovs -all other mss. 

Arcesilaus and his circle in the Academy (cf Adv. 
Colotem 1120 c). Arcesilaus (316/15-241/40) succeeded 
Crates of Athens as head of the Academy, the " middle " 
Academy as it was later called because of the sceptical turn 
that he gave to it : WpxtoLXaos . . . 6 rfjs /^e'cn;? 'A/caS^/Was 
Kardp^as, irpwros l-niaxdiv rds a.iro<f>ao€LS oca rds ivaurLOTrjras 

TWV XoyOJV. TTpd)TOS 0€ KOL CIS €KO.T€pOV e7T€X€Lpr)G€ . . . (DiO" 

genes Laertius, iv, 28). See also Sextus, Pyrrh. Hyp. i, 


cautiously as it is in the court-room not by way of 
putting the case for them but by way of destroying 
their plausibility. " For," he says, " while that 
practice is incumbent upon those who in all matters 
observe suspension of judgment and is conducive 
to their purpose, it is, on the contrary, incumbent 
upon those who inculcate knowledge in accordance 
with which we shall live consistently b to instruct 
their pupils in the principles and to fortify them from 
beginning to end by destroying the plausibility of the 
opposite arguments, just as is done in the court-room 
too, when an opportunity arises to mention them 
also." This he has said in so many words. Now, 
that it is monstrous of him to believe it necessary for 
philosophers to state the opposite argument without 

220 and 232-234 ; Cicero, Acad. Post, i, 45-46 and Acad. 
Prior, ii, 15, 59, 67, and 103-104, De Finibus ii, 2, and tie 
Oratore iii, 67-68 with P. Couissin, Rev. de Philologie, 3 Ser. 
xi (1937), pp. 401-403. Couissin had already shown (Rev. 
iZtudes Grecques, xlii [1929], pp. 373-397) how Arcesilaus 
intended his e-mxeiprjcns els tKarepov to issue in the with- 
holding of assent from each of the opposite theses, the eVox?) 
Ticpl TrdvTwv which he developed out of Zeno's own theory in 
his polemics against Zeno (cf. Cicero, Acad. Prior, ii, 76- 
78 and Sextus, Adv. Math, vii, 150-158). Weische, while 
adopting Couissin's explanation, has recently attempted to 
derive from Peripatetic practice the method of Arcesilaus, 
who before entering the Academy was a pupil of Theo- 
phrastus (Cicero und die Neue Akademie, pp. 13-26, 50-54, 
68-82, 104-1 1 1). In the present passage, the source of which 
may be the Ilpos ro WpKcmXdov fieOoSiov (S. V.F. ii, p. 8, 20), 
Chrysippus probably meant his remark about the method of 
Arcesilaus ironically : "a method appropriate to an ir- 
responsible purpose " ; what Plutarch — or the Academics — - 
professed to think of Chrysippus* relation to the work of 
Arcesilaus and what the Stoics thought of it can be seen from 
1037 a infra and from De Co mm. Not. 1059 b respectively. 
* See note g on 1033 c supra. 



(1036) f / m % ^ f ! e, , y 


rrjv aArjOetav ctAAa Trepl vucrjs dycovi^opievovs , £i>pv)~ 
tou rrpos avrov 2 St' ereptov. on S' avros ovk eV 
oXiyois 3 aAAa uoXXa^ov rovs evavriovs of? 4 Soki- 
ixa^ei Xoyovs KareoKevaKtv eppajpLevous /cat pier a 
G7Tov8rjs /cat (friXonpiias rooavrrjs ware per) 7tolvt6s 
€lvoll KarapLaOelv rd dpeoKov avrol 6 SrjTrov Xeyovai, 


KapvedSrjv ovSev olopievoi Xeyeiv l8lov dXX* i£ &v 

€T7€)(<ELprjG€ Y^pVOtlTTTOS ft?' TOVVCLVTIOV 6ppL(l)pb€VOV 

iTTiTiOeadai rot? Xoyois avrov /cat 7roAAa/ctS" 8 napa- 

(f)6iyyea0ai " Scupiovie, <j>6loei ae to gov pLtvos," (bg 

C fieydXas dropped? /ca#' iavrov SiSovra rot? Kiveiv 

ra Soyuara /cat Sta/3aAAetv fiovXopi€vois. irrl Se 

1 kclkovvtols -X 3 , g ; kglkovvtol -all other mss. 

2 avrov -d, v, z ; avrtov -all other mss. 

3 Meziriac ; Aoyot? -mss. (c/. 1033 b supra). 

4 ous -X 3 , g, B. 

5 cc7roSo/a/uia£ei -X 3 (a7ro superscribed), g. 

6 mss. (ol in erasure -X 3 ) ; <avra>> avrol -lleiske (but see 
Quomodo Adulator ab Amico Internosc. 51 f and 53 a 1). 

7 if< -d, v, z. 

8 77oAAa/as ye -B. 

a In the Catalogue of Lamprias numbers 45 and 156, 
neither of which is extant, are entitled respectively Uepl rijs 
€LS €Ka.T€pov eVixeipTJoreajS" /fySAta e' and Et 7raai ovvrjyop-qreov. 
Pohlenz has suggested (Hermes, lxxiv [1939], p. 9) that it is 
one of these to which Plutarch here refers. See also number 
198 : Tie pi tcjv orvvrjyopovvrcov. 

h on o* avros . . . Sia/SaAAeiv Pov?xOfj,€vois = S.V.F. ii, frag. 

c Iliad vi, 407. Of. Cicero, Acad. Prior, ii, 87-88 where 
the Stoics are said to complain " ab eo [scil. Chrysippo] 



putting the case for it but after the fashion of 
barristers maltreating it like contenders for victory 
and not strivers after the truth, this retort has been 
made to him in other writings a ; but that he has 
himself in not a few but in many places b maintained 
arguments the opposite of those which he approves 
and has done so with such vigour, zeal, and con- 
tentiousness that to discern his opinion is not within 
the competence of everyone, — this surely is what 
the Stoics themselves mean by their admiration of 
the man's cleverness and by their belief that Car- 
neades says nothing original but attacks the argu- 
ments of Chrysippus by basing himself upon those to 
the contrary which Chrysippus devised and that in the 
aside which Carneades often utters, " Hapless thou 
art and thy strength will destroy thee," c he refers 
to Chrysippus as giving to those w r ho wish to upset and 
discredit his doctrines large means with which to 

armatum esse Carneaden." In De Comm. Not. 1059 e 
Carneades' simile of the self-devouring octopus is applied to 
the dialectic of Chrysippus, of whom the Stoics had just 
been said (1059 b-c) to boast that his replies to the arguments 
of Arcesilaus had providentially forestalled those of Car- 
neades. In a sense different from that here imputed by the 
Stoics to Carneades' use of Iliad vi, 407 the latter is said 
(Diogenes Laertius, iv, 62) to have acknowledged that he 
owed all his success to the works which Chrysippus had 
composed for him to refute, for this is the meaning of his 
verse, ei ^17 yap rjv Xpvoi7T7ros, gvk av rjv eyaS, a parody of that 
other famous tribute to Chrysippus, el fir) yap rjv XpyoLTrnog, 
ovk av tJv Lroa (Diogenes Laertius, vii, 1S3). For a good 
general account of Carneades (ca. 214/13-129/28), called 
the founder of the " third " Academy, see Robin, Pyrrhon, 
pp. 71-129 ; cf. also B. Wisniewski, Karneades Fragmerde : 
Text und Kommentar, Wroclaw/Warszawa/Krakow, 1970 
(Archiwum Filologiczne, xxiv), which is inadequate, how- 
ever, and to be used with caution. 



(1036) rolg 1 Kara rrjs avvrjOeias 2, eKhoQeloiv outoj? ko- 
jjlcooi koll fjLeyaXrjyopovoLV cooTe tovs tt&vtcov ojjlov 
tcov 'AKaSrjjjLa'CKtov Xoyovs els ravro ov[xcf)oprj6ev' 
tcls ovk a£tovs elvai TrapafiaXeiv ols XpvoiTTTros 
eypaipev els Sia^oXrjv rwv aloOiqoecov . kcli tovto 
{lev direipias tcov XeyovTcov 77 <f>iXc\VTias o'qfxelov io- 
tlv €K€ivo S' dXrjdes, otl fiovXrjdels clvOls ovvei- 
nelv rij GVV7]Qela /cat rats alodqoeoiv evdeeoTepos 
yeyovev avrov 3 koli to avvrayfia rod ovvraypia- 
tos pLaXaKcbrepov. wot* olvtov eavTco 4, fidxeudaL, 
D KeXevovTa fiev del TavavTca firj /xera ovvr)yopias 
dAAa fxeT evSel^ecos tov otl i/jev8rj s eoTi 7rapart- 
8eo6aiy tcov Se clvtov* Soy/xarcuv Kcvr-qyopov ovtol 
heivoTepov rj ovvrjyopov, kcxl <)>vXdTTeo9ai pcev ire- 
pots irapaivovvTa tovs els TavavTLa Xoyovs cos 
TTepioircovTCLS TTjv KcvrdXrufuv olvtov 6 8e tcov /3ej3cu- 


1 ttJs -d, v. 

2 rrjs ovvrjdetas -X, v, z, E, B (cf 1036 e and 1037 a 
infra) ; avvrjOeias -a, A, /?, y ; owr]6eiav -g, d. 

3 kavrov -g ; avrov -y. 

4 cV rco -y, E. 

5 ipcvSi] -X 3 (t} over erasure), g, B ; iftev&rjs -all other mss. 

6 iavrov -g ; avrcov -Tolet. 51, 5 ; avrov or avrov -all 
other MSS. 7 tou? ivavriovs -a, A, /?, y, E. 

8 auroi/ -X 3 (o in erasure), d, v, z ; aurtov -all other mss. 

irrl Se rots Kara. avvrjOeias . . . (ia\aKU)repov = S.V.F. 
ii, frag. 109 (p. 33, 31-37). Cf. Cicero, Acad. Prior, ii, 75 
and 87 (S.V.F. ii, p. 34, 8-21) and especially " ipsum sibi 
respondentem infer iorem fuisse " of § 87 with Plutarch's 
ivoeearepos yeyovev avrov . . . fiaXaKojrepov. Besides Aoyoi 
-napa. ras awrjOfias a' (S. V.F. ii, p. 6, 14), probably concerned 
with violations of linguistic usage and so irrelevant here, 
Diogenes Laertius (vii, 198 = 5. V.F. ii, p. 8, 22-23) lists 
among the writings of Chrysippus a work in six books Kara 


attack him. On the subject of his publications 
against common experience a they go so far in their 
vainglory and boastfulness as to assert that the 
arguments of all the Academics together rolled into 
one are not worth comparing with those that Chrysip- 
pus composed to discredit the senses. While that is 
another sign of the ignorance or the self-conceit of 
those who say so, this is true, that, when later he 
desired to speak on the side of common experience 
and the senses, he fell short of his own achievement 
and the second treatise was feebler than the first. 
So he is in conflict with himself b : while prescribing 
that the opposite side always be cited along with an 
indictment of its falsity and without putting the case 
for it, yet he is more clever as a prosecutor than as a 
defender of his own doctrines ; and, while exhorting 
others to beware of arguments for opposite sides of a 
question on the ground that they divert the appre- 
hension, yet he does himself more eagerly construct 
arguments that destroy apprehension than argu- 

rr\s owrjOetas and another in seven irtpl (v-ntp -Cobet) rfjs 
GwyQeias and before this (vii, 183) cites Sotion as stating 
that Chrysippus was associated with Arcesilaus and Lacydes 
in the Academy ol* fjv cutuxv ko! Kara rrjs gvvtjOclos ko.1 vTrep 
avrijs £77€x*lpyae ( a story rejected by Brehier, Chrysippe, p. 
11 ; but see von Arnim, R.-E. iii [1899], col. 2502, 43 ff. 
and Pohlenz, Stoa i, p. 29). For ovvrjSeia in this semi- 
technical sense in which it was attacked by the Sceptics and 
the Academics and defended by the Stoics see Epietetus, 
Diss, i, xxvii, 15-21 and A. Bonhoffer, Epictet unci die Stoa, 
pp. 8 and 129-130. 

6 a)(JT avrov iavrco {idxccrOai . . . ovvaiLiKcorepojv epajT^fMarcov 
(1036 e i?ifra) = S. V.F. ii, frag. 270. 

c For the role of /caraA^^ty in Stoic epistemology see 
Cicero, Acad. Post, i, 40-42 and Acad. Prior, ii, 145 ; Sextus, 
Adv. Math, vii, 151-152 and viii, 397-399. 



(1036) nOevra tovs avaipovvras . kclltol auro? 1 otl tovt* 
avro <f)of$<urai oacjxjjs vrroociKWcnv iv rep rerdprco 

TT€pL BtO>V, TCLVTCL ypd(f)COV' " OZ>X <*>$ ^ rv X € ^ Ov8i 

tovs evavrlovs 2 V7toS(?lkt€ov 3 Aoyov? ovSe (rd) 4 
E 77^09 rdvavTia mdavd dAX evAafiovp*ivovs ptrj /cat 5 
TrepiviracrdevTes* vir olvtojv ra? KaraArjipets d</>a>- 
aiv, ovrc' rtov Xvaecov iKavcJos dv aKovaai 8vvd- 
fxevot KaTaAapfidvovres r evarrooeiGTOJS' irrel Kal 
ol i<ard rrjv s ovvrjOeiav KaraAapL^dvovreg /cat rd 
ataOrjrd Kal raAAa ck tcov alaOrjoeajv paSt'to? rrpo- 
tevrac ravra, /cat vtto tcov MeyapiKtov ipojTrjpLaToov 
7T€pio7Ta)pL€vot Kal vtt dAAa>v TrAetovojv Kal 8wapu- 
KOJTepojv ipojTrjpLaTOJV." rjSeoos dv ovv 9 TrvQoiprqv 
tcov Htcoikcov el Ta Meyapt/cd ipcoTijpLara Svvapu- 
Kcorepa vopLi^ovoiv elvai tcov vrro y^pvaiTTrrov /card 
tt\s avvrjOelas iv e£ fiipAiois yeypapupLevcov. rj 
F tovto Trap' avTov yLpvocTrrrov Set ttvv9 dveoO at ; 
GKorrei yap ola rrepl tov MeyaptKOV Aoyov ye- 
ypatpev iv tco rrepl Aoyov Xprjoecos ovrcos 10 - " olov 
rt uvp^e^TjKe Kal irrl tov HtLAttcovos Aoyov Kal 

1 clvtos -Bernardakis ; avro -g ; omitted by other mss. 

2 ivavriov -X-^. . . ovs -X 3 ). 

3 vtto$€kt£ov -X^e 1 over ei erased), g, d, v. 

4 <ra> -Pohlenz ; 7rpoo<at<T€ov> -Reiske ; 7Tpoa<€Tea> 
-Wyttenbach (assuming vttoB€kt€ov instead of the correct 
viTohziKriov preceding). 5 /cat /at) -d, v, z. 

6 X 3 (last € over erasure), g, B ; TTtpiGTraobtvTas (. . . tt€tr 
oQevras -v) -all other mss. 7 Reiske ; ov$e -mss. 

8 Kara rrjv -X 1 , d, v, z, B ; Kara -erased by X 3 , omitted by 
g ; n)v -omitted by a, A, /?, y, E. 

9 ovv -omitted by A, /9, y, E. 

10 ovtos -X 3 (o over erasure), g, omitted by z. 

a rj&ews av . . . yeypafifidvwv^ S.V.F. ii, frag. 109 (pp. 33, 
38-34, 2) ; cf. S. V.F. ii, p. 8, 22 and note a on 1036 c supra. 



ments that confirm it. That he does fear this very 
thing, however, he clearly shows himself in the 
fourth book on Ways of Living, where he writes as 
follows : " The opposite arguments and the plausi- 
bilities on opposite sides are to be exhibited not at 
random but with care lest the hearers be diverted by 
them and actually lose hold of their apprehensions 
because they cannot understand the solutions ade- 
quately and have their apprehensions insecurely, 
since the very people who apprehend in accordance 
with common experience both sensible objects and the 
other things that depend on the senses easily give 
these up when diverted by the dialectical ques- 
tions of the Megarians or by others more numer- 
ous and more cogent." Well then, I should like to 
have the Stoics tell me whether they consider the 
Megarian questions to be more cogent than those 
against common experience which Chrysippus com- 
posed in six books. a Or should this question be put 
to Chrysippus himself? For look at the kind of 
things he has written about the Megarian reasoning 
in his treatise on Use of Discourse, to wit b : " Some- 
thing of the kind has happened also in the case of 
Stilpo's reasoning and that of Menedemus, c for, 

b S.V.F. ii, frag. 271 and Doring, Megariker, frag. 

c Stilpo (ca. 380-300), third head of the Megarian school, 
was in Athens about 320. Zeno studied with him for a while 
(cf. Diogenes Laertius, ii, 114 and 120 ; vii, 2 and 24 ; and 
S. V.F. i, frag. 11) ; and so also did Menedemus of Eretria 
(ca. 339/37-265/63), founder of the Eretrian school and 
statesman, who for political reasons later became a bitter 
enemy of Persaeus, the pupil of Zeno. On Stilpo see K. 
Praechter, R.-E., Zweite Reihe iii/2 (1929), cols. 2525, 23- 
2533, 20 ; and on Menedemus see K. von Fritz, R.-E. xv/1 
(1931), cols. 787, 54-794, 8. 



(1036) MeveSrjfiow acf)68pa yap errl oo<f>Lq yevopievajv 
avra>v €vS6£(ov, vvv ets* oveiSos avrcov 6 Aoyos 

7T€piT€TpaiTTaLy <I)S TWl/ 1 fl€V 7Ta^VT€pCOV 2 TCOV S' 

1037 €K<f)avtos 3 ao^L^opbevcov. 17 dpd ye* rovrovs pev, to 
fieAriare, rovs Aoyovs <Lv KarayeAas kcu KaAeis 
ovelSrj rtov ipojrcovrajv d)$ £p(f)avrj rrfv kclklolv 
k'xovras opucog Se'Stas* pirj rivas Trepiorrdoayaiv and 
rfjs KCLTaArjifjeajs avros 8e, roaavra /3i/3Aia ypd<f)a)v 
Kara rfjs avvrjdeias, ofs* o tl dvevpeg 5 TrpoaedrjKas, 
vrrepfiaAioOai <f)iAorLpLovp,€vos rov 'ApKecrlAaov, ov- 
Seva tcov evTvyxavovToiv emrapd^iv TrpooeSoKT)- 
oas ; ov8e yap iftiAols xPV raL ro ^ Kara rrjs* ovv- 
rjOetas €7nx €i PVI JiaaiV > &^& cboTrtp £v Slktj puera 
Trddovs 1 twos Gvv€7Tnrdox<*)V puopoAoytlv re rroA- 
Aa/a? Aeyet koi k€vokott€lv. 8 Iva roiwv prjo* dvrip- 
B p-qoiv aTToAirrrj rod rdvavria Aeyeiv, iv ptev rals 
(bvcLKais Qdcreac ravra yeypacfyev " k'orai 8e Kal 
KaraAapfidvovrds re TTpos rdvavria imx^ip^lv rrjv 
evovaav avvrjyopiav TrocovpLevovs 9 rrore 8' ouSere- 

1 TOV "g. 

2 Wyttenbach (but conjecturing to fitv ... to 8c for 
tcDv fiev . . . Toiv 8c) ; ra^vrcpov -X 1 , d, v, z ; 7raxvT€pov -X 3 
and all other mss. (cf. Apelt, PMlologus, lxii [1903], p. 287 : 
twv iikv iraxvTtpov tcjv 8' . . .). 3 £p,<j>avu)S -g« 

4 H. C. ; epya -mss. ; eha -Reiske. 

5 E ; oti av evpois -z ; tl avevpa -X 1 , d, v ; two. vevpa -X 3 , 
g; rt avevpcs -a, A, /?, y, B ; ct rt aycupcs 1 -Turnebus ; tiv 
dvatpovvTa -Apelt (Philology $, lxii [1903], pp. 287-288). 

6 Trjs -omitted hy a, A, £, y, E. 

7 fiddovs -Pohlenz, thus giving precisely the wrong sense, 
" serenity " or '* placidity " (cf. L. and S., Addenda, p. 2056 
*.*». Padvsi F. Zucker, Philologus, xciii [1938/39], pp. 34 
and 44) ; for ^erd rrddovs here cf. Plutarch, Brutus xxxiv, 
2 = 999 K. 

8 KcuvoK07T€iv -g\ corrected with c superscribed over a. 


though they had become very highly esteemed for 
skill, their reasoning has now redounded to their 
disgrace, some parts of it being considered clumsy 
and others manifest sophistry." a What, my dear 
sir, these arguments, which you deride and for their 
glaring defectiveness call the disgrace of their pro- 
pounders, these you still fear may divert people from 
their apprehension but that you would yourself 
disturb any of your readers by writing against 
common experience so many books, b where in your 
ambition to outdo Arcesilaus you added whatever you 
had invented, this you did not expect ? Of course 
not, for it is not merely the dialectical arguments 
against common experience that he employs either, 
but as if carried away by emotion in a law-suit he 
frequently exclaims with a kind of passion that it 
talks nonsense and is idle chatter. Then, to leave no 
possibility of denying that he contradicts himself, he 
has in his Physical Propositions written this c : Even 
when they have a definite apprehension it will be 
possible to argue to the contrary by making out such 
a case as the subject permits and sometimes to state 

° Cf. Cicero, Acad. Prior, ii, 75, where Stilpo, Diodorus, 
and Alexin us are called " minutos . . . quorum sunt contorta 
et aculeata quaedam Go^io^ara^ and Diogenes Laertius, ii, 
120 where Stilpo's dialogues are called " frigid." In 6 \6yos 
iT€pLT€TpaTTTai there is a double pun : upon the argument 
called 7repiTpo7Trj, " reversal," and upon their " reasoning " 
which was the reason for their " reputation." 

b avrds oe, TocravTa f3if$\la ypa<f><x>v . . . K€VOKOTTeZv= S.J r .F. 
ii, frag. 109 (p. 34, 2-7). The subject of utopoXoydv and 
K€voko7T€lp (for which cf. KOTTis and Acme, i [1918], p. 324) 
is, as Amyot saw, ovirfdciav. c S. V.F. ii, frag. 128. 

9 X 3 (ou9 over erasure), g; -nowv^evos -d, v, z, a, A ] (s 
changed to v ) ; notovficvov -J3, y, E, B. 



(1037) pov KaraXaptfidvovras 1 els eKarepov rd (ev)6vra 2 
Xeyecv." iv 8e rep 7T€pl rrjs rod Aoyov y^prjuecos, 
elircov cos ov 8ei rfj rod Aoyov 8vvdp,ei rrpos rd p,rj 
eirifidXXovra xPV G ^ at K ^6drrep ov8e orrXois, ravr 

i7T€lp7]K€' " TTpOS pieV ydp T7]V TCJV dXrjdcOV €Vp€GLV 

8et xPV a ^ aL a VTrj 3 kolI rrpos rrjv rovrcov ovyyv- 
pbvaoiav, i els rdvavria S' ov, ttoXXcov ttolovvtoov 


C aAA' etcelvoi fJLev ov8erepov KaraXapufidvovres els 
eKarepov 6 cirt^ccpouatv, cos €t ri KaraXrynrov €cr- 
tiv* ovrcos dv jjlovojs fj pudXtara KardXrjijjtv eavrrjs 
rrjv dXydecav Trapexovaav . ov 8e, 6 Kariqyopcov 
€Keivoov s avros re 9 rdvavria ypd<f>cov ots KaraXa^i- 
fidvecs 7T€pl 10 rrjs avvrjOeias erepovs re 11 rovro rroi- 
elv puer a ovvqyopias irporpeiropevos , ev axp^orots 
Kal fiXafiepois opboXoyels rfj rod Xoyov Swdpuec 
Xpoopievos V7TO c^cXorcpiias veavteveadai. 

1 X(s- possibly added by X 3 ), g, E, Aldine, Basil. ; nara- 
XafjfidvovTa -all other mss. 

2 R. M. Jones (c/. ivovoav supra) ; ovra -mss. 

3 X 3 ^ over erasure), g, E ; avrals -all other mss. (clvt" 
-a, A, y). 

4 Pohlenz (cf. Hermes, lxxiv [1939], p. 9, n. 2); avy- 
yeveiav -MSS. 

5 Emperius (Op. PhiloL, p. 340) ; S* -mss. ; deleted by 

6 €T€pOV -X, g, d. 

7 ei n -Meziriac (" si quid possit percipi " -Xylander's 
translation) ; con -mss. 

8 ionv . . . napexovoav -omitted by E with 1 \ lines blank. 

9 re -omitted by E. 


the possibilities on either side, though they have an 
apprehension of neither " ; and yet in his treatise on 
the Use of Discourse, after having said that the 
faculty of reason must not be used for inappropriate 
ends just as weapons must not either, he has added 
this statement a : ''It must be used for the discovery 
of truths and for their organization, not for the 
opposite ends, though this is what many people do." 
By " many people " he probably means those who 
suspend judgment. 5 They frame arguments on 
either side, however, without having an apprehension 
of either, their notion being that, if anything is 
apprehensible, only or especially in this way would 
the truth yield an apprehension of itself c ; but you 
who denounce them, when on the subject of common 
experience you write the opposite to what you 
apprehend and exhort others to do this with a show 
of making out a case, you do yourself confess that 
from ambition you are showing off by using the 
faculty of reason in ways unprofitable and harmful. 

° S. V.F. ii, frag. 129. 

6 See note a on 1036 a supra. 

c Cf. Cicero, Acad. Prior, ii, 7 (". . . neque nostrae dis- 
putationes quicquam aliud agunt nisi ut in utramque partem 
dicendo eliciant . . . aliquid quod aut verum sit . . .") and 
Tusc. Disp. ii, 9 (**. . . in contrarias partis disserendi . . . 
quod aliter non posset quid in quaque re veri simile esset 
inveniri . . ."), which resemble more closely the reason here 
imputed by Plutarch to the Academics in defence of their 
method than do such passages as Be Prima Frigldo 955 c, 
De Defectu Orac. 431 a, and Quaest. Conviv. 700 b (Schroeter, 
Plutarchs Stellung zttr Skcpsis, pp. 40-11 ; cf. De Lacy, 
Class. Journ., xlix [1953/54], pp. 82-85). 

10 rrapa -d, z. 
11 re -omitted by E ; Se -z. 



(1037) 11. To KaropOayfJid 1 <j>aai vojxov rrpooTaypia et- 
j>cu to 8e dpLapTrjpa vofiov arrayopevpa, 8lo tov 
D vopiov TToXXd rots <f>avXois arrayopeveiv TTpoordr- 
reiv oe prjSiv ov yap Svvavrat 2 KaropOovv. /cat 
tis ovk otSev on ra> /jltj Svvapeva) Karopdovv d8v- 
varov ear i p,r) d/xapravetv; avrov ovv aura> iia- 


TToielv dhvvarovoLv drrayopevovra oe a>v air^eadac 
pfY) ovvavrai' 6 yap pirj ovvdpizvos aaxjypovelv dv- 
OpujTros* ov hvvarai per) aKoXaaraiveiv , i<al 6 pbrj 4, 
hvvdpievos <f>poveiv ov Svvarac prj d(f>paiveiv . avroi 
ye prjv Xeyovcri tovs array opevovTas dXXo p,ev Ae- 
yecv dXXo S' arrayopeveiv dXXo 8e rrpoordrreiv' 6 
yap Xeyojv l firj KXeiprjs " Xeyei puev avro tovto 
E " pxf KXdifsr)S " 6 a/irayop€V€i 8e (KXerrTeiv Trpoordr- 
T€i oe) 7 pirj KXerrTeiv. ov8ev ovv array opevaei TOLS 
t^auAois" o vopios el pr]8e 9 rrpoord^ei. ert 9 /cat tov 
laTpov Tip pLadrjTjj rrpoaTaTTeiv Xeyovoi repieiv /cat 
/caucrat /caret rrapaXeiifjiv™ tov evKalpcog /cat /ze- 
Tpiojs Kal tov piovoiKov Xvpiaai /cat aaat /caret 

1 Karopfia -X ^corrected with da> superscript -X 3 ). 

2 hvvarai -B. 3 avOpcorros -omitted by d, V, z. 

4 fii] -omitted by E. 

5 to fj.rj -d, v. 

6 Xeyct fxev . . . KXctpTjs -omitted by g. 
*<...> -added by Meziriac. 

8 firjSe -d, v, z ; §e fx-q -all other mss. ; [Sc] -Turnebus ; 
kolI ixi] -Reiske ; ye fxr) -Wyttenbach. 

9 7rpo<yra^€i. en -X, g, d, V, z, a, B ; irpooTa^eU n -A, jS, 
y, E. 10 rrapdXrjipcv -g, a 1 . 

° S. V.F. iii, frag. 520. Of. Pohlenz, Stoa ii, p. 75, U 1 
and Kidd, Class. Quart., N.S. v (1955), p. 193, n. 10, both 
of whom cite S.V.F. iii, frag. 519 against Plutarch's argu- 
ment in this chapter. For the relation of v6p,os and KaropOwp-a 



11. Right action, they say, a is what law prescribes 
and wrong what it prohibits ; that is why the law has 
many prohibitions for the base but no prescriptions, 
for they are incapable of right action. And who does 
not know, then, that for one incapable of right action 
it is impossible not to go wrong? So they reduce the 
law to the inconsistency of prescribing what people 
are incapable of doing and prohibiting what they 
cannot avoid, for the man who cannot be sober cannot 
help being intemperate and the man who cannot be 
sensible cannot help being foolish. Yet they them- 
selves say b that those who pronounce a prohibition 
say one thing, prohibit another, and prescribe a 
third : for example, he who says " do not steal " says 
just this, " do not steal," but he prohibits {stealing 
and prescribes^) not stealing. The law, then, would 
not be prohibiting the base anything without also 
prescribing. Furthermore, they say c that the 
physician's prescription to his pupil to cut and 
cauterize is given with ellipsis of the phrase " in due 
time and measure " and the musician's to play the 
lyre and sing with ellipsis of the phrase " in tune and 
in time " ; that is why the pupils who have performed 

see 1041 a-b infra (S.V.F. iii, frag. 297) and S.V.F. iii, 
frag. 502 ; and besides these for Kar6pBwp.a y which, as being 
not merely " appropriate " but also motivated by right inten- 
tion, is possible only for the sage, since such intention 
implies integral virtue, which is the result of having appre- 
hended the laws of life as a whole, see S. V.F. iii, frags. 11, 
13, 494, 498, 500 (<?/ Festugiere, Class. Phil, xlviii [1953], 
p. 238, n. 2), 501, and 517 ; van Straaten, Panetius. pp. 195- 
197 ; Kidd, Class. Quart., N.S. v (1955), pp. 186-187. 

b S. V.F. ii, frag. 171. Cf. Mates, Stoic Logic, p. 1 1, n. 6. 

c koI rov larpov . . . irpoordyyara roiavr elvai^S. V.F. iii, 
frag. 521. Of this only tov larpov . . . ovk 6p6a>s eVot^crav is 
a paraphrase of what the Stoics said and so a " fragment." 



(1037) rrapaXeajjiv 1 rod epLpLtX&s /cat avfufycovcos, Sto rovg 
ravra Troirjaavras arexycos f<al kclkcos KoXd^ovoLV 
[cos*] 2 TTpoaerdxOr] yap (cos) 6p6a)s, ol S' ovk 
6p6cQ$* eTToirjaav. ovkovv /cat 6 aocf)6s rco 9epd- 
7TOVTI TTpOOTaTTCOV etrrclv rt /cat Trpd^ai /caV 4 /xt) 
evKaipajs rovro Trpd^rj pbrjSe ojs Set KoXd^wv 8rj- 
A09 ecrrt pteoov 7Tpoordrra>v 3 ov KaropOwpia 5 ' el 8e 
F /xe'aa 6 irpoordrrovuiv ol oo<f>ol rocs (f>avXois, rl klo- 
Xvei /cat rd 1 rod vopiov rrpoordypiara roiadr elvat; 
/cat psqv rj opfirj, Kara y* avrov, rod dvOpcorrov 
Xoyos iorl irpoorariKos avra> 8 rod 7tol€lv, ojs iv 
tw 9 Trepi Nopiov yeypa<f)€v. ovkovv /cat rj dc^opprj 
Xoyos arrayopevriKos , /cat rj e/c/cAtcrt? 10 {, evXoyos 
y ovoa- rfj ope^ct yap evavrta- rj 8' evXdfleta 
1038 Ko.r avrov") 11 evXoyos 12 e/c/cAtatS'. 10 /cat rj evXdfieia 

1 7rapdXrjijjLV -X 1 , g. 

2 <vs -omitted by z, deleted by Meziriac and Reiske ; 
transposed after ydp -H. C. ; retained by Pohlenz, who with 
Sieveking changes yap to p.kv. 

3 6p6a>s ovk -g. 4 av -X 3 (*r erased), g. 

5 fjicaov . . . KaropOajfia -Madvig (Adversaria Critiea i, 
p. 667) ; KaropOojfjia Trpoordrriov ov fidaov ([idowv -X, g, d ; 
/xeya -z) -MSS. 

6 Xy lander ; /xeya -mss. 7 ra -omitted by g. 
8 avrov -n, E. 9 to -g. 

10 ckkXktls (twice) -Turnebus ; cy/cAiais -mss. 

11 H. C. ; <rj Be evXdfieia} -von Arnim ; <d(f>opp,rjs yap eonv 
elbos' 7} b* evXdfieia /car' aurov> -Pohlenz. 

12 X, E ; dXoyos ~g ; /cat evXoyos -d, v, a, A, y, B : Kai rj 
evXoyos ~/3» z. 

The Stoic sage, being infallible (cf. e.g. S. V.F. iii, frag. 
548), knows that the non-wise cannot perform right action ; 
and so he would not prescribe it. What he prescribes and 
holds a servant responsible for, therefore, can only be " in- 
termediate " actions. For this term and concept in Stoic 
ethics cf. S. V.F. i, frag. 231 and iii, frags. 494, 496, 498, 515, 


inartistically and poorly are chastised, for " cor- 
rectly " was implied in the prescription and they 
performed incorrectly. Well then, the sage also in 
prescribing some word or action to his servant whom 
he chastises if it is not performed at the right time 
and as it should be is clearly prescribing intermediate 
action and not right action a ; but, if sages prescribe 
intermediate actions to the base, what prevents the 
contents of the law too from being prescriptions of 
that kind ? What is more, he holds, 6 as he has written 
in his treatise on Law, that impulse in man is reason 
prescriptive of action for him. Well then, repulsion 
is prohibitive reason and so is avoidance <(, at least 
when it is rational (for it is opposite to conation) ; 
and caution is according to him) rational avoidance. 

522 ; Hirzel, Untersuchungen, ii, p. 45, n. 1 (on p. 46) ; and 
Bonhoffer, Die Ethik . . ., pp. 208-212. 

6 i.e. Chrysippus does, /ecu firjv ... a €v\aj!jovvTcu = S. V.F. 
iii, frag. 175 (though the " fragment " is really only i) 
opfii) . . . rov 7tol€iv). Plutarch, having just proved that 
contrary to the Stoic assertion the law on Stoic principles 
can contain positive prescriptions for the base, now proceeds 
in similar fashion to show that it can contain prohibitions 
for the sage, although the Stoics deny this too (cf. S. V.F. 
iii, frags. 519 and 590). 

c For this Stoic definition of caution (cuAa^eia) cf. S. V.F. 
iii, frags. 275 (p. 67, 42-43), 431 (p. 105, 18-19), 432 (p. 105, 
29), 41 1, and 438 (p. 107, 10-14). In the last two places fear 
is defined as irrational avoidance, so that the avoidance 
which Plutarch here says is prohibitive reason must be 
limited to that which is euAoyoj. That it is prohibitive 
would follow from the fact that, avoidance being the con- 
trary of conation (Spelts, cf. Simplicius, In Epicteti Ench. 
i, l = 8a [p. 17, 2-4, Schweighaeuser = p. 4, 25-28, Dubner]) 
and conation rational impulse or a species of it (S. V.F. iii, 
p. 115, 38-39 and p. 40, 8-9), impulse itself, as has just been 
said, is according to Chrysippus Xoyos irpoaraTLKos. The 
Stoics used 6pp,y — and so also dfoppuj — in wider and nar- 



(1038) Toivvv Xoyos eorlv aTrayopevriKos 1 tcj aocf)cp' to 
yap tvXajSelodai aofitov loiov, ov cf>avXcov, eoriv. el 
jxev ovv erepov iartv 6 rov 2 ao<f>ov Xoyos /cat 3 ere- 
pov 6 vojios, p.ayo\ievov rep vopap \6yov ol oo(j>oi 
ttjv evXdfietav eypvaiv el 8 ovk dXXo re vop,os 
iarlv t) 6 rov aocpov Xoyos, evprjrou vopcos array o- 
pevaiv rols oo(f)oZs TTOcelv 4, a 5 evXafiovvrat, . 

12. Tots' <f>avXois ov&ev etvai xprjcripiov 6 Xpu- 
oittttos (farjoiv oz)S' ex^iv xpzlav rov cfravXov 6 ov- 
Sevos ouSe heloOai. ravra 8' elrrcov ev rep rrpcorcp 
7T€pl 7 KaTopdajfidrajv avdts X4yei /cat rr)v evxprj- 

GTLOJV /Cat T7jV X^P lV € ^ T< * ^Oa Sl(lT€W€LV, d)V 

B ov8iv eon xP 7 ] <Jt l J ' ov KCLT avrovs. /cat pi)v oi)S' 
olk€lov ovSe appLorrov ovSev* etvai rep cf>avXcp (firjalv 
ev rovrois' " Kara ravra 9 Se rep pcev aoreicp dXXo- 

1 airayopzvTiKOS ianv -E. 

2 ooov -E. 

3 /cat erepov . . . o rov oofov -omitted by d. 

4 d-nayoptvTiKos tols oo<j>ols rod rroieiv -g (cf. Pohlenz- 
Westman, Moralia vi/2, pp. 225-226 and p. 230). 

5 S. 7TOL€tV -B. 

6 tov cf>avXov -X, g, d, v, z, B ; tcov <f>avXcov -all other mss. 

7 n€pi -d, v, z (cf. 1068 a infra) ; tcov -all other mss. ; 
TT€pl tcov -Reiske. 

8 ovb€v -omitted by B. 

9 KaTQ. Taurd (raura -d, v, z) -X, g, B ; kclt avTa -all other 


rower senses (cf. S.V.F. iii, frag. 169), and it is only as 
occurring in rational animals (cf. tov dvOpcorrov in Plutarch's 
citation of Chrysippus here) that it is defined as Xoyos 


a Cf. Cicero, Tusc. Lisp, iv, 1S = S.V.F. iii, p. 107, 11-12. 
b Cf. S.V.F. iii, frags. 316, 613, and 614. 
c S. V.F. iii, frag. 674 (p. 168, 27-36). Cf. Be Comm. Not. 
1068 a-c and Seneca, Epistle ix, 14 (both quoted in S.V.F. 



And consequently caution is prohibitive reason for 
the sage, since to be cautious is characteristic of 
sages and not of the base. a If, then, the sage's 
reason is one thing and the law another, the caution 
that sages have is reason in conflict with law ; but, 
if law is nothing other than the sage's reason, 6 it 
turns out that law does prohibit sages from doing 
things of which they are cautious. 

12. Chrysippus says c that to the base nothing is 
serviceable and that there is nothing for which the 
base man has any use or need. After stating this in 
the first book concerning Right Actions he says later 
on that both utility and gratification extend to the 
intermediates,** none of which according to the Stoics 
is serviceable. Moreover, that nothing is either 
congenial e or appropriate to the base man he states 
in these words : " As nothing is repugnant to the 

iii, frag. 674) and Shorey's concise explanation with his 
references in Class. Phil., vi (1911), pp. 477-178. 

d Cf. De Coram. Not. 1008 e. For ra fxcaa, " inter- 
mediates," see the references in note a, page 450 supra, and 
for €vxpr\<JTia cf. evxprjOTos in De Comm. Not. 1066 b, 1068 a, 
1070 a ; evxprjGTjjfiaTa in Cicero, De Finibus iii, 69 ; and 
Porphyry, De Abstinent la iii, 20 (p. 210, 6-7 [Nauck]) : 
♦ . . <to> rrjs (IxffeXeias, fjv €i>xpw<JTiav ovroi Xiyovoiv, . . . 

e For the Stoic theory of oUciaiois and its terminology see 
the concise note by M. H. Fisch in A.J. P., lviii (1937), 
pp. 149-150, the excursus by Grumach, Physis und Agathon, 
pp. 76-77, the articles by C. O. Brink in Phronesh, i (1955/ 
1956), pp. 123-145 (especially pp. 123-124 and 139-144) and 
H.S.C.P. lxiii (1958), pp. 193-198, and those by S. G. 
Pembroke in Problems in Stoicism ed. A. A. Long (London, 
1971), pp. 114-149 and by G. B. Kerferd in Bulletin of the 
John Rylands University Library, lv, No. 1 (1972), pp. 177- 
196. With S. V.F. iii, frag. 178 compare the theory of A. N. 
Whitehead summarized by Morton White, The Age of 
Analysis (Boston, 1955), p. 87. 



(1038) rpiov ovSev tcq Se 1 (f>avXa) ov8ev ot/cetoV 2 iartv, 
€7T€tS'}] to fJLev dyadov to Se kclkov Iotlv clvtcjjv" 


vrj Ala 3 Kal tjOikco ypdcf>a>v ojs oiKeiovpieOa irpos 
auTou? evOvs yevo/xevot Kal to, /xepTj Kal id e/cyova 
to, €avTU)v ; iv Se toj rrpa)TO) Trepl AiKaioovvrjs Kal 
ra Orjpla (f>y]cl o^>/x^zeVpa;s , tjj XP € ^ a T ^ )V ^Kyovojv 
<I)K€ia)o8aL i irpos avT(i, 5 rrXrjv tG)v IxOvojv avTa. 
ydp ra KvrjfiaTa Tpecf>€Tai St' avTwv. aAA' ovt 
C alaOrjois Igtiv ots' pfnhev al&drjTov ovt* oik€iojois 
ots firjSev oIkcZov rj ydp oIkciojois olodrjois eot/ce 
tov olkelov Kal dvTiArjifjis etuat. 

13. Kat(rot) 6 to Soy/xa tovto tois KvpiaiTaTocs 

€7T6fJL€v6v €OTL, Kal y^pVGlTTTTOS , €1 Kal 77oAAa TTpOS 

TovvavTiov yeypacf)€, 8rjA6s e'art TrpooTiOepievos toj 
\ir\T€ KaKiav /ca/ctas" rj afiapriav dpiapTiag virep- 
iyovoav clvai psfyr apCTTjv dptTfjs 77 KaTopOtooiv 
KaTopdtooeojs* os 1 ye (firjoiv eV Tip TpcTto irepl 

$>VO€a>S' " 0)077€p Tip All 7TpOOr\Kei G€(JLVVV€o6ai 

€(/>' avTco 8 re /cat tco jSta) /cat 9 txe'ya <f>pov€iv /cat, el 
1 Se -omitted by g (the preceding ph superscript above 

aOTtlCo). 2 OLKGLOV OuBeV "g. 

3 vrj Ala -Reiske ; i5to> -d, v, z ; tSta -all other mss. (<f>v- 
GLKcp Kal rjdiKtp t'Sta -g) ; <ra> iota -R. G. Bury (cf. H. West- 
man, ^/c£a Acad, Aboensis Hum.,, xxiv, 2 [1959], pp. 3-4; 
but for arroKvaUiv without object see 1043 e infra and 
Moralia 628 c and 961 c). 

4 cjKZioMjaoOai -g ; aWitucrai -d, v, z. 

5 aurous -d, v. 6 Pohlenz ; /cat -mss. 

7 os -d, v, z ; os . . . Ouoecos -omitted by g ; ojs -all other 


8 Meziriac ; eV avra> -mss. 

9 Kal -omitted by g, B. 

° 5. F.F. iii, frag. 179. 
6 S. V.F. ii, frag. 724 ; c/. Cicero, De Nat. Deorum ii, 129. 



decent man, in the same way nothing is congenial to 
the base, since the latter property is good and the 
former bad." Why then again in every book of 
physics, yes and of morals too, does he keep writing 
ad nauseam that from the moment of birth we have 
a natural congeniality to ourselves, to our members, 
and to our own offspring ? a In the first book con- 
cerning Justice he says b that even the beasts have 
been endowed with congeniality to their offspring in 
proportion to its need, except in the case of fishes, 
for their spawn is nourished of itself. Yet there is 
neither sensation in subjects for which no object is 
sensible nor congeniality in those to which nothing 
is congenial, for congeniality seems to be sensation 
or perception of what is congenial. 

13. This doctrine is a consequence, however, of 
their fundamental principles ; and Chrysippus, 
though he has written much to the contrary, clearly 
adheres to the proposition that there is no greater 
and less either in vice and wrong-doing or in virtue 
and right action. d In fact, he says in the third book 
concerning Nature e : " As it befits Zeus to glory in 
himself and in his way of life and to be haughty and, 

c Cf. Porphyry, Be Abstinentla iii, 19 (p. 209, 2-5 
[Nauck]) : rots Se ovOev Zctlv alaO-qrov, ovtws &€ ovSe aXXorpiov 
. . . zeal yap oi/ccidjcreaj? rrao-qs /cat dXXoTpLCoaccvs o-pXV TO dlaOd- 
vecrOm. See also S. G. Pembroke in Problems in Stoicism, 
p. 118; and for the term avrlXruJiis cf. O. Luschnat, Pro- 
legomena ii (1953), pp. 32-33. 

d Cf. S. V.F. iii, frags. 525, 527-529, and 531-533. From 
this it follows that there can be nothing bad about the good 
man (and so nothing repugnant) and nothing good about 
the base (and so nothing congenial). 

e S. V.F. iii, frag. 526. Cf. De Comm. Not. 1076 a-b ; 
Stobaeus, Eel. ii, pp. 98, 14-99, 2 (Wachsmuth) ; S. V.F. 
iii, frag. 764. 



(1038) Set ovtojs tlnelv, vxfjavx^velv 1 Kal Kofidv /cat /xeya- 

Arjyopeiv, d^iws fiiovvTt pLtyaArjyoplas , ovtu> toZs 

D ayadols iraai ravra 7Tpoar)K€i, kclt ovSev irpo- 

exofjievoLS vtto tov Aid?." dAA' auTo? ye ttoXlv iv 

Tip TpLTCQ 7T€pl AlKaiOOVVTjS (f>T]alv OTL TTJV 2 SlKCUO- 

avvrjv dvaipovoiv ol reAos VTTOTiOepievoi rrjv rjSovrjv 
ol Se jiovov ayadov elvat Aeyovres ovk dvaipovoiv* 
eari Se ravrl rd 3 Kara Ae'^tv " rd\a yap ayadov 
avrrjs* aTroAzLTTopLevrjs reAovs Se prq rtov Se St' 
avrtov 6 alperwv ovtos 1 Kal rod KaAov 8 ocp^oipiev av 
ttjv SiKaioovvrjv, fiel^ov ayadov aTToAirrovres to 
/caAov Kal to SiKaiov Trjs rjSovrjs" dAA' et'rrep 
fiovov to KaAov dya96v 9 cotlv, dpiapTavei piev 6 ttjv 
rjSovrjv ayadov 10 dirocjyaivoov tjttov Se dpuapTavei tov 
E Kal re'Aos avTrjv 11 ttolovvtos' dvatpet yap ouro? ttjv 
SiKaioovvrjv zkcIvos Se 12 a<o£ei, Kal /card tovtov rj 
Koivojvia <j)povh6s eari Kal a77oAa>Aev d Se 13 XP 7 )' 
otottjtl Kal (f)iAavdpa)7Tia yoypav SiSwoiv. ert to 
fjiev Ae'yetv avTOv iv ra> 14 nepl tov A109 " av^eodai 

1 vijjavxeiv -a, A, /?, y, E, B ; vipavxtw re -n. 

2 rrjv -omitted by a, A, £, y, E. 

3 ravrl ra -X, g, B ; ravra ra -d, V ; ravra -z ; ravrl -a, A, 
y, E ; raoro -j9. 

4 avrrjs -X 3 (s* added in erasure), g, d, v, z ; avrij -all other 


5 Te'Aos* -y, n, E, Tolet. 51, 5. 

6 aurwv -X, z, E (<*/. 1040 c infra) ; aurojv -a, A, /?, y, B ; 
auro -g, d, v ; aura -Stephanus (rf. 1043 u infra : iv ra> 
7T€pl rcov At' aura alperwv). 

7 Reiske (<*/. 1040 c Infra) ; ovtojs- -X ; oVrojv -all other 


8 Kal KaXcov -g. 

9 KaXov Kal ayadov -X, g. 

10 dyaflov -omitted by g. 

11 aim?*' -X 3 , g, z, E ; 00x77 (or avrij) -all other mss. 



if it must be said, to carry his head high and plume 
himself and boast, since he lives in a way worth 
boasting about, so does this befit all good men, since 
they are in no wise surpassed by Zeus." Yet again 
in the third book concerning Justice he says himself a 
that justice is annulled by those who set up pleasure 
as a goal but not by those who call it only a good. 
Here is his statement verbatim : " For, if it is held 
to be a good but not a goal and if the fair too is 
among the things that are of themselves objects of 
choice, we could perhaps preserve justice by main- 
taining that the fair and just is a greater good than 
pleasure." If, however, only the fair is good, 6 the 
man who declares pleasure to be good errs, to be 
sure, but errs less than the one who makes it a goal 
as well, for the latter annuls justice but the former 
preserves it and by the doctrine of the latter society 
is over and done for but the former leaves room for 
goodness and humaneness. Further, while I pass 
over his remark in the treatise on Zeus that " the 

a What follows is repeated in 1040 c infra ; and the 
words of Chrysippus are paraphrased in De Comm. Not. 
1070 d. The three passages are given by von Arnim as 
S. V.F. iii, frag. 23 (p. 8, 10-21). 

b As the Stoics maintained : cf. 1039 c and S. V.F. iii, 
frags. 30-32. 

c Cf. Cicero, De Officiis iii, 118 (" Iustitia vacillat vel 
iacet potius omnesque eae virtutes quae in communitate 
cernuntur et in societate generis humani . . .") and Acad. 
Prior, ii, 140 (S. V.F. iii, p. 7, 37 ff.). According to the 
Stoics xpV aT ° T VS an d cvKOLvcovrjala are subdivisions of BtKaio- 
ovvr) (S. V.F. iii, frag. 264) and so would be involved in its 

12 Sc -omitted by a, A. 

13 Wyttenbach ; o 817 -X, g, d, v, z ; a> &rj -a, A, 0, y, E ; 
a 817 -B. 14 iv rep -omitted by E. 



(1038) tcls dperds /cat StajSatWiv " d^i^/xt pur) Sd£a> rwv 

OVO\l6jTLOV X €7Tl\afjLfidv€odcU, KdLTOL TTLKpwg 2 €V TO) 

yeVet rovrcp /cat HXdrajva /cat tovs aAAovs rod 


t6(jl€vov /car' dperrjv KeAevcov €fjL<f>aiv€i rtvd rtov 
KaTopdajfidrcjov hia<f)opdv. Ae'yet Se ovtojs iv rai 3 
F rrepl rod Aids' * " epycov yap /card rds dperds ovrcov 
ouceicov 4, eon rd <ju/>]) TTpoeveydevTo^ kolI tovtcov 
olov 6 dv8p€LO)s top SaKTvAov €KT£Lvau /cat iyKpartos 
aTTooxevdcu 8vadavard)arjs ypaos" /cat drrpoTTTcoTajs 7 
d/couaat rod rd rpia reooapa [pur}]* elvai reAecos 9 ' 
- — Ttvd 10 £pL(f)aiv€L ifjvxptav 6 Std rcov tolovtojv €7t- 
1039 atvetv Tivas ey^ctpco^ /cat ey/ca>/xtd£etv. nl1 ouota S' 
e'lprjrai tovtois eV rep rpirco rrepl Qecjv " ert yap 
olfiai" cf)Tjal ' l rovs irraCvovs 1 ' dAAorptcoaca^at Kara 13 

1 OfJLfKlTCOV "g. 2 TTLKpOS -a. 

3 iv to) -omitted by B. 4 Wyttenbach ; olkziov -mss. 

5 4Wt rd </Lt7j> . . . -H. C. ; icrrl tol TTpoevexOevra (irpoa- 
vexdtvra -g) -mss.; iari riv drroTTpoax^vra -Pohlenz (Hermes, 
lxxiv [ 1939], p. 10, n. 1) ; but the examples given are actions 
Kara rds dperds and so cannot be d-rro-n-poaxflevTa {cf. S. V.F. 
iii, p. 29, 31-38). For the meaning of npoeuexdivra here see 
Plutarch, Pelopidas 289 a and Aristotle, Categories 4 a 12. 

6 otov -omitted by y, n, E, Tolet. 51,5. 

7 d vac. 4 ojtttojs -d, v, z. 

8 [. . .] -deleted by Wyttenbach. 

9 XiyovTos -Wilamowitz ? reAe'cu? <re> -Pohlenz. 

10 riva -X, g ; nvd (or rtva) -all other mss. 

11 eyKCDfjud&tv -X 3 (et over erasure), g, 13 ; iyKojpLid^ojv -all 
other mss. 

12 i-rraivovs . . . avfiflaLvovTOJv -omitted by y and added at 
foot of column but with omission of Kara. 

13 Kara -omitted by y (see preceding note on eVcuVous-)* n, 
E, Tolet. 51,5. 

S. V.F. iii, frag. 226. Cf. Cicero, De Fintbus iii, 48 
(S. V.F. iii, p. 142, 19-20) ; and for the sense in which this 


virtues wax and expand " a — for I would not give the 
impression of cavilling at words, although Chrysippus 
attacks Plato and the rest tooth and nail in this 
way — , yet by his injunction not to praise every act 
performed in accordance with virtue he indicates that 
there is some difference in right actions. This is 
what he says in the treatise on Zeus b : " For, 
although deeds done in accordance with the virtues 
are congenial, even among these there are those that 
are (not) cited as examples, such as courageously 
extending one's finger and continently abstaining 
from an old crone with one foot in the grave and 
hearing without precipitate assent that three is 
exactly four c ; — one who undertakes to praise and 
eulogize people by means of such examples gives 
evidence of a kind of insipidity." A similar state- 
ment is made in the third book on the Gods. " For 
furthermore I think," he says,<* " that there would be 

was meant cf. Seneca, Epistle lxxiv, 28. For the meta- 
phorical use of hiafialvuj see Plutarch's reference to another 
statement by Chrysippus (S. V.F. ii, p. 32, 14-15) and 
Plutarch himself, De Vitando Aere Alieno 829 e. 

6 S.V.F. iii, frag. 211. 

c a-npoTTTojoia is the disposition of withholding assent until 
a clear apprehension is present but only so long (S. V.F. ii, 
frags. 130 and 131 [p. 39, 22-23 and p. 40, 9-161). The 
present example must be a case of withholding assent which, 
though right, requires no more exertion of this virtue than 
the abstention from an old crone requires of iyKpdreta. Such 
would be deliberate reserve of assent when presented with a 
statement so obviously false that in De Co nun. Not. 1078 a it 
is given as an extreme example of the inconceivable. 

d S.V.F. iii, frag. 212. In De Coram. Not. 1061 a this 
quotation and that immediately preceding it are conflated 
and paraphrased. Since it is a paraphrase, there is no 
justification for the many attempts to emend the language 
of the present passage to conform to it. 



(1039) ra rotaura rtov crvpL^aivovrajv an apcrfjs, olov 
Svcrdavartoorjs ypaos arroox^odo.i /cat Kapreprjaai 1 
jxvias SrjypLov." riv ovv odros aXXov Karrjyopov 2 
Trepipievei rtov avrov Soyfidrcov; el yap if/vxpos 
eartv 6 ravr eTraivcov, ttoXXlo Stjttov ipvxporepos 6 
rovrojv ocacrrov av 3 Karopdcofia /cat fieya /cat fxe- 
yiorov* elvai ri6ej.i€vos % el yap taov 5 iorl rep (aV- 
Speltos r€fiv6jjievov /cat Kaiofievov hiaKaprepelv /cat 
tw aweppovojs AatSos rj Opvvrjs aTroaxeaOai r6y 
avSpelws 6 Srjyfia pivias eveyKelv /cat ro acocf>p6va>s 
aTtooyeadai rrjs ypaos y ovSev ot/xat Siacpcpet rov 
oiTov&alov cx7to rovra>v rj a7r IkcLvlov €7ratV€U70at . 
B en roivvv iv 7 rep Sevrepcp rrepl <&tAtas- StSaa/ca>v 
tbs ovk errl iraoi Set rols ap,aprr)\xaoi ras cf)iXtas 
SiaXveoOai raurat? Kexp^jrai ralg Ae'^ear " npoa- 
7]K€l yap ra pcev oXcos TrapaTrepLrreodac ra Se pui- 
Kpas imarpocprjs rvyx&veiv ra 8e /cat €ttI r fxet^ov 
ra 5e oAa>s ScaXvaeajs a£iovodaL. n o 8e rovrov 
jtiet£ov ear iv, iv ravrcp c^-naty ort rot? pXv e'm 
7rAetov Tot9 8' eV eXarrov ovpLpaXov/JLev, tocrre rovs 
fjiev jidXXov rovs Se rjrrov cplXovs elvat* errl rroXv 
8e rrjs roiavrrjg irapaXXayrjs ytyvofievrjs (ot fiev 

1 a, A, j3, y, E ; Kapreptos v7TOfj,€ivai -X, g, d, v, z, B (pro- 
bably a gloss in the common archetype). 

2 KaTijyopov dXXoi' -g. 

3 av -deleted by Meziriac ; €ko.otov vac. 2 -E. 

4 koX fxeya p,iyi07ov -d, z ; koX pLeyiorov {fx€ya koli omitted) 


5 ooov -n. 

6 tcu <• . •> avSpeiws -Castiglioni (Gnomon, xxvi [1954], 
p. 81)' after Pohlenz (cf. Sextus, Adv. Math, ix, 153-154) ; 
roj avhpzuos -d, V, Z, a, A, £?, y, E, Tolet. 51, 5 ; to avSpeuos 
-X 3 (o and ? over erasures), g, B, n ; lacuna first indicated by 



repugnance in praising what comes about in such 
ways as incidental results of virtue, for example 
abstaining from an old crone with one foot in the 
grave and enduring the bite of a fly." Whom else 
does he wait for, then, to denounce his own doctrines ? 
If one who praises these actions is insipid, surely he 
would be far more insipid who supposes each of them 
to be right action in a high, nay the highest degree. a 
For, if to bear the bite of a fly courageously and 
soberly to abstain from the old crone is equal to the 
{courageous endurance of scalpel and cautery and 
the sober abstention from Lais or Phryne), it makes 
no difference, I think, whether the good man is 
praised for those actions or for these. Furthermore, 
in the second book on Friendship in explaining that 
not all wrong actions should be taken as grounds for 
dissolving friendships he has used these words b : 
11 For it is fitting that some be passed over entirely, 
that some receive slight attention and others still 
more, and that some be judged to merit complete 
dissolution of friendship." What is more than this, 
he says in the same work that we shall have converse 
with some men to a greater extent and with others 
to a lesser with the result that some are more our 
friends and others less so and that as this kind of 
variation has a wide range (for some deserve friend- 

° Cf. De Comm. Not. 1060 e-f and with this S. V.F. iii, 
frags. 52$ and 529 (p. 142, 1-6 and 10-12). 
b S. V.F. iii, frag. 724. 

Wyttenhach ; cf. Madvig, Adversaria Critica i, pp. 667- 
668. Similar lacuna in T)e Comm. Not. 1060 f. 

7 cV -omitted by d, v, z. 

8 eiri to -B. 

9 elvcu <j>t\ovs -d, v, z. 



(1039) yap 1 roaavrrjg 2 ol Se Tooravrrjs* yiyvovrai <f)i\ias 
a£ioi) kolI ol fxev errl tooovtov (pi S' em tooovtov)* 
C Trlorecos kolI tGsv d/xoicov KaTa£io>#7]crovTcu. ti yap 
dXXo 7T€7ToirjKev ev tovtols 5 r] 6 Kal tovtojv fxeydXas 
Stacfropas aTroXeXoLrre ; /cat /jltjv iv rco rrepl KaAou 
TTpos arroSei^iv rod (jlovov to KaXov' dyadov elvaL 
tolovtols Xoyocs KeyprfTaL' " fdyaOov alperov, to 
e aip€Tov apeGTov, to o apeoTov erraLveTov , to o 
€7TaLV€Tov KaXov" i<al 7toXiv " TayaOov yapTOv, to 
Se yapTov oepuvov, to Se oepvbv KaXov" ovtol Se 
ol XoyoL jidyovTOL rrpos eKelvov ei're ydp rrdv aya- 
66v crraiveTOV 9 ioTL, Kal to oaxf>p6va)s drrooyeoOaL 
Trjs ypaos eiraLveTov dv etr\ • eLTe (firj Kal tovt eVcu- 
V€tov, ovSe koXov dv elrf) tt&v 10 dyadov ovTe oepivov 
ovt€ yapTov, dXX n olyeTaL 6 Aoyos*. ttcos 12 yap olov 

D T€ 13 TO fJL€V 1A dXXoVS 0,770 TOJV TOLOVTCOV €T7awetV ifjV- 

Xpbv ^tvai to S' avTOV 1 * enl toIs tolovtols yaipeLV 
Kal oepLvvveodaL firj KaTayeXaoTov ; 

14. YloXXayOV fJL€V 16 TOLOVTOS eOTLV, ev Se Tals 

rrpos eTcpovs dvTLXoyiaLS rJKLOTa cfipovTL^eL 17 tov 

1 yap -omitted by B. 

2 Meziriac ; tolclvttjs -mss. 

3 roiavTTjs -d, v, z ; rooavrois -a. 
*<...> -added by Meziriac. 

5 iv TOVT co -g. 

6 ij -omitted by d, v, z. 

7 tov kclXov -X 1 (corrected by erasure), a, A ^corrected by 
A 2 ). 

8 dyadov -d, v, z. 

9 iiraiveTeov -a, A, ft, y, n. 

10 €lt€ <• . .> nav -H. C. after Pohlenz : clt€ <tovt ovk 
i-rratveTov, ovk£tO trav {c,f. Xylander's version : " sive non 
meretur [scil. laudem], non omne boniuii honorabile . . .") ; 
€L7j €tT€ -nav -X 3 (etre added in margin), g ; etr) trdv -all other 




ship of one degree and others of another) some will 
also be held to merit one degree of confidence and 
the like {and others another). This is important, for 
what has he done here but maintain that in these 
things too there are great differences ? Moreover, in 
the treatise on the Fair to demonstrate that only the 
fair is good he has employed arguments like this a : 
11 What is good is chosen, what is chosen is approved, 
what is approved is admired, what is admired is fair " 
and again " what is good is gratifying, what is 
gratifying is grand, what is grand is fair." These 
arguments, however, are in conflict with that other, 6 
for either everything good is admired, in which case 
sober abstention from the old crone would be ad- 
mired as w r ell, or {this is not admired as v/ell, in 
which case it would not be true either that) every- 
thing good {is fair) or grand or gratifying and 
nothing is left of the argument. How, in fact, can 
it be insipid to praise others for such things and yet 
not ridiculous to make them reason for one's own 
gratification and glorification ? 

14. There are many places where he acts this way, 
but it is when disputing others that he is least con- 

° S. V.F. iii, frag. 29 (p. 9, 24-28) ; cf. S. V.F. iii, frag. 
37 (p. 11, 5-22). 

b i.e. the one reported in 1038 f — 1039 a supra. 

11 In F the text of this essay begins here (cf. Pohlenz- 
Westman, Moralia vi/2, p. in). 

12 7r(Z$ -Wyttenbach and Kaltv/asser ; cacos -mss. 

13 otovrai -d, v, z (conjectured by Meziriac). 

14 fiev ovt> -X z (ovv added superscript), g. 

15 ttUTov -X 3 (v over erasure), g, a 2 (v added superscript), A, 
j5, y, E, B ; avro -F, d, v, z. 

1G fih <ovv> -Meziriac. 

17 <f>povTL^€Li> -F, X^final v erased -X 3 ), a. 



(1039) firjSev elnelv ivavTiov iavrto Kal 8id(j)Ojvov. iv 
yovv rdls 7T€pl rod UpoTp€7T€o6ac tov YlAdrcovos 
€7Ti\afjLfiav6fJL€vos XiyovTos on rq> jjarjBe 1 jiaOovn 
[17)8' emcFTaixevcp ^rjv XvotTeXel p,r) tfqv tclvt cl- 
prjK€ Kara Xi^iv il 6 yap tolovtos Xoyos Kal eavrco 
fidx^rat 2 Kal tJkiot' ion TrporptTTTiKos. irptorov 
yap rrapaheiKVvayv on Kpdnorov rjfjuv ion to jirf 

tfiv Kal TpOTTOV nVCL a7To6vijaK€LV a^LCOV TTpOS €T€pd 

E nva fi&XXov tj/jl&s ti porpeifjcr at 4 r) to (f>iXooocf)€lv 
ov 5 yap €oti pir] ^tbvra (f>iXooo(f>elv ov8e firf ttoXvv 
Xpovov im^rjoavTa KaKtos Kal drreipajs 1 <j>povip,ov 
yev€O0ai." Kal rrpoeXOtov 8e (f>rjoiv otl Kal Tots* 
<f>avXois KaQrjKei /xevecv iv to) tfqv etra /cara Xe^iv 
TTpcoTov yap rj aperr) iJjlXujs ov8iv iaTi TTpos to 
t,r)v rjfJLas, ovtojs S' ov8e rj /ca/cta ovSiv ioTi rrpos 
to 8elv rjfjL&s a-niivai" /cat firjv oi>x erepa Set 
jStjSAt'a StetA^aat tov XpvoiTnrov tt)v Trpos avTov 


[lev tov ' 'AvTio8evovs iiraiv&v npofiepeTai 10 to 8elv 
KTaodai vovv r] fipoxov Kal tov TvpTaiov to 

Trplv dp€Trjs TreXdaai Teppiacnv rj Oavdrov 

1 -d, z. 

2 iMaxtaOai -A, y, n, Tolet. 51,5. 

3 jjltj -omitted by F 1 but added superscript by F 2 . 

4 7rpovTp€ijj€v -X 3 (u added superscript in ligature and cfav 
over erasure), g; 77/307 petperat -F 2 (er added superscript) 
and all other mss. 

5 ov yap . . . <j>i\ooo<f>€iv -omitted by g. 

6 txrj -d, v, z ; jxrjv -all other mss. 

7 padvpLco? -g. 

8 ivheLKvvfjLtvov -d, v, z. 

9 lavTols -F, a, A J (erasure before aurot? -A 2 ). 

10 7rpoo-<f>€p€TaL -V, z, y, n, E, Tolet. 51, 5 : <£<jiWtcu -g. 

a Clitophon 408 a 4-7. 


cerned to avoid self-contradiction and inconsistency. 
Anyway, in the books on Exhortation where he 
attacks Plato for saying that one who has not learned 
or does not know how to live had better not be alive a 
he has the following statement word for word b : 
" Such an assertion is self-contradictory and also 
least effective as exhortation. For in the first place 
by indicating that it is best for us not to be alive and 
in a sense requiring us to die it would exhort us to 
do something other than philosophize, for it is not 
possible to philosophize without being alive nor 
possible either to have become prudent without 
having survived a long time in vice and ignorance." 
Further on he also says that even the base ought to 
remain alive, and then in so many words : " For in 
the first place virtue all by itself is no reason for our 
living, and so neither is vice any reason why we need 
to depart this life." And now for an exhibition of 
Chrysippus in conflict with himself there is no need 
to go through other books ; here in these books 
themselves c he now quotes with approval the saying 
of Antisthenes that one needs to get intelligence or 
a halter d and that of Tyrtaeus, 

Ere reaching the narrow divide 'twixt virtuous living and 
dying • 

b S. V.F. iii,frag. 761 ; cf. R. Westman, Eranos, lix(l961), 
pp. 89-100. 

c S.V.F. iii, frag. 167. 

d Antisthenes, frag. 121 (Mullach, Frag. Philos. Graec. 
ii, p. 292) = 67 (Caizzi). Substantially the same remark is 
ascribed to Diogenes of Sinope (Diogenes Laertius, vi, 24 
and Epistle xxviii, 6) and to Crates the Cynic {Gnomologium 
Vaticanum 386). 

e Tyrtaeus, frag. 11 (Diehl, Anth. Lyr. Graec, fasc. I 3 , 
p. 18) = frag. 14 (Bergk, Poetae Lyr. Graec, ii 4 , p. 20). 



* ° J, (kolltol tl 1 ravra fiovXerai StjXovv 2 aAAo ttXtjv on 
to jjirj c^rjv XvoireXearepov eon rod tft)v rois kclkols 
Kal avor'jTois;) rrork Se rov Qeoyviv eTravopOovpie- 
vog " ovk eSa " (j>rjolv " elrrciv ' XPV nevirjv fyzvyovra 
p^aXXov 3 oe 

Xpr] KaKiav (jievyovra Kal is fiaOvKrjrea ttovtov 
pirrreiv Kal 7T€rpa>v, Kvpve, Kar TjXlfiaTOJV ." 

1040 Tt ovv aAAo 86£eiev av A Troielv rj ravra irpoordy- 
fiara 5 Kal Soypiara rrapcyypd^eiv avros ireptov Se 
ypa<f)6vrojv i£aXci(f>€iv, TlXdrowi jiev* iyicaXajv on 
rod /ca/ccDs" l^rjv Kal ajjuadajs to p,rj ^rjv drroSeiKvvoi 
XvaireXeorepov QeoyviSi 8e ovpifiovXevojv Kara- 
Kprjjjivt^eiv Kal KaraTTovri^eiv lavrbv 1 vrrep rod <j>v- 
ytiv 8 rr)v KaKiav; ' AvnoQcvrf piev ydp irraivajv 
on rovs firj vovv eypvras eis ftpoypv ovvr\Xavvcv , 
(avrov) 1Q avros eifjeyev eirrovra pirjSev etvai rrjv 
KaKtaV 77p6$ TO €K rov t^rjv r)p,a$ a7raAActTT€tv. 

15. 'Ev Se tois rrpos avrov nAarawa irtpl At- 
Kaioovvrjs evOvs i£ apx^js ivdXXerai 11 rw nepl detov 

1 Tt -omitted by g. 

2 fiovXerai r) ri BrjXoi -X 3 (rat over erasure and r] tl added 
at end of line), g ; fiovXerai BrjXoi -F^corrected to brjXovv 
-F 2 ). 3 /LtaAAov . . . fcvyovra Kal -omitted by B. 

4 av -omitted by g ; Sa'faey av -y, n, E, Tolet. 51, 5. 

5 Keiske (cf. Hartman, De Plutarcho, p. 605) ; rrpdyiiara 
-mss. 6 fx€v -omitted by d, v, z. 

7 KaTaKprjfiVL^€LV 4avrov Kal Kararrovri^LV -K. 

8 tm€p<f>vy€iv -X^tov -added by X 3 superscript before era- 
sure Over <}>v) ; imtp rov a7ro<f>vy€lv -g. 

9 'AvriaQevrjv -X*(? ['AvriaOevrj with rj over erasure -X 3 ]), 
g, ft B ; 'AvnoOcvet -v. 

10 <avrov> -Bernardakis after Reiske (auros <aurov>). 

11 evaXXdrrerat -g ; eVaAAaTai -A , y, Tolet. 51,5; ivdXXarre -n . 

° Theognis, 175-176 {Theognis . . . iterum ed. D. Young 


(though what do these intend to show except that 
not being alive is for the vicious and stupid more ad- 
vantageous than living ?), and again he says in cor- 
rection of Theognis : " he ought not to have said 
* From want you must flee ' but rather 

From vice you must flee, oh my friend, though headlong 

you plunge in the motion 
Down cliffs sharp and sheer or below the yawning abyss of 
the ocean." 

So what would he apparently be doing but himself 
writing in the same prescriptions and doctrines that 
he erases when others write them, objecting to Plato 
for showing that not to be alive is more advantageous 
than to be living viciously and ignorantly but advising 
Theognis to plunge over a precipice or to drown him- 
self in order to flee vice ? In fact, by praising Anti- 
sthenes for trying to force to the halter those who have 
no intelligence he was censuring <(himself ) for saying 
that vice is no reason for us to take leave of life. 

15. At the very beginning of the books concerning 
Justice directed against Plato himself b he pounces 
[1971], p. 12=Bergk,Poetae Lyr. 6Va*c, ii 4 , pp. 134-135). In 
the mss. of Theognis line 175 begins fjv 817 XPV instead of xpi 
77€vo?v, as it does in all the testimonial and line 176 has the 
form 7r€Tpeujv instead of trtrpGiv. Plutarch quotes the 
couplet again in De Comm. Not. 1069 d (but with /xcya/ajrea, 
instead of paOvKTjrea) and refers to it in De Virtute Morali 
450 a and possibly in De Superstitione 164 f — 165 a. For 
the Stoic technique of inavopdejens of which the " correc- 
tion " here is an example, cf. Dyroff, Die Ethik der alten 
Stoa, pp. 305-307. 

6 S. V.F. iii, frag. 313. For reference to the same title 
see De Comm. Not. 1070 e-f (S.V.F. iii, frag. 455). In 
1040 d infra the work is referred to succinctly by the phrase, 
eV tols -npos HXarojva (so also in 1041 c), and there is certainly 
distinguished from to. irepl AiKaLOGvvqs (1040 c), of which von 
Arnim (S. V.F. iii, p. 195, 34) thought it may have been a part. 



(1040) w , , „,,„., , . , , m 

x ri Aoycp kcli cprjaiv our opucos arrorpeTreiv rep arro rojv 

detov cpofitp 1 rfjs aStKuxs* rov KecfiaAov €v8idfiAr]r6v 

r etvai 2 kolI 3 Trpos rovvavrtov e^dy(€iv Trapi^ovro? 


tttovocls rov Trepi rwv vtto rov 6 deov KoAdaecDV 
Aoyov, (1)9 ovSev Sta^epovra -7-779 'Akkovs koli T779 
9 AAcJ)itovs St* cZv rd TTaiSdpia rov KaKooxoAelv' 3 at 
yvvaZK€s dvzLpyovow* ovroj he Siaovpas to. 8 rov 
HAdratvos erraivel irdAiv iv aXAots kcli Trpocjyipe- 
toll rd rov 9 JLvpiniSov ravrl TroAAaKts 

aAA' ear iv, k€l 10 tls iyy eAa Aoycp, 
7j€vs koX Qeol ftporeia Aevaoovres 11 irdOr)' 

koI opLoiojs iv rep rrpcorcp rrepl Aikcuoovvtjs rd 
'HcnoSeia ravrl 12 TTpoeveyKaLievos 13 

C roTcriv 1 * S' ovpavoOev Lily* iTrrjAacre TrrjLia Kpovtojv, 


ravrd (f>rjcn rovs deovs iroielv, ottcjs rc2v 7rovrj- 
pcov KoAa^oLievcov 16 ol Aolttol 17 TrapaSetypLaai rovrois 

1 to)v deo(j)6fiip -X 1 , F, a 1 ; Ocwv <j>6(3a> -B. 

2 evhiafiXrjTov ion -X ; dotdfiX-qrov ion -g". 

3 koX -omitted by d, z. 

4 e'fayav -Diibner ; <7rap€xovra> -Reiske (but after dvri- 
TTLTTTovoas) ; igdyovri -d, z ; e^dyovra -all other mss. ; e£ay<etv 
€\>ovra -Bernardakis. 

5 TTtpioTrdooiiev -X 3 (ao over erasure), g. 

6 rov -X, F, E ; omitted by all other mss. 

7 KCLKOoxoXoyeiv -d, z. 

8 rd -X 3 , g, B ; omitted by all other mss. 

9 rov -omitted by A, /?, y, n, Tolet. 51, o, E. 

10 loriv K€i X ! (v erased -X 3 ), F ; Iotiv d -v, B ; ton tee! 
all other mss. 

11 XevcjovTts -X, g, F 1 , a I (second a added superscript -F 2 , 
a 2 ), d, v, z, B. 

12 tovti -d, v, z. 


upon the argument about the gods and says that 
Cephalus was wrong in trying to make fear of the 
gods a deterrent from injustice a and that the argu- 
ment about divine chastisements is easily discredited 
and, <(as it produces) many distractions and conflict- 
ing plausibilities, 6 is an inducement in the opposite 
direction, being in fact no different from the Bogy 
and Hobgoblin with which women try to keep little 
children from mischief. Yet, having thus disparaged 
Plato's words, in other places again he praises and 
frequently quotes these lines of Euripides c : 

In fact there are, though one deride the words, 
Zeus and the gods, who mark our mortal woes ; 

and similarly in the first book concerning Justice d 
he quotes these verses of Hesiod's,* 

Zeus from the heavens inflicted a grievous calamity on 

Plague and famine at once ; and the populace utterly 


and then says that the gods do these things in order 
that from the chastisement of the wicked the rest of 

° Plato, Republic 330 d— 331 b . C/. Shorey's note ad 
toe. Republic (L.C.L.) i, p. 16, n. a. 

b Cf. 1036 D supra . . . ovbk <ra> npos ravavria ■mdava dAA' 
cvAafioufjLcvovs firj /cat irzpioTTaodtvTes vn avrcov. . . . 

c Frag. 991 (Nauck, Trag. Oraec. Frag. 2 , p. 679). 

* S.V.F. ii, frag. 1175. 

c Works and hays 24.2-243. The mss. of Hesiod have 
€7rrjyay€ instead of €7TT)\ao€ in line 242. 

13 7rpo€^ey/<a/xcpo? -E, Tolet. 51, 5 ; irpooeveyKaiizvos -all 
other mss. 

14 tolctlv -a 2 (v added superscript), A, y, n, E, Tolet. 51, 5 ; 
rotci -all other mss. 

15 a.7TO(j>dLvovdovai -X 1 (o after v erased -X 3 ), F ; air o<j>divovoL 
-A, 0, y, n, E, Tolet. 51, 5. 

16 KoXa^ofJLCVcov rcjv 7Tovt]pu)V -g. 17 oi ttoXXol -B. 



(1040) ^pOJ/xeVOt fjTTOV €TnX€ip<JL)0l TOIOVTOV Tt 7TOL€LV. 7TOL- 

Xtv iv fiev rots irepl AiKouoavvrjs vTrenrdiv 1 on rovs 
dyadov 2 dXXd jit) reXog Tidejiivovs tt)v rjSovrjv 
eVSev^rcu GU)l,€iv Kal ttjv SiKaioavvrjv, dels tovto 
Kara Xi^iv eiprjKe 3 ' u Taya yap dyadov* avrrjs 
aTToAeLTrofjiev'qs 5 reXovs 8e fir) tcov Se St' avTtov 
alpercov ovtos* Kal rod KaXov, aco^oifiev av ttjv 
SiKatoovvrjv, fieii^ov dyadov airoXnrovrcs to KaXov 
D Kal to StKatov tt}s rjSovrjs." ravTa pXv iv tov- 
tois 1 irepl Trjs 8 rjSovrjs. iv 8e toTs TTpOS HXaTa>va,° 
KaTTjyopcjv avTov ookovvtos dyadov 10 aTroXnrelv tt)v 
vyleiav, ov 11 fxovov tt)v hiKaioovvr\v (f>rjolv dAAa Kal 
ttjv jjLeyaXoifjvxLCLV dvaipelodai Kal ttjv oaxfrpoov- 
vrjv Kal tcls aXXas dpeTas dirdoas, av rj ttjv r)8o- 
vfjv r] tt)v vyleiav rj rt tcov dXXojv o 12 p,r) KaXov 
€otlv dyadov dTroXtTrojfiev. a jxkv ovv prjTeov vrrep 
YlXaTOJVos iv dXXoLS yeypanTat irpos avTov iv- 

1 €7T€17T(1)V "g". 

2 dyadov -d(conjectured by Wyttenbach and implied by 
the versions of Xylander and Amyot) ; rdyadov -all other 


3 ctpr}K€v -X J (v erased -X 3 ), F. 

4 dyaOov -A 2 , /?, y, n, E, B ; dyadovs -X, g, F, d, v, a, 
A 1 ; dyadijs -z. 

5 d7T0XeL1T0fl€V7]S _ g i d7To\€L7TOfJL€VOVS "X, F, d, V, Z, a, A 1 ? 

dTToXecnoficvov -A 2 , jS, y, n, E, B. 

6 ovros -d, v, z(conjectured by Reiske, cf. 1038 d supra) ; 
ovtcov -n ; ovrtos -all other mss. 

7 rot? -d, v, z. 

8 77ept T7js -X 3 , g, d, v, z, E, B ; -nepi re -X 1 , F, a ; TrepL 
re rijs -A, />, y, n, Tolet. 51, 5. 

9 irpos tl\dro)va -d, v, z ; nepl TLXdrajvos -X 3 (os over 
erasure), g : 7rept HXdrwva -F, a, A, /3, y, n, E, B. 

10 dyadov Sokovvtos -g. 

11 ov (jlovov . . . 77 rr)v vyUiav -omitted by g. 

12 dXXcov rj -n. 



mankind may take warning and be less inclined to 
attempt any similar misdeed. Again in the books 
concerning Justice a after suggesting that for those 
who regard pleasure as a good but not a goal it is 
possible to preserve justice as well he has affirmed 
this position b and said in so many words : " For, if 
it is held to be a good and not a goal and if the fair 
too is among the things that are of themselves objects 
of choice, we could perhaps preserve justice by 
maintaining that the fair and just is a greater good 
than pleasure." This is what he says there about 
pleasure ; but in the books against Plato c he 
denounces him for appearing to hold that health is 
good d and says that not only justice but magn- 
animity too and sobriety and all the other virtues 
are annulled if we hold that pleasure or health or 
anything else that is not fair is good. Now, for what 
is to be said in Plato's defence, that rejoinder has 
been given elsewhere e ; but here is manifest the 

• & V.F. iii, frag. 23 (p. 8, 10-16). Cf 1038 d supra and 
note a there. 

b Plutarch's argument here requires him to maintain that 
Chrysippus took the position himself and did not merely 
suggest it as a possibility for others. So the phrase, Bets 
touto, must not be excised as Westman has suggested it 
might be (Pohlenz- Westman, Moral ia vi/2, p. 230). 

c S. V.F. iii, frag. 157. For the books referred to see 
note b on 1040 a supra. 

d Cf. Lysis 218 e— 219 a, Gorgias 4-52 a-b and 504 c, 
Republic 357 c, Laws 631 c and 661 a-d (where Plato's posi- 
tion is fully stated). 

e Presumably in a work now lost, which Pohlenz suggests 
may have been the essay ti kcito. nAarcova tc'Aos or the Ilepi 
8i/caioowi7? -npos Xpv(jL7nTov t numbers 221 and 59 respectively 
in the Catalogue of Lamprias. Babut (Plutarque et le 
Sto'icisme, p. 33) holds that the reference must be to number 
59 ; cf. also Sandbach, Class. Quart. , xxxiv (1940), p. 22. 



(1040) ravda Se r) 1 p-dyr] KaTacfxxvrjs eoriv i orrov pev, dv 
perd rod kolAov tis VTrodfjrat, 2 Kal rr)v rjSovrjv dya- 
66v elvai, oco^eodat StKaioovvrjv Xeyovros ottov Se 
ttoXiv rovs 2 jxr) jxovov to 4 KaAov (aya#6v) 5 drro- 
E Aittovtols 6 alriojpLevov ras dperds drrdoag dvaipelv. 
IVa Se /X7?S' drroXoyiav vrroXiTTrf rols evavraldpLa- 
oiv, ' ApiororeXei rrepl kiKaioovvrjs dvriypd<f>ojv ov 
<f)rjoiv avrdv 6 dpdcos Xeyeiv ore rrjs rjSovrjg oiiorjs 
reXovs 9 dvatpelrai puev rj SiKaioovvr) ovvavaipelrai 
he rfj SiKaioovvr} Kal ra>v dXXcov dpercov eKaorr]- 
rrjv fxev ydp SiKaioovvrjv vtt avrdv (hs aXrjdtos dv- 
aipelodai ras §' aAAas dperds ovSev KUjXvetv™ vtt- 
apyew, ei teat firj ol avras atperas aAA ayavas 
yovv Kal dpeoras 12 eoo^ievas' eld eKaorrjv e£ ovopa- 
ros TTpooayopevei. fieXriov Se rds eKeivov Xegeis 

1 evTavQ* 7) -l ri (a superscript and S' inserted by F 2 ). 

2 V7TO0€lT(Ll -a, A(?). 

3 rovs -A 2 , j8, Vat. lieg. 80 ; to -E ; rod -all other mss. 

4 t6v -d, v, z. 

5 <dya66i'> -added by Reiske (before to kclXov) and trans- 
ferred here by Bernardakis (cf. 1041 a infra). 

6 a-noXiTTovTOs -X 3 (to over erasure), g, B. 

7 d-noXiTTT) -g, E. 

8 avros -d. 

9 riXos (not -ovs) ovo-qs -g. 

10 KtoAvti -X 3 (erasure after €i), g, A 2 (final u hardly erased), 
J3, y, E, B. 

11 dperds ~g- 

12 dptards -X 3 (cctt over erasure), B ; dperds -all other mss. 

« £. V.F. iii, frag. 24 (p. 8, 22-37). Pohlenz is mistaken 
in saying (Hermes, lxxiv [1939], p. 10, n. 2) that in what 
follows Plutarch only gives with greater exactness what in 
1040 c supra he said with reference to the -rrepl A.tKatoauvrjs 
of Chrysippus ; but he is nevertheless right in denying that 



inconsistency of his accuser, who in one place asserts 
that justice is preserved if it be assumed that along 
with the fair pleasure too is good but elsewhere 
again charges with annihilation of all the virtues 
those who do not hold that only the fair is <good). 
In order to leave his self-contradictions not even a 
plea of defence, when writing against Aristotle con- 
cerning Justice he declares a him to be wrong in 
asserting that, if pleasure is a goal, justice is an- 
nulled and along with justice each of the other 
virtues also. & This is wrong according to him because, 
while justice is in truth annulled by them (who so 
treat pleasure c ), nothing prevents the other virtues 
from existing, since they would at any rate be good 
and approved d even though not per se objects of 
choice ; and then he gives each of them by name. 
It is better, however, to repeat his own words : 
from this passage the existence of a separate monograph, 
n€pl AiKCLLoovvris Trpds ' ' ApLOToriXrjv^ can be inferred. 

b Aristotle, frag. 86 (Rose). Rose took the sentence to be 
a " fragment " of Aristotle's De Justitia. So it is assumed 
to be by W. D. Ross (Aristotelis Fragmenta Selecta [Oxford, 
1955], pp. 98-99) and by P. Moraux (Le Dialogue " Sur la 
Justice M [Louvain/Paris, 1957], p. 58), although E. Bignone 
had argued for the Protrepticus (JS Aristotele Perdu to 
[Firenze, 1936], i, p. 373) and R. Walzer had printed the 
sentence as frag. 17 of that work (Aristotelis hialogorum 
Fragmenta [Firenze, 1934], pp. 61-62). With the notion 
that along with justice each of the other virtues also is 
annulled cf. Eth. Nic. 1130 a 8-9 {avr-q p,kv ovv r) hiKaioavvrj 
ov fx4pos aptrrjs dAA' oAtj aperrj itmv . . .) and P. Moraux, op. 
cit., p. 1 15. 

c i.e., the avrtov, which Reiske wished to " emend " 
because it has no antecedent, refers to those who hold 
pleasure to be a goal. Cf. Kar olvtovs in the quotation from 
Chrysippus immediately below (1040 f). 

d For the term aptoros cf. 1039 c supra and S. V.F. iii, 
p. 22, 13-16 and p. 49, 42-44. 



(1040) dvaXaj3etv " rrjs yap rjSovfjs" (f>r]<jlv " efufxiivo- 
F pcevrjs reXovs Kara tov tolovtov Xoyov, to puev 

TOLOVTO 1 7T&V pLOL 8o!C€t OVK epLTTeptXapL^dveGdai' 8t6 

prjTeov {lyre tujv apeTwv Tiva St avTrjv alpeTrjv 
etvat p,r\re rwv KaKiwv (f)evKrrjV y dXXd navra ravra 2 
8eiv dva(f>f.p€adai 3 irpos tov VTxoKelp.evov gkottov 
ov8ev pcevTOi KO)Xvaei Kar avrovs rrjv dv8p€ lav \xh) x 
koX tt)v cf)p6v7](jiv Kal ttjv eyKpdreiav /cat rrjv Kap- 
Tepiav Kal tcls opLOLas ravrais* dperds elvac tcjv 
dya6a)v rds §' evavrias (/cafcta?) 6 V7rdp)(eiv <f>evK- 
1041 rds," tls ovv tovtov rrpos Xoyovs IrapLwrepos yeyo- 
vev, os 8velv rwv dpiOTtDV 7 <f>iXoa6<f>a)v s iyKeKXrjKe 
rep jitev ore Traoav dperrjv dvaipel psq piovov to Ka- 
Xov dyaOov drroXc7Tcbv Tip 8e ort Trjs rj8ovrjg re- 
Xovs ovG7)S ov 9 Ttaoav dp€TTjv dvev TTJS OlKaiOGVV7)S 
acp^eaOai vop,lt,ei; OavpiaoTrj yap rj ££ovo ta Trepl 
tojv avTtov 7rpaypiaTOJv 8iaXeyopievov d tlQ^giv 
avTos iyKaXcov 'AptGTOTeXei TavT dvaipelv irdXiv 
YlXaTcuvos KaTrjyopovvTa. Kal p,rjv ev Tats Trepl 
kiKaioovvrjs ' Attoo€l£€gl Xeyei parous 10 drt " udv 
KaTopOojpia Kal evvopLTjpLa Kal hiKaiOTrpdyrjpid €gti- 
to 84 ye /car' eyKpdreiav rj Kaprepiav rj fipovrjaiv 
B rj dv8peiav TTpaTTop^evov KaTopdojpid Igtiv toGTe Kal 
8iKO,io7Tpdyr]pia. yy ttcos ovv ots dTToXeirrei 11 (f>po- 
V7]glv Kal dv8peiav koX eyKpdreiav ovk aTroXeiTrei 

1 TOIOVTOV "g, Z. 

2 TauTa TravTa -d, v, z ; raura -omitted by g. 

3 dva<f>€p€o9ai -Basil. ; avac/xiiveaQau ( — (j>dv€cr$aL -E) -MSS., 

4 ttjv \xkv dvSpaav -d, v, Z. 

5 TauTaLS X 3 (t inserted), g, E, B ; raura? -all other mss. 

6 <KaKias> -added by Meziriac. 

7 tcjv dpiGTojv -F 2 (ktt made from ct), d, v, z, a 2 )ior over 


" For, while pleasure is indicated as a goal in such a 
theory, that does not, I think, have all this kind of 
implication. That is why it must be stated that 
neither is any of the virtues an object of choice per se 
nor any of the vices an object of avoidance but all 
these must be referred to the aim one has assumed. 
Nothing in their theory, however, would prevent 
courage, prudence, continence, endurance, and the 
virtues similar to these from being classified as goods 
and the contrary <(vices)> from being objects of 
avoidance. ,, Now, who has ever been more reckless 
in argument than this man ? He has lodged com- 
plaints against two of the best philosophers, against 
the one for annulling all virtue by not maintaining 
that only the fair is good and against the other for 
not believing that all virtue save justice is preserved 
if pleasure is a goal. The arrogance he displays is in 
fact amazing when, the same subject being under 
discussion, what he affirms himself in objecting to 
Aristotle he in turn denies in denouncing Plato. 
Moreover, in the Demonstrations concerning Justice 
he says expressly a : " Every right action is a lawful 
act and an act of justice ; but what is done in 
accordance with continence or endurance or prudence 
or courage is right action ; consequently it is also an 
act of justice. " How, then, can he deny justice to 
those to whom he grants prudence and courage and 

° S. V.F. iii, frag. 297. For the terminology c/. S. V.F. 
iii, frag. 502. 

erasure), A, /3, y, E, B ; nepl ra>v aperatv -X 3 (7T€pt added 
superscript, cu and cto> over erasures), g. 

8 <f>iXoo6<j)OLv -X 3 (cn over erasure), g. 

9 ov iraoav . . hiKaioavvrjS -omitted b}' X and g. 

10 \ty vac. 4 ot)tuj$ -g 1 ; Xeyovros orjjqjs -g 2 . n oltto^lttol -d. 



(1041) hiKaioovvqVy evOvs avTtov oaa 1 Karopdovotv iv Tats 
elprjjjLevats 2 dperatg Kal Sckcllott pay ovvtcov ; 

16. Tov Se YlXartovos €lttovtos ttjv doiKiav d>s 
$iacf)opa 3 ifwxTJS ovoa Kal otolgls ovS* eV 4 avTols 
tois 5 exovoiv a,77o/3dAAet ttjv ovvapuv dXX aurov 
eavTto ovptfiaXXec [kcll Kpovei Kal rapdrreif tov 
TTOVTjpov, iyKaXajv XpvanrTros droTrcos cf>rjal Xeye- 
odai to dSiKeZv eavrov elvai yap TTpos erepov ov 
TTpos eavrov rrjv doiKiav eTTiXaOojievos 8e 7 tovtojv 
C avOis iv rals rrepl AiKaioavvrjs Arrohet^eatv doi- 
Keladai $r\oiv vcf)' eavrov tov dStKovvra Kal avTov 
doiKeiv otov d'AAov 8 dStKT], yevopievov 9 iavTcp tov 
7TO.pavofi€iv aiTLov Kal fiXdrrTOVTa irap d^iav eav- 
tov . ev jjl€v rots Trpos nAdrtova Taur' eiprjKC rrepl 
tov tt)v doiKiav XeyeaO at /x?^ TTpos eavrov dXXd 
Trpos €T€pov u ol yap KaT IStav {dou/cot ovk elaiv 
ovSe ol) dSiKoi 10 ovveoTrjKaoiv e/c TrXeiovajv toiov- 
tojv TavavTca XeyovTOJV, Kal aXXoj$ ttjs dSiKtas 
XajjL^avofxevrjs d>s dv ev TrXeiooi vpos eavTovs 11 ov- 

1 avrdjv oaa -F 2 (avra>v in margin), Basil. ; avrwv oaoi 
-X 3 (a> made from o [?], ol over erasure), g ; avrov 6oa -d, v. 
z ; a ra>v oaa -F 1 , a, A, j3, y, n, B, Aid in e ; rwv oaoi -E. 

2 eiprjfievais -omitted by g. 

3 Dyroff (Programm Wtirzburg, 1896, p. 51) ; oia<f>6opd 
-mss. (mistakenly defended by Gossage, J. U.S., lxxvi [1956], 
p. 118 against Pohlenz). 4 ovSev iv -n. 

5 rots -omitted by X J (added by X 3 in margin). 

6 [. . .] -omitted by g ; Kal Kpovei- rapdrrei -X 1 , F ; Kal 
Kpovei Kal rapdrrei -X 3 and all other mss. ; Kal <ovy> Kpovei 
i<al rapdrrei -Reiske ; /cat <avy> Kpovei [rapdrrei] -Pohlenz. 

7 be -E ; yap -all other mss. 

8 dXXo -y> n. 9 yivd\ievov -g, B. 

10 <. . .> added by If. C. ; ov (Wyttenbach) yap Kar IBiav 
dSiKoi <ol dvdpcoTToi ovo y ol dSiKoi> -Pohlenz (revising his con- 
jecture in Hermes., Ixxiv [1939], pp. 14-15). 

11 avrds -d ; avrovs "V, Z. 



continence, when whatever right actions they per- 
form with the virtues just mentioned they ipso facto 
perform justly as well ? 

16. Since Plato had said of injustice that, being 
discord of the soul and intestine strife, it does not 
lose its force within those who themselves harbour 
it either but sets the wicked man at variance with 
himself," Chrysippus objects and says that to speak 
of doing oneself injustice is absurd, for injustice 
exists in relation to another and not to oneself b ; 
but this he forgot, and later in the Demonstrations 
concerning Justice he says that the wrong-doer is 
wronged by himself and does himself injustice when- 
ever he wrongs another, for he has become a cause of 
transgression for himself and is injuring himself un- 
deservedly. In the books against Plato this is what 
he has said concerning injustice as a term used in 
relation not to oneself but to another d : " For 
isolated individuals (are not unjust nor are) unjust 
men composites of several such individuals con- 
tradicting one another, injustice being understood 
anyhow as obtaining in the case of several persons so 

Republic 351 d — 352 a (. . . idv , . . iv ivl eyyivrjrai 
a&iKia, ficbv fir) OLTToXel rr)v avrrjs hvvafj.iv . . . ; ... bid to ara- 
oid£eiv kcu &La<f>€p€o9aL . . . Kal iv €vl . . . evovoa ravra ravra 
TTOL-qoei . . . oraaid^ovTa /cat ovx o/xovoovvra avrov iavrtb . . .) ; 
and, on the contrary, for justice in the soul cf. Republic 441 
d — 443 b and 586 k. 

b S.F.F. iii, frag. 288 (p. 70, 30-36). Cf. Aristotle, Et h. Xic. 
1 120 b 25-27, 1 130 a 10-13 and a 32-b 5, 1 138 a 4-b 13. 

c 8. V.F. iii, frag. 289 (p. 71, 5-9). 

d S.V.F. iii, frag. 288 (pp. 70, 37-71, 4). Cf Plutarch, 
De Defectu Orac. 423 d (ov yap rrpos avrov ovBe ficpos avrov 
Xpfjois ion oiKatoavvris . . . dAAd npos aXAovs) and Aristotle, 
tith, JMc. 1138 a 19-20 (del iv rr\eioaiv dvdyKt] elvai to oiKatov 
Kal to aoiKOv). 



(1041) ra>s exovatv 1 els 8e rov eva pL-qoevos Starelvovros* 

TOiOVTOV KaO' OOOV &€ 77/309 rOVS TtXtjOLOV ^€t 3 OV~ 

ra>s." iv Se rat? ^Arrohei^eoi roiovrovs r)pd)rrjKe 
D Aoyous" 4 7T6pt rov rov dhiKOv kcu eavTov dSucetv 
" TTapaiTLov yeveoBai Trapavoprjparos array opev- 
ei 6 vofxog' Kal ro dStKeiv eori b TrapavopLrjjia' 
o rotvuv rro^paircos yevoptevos avra> rod doiKelv 
irapavop.eZ els iavrov 6 Se rrapavopidjv els eva Kal 
aSi/cet eKeZvov*' 6 apa 1 koI ovrivovv dSiKtov /cat 
iavrov aSi/cei." rrdXiv tl ro dpudpr^jjia rcov /JAa^i/za- 
ra)v eori, Kal Tras B dpiaprdvajv map* iavrov dfiap- 
ravec rras dp o dfiaprdvajv fiXdnrei iavrov rrapa 
rrjv di;Lav el Se rovro, Kal dbiKeZ iavrov" 9 en 
Kal ovra>s " 6 fiXarrropLevos vcf> y irepov iavrov jSAa- 
rrrei Kal irapd rrjv d£iav iavrov fiXdrrrei 10 - rovro 

1 excoaiv -g, /?, E, B (omitting the preceding outoj?). 

2 dvrireivovros -B. 

3 rov 7r\r)(jLov ex 7 ) "^* 

4 toiovtovs . . . Xoyovs -d, v, z ; tolovtois . . . Xoyots -all 
other mss. 

6 icm -d, v, z ; carat -all other mss. 

6 €K€LV0S -d. 

7 o apa -g, d, v, z ; $v apa -all other mss. 

8 rras 6 -B. 

9 7ras" apuaprdvcov . . . aot/cci ko.vrov (omitting 7ra/o* iavrov . . . 
o afzaprdvajv) -g but with pXdnrci . . . dSixret eavrov dotted and 
the whole text from nap' iavrov apuaprdvei repeated without 

10 Kal rrapa . . . ^Xd-rrrei -omitted by E and B. 

° S.V.F. iii, frag. 289 (p. 71, 10-21). 
b The argument assumes that one can aid or abet one's 
own wrong-doing (by " giving assent " to it [?]), and the 



disposed to one another and no such condition per- 
taining to the individual save in so far as he stands in 
such relation to his neighbours." In the Demon- 
strations, however, he has propounded arguments 
like the following concerning the unjust man's doing 
injustice to himself as well : " The law prohibits 
one from becoming accessory to a trangression ; and 
to do injustice is a trangression. Now, he who 
has become his own accessory in doing injustice 
transgresses in regard to himself ; and he who 
transgresses in regard to an individual also does that 
individual injustice. Therefore, he who does anyone 
at all injustice does himself injustice too." b Again 
he argues : " Wrong action is a kind of injury, and 
everyone in doing wrong does wrong in violation of 
himself. Therefore, every wrong-doer injures him- 
self undeservedly ; and, if so, he also does himself 
injustice." c Furthermore he argues as follows : 
" He who is injured by another injures himself and 
injures himself undeservedly. This, however, is to 

conclusion, lavrov aSi/cet, depends upon the ambiguity of 
els (" in regard to " and " against ") ; but, whatever the 
context in which Chrysippus used the argument, nothing in 
its formulation justifies Pohlenz's assertion (Hermes, Ixxiv 
[1939], p. 15) that it has to do with the Stoic theory of man 
as a member of a social organism, injury to any member of 
which is injury to all, including the member doing the 

c Cf. S. V.F. iii, frag. 626 (. . . kolvcl . . . rcbv <j>av\a>v ra 
KaKa. 6t* o . . . rov pXaiTTOvra koL iavrov ^Xdirreiv) and with 
this Marcus Aurelius, vii, 13 ; but the argument of Chry- 
sippus here quoted seems rather to be that by the very act 
of doing wrong one makes oneself worse and so injures one- 
self : cf. Musonius Rufus, xii (p. 65, 7-10 [Hense]) and Cle- 
ment, Paedagogus ii, 10, 100 (p. 217, 5-8 [Stahlin]) ; Epic- 
tetus, Diss, iv, v, 10 : Marcus Aurelius, ix, 4 with viii, 55. 




17. Toy 7T€pl dya6d)v koll kolkol>v Xoyov, ov avTos 
tioayei kol So/a/xa£et, ov ia^qjv otoltov elval (fyrjai rco 
filoj kol iiaXiora toov €(ji(f)VTtov aiTTeoOai 7rpoXv t - 
tftzcov. ravTi yap iv too rpLrcp tojv UpoTpeiTTtKcov 


a77o tojv dXXcov arrdvTOJV dcjjeXKtiv tov dvOpco- 

7tov J>s ovSev ovtojv rrpos rj^i&s ov8e ovvepyovv- 

tojv Trpos evSaifiovcav ovSev. opa 2 tolvvv ttlos 

auTco ovfjL<f>ojv6s 3 £otl, rov d^eXKOVTa tou tfrjv /cat 

ttjs vyieias /cat tt]s drrovias* koll ttjs toov aloOrjTrj- 

pioov oXoKXrjplas /cat paqoev etvat raura </>aa/covra 5 

F Trpos rjfJicis, a rrapd toov dedov atTov^Oa, fidXiaTa 6 

ovpi(f)OJveLV too (3itp /cat rat? kolvcus 7 rrpoXrufjecrcv 

aTTo^aivo/xevo?. 8 ciAAa iva jxt]8 9 dpvrjais fj tov Tdv- 

1 Xylander ; dpa SiKcuovfievos -mss. 

2 opa -X 3 , g ; 6pa> -all other mss. 

3 ovfx(j>a>v6v -A, /?, y, n, E, B. 

4 anovoias -g, d, V, z, B 2 . 

5 (fydoKOVTi -d ; <f>aoK0VTi tq -V, z. 

6 jjidAxjTa -omitted by g. 

7 Koivais -omitted by E. 

8 dno^oAvofxevov -E. 

9 firjh* -X, g, d, v, z, B ; fxrj -all other mss. 

a Pohlenz (Hermes, lxxiv [1939], p. 15) thought this an 
Academic parody which Plutarch found in his source and 
mistakenly took for Chrysippus 5 own reasoning. Never- 
theless, since the Stoics held that the sage is not subject to 
unjust treatment or injury (1044 a infra=S.V.F. iii, frag. 
579 ; cf. ibid, frags. 578, 567, 587, and 588), Chrysippus 
may have argued that anyone who is injured or unjustly 
treated is always accessory to that treatment if only because 
his nature invites it or makes it possible. 

b S.V.F. iii, frag. 69 (p. 17, 12-15). On the Z^vtol 
7TpoArnfi€is> inbred (not " innate *') preconceptions, see IT. von 



do injustice. Therefore, everyone who is done in- 
justice by anyone at all does himself injustice." a 

17. He says that the doctrine of goods and evils 
proposed and approved by himself is most consistent 
with life and most closely coincides with the inbred 
preconceptions. This is what he has said in the third 
book of his Exhortations b ; but in the first he says 
that this doctrine abstracts a man from all else as 
being of no concern to us and contributing nothing 
to happiness. So consider the way in which he is 
consistent with himself, declaring most consistent 
with life and the common preconceptions the doctrine 
that abstracts us from living and health and painless- 
ness and soundness of the senses and asserts that 
these things which we beg of the gods are of no 
concern to us. d Lest there be any denying that he 

Arnim, ll.-E. iii (1899), cols. 2507-2508; F. H. Sandbach, 
Class. Quart., xxiv (1930), pp. 44-51 ; Pohlenz, Grund- 
fragen, pp. 82-99 (especially pp. 88-93 on this passage) and 
Stoa i, pp. 56-59 and ii, pp. 33-35 ; Goldschmidt, he systeme 
sto'icien, pp. 159-162. The interpretation of these precon- 
ceptions as a priori knowledge, which Grumach tried to 
revive (Physis and Agathon, pp. 72-76 ; cf % Rteth, Grund- 
begrlffe, pp. 187-190), has been defended again with no more 
success by C. Tibiletti (Atti delta Accademia . . . di Torino, 
CI. di Scienze Morali, lxxxviii [1953/54], pp. 104-115). 

c S. V.F. iii, frag. 139 (pp. 33, 36-34, 2) ; cf. 1048 a-b 
infra and De Comm. Not, 1060 d-e. DyrofF maintained 
{Die Ethik der Stoa, p. 114, n. 3) that what in these 
passages is ascribed to Chrysippus is proved by comparison 
with Cicero's De Finibus iv, 68 (S. V.F. iii, frag. 27 [p. 9, 
12-17]) to have been the doctrine of Ariston which Chrysippus 
did not accept but in his work on Exhortations merely cited 
along with others as effective protreptic themes. See the 
next note infra. 

d See the precisely contrary statement of Chrysippus cited 
1047 e infra (S. V.F. iii, frag. 138). 



(1041) avrla 1 Xeyeiv, iv ra> rpiro) rrepl AiKacoovvrjs ravr 
ciprjKe- " Slo kcli Sid ttjv V7TepfioXrjv rov re fieye- 
dovs Kal rov koXXovs 7rAaa/xaat SoKovpcev ofjioia 
Xeyeiv Kal ov Kara, rov dvdpa>7Tov Kal rrjv avdpoj- 
1042 TTLvrjv (frvaiv." eonv ovv ottojs av rig i£op,oXoyrj- 
oairo oacf>eorepov rdvavria Xeyeiv avros irpos eav- 
rbv rj ovros, 2 a Sta virepftoXrjv cfirjcri TrXdopiara? 
hoKelv elvai Kal vrrep rov dv9pa)7rov Kal virep rrjv 
avBpojTTivrjv (j>voiv XeyeoOai, ravr a ovpL<f>a)ve2v rw 
filtp (jydaKOJV Kal pbdXiora rd>v ipL<f>vrwv dirreoOai 
TTpoXrjijjeoJV ; 

18. Ovolav KaKohaipiovLas aTTocjiaLvei* rrjv /ca- 
Kiav, iv 7ravrl j8tj8Aico cj>voiKtp Kal r)6iKto ypd<f>ojv 
Kal Scare ivopievos on rd Kara /ca/aav £,rjv ra> 5 
KaKO&aifjiovojs £,r)v ravrov ionv iv Se rep rpirco 
rrepl <$>voea>s vrreirrcov on XvoireXel lj)v* d<f>pova 

fldXXoV T) (jU/^) jSlOW 7 KCLV /X7]8e7TOT€ jXeXXj) (f)pOVT}- 

B oeiv iniXeyei- li roiavra yap ray add ion rols av- 
Opojirois, cuure rponov nvd (KaV) s rd KaKa rcov 9 
dvd fxeoov rrporepelv." on \xev ovv eiprjKtbs iv 
erepois firjSev elvai rots d<j>pooi XvoireXes 10 ivravOd 

1 rovvavTia -d, V, z. 

2 ot>TOJs -Vat. Reg. 80. 

3 nXdafia -d, v, z. 

4 aTTO<f>aiv€iv -d, z. 

5 to -a, A, 0, y, n, Tolet. 51, 5. 

6 OTI A. £. VTTCLTTCOV "d, V, Z. 

7 paXAov r) <pr)> jSiow -Wyttenbach (implied in versions of 
Xylander and Amyot) ; fidXXov rj fiovv -mss. (rj fiiovv [lacking 
fiaWov and fxr)] -De Comm. Not. 1064 e) ; paXXov rj fiiovv 

8 <koX> -added by H. C. from De Comm. Not. 1064 e. 

9 tojv -X 3 , g, A 2 ; omitted by all other mss. (tojv aAAojv 
-De Comm. Not. 1064 e). 

10 Xv oireAes rots a<j>pooiv -g. 


contradicts himself, however, here is what he has said 
in the third book concerning Justice : " That is 
why also because of its exceeding sublimity and 
beauty what we say seems like fiction and not on the 
level of man and human nature." Is there, then, 
any way for one to acknowledge more clearly that 
one is contradicting oneself than this man's assertion 
that that is consistent with life and most closely 
coincides with the inbred preconceptions which be- 
cause of its excess he says seems to be fiction and a 
formulation transcending man and human nature ? 

18. He declares that vice is the essence of un- 
happiness, stoutly maintaining in every book of 
physics and of morals the proposition that to live 
viciously is the same as to live unhappily b ; but in 
the third book concerning Nature, c after having 
remarked that to live a fool is better than {not) to 
be alive even if one is never going to be sensible, he 
adds the statement, " for to human beings goods 
are of such a nature that in a way {even) evils have 
the advantage over intermediates/ ' Now, though he 
has elsewhere said that for fools nothing is advan- 
tageous^ he here says that there is advantage in 

S. V.F. iii, frag. 545. 

b S.V.F. iii, frag. 55 (p. 14, 17-20). 

c 8. V.F. iii, frag. 760 (p. 188, 21-25). The passage recurs 
in De Comm. Not. 1064 e. For a defence of Chrysippus 
against Plutarch's charge of self-contradiction there and in 
the present chapter see Bonhoffer, Die Ethik . . -, pp. 190- 
192 and pp. 227-228 ; and cf. Rieth, Grundbegriffe, pp. 112- 
113, and O. Luschnat, Philologus, cii (1958), pp. 187-188 
and p. 210. 

d Not in S. V.F. Cf. 9 however, 1038 a supra (rots <f>av\ois 
ovbev dvm xpl^^ov) with page 453, note c ; De Comm. Not. 
1068 d ; Seneca, De Beneficils v, xii, 3 and 5-7 ; and S. V.F. 
iii, frag. 587. 



(1042) </)7]<ji XvoiTeXelv to dcfcpovcog tff]v y dc\>it)p,i. tcov 8' 
dvd fjieaop XeyopLevcov rrapa tois Htcolkols 1 pLrjTe 
kolkcov gvtcov p,ryr dyadcov, ra Kat<a rrpoTepelv 
Xeycov ovhev aXXo Xeyei 7rXrjv tcov p,rj kclkcqv 2 tol 
kclkcl irpoTepelv Kol to KCLKoSaijJLoveZv XvoiTeXeoTe- 
pov elvat tov fjir) KaKoSaipioveZv , Kol tou KaKoSai- 
povetv 3 aXvGLTeXecjTepov rjy€LTCLl* TO p/T] KOLKoSoupLO- 
velv el S' dXvoiTeXeoTepov , kolL fiXafiepcoTepov 8 ' to 
p/r\ KOLKohaipiovelv dpa fiXafiepcoTepov tov KaKoSat- 
pioveiv.* fiovXopievos ovv TavTrjv emXeaiveiv ttjv 
C aToniav emXeyei rrepl tcov kolkcov " eon S' ov 7 
TavTa 7rpoT€povvTa dXXd 6 Xoyos, pied* ov fitovv 
emfidXXei puaXAov kol el acf>poves eao/xcffa." upco- 
tov piev ovv Ta KtiKa kclkiclv Xeyei* koll tcx /x^t- 
eypvTa kolklols aAAo S' ovSev rj Se Ka/aa XoyiKov 9 
ion ^idAAov Se Xoyos 7]pLapTrjpLevos' ovSev ovv eTe- 
pov ioTi to pieTa Xoyov fiiovv dcfcpovas ovtos r) to 
ju,erd KaKias fitovv. eTreiTa 10 to fliovv d<j>povas 


ovv rrpoTepet 12 tovto tcov dvd pieoov ; ov yap rrpos 

1 Sra)tKots , -X 3 (added in margin), g ; omitted by all other 
mss. {rrapa tols <vac. 4> -B ; -nap avrols -A 2 , Yat. Keg. 80 ; 
irapd tcov -E). 

2 tcov KaKcov p.rj -X 1 (corrected by X 3 ) ; tcov lltj KaXcov -a. 

3 Kal tov KaKoiSai}xovelv -E ; Kal -B ; omitted by all other 
MSS. (X and g omit koX tov KaK. dX. rj-y. to fxrj KaKohaifiovclv). 

4 iJyeiTO -d, V, z. 

5 afiXafiepcoTepov -B. 

6 to fJLTj KaKoSaipLOveiv dpa fiXafiepcoTepov tov KaKoSai/xoveiv 
-E ; omitted by B ; Kal K-aKoSai^tovetv -all other mss. (<•/. 
Castiglioni, thiomon, xxvi [1951], p. 83). 

7 Iotiv ov -g. 

8 Ae'yetv -F, X 1 (final v erased -X 3 ), a, A, jg, y, n (toO t<x 
KaKa Kaiciav Aeyetv), E, B. 

9 XoyiKTj -g. 


living foolishly ; but I let that pass. Since, however, 
what the Stoics call intermediates are neither evil nor 
good, a in saying that evils have the advantage he 
says nothing else than that evils have the advantage 
over what are not evils and to be unhappy is more 
advantageous than not to be unhappy, that is he 
holds that not to be unhappy is more disadvantageous 
than to be unhappy and, if more disadvantageous, 
more injurious also and therefore that not to be 
unhappy is more injurious than to be unhappy. b In 
his desire, then, to mitigate this absurdity he adds 
this statement on the subject of evils c : ** It is not 
these that have the advantage but reason, and it is 
incumbent upon us rather to be alive with reason 
even if we are to be fools." Now in the first place he 
asserts that evils are vice and what partakes of vice 
and are nothing else d ; but vice is rational or rather 
is reason gone astray , e and consequently to be alive 
with reason as fools is nothing else than to be alive 
with vice. In the next place to be alive as fools is 
to be alive as unhappy wretches. In what respect, 
then, does this have the advantage over inter- 
mediates ? For surely it is not in respect of being 

° S.V.F. iii, frag. 760 (p. 188, 26-27). 

b Cf De Comm. Not. 1064 f. 

c S.V.F. iii, frag. 760 (p. 188, 28-33). 

d For this and the corresponding definition of goods cf 
S.V.F. iii, frags. 70 (p. 17, 17-20) and 76 (p. 19, 23-24 and 
30-32) with iii, p. 154, 6 and p. 165, 21. 

• Cf. Plutarch, De Virtute Morali 441 c-d and 446 f— - 
447 a (S. V.F. iii, frag. 459). 

10 €TT€t "d, V, Z. 

11 piovv tart KaKo&aLf.iovas ovrag -omitted in text but added 
in margin -X. 

12 7TpOT€p€lP -g. 



(1042) ye to 1 evoaipioveZv fojcrec 2 irpoTepeZv to 3 /ca/coSat- 
jxovelv. dAA' ovSe oAcoj, (jxiaiv, otcrat oeZv X/rJ- 

D oiTTTiOs ovre fjL0V7]v ev Tto fitto toZs o\yadoZs ovt 
e£ayojyrjv toZs kclkoZs rrapap^eTpeZv dAAd toZs jjl€- 
gols /caret <f>voiv oio /cat toZs ev8 at pLovovai yiyve- 
rai ttotc KaOrJKov e^dyeiv iavrovs /cat p^eveiv avOtg 
iv to) £,r)v tols KaKohaijjLovovoiv . etra rl tovtov* 
fxeZ^ov iariv vrrevavTicupLa 77/309 alpeoiv /cat (jtvyrjv, 
el rots* err' 5 aKpov evoaipiovovoiv airovoia 6 tojv 
a8ia(f>6pQ)v 7 d(/)iGTaa9ai 8 tojv dyadtov irapovTOJV 
KadiqKei; /catrot 9 rtbv d8ta(f)6pojv ovoev alperov ov- 
oe (f)€VKrov, dAAd fjiovov alperov rdyadov 10 /cat puovov 
<(>€vkt6v TjyovvraL 11 to kolkov. ware at>/z/3atWt 12 /car' 
avrovg firj 13 npog rd alperd prjSe rrpds rd cf>evKrd 

E tovs tojv rrpd^eoov TiQeodai 1 * Xoyiapiovs, dAA' ere- 
poov OToxa^ofievovs a payre <f>evyovoi pirfii* alpovv- 

TCLl, TTpOS TOLVTCL /Cat t/f]V /Cat d7To6vrjGK€lV . 

1 7Tp6s ye to -Meziriac ; TTpooUro -F, d, v, z, a, A, /J, y, 
n, B ; 7TpoorjKu to -X 3 (^*ct to -over erasure), g ; npos rl to 

2 (j>rjO€i -Emperius (Op. Philol., p. 340) ; fool -mss. (<f>aol 
-Vat. Reg. 80). 

3 to -Meziriac ; tow -mss. * tovtov ti -g. 
5 Trpos -d, v, z. 6 airovolav -X 3 , g. 

7 tojv dbia(j>6po)v -X 3 , g ; tol> (tojv -d, v, z) aSta</>dpojS" -all 
other mss. 

8 a(f>LGTacr6aL -Meziriac (implied in versions of Xylander and 
Amyot) ; inloTaodai -mss. 

9 KaiToi -X 3 , g, B ; /cat to -all other mss. 

10 aya86v to alpcTOv -a, A, jS, y, n, E. 

11 r\yovvTo -d, V, z. 

12 ov/.cpaiv€L -F, X, g, d, v, z ; ovp.fialv€iv -all other mss. 

13 /LoySe -d, V, Z (kclO' clvtovs /u-t/Sc -d). 

14 ytveadac -g. 

& F./ 7 '. iii, frag. 759 (where this statement of Chrysippus 


happy that he would say being unhappy has the 
advantage. But Chrysippus, they say, thinks a that 
the standard of measurement for remaining alive or 
taking leave of life should be not at all goods for the 
former and evils for the latter but for both the inter- 
mediates conforming with nature, 6 which is why it 
sometimes becomes proper both for the happy to 
commit suicide and for the unhappy again to con- 
tinue living. Why then, what self-contradiction in 
respect of choice and avoidance is greater than this, 
that for those who are in the highest degree happy 
it is proper to withdraw from the goods they have 
because they lack things that are indifferent ? Yet 
they (the Stoics) hold that of indifferent things none 
is an object of choice or of avoidance but that good 
is alone an object of choice and evil alone an object 
of avoidance. Consequently it turns out that by 
their own assertions they make their practical calcu- 
lations not with regard to the objects of choice nor 
yet with regard to the objects of avoidance but the 
aim of their endeavour in living and in dying is other 
things, which they neither avoid nor choose. 

as given in De Comm. Not. 1063 d is printed also). With 
what follows here cf. the whole of De Comm. Not., chap. 1 1 
(1063 c— 1064 c) and Cicero, De Finibus iii, 60-61 (S. V.F. 
iii, frag. 763). 

b With rot? ix€gols Kara </>ucriv here cf. in De Comm. Not. 
1063 d tols Kara <f>vaiv ical napa <f>vat,v and in 1060 e and 
1068 a ra Kara (j>vmv. In the similar passage of Stobaeus 
(S. V.F. iii, frag. 758 [p. 188, 4]) the phrase used is rot? 
KadrjKovat kcli toIs irapd to KaOrjKOV. On ra d$id</>opa Kara 
<j>voiv and -napa <j>voiv cf. De Comm. Not. 1060 b-d (S. V.F. iii, 
frag. 146) and S.V.F. i, frag. 191 and iii, frags. 140-143. 
They are in the technical Stoic terminology the 7Tpor)yp.eva and 
drroTT porjyueva respectively, for which see page 529, note a 



(1042) 19. TdyaOd npos ra KaKa rrjv naoav k\etv & ia ' 
<f>opdv 6/JLoXoyet XpvoiTTjros . Kal dvayicalov ioriv 
el ra 1 \xkv ioxdrtos ttoicI KaKohaipuovas evdvs 2, olg 
av Trapfj ra 8' err' aKpov evdalfAOvas. alaOr^ra 8' 
thai rdyaOa /cat 3 ra KaKa cf>r]oiv, iv rep 7rpor4pa) 
Trepl TeAovs ravra ypdcj)a)v " on \xev ydp aladrjrd 
ion rdyaOa Kal to. KaKa Kal rovrois eKTroiet 4 Xt- 
yeiv ov yap \xovov ra 5 Trddrj iorlv alaOrjrd ovv rots 
eiSeocv, olov Xvtttj Kal cf)6j3os Kal rd TrapaTrXrjo 1a, 
F aAAd Kal kXotttjs Kal pLOt^e las Kal tldv o/jloiojv %otw 
alodeoOai ical KaOoXov 6 d<f)poovvr)s Kal htiXias Kal 
dXXajv ovk oXiyojv KaKitov 1 ovSe ptovov x a P^ Kai 
€vepy€Gict)v Kal dXXcov 7toXXluv KaTop9a)0£0)v* 
dXXd Kal 9 (f)povr]0€a)s Kal dvSpecas Kal rwv Xolttcov 
dperajv." tovtwv rrjv [lev dXXrjv droTriav defxjopiev, 10 
on be /za^erat rols rrepl rov StaXeXrjOora 11 oo<j>dv 
tls ovk av ofJLoXoy-qoeiev ; alodqrov ydp ovros 12 rd- 
yaOov Kal pLeydXrjv rrpos to KaKov Sia(/)opav 13 k\ov- 
1043 ros, top €K (fiavXov yevopuevov 1 * 1 oirovhalov dyvoetv 
rovro Kal rrjs dperTJs pL7) aloOdveodai TTapovorjs 

1 el fikv ra -F, X, g, d, v, z, a, A 1 . 

2 €vdvs -omitted by g. 3 rdyada Kal -omitted by g. 
4 tla-iToia, -£. 5 ra -B ; ovto. -all other mss. 

6 KaOoXov -Reiske ; yap oXov -mss. 

7 KaKCOV -g. 

8 KaTopdwoecov -X, g, B ; Karopdaxjccos -all other mss. 

9 Kal -A 2 (?), jB, y, n, Tolet. 51, 5, E ; omitted by all other 


10 (f>a)fxev -n. 

11 huX-qXvOoTa -g, d, v, z. 

12 yap ovtos -Meziriac (implied by Xylander's version) ; 

TTapOVTOS -mss. 

13 &ia<f>opav npos to KaKov -d, v, z. 

14 y€v6fjL€vov -X 3 (first e made from t), g ; ytvouevov -all 
other mss. (o-novoaZov yivop.€vov -B). 



19. Chrysippus admits that good things are entirely 
different from evil, and it must be so if by the 
presence of the latter men are straightway made 
utterly unhappy and by that of the former happy in 
the highest degree a ; but good and evil things are 
perceptible, he says, writing as follows in the first 
book of the two concerning the Goal b : " For even 
with the following one has enough to assert that good 
and evil things are perceptible. For not only are the 
affections along with their species, that is to say 
grief and fear and the like, perceptible but also it is 
possible to perceive theft and adultery and similar 
things and, in general, folly and cowardice and not a 
few other vices and not only joy and benefactions and 
many other right activities but also prudence and 
courage and the rest of the virtues." Let us pass 
over whatever else is absurd in this statement ; but 
who would not admit that it is in conflict with the 
assertions made about the man who is a sage without 
being aware of it ? c For, if good is perceptible and 
far different from evil, how is it not the utmost 
absurdity that one have changed from being base to 
being good without knowing it and without per- 

For the Stoic formulation of the causal relation of good 
and evil to happiness and unhappiness respectively cf. S. V.F. 
in, frags. 106, 107, and 113. 

b S. V.F. iii, frag. 85 (p. 21, 27-37) ; cf. Be Comm. Not. 
1062 c. 

c From the maximum of ethical " progress," which being 
still not good is therefore evil, to the virtue and wisdom of 
the sage the change is instantaneous (cf. Plutarch, Stoicos 
Absurdiora Poetis Dicere 1058 b) and so may be unper- 
ceived by the subject of it (cf. S. V.F. iii, frags. 540 and 541). 
For the objection to this Stoic doctrine raised by Plutarch 
in what follows here see also his Quomodo Quis . . . Sentiat 
Profectux 75 c-e and T)e Comm. Not. 1062 b-e. 



(1043) dAA' oieadai rr)v kolklclv avrtp 1 napuvai, ncos ovk 
zcftlv aroTTCxyrarov ; r) yap ovoels ayvoelv r) dm- 
arclv Svvarac tcls dperas e'xojv drraaas, r) piiKpd ris 
eon Kal 7TavrdiTaai ovaOeajp-qros rj Siacfropd ttjs 
dperfjs npos rrjv kolklclv Kal rrjs evSaLfxovlas rrpos 
rrjv KaKoSaipLOVLav i<al rod koXXLotov j3iov rrpos 
rov alvyLOTOV el ravrd tls dvr eKelvajv KTrjad- 
jjievos iavrov AeArjde. 

20. Mux ovvra^LS r) Trepl 2 Blojv rerrapa /3t/3Aia- 
rovrwv ev rep rerdpra) Xeyet rov acxfiov aTrpdyfiovd 
r elvaL Kal loLoirpdypLova* Kal rd aurou 4 TrpdrreLv. 
eart oe r) Ae^LS avrrj- OLfxaL yap eycjye rov cppo- 
VLfJLov Kal drrpaypiova elvaL /cat oALyorrpdypiova 6 Kal 
rd avrov nparreLV, o/xota>s* rrjg r avrorrpayias Kal 
rrjs oALyoTrpaypLocrvvrjs dareiwv ovrwv." rd 8e 
o/xota ax € °° v * v T <? rrepl rcbv Ai' avra alpercov 
€Lpr]K€ ravraLS rals Aefjeai* " r& yap ovtl </>cuWtcu 
6 Kara rr)v rjovxlav ^los aKLvovvov tl Kal do^aAks 

tSetV." OTL pi€V TCQ *Yj7TLKOVpip Tf]V TTpOVOLaV (xVflU- 

povvTL Sid rrjs drrpaypLOGvvrjg rrjs rrepl rov deov 

1 avra> -Sandbach ; avrto -mss. 

2 napd -d. 

3 ^Lonpayfiova -V ; 6Xiyo7Tpdyfj,ova -Reiske. 

4 Kal ravra avrov -F 1 (rav cancelled), d, v, z. 

5 lorn Sc 17 Xe^ts . . . Kal rd avrov irpdrrtiv -omitted by g 
and E. 

6 XiyoTTpayfjiova -d ; ISioTrpdyfiova -Pohlenz. 

7 fiev <ovv> raj -Meziriac (but cf. 1039 d supra). 

a S.V.F. iii, frag. 703. 

6 For IdioTTpdyfiova cf Hesychius, s.v. loLOTrpayeli Schol. 
in Euripidis Medeam 217 (ii, p. 157, 21 [Schwartz]) ; S. V.F. 



ceiving the presence of virtue but thinking that vice 
is residing in him ? Either no one who has all the 
virtues can be ignorant of the fact or disbelieve it, or 
else the difference between virtue and vice, between 
happiness and unhappiness, and between the fairest 
life and the ugliest is minute and scarcely discernible 
at all if anyone has acquired the former in place of 
the latter without noticing it. 

20. The work on Ways of Living is a single treatise 
in four books. In the fourth of these he says a that 
the sage is unmeddlesome and retiring b and minds 
his own business. These are his words : " For / 
think that the prudent man is unmeddlesome and 
unomcious and that he minds his own business, 
minding one's own business c and unofficiousness 
being alike matters of decency/' In the work con- 
cerning Objects of Choice Per Se, he has said very 
nearly the same thing in these words d : For in fact 
there seems to be something secure and certain 
about the life of tranquillity, though most men are 
not really able to perceive this." For Epicurus this 
is clearly not out of keeping, since he by the doctrine 
that god does not meddle does away with provi- 

iii, p. 245, 31-32. There is no more reason to change this to 
oXL-yoTrpdyfiova as Reiske did or SXiyo-n pay fxova in the direct 
quotation to ISio-nody/iova as Pohlenzdoes than there is to 
change ao<j>6v in Plutarch's paraphrase to <f>p6vifiov or the 
latter in the direct quotation to ao<f>6v. 

c Cf. oiKeio-npayia in Plato's Republic 434 c, where in 
contrast to TToXv7Tpayp,oovv7) (434 b 9) it defines Sik-cuoo-uV*;. 
This by Proclus (In Rempublicam i, p. 23, 3-8 and p. 220, 
5-8) is called to avTOTrpayeiv and avronpayia (cf Iamblichus, 
Be Mysteriis, p. 187, 13-14 [Parthey]). In the pseudo- 
Platonic Definitions (411 t:) (juxjypoovvr) =-- avToirpayia Kara <j>v- 


d S.V.F. iii, frag. 704. 



(1043) ovk aTraSei 1 SrjXov iartv dXX* avTog 6 Xpucrt7r7ro? 
ev rqj TTpdjTQj rrepl Blojv fiacnXeiav 2 re rov oocj)6v 
C £kovoIojs* dva&e^eoOai* X4yti ^piqfjLari^oiievov air' 
avrrjs' Kav avros fiaaiXeveiv pur) hvvr\rai, ovpfiiaj- 
oerat fiaoiXel koI err pared oerai pera 5 /^acriAeoK, 
0109 tjv \0dvdvpoo5* 6 HkvOtis t) 7 Azvkojv 6 E[oy- 
riKos. rrapadrjaojiai Se 8 Kal ravrrjv avrov rrjv 8td- 
Xzktov, oitods elSojfiev el KaOdrrep €K vrjrrjg Kal 
VTraTrjS yiyverai ovpqbojvov ovtojs opioXoyel /3t'o9 
avSpos koI aTrpaypLOOVvrjv alpovfievov Kal oXiyo- 
rr pay poovvrp? elra avvLTTTra^opevov Y*Kv6aL<s Kal rd 
row iv T5oo770pa) rvpdvvojv irpdrrovros it; olaaSrj- 
rivos dvdyKTjS' u OTi ydp " <^ncrt " Kal arparevacrat 

1 aTrabei -X 3 (seeond a made from o), g, Vat. Reg. 80 2 ; 
a-TTohtl -all other mss. ; dircphel -Basil. 

2 fiaoi\4u)s - d ; fiaoiXav -V. 

3 €kovoiu>s -omitted by g. 

4 Kronenberg (Mnemosyne, Hi [19241, p. 104) and implied 
in the versions of Xylander and Amyot ; dvaBcxecrdai -X, g, 
B ; dv4x€odai -all other mss. 

5 /xerd -omitted by A padded superscript -A 2 ) ; Kara -d, z. 

6 ^IhdvOvpuos -Xylander (cf. C.I.G. ii, pp. Ilia and 
113a); iavdvpcros -¥ l (vhau superscript -F*) ; vSdvdr/poos -g, 
d (v changed to l), v ; vhdQvpoos -H ; vhdvBvpoos -X 3 (v&d 
over erasure) and all other mss. (cf. 1043 n infra, De Comm. 
Not. 1061 i), and Reg. et Imp. Apophthegmata 174 e). 

7 r) -omitted by g. 

8 8e -omitted by F; d, v, z (7Tapadrjaofj.€v -d, v, z), a, A, 
P* y, n, E. 

9 7To\vTrpayp.oovvr)v -E, n. 

t.0. Chrysippus cannot consistently identify tranquillity 
with the good life as Epicurus can (cf. 1033 c supra), for 
the latter, unlike the former, ascribing it in its most perfect 
form to the gods sees and asserts that this precludes the pos- 
sibility of providence and of all divine intervention in human 
affairs and natural processes (Epicurus, K. A. i and Epistles 



dence a ; but Chrysippus himself in the first book on 
Ways of Living says & that the sage will voluntarily 
assume kingship and make a profit from it and, if he 
cannot reign himself, will dwell with a king and go 
campaigning with a king of the kind that Idanthyrsus 
the Scythian was or Leuco of Pontus. c I shall cite 
this too in his own language, in order that we may 
know whether as the highest and lowest tones pro- 
duce concord so there is consistency d in the life of a 
man who chooses to be unmeddlesome and unofficious 
and then from some necessity or other goes riding 
with Scythians and minding the business of the 
tyrants in the Bosporus : " For," says he, " holding 
fast to this let us again consider the proposition that 

i, 76-77 and ii, 97 ; Cicero, De Nat. Deorum i, 51-56 ; 
[Plutarch], De Placitis 881 a-v = Dox. Graeci, p. 300, 4-16). 
This Epicurean doctrine and the Stoic opposition to it are 
played off against each other in chap. 38 infra (1051 d-e 
and 1052 b) and in De Comm. Not, chap. 32 (1075 e-f). See 
also Plutarch's references to the Epicurean doctrine in 
Pyrrkus, chap. 20 (395 e-f) ; De Defectu Orac. 420 b ; Non 
Posse Suaviter Vlvi 1100 e— 1101 c, 1103 d ; Adv. Colotem 
1108 c, 1111 b, 1123 a, 1124 e, 1125 e. 

b S. V.F. iii, frag. 691 (p. 173, 23-36) ; cf. De Comm. Not. 
1061 n. 

c For Idanthyrsus, king of the Scythians when they were 
attacked by Darius (514 b.c.), see Herodotus, iv, 76, 120, 
126-127 and F. Jacoby, F. Gr. Hist. I A, p. 102 (3 F 174) 
and III C, p. 616 (715 F 11) ; for Leuco, ruler of Bosporus 
and Theodosia and many neighbouring Scythian tribes and 
friend of the Athenians (ca. 393-348 b.c), see E. H. Minns, 
Scythians and Greeks (Cambridge, 1913), pp. 556-557 and 
574-576 ; Geyer, R.-E. xii, 2 (1925), cols. 2279-2282 ; and 
H. Volkmann, Der Kleine Pauly, iii (1969), p. 599, col. 1, 
7-32. The two appear together among the examples of good 
kings named by Dio Chrysostom, Oratio ii, 77. 

d For the intended irony of 6fioXoycl here cf the notes on 
1033 a and 1033 c supra. 



(1043) fiera bvvaarcop 1 kcu fSicooerai, ttoXiv €TnoK€\jjco- 
D fieOa 2 rovroov €yo\ievoi s rivtov jjlcv ovSe ravra vtto- 
voovvtcov Sta rovs ofiOLovs VTroXoyiofAovs rjfjLcov 8e 
Kal ravr a/noknrovTtov Sta rovs 7rapa7rXr]criovs 3 
Xoyovs." Kal fjLera fMKpov' u ov jjlovov Se fiera 
tcov 7TpoKeKO(f>6ru}V irrl rroaov Kal iv ayooyais Kal 
iv eOeac* ttolols yeyovoroov, olov irapa A.€Vkojvi Kal 
*l8avdvpacp"* KaA/W0eVa rives iyKaXovoiv on 
TTpos ' 'AXe£av8pov errXevaev iXiri^oov avaorrjoeiv 
"OXvvOov cos Tirdyecpa 6 ^ApLorroreXrjs 1 "E(f>opov Se 8 
Kal SevoKpdrrf Kal M.€vi8r]fiov iTracvovcn Trapairr)- 
aafievovs rov 'AXe(;av8pov' 6 8e yLpvanrTros evtKa 
XprjfjLaTiafAov rov oo<j>6v iirl KtcfraXrjv is WavriKa- 

1 hvVCLTUiV ~g, V, Z. 

2 imoKeJjonzOa -g, a\o changed to co -a 2 ), Tolet. 51, 5; 

€7TLaK€lIt€fl€da "d. 

3 TrapaTrAijatov -j5, n, Vat. Reg. 80. 

4 rjOeoi -d, v, z. 

5 Cf. 1043 c supra ; vSaOrjpaa) -g ; vhadvpoa) -B ; vhav- 
Ovpau) -all other mss. 

6 chardyetpa -X 1 ; iv ardytipa -a, A, j3, y, n, E, Tolet. 51,5. 

7 dpiGTOT€Xrfv -g ; after dpLOTOTtXrjs half a line left blank 
in E. 

8 5c -omitted by a, A, p, y, n, E, Tolet. 51,5. 

9 fcvoKpdrrjv -X 1 (final v erased -X 3 ), g, d, v, z, 0, n. 

a /cat . . . ycyovor<x)v is explicative ; for the significance of 
the phrase in explaining the Stoic theory of ethical progress 
cf O. Luschnat, Philologus, cii (1958), pp. 202-203. 

6 Concerning the motive here alleged cf. W. Kroll, R.-E. 
x (1919), col. 1(375, 62 ff. in his article (ibid., cols. 1671, 67- 
1726, 7) on Callisthenes (ca. 370-327), Aristotle's grand- 
nephew, who was executed by Alexander and whose story is 
told by Plutarch in his Alexander, chaps. 52-55 (69 i e — 
696 e). See further L. Pearson, The Lost Histories of Alex- 



he will go campaigning and dwell with princes, since 
we have maintained this too for reasons much like 
the very considerations which have caused some not 
even to suspect it." After a bit he adds : " and not 
only with those who have made some progress by 
having been engaged in certain kinds of discipline 
and habituation, for example at the courts of Leuco 
and Idanthyrsus." Some arraign Callisthenes for 
having sailed to Alexander in the hope of restoring 
Olynthus b as Aristotle restored Stagira c and praise 
Ephorus and Xenocrates and Menedemus for having 
declined Alexander's invitation d ; but Chrysippus 
thrusts the sage headlong into Panticapaeum and the 

ander the Great (New York, 1960), pp. 22-49. Olynthus 
had been taken and utterly destroyed by Philip II of 
Macedon in 348 b.c. (cf Demosthenes, Oratio ix, 26 ; 
Diodorus Siculus, xvi, 53, 2-3 ; Dionysius Hal., Ad Am- 
maeum i, 10 = p. 269, 8-11 [Usener-Radermacher] ; and 
[Plutarch], Vitae X Oratorum 845 d-e). 

Cf. Plutarch's Alexander,, chap. 7 (668 a), Non Posse 
Suaviter Vivi 1097 B, and Adv. Colotem 1126 f; Diogenes 
Laertius, v, 4 ; I. During:, Aristotle in the Ancient Bio- 
graphical Tradition (Goteborg, 1957), pp. 290-294 ; and 
O. Gigon, Vita Aristotelis Marciana (Berlin, 1962), pp. 56- 
57, where the evidence for the destruction of Stagira by 
Philip II in 349 b.c. and for Aristotle's role in the restoration 
of his native city is discussed. 

d Similar stories are told of Xenocrates by Plutarch in his 
Alexander, chap. 8 (668 e), Be Alexandri . . . Virtute t 331 e 
and 333 b, Reg. et Imp. Apophthegmata 181 d-e, Adv. 
Colotem 1126 d (cf. also Cicero, Tusc. Disp. v, 91 ; Diogenes 
Laertius, iv, 8-9 ; Stobaeus, Anth. iii, 5, 10 [p. 258, 6-9, 
Hense] ). The Menedemus mentioned here is not the Eretrian 
(1036 f supra) but Plato's associate from Pyrrha, mentioned 
again by Plutarch in Adv. Colotem 1126 c-d (cf. K. von 
Fritz, R.-E. xv/1 [1931], col. 788, 19-53). On the inclusion 
here of Ephorus of Cyme, the historian (ca. 405-330 b.c), 
</. F. Jacoby, F. Or. Hist. II C, p. 36, 9-16. 




yaoias 1 eW/ca /cat xP r H JLarto l Jio v tclvtol iroiel /cat 
TTpoSedTJAtoKe rp€ls viroOepievos appco^ovras fid- 
Xtara 2 to) oo(f>tp xprjpLaTiofiovs, rov dno fiaoiXeias 

/Cat TOV (X7t6 </>lX<jOV KOI TplTOV €7TL TOVTOIS TOP OL7t6 
O0(j)lGT€iaS . KCLLTOl 77oAAa^Ol} jtt€V aTTOKVaUl* TO.VT 


€7T€c ri (Set) 4 fiporoLGL TrXrjv Sueiv fiovov, 5 
ArjpLTjTpos aKrrjs TTtLpLCLTOs ff vSprj^oov ;° 

€V 7 8e rots' 7T€pl Qvoeojs Xeyet rov oocjiov, el 8 rrjv 
pL€yiGT7)v ovoiav dirofidXoi? SpaxfJ^v ficav €/c/?e/3A?]- 
Kevai So^etv. ovtoj S' clvtov apas* c/cet /cat 6y- 
kcLocls evravOa irdXiv els puoOapviav Kara^dXXet 
/cat ao^iareiav 10 ' /cat yap avrr^oeiv /cat rrpoXrufje- 
F cr#at to piev evdvs apxpfievov to Se xpovov tco 
fiadrjrfj SieXdovTog, oirep tvyvaifioveoTCpov etvai, 

1 yap epyaaias -Reiske (implied in the versions of Xylander 
and Amyot) ; Trap ipyaaias -F 1 , X 1 ; irep epyaaias -X 3 , g, 
B ; 7rap€pyaoias -F 2 and all other mss. 

2 (lis fidXtoTa -g. 

3 dnoKvaUi -X 3 (atct over erasure), g, A 2 , /?, y, E, B; 
aTTOKviaai -F, d, V, Z, a, A 1 . 

4 <8ct> added by Leonicus (cf. 1044 b jw/ra and Quomodo 
Adulescens Poetas Audlre Debeat 36 f). 

5 /xoVcoy -d, v, z, B. 

6 ArffirjTpos olkttjs 7TOfiaTOs (7TO)p,aros -Diibner) #' vSp-q^oov 
(vopoxoov -g) -X 3 (added in margin), g, B ; omitted by all 
other mss. here (cf 1044 b and f infra and Quomodo Adu- 
lescens ... 36 f). 

7 ev -F 2 (superscript over od> cancelled), X 3 (over erasure), 
and all other mss. 8 €i -omitted by d, v, z. 

9 d-rropaXoL -X 3 (A over erasure), g, a 2 (A over erasure), 
A, 0, y, n, E ; d-nofidWoi -F, d, v, z ; aTro/^aAAei -B. 
10 €iV -omitted by B ; els p>. *cu a. Kardyei -d, v, z. 

a S.KF. iii, frag. 691 (p. 174, 1-2), cf T)e Comm. Not 


Scythian wilderness a in order to make a profit, for 
that the purpose intended is trade and profit he has 
made clear even before this b by prescribing three 
sources of profit particularly appropriate to the sage : 
kingship, friends, and, third after these, lecturing. 
Yet in place after place he praises ad nauseam the 
verses : 

For what need mortals save two things alone, 
Demeter's grain and draughts of water clear ? c 

and in the books concerning Nature he says d that 
the sage, if he should lose the greatest fortune, 
would reckon his loss at a single drachma. After 
having thus exalted and inflated him there, however, 
he here reduces him again to wage-earning and 
schoolmastering, for he says that the sage will both 
demand a fee and collect it in advance, in some cases 
at the beginning of the pupil's term and in others 
after some time has elapsed, the latter being the 

1061 d {S. V.F. iii, p. 174, 3-9) ; but neither of these passages 
is a " fragment " of Chrysippus (cf Pohlenz, Hermes* lxxiv 
[1939], p. 16). Panticapaeum, at the N.E. corner of the 
Taurian Chersonese, had been founded by Miletus and con- 
quered by the Bosporian rulers, who made it their " Euro- 
pean capital " (cf. Strabo, vii, 4, 4-5 [309-311] and xi, 2, 5 
and 10 [494, 495]). For the phrases, eVi K€<f)aXrjv a>0cF and 
tt]v Y*KvdGiv €p7)fj,lav, see Leutsch, Corpus Paroem. Graec. ii, 
p. 412 (no. 64 [add Plato, Republic 553 b 8]) and p. 208 (no. 
66 [add Aeschylus, Prom. Vinct. 1-2]). 

b S. V.F. iii, frag. 693 ; cf. 1047 f infra and S. V.F. iii, 
frag. 686. 

c The first two of five lines by Euripides (frag. 892 
[Nauck, Trag. Graec. Frag.' 2 * p. 646]), the second and third 
of which are freely reproduced at 1044 f infra. Aulus Gellius 
(vr, xvi, 6-7) says of the lines M quibus saepissime Chrysippus 
philosophus usus " (S. V.F. iii, p. 177, 19-28). 

d Kairoi noXXaxov /u.ev . . . ho^€Lv= S.V.F* iii, frag. 153; 
cf. 1048 b infra (iv Se to) TptVa> 7rcpt Ouaecus . . .). 



(1043) (f>r)otv, docfxxXeorepov 8e rd npoXapLJUdveiv, cog dSt- 
KrjfjLara rov rdnov 1 imSexopievov. Xeyei 8e ovrcog' 
t( elan parr ovr at 2 Se rov puodov ov ndvras 3 ol vovv 
exovres cbaavrcos dAA' dXAcos (jfj rd") nXrjOos* 
cos dv 6 Kaipos <f>tpTI> ovk enayyeXXopizvoC' noir)- 
oretv dyadovs /cat ravr iv iviavrco ocrov* St* nap 9 
iavrovs 1 ravra noirjcrecv npds rov ovpLcfycovrjOevra 
1044 XP° V0V " Kai TrdAiv npoeXdcov "rov re Kaipov 
eioerai, ndrepov evdvs Set rov puodov Xap,/3dveiv 
a/xa rfj npoadocp s Kaddnep nXeiovs nenoir\Kaoiv r) 
/cat xpovov avrols StSoVat, rov rdnov 9 rovrov /xaA- 
Xov /cat dSt/c^/Ltara 10 em8e)(opLevov 8d£avros o* aV 1 
elvai evyvcopcoveorepov . y ' 12 /cat ncos r) 13 xp r H JL( ^ LTCOV 
Karacj>povr]rr)s lx d crowds, vno ovyypacfcrjv en dp- 
yvplco rrjv dperr)v napa8i8ovs /cav fir) napaSco rd 
fjLioddpiov 15 elonpdrrcov cos nenoirjKchs 16 rd nap av- 
roVy 17 r] fiXdfirjs KpeLrrcov > tfivXarrdfJLevos fir] dSiKrjOfj 

1 Tpo-nov -g 2 (/> added superscript). 

2 €KTTpaTTovTai -F, X, g, d, v, z, a. 

3 Emperius (Op. Philol., p. 340) ; rravres -mss. 

4 aAAco? <rj to> irXijdos -R. G. Bury ; dXtos ttXtjOos -g\ d, 
v, z ; aAAcos vac. 6 -E ; aAAcos TrXrjdos -all other mss. 

6 inayyeXXoficvoi -E ; i-nayyeXXofievcov (eVaye -F ; dnayye -d, 
v, z) -all other mss. 

6 oca -E. 

7 Shorey (Class. Phil., xi [1916], p. 465 and xiii [1918], 
p. 413) ; 7Tp6s iavrovs -MSS. 

8 npooBu) -X 3 (erasure after v-po), g. 

9 Tponov -g 2 (p added superscript). 

10 a&LKTJtLCLTOS "g, V, Z. 

11 av -omitted by g. 

12 dyvcofxov€(jT€pov -d, v, z. 

13 ttcjs dv €trj -X 3 , g, B. 

14 KaTa<f>povr)T7)v -d, V, z. 

16 to puadapviov -F 1 (so also at the end of this sentence) ; 
rov fitoddpiov -a. 


more courteous procedure but collection in advance 
the more certain, since the situation admits of 
fraudulent practices. His statement runs as follows a : 
'■ Those who are intelligent do not exact their fee of 
all in the same manner but, otherwise <(than the) 
majority, as occasion requires, promising not to pro- 
duce virtuous men and that too within a year b but 
so far as in them lies to produce these results at the 
time agreed upon." Further on he says again : " He 
will know what is the appropriate time, whether he 
should take his fee straightway upon the entrance 
of his pupils, as has been the practice of a majority, 
or should also grant them time, the latter being a 
situation which is more open to fraudulent practices, 
to be sure, but which would seem to be more 
courteous." How is the sage, then, either disdainful 
of wealth, contracting as he does to transmit virtue 
for money and, even if he does not transmit it, 
exacting his pittance on the ground that he has done 
what in him lies, or superior to injury, taking pre- 

° S.V.F. iii, frag. 701. See Headlam's note in Herodas, 
The Mimes and Fragments ed. A. D. Knox (Cambridge, 
1922), pp. 123-124. The injunctions of Chrysippus are com- 
pared by L. Edelstein (Bull, Hist. Medicine, xxx [1956], 
p. 402, n. 20 = Ancient Medicine [Baltimore, 1967], p. 330, 
n. 20) with the recommendations for physicians in the Hip- 
pocratic Precepts 4 and 6 (ix, pp. 254-258 [Littre]). 

b Such professions are ridiculed or castigated by Isocra- 
tes, Adv. Sophistas 3-6 and by Plato in Euthydemus 273 
d-e, Protagoras 319 a, Laches 186 c, Republic 518 b. 

16 ws 7TcnoLr)Kohs -omitted bj^ d, v, z ; ws ttcttoltjkoos . . . 
Kpeirrwv -omitted by y, n, E, Tolet. 51, 5. 

17 nap* avrov -Reiske ; ircpi avrov -mss. (-ncpl defended by 
Kolfhaus, Plutarchi De Comm. Not., p. 56 ; but cf. 1043 f 
supra [-n-pos for Trap'] and De Comm. Not. 1071 a : ra trap* 

iavrov 7TOl€Lv). 



(1044) nepl to paodapiop ; ahiKelrai yap ov8els fir) fiXaTT- 
roixevos' o0€p p,rj dSiKetadat top oo(f>6v Iv d'XAots 
B a7TO(f)r]vdiJL€vos ivravdd cprjotp d8iKT] t uara top tottop 1 

21. 'Ev 8e TO) 7T€pl YloAlT€LCLS Ol)8eP i)8opfjS 

€V€kcl rrpd^ecp ov8e rrapao Kevdoeod 'at 2 (f>rjot tovs 
TroXiTag' Kal top TLvpi7Ti8r]p enaipel rauTa 7Tpo(f>€- 

p6jJL€PO$ Z 

€7T€L TL 8a* fipOTOLOL TtXyJP 8v€LP fJLOVOP , & 

Arj/jLrjTpos aKTrjs ttoj/jloltos 8* v8prjxoov; Q 

€LTCL pLlKpOP* aTTO TOVTCOP 7TpoeX9d)P % €7TaiP€t TOP 

Acoyeprj 9 to ol18olop diroTpifiopLepop £p (f>apepa) 10 Kal 
XeyoPTa rrpos tovs napopTas* " eWe Kal top At/zoV 1 
ovtojs arroT pcipaaO at tt}s yacrTpos rj8vpdprjp .' " tip* 
ovp €X ei Xoyop €P toZs avTois irraipelp top ik- 
pdXXovTa 12 T7jp fj8oprjp dfia Kal top r)8oprjs eW/ca 
roiavra rrpaTTOPTa Kal ToiavTrjs diTTopevop al- 
C oxpovpylas ; ypdipas tolpvp ep tols irepl Qvozojs 

OTt 13 7ToAAa TO)P Z,OJOJP €P€Ka KaXXoVS 7] (f>VOlS iPTjPOX^ 

cf>iXoKaXovcra Kal x a ^P ovoa T fl ttoikiXicl Kal Xoyop 

1 aSiKTjtiaTa rov tottov -Wyttenbach ; a&iKrjfid n (or a8i/oj- 

jJLOLTl) O.TOTTOV "F 1 , X, g, d, V, Z, B ; dStK^fMO. TL (OT dSlKT^iaTl) TOV 

tottov -F 2 , a, A, j3, y, n, E(a superscript between tl and tov). 

2 TrapaoKtvaoaodai -g, /?, n, B. 

3 7TpO(j>€p6fM^VOV "E. 

4 Set -X 3 (superscript), g, B ; omitted by all other mss. 
(ef. 1043 e supra). 5 fiovcov -d, v, z. 

6 nofiaros 0' v&p-qxoov {vhpoxoov -g) -X 3 (in margin), g, B ; 
omitted by all other mss. (</. 1043 i: supra). 

7 €CTa KCLTO. fXLKpOV "g. 

8 TTtpieXQwv -d ; SieA#a>v -B^irpo superscript over 8t). 

9 hioyev-qv -X^final v erased -X 3 ), g, d, v, z, /?. 

10 eV tw (j>ai'€pa> -E. n Aoi/>toy -a. 

12 iKpakovra -d, v, z. 13 on -z, B ; cos otl -all other mss. 



cautions as lie does against being defrauded of his 
pittance ? No one is defrauded without being 
injured. Chrysippus, who on that ground elsewhere 
declared the sage not to be subject to fraud/* here 
says that the situation admits of fraudulent practices. 
21. In his work on Commonwealth he says b that 
the citizens will not do or contrive anything for the 
purpose of pleasure ; and he praises Euripides, 
quoting these verses of his : 

For what need mortals save two things alone, 
Demeter's grain and draughts of water clear ? c 

Then a little further on he praises Diogenes for 
saying to the bystanders as he masturbated in public, 
" Would that I could thus rub the hunger too out of 
my belly.' ' d Now, what sense does it make to praise 
in the same work at once the man who repudiates 
pleasure and the man who for the sake of pleasure 
does things like this and engages in such obscenity ? 
Furthermore, after he had written in the books con- 
cerning Nature e that beauty is the purpose for 
which many of the animals have been produced by 
nature, since she loves the beautiful and delights in 

° S. V.F. iii, frag. 579 ; cf. ibid, frag. 578 and note a on 
1041 e supra. 

b S.V.F. iii, frag. 706 (p. 177, 9-18). 

c See 1043 e supra and note c there. 

d Cf. Diogenes Laertius, vi, 46 and 69. Diogenes of 
Sinope, the Cynic (ca. 400-325 B.C.), used " shamelessness " 
for didactic purposes (cf. K. von Fritz, Philologus, Suppl. 
xviii/2 [1926], pp. 45-49) ; and Plutarch here misinterprets 
both the lesson intended by the anecdote and the motive of 
Chrysippus in citing it (cf. Elorduy, Sozialphilosophie, p. 148, 
n. 263). 

e S.V.F. ii, frag. 1163 (p. 334, 19-23). Cf Cicero, De 
Finibus iii, 18 (S.V.F. ii, frag. 1166). 



(1044) €7T€LTT(hv TTapaXoytOTaTOV 1 OJS 6 rad)S €V€KOL rrjs ou- 

pas 2 yeyove 8id to /caAAo? avrrjs, av8is iv ra> Trepl 
YloXtreias veaviK&s 3 iTTLrerLfjLrjKe tois ra<hs rpe- 
<f)OV<7L /cat drjSovas, woirep* dvrivopLoderdjv ra> rov 
Koafiov vofjLoderrj kolI rrjs (f>voea>s KarayeXajv (f>iXo- 
KaXovarjg Trepl ra rocavra rtov ^ojojv of? 5 6 oocfaos 
iv rrj iroXet Tonov ov SlSojol. ttcos* yap ovk dro- 
ttov iyKaXetv tols rpe^ovoiv 1 a yewtooav irraivel^ 

D TTjV TTpOVOiav; Iv fJL€V OVV TCp 7T€jJL7TTCp 7T€pl Outf^CO?, 

elrrtbv on oi Kopeis evxpijorojs i^VTTVi^ovoiv rjjjL&s 
kclI ol fJLves €7narp€(f)ovoiv rjjjLas pur) dfieXcos c/caara 
ndevai (f)tXoKaXetv Se rrjv (f>votv rrj TroiKiXia X ai ~ 
povaav €lkos ion, ravra Kara Xetjcv etprjKe' " yi- 
voiro S' av fidXiGTa rovrou 9 ejjL<j>aois errl rrjg Kep- 
kov rov raw. 10 ivravda yap imfyaivei to £wov 
yeyovevai eveKa rrj? KepKov Kal ovk dvaTraXtv, 11 rep 
(S') 12 dppevi yevopbevoj 13 ovtojs r) OfjXvs ovvrjKoXov- 

1 napaXoywrara -g. 2 Upas -a. 

3 TvpaviKtos -g (rvp over erasure). 

4 wairep . . . qlkcoXvtcds (1050 c infra) written in d by a 
different hand. 

5 ols . . . olkwXvtws (1050 c infra) missing from v and z 
(in z a large part of f. 175v and all of f. 176 have been left 

6 ttws . . . pL-qhkv rov irepov (1045 b infra) missing from F, 
where the words filled one folio now lost {cf. Pohlenz- 
Westman, Moralia vi/2, p. in). 

7 iyKaXetv . . . vac. 11 (apparently erased at end of line) 
. . . <j>ovaiv -g. 

8 a yevvwoav eVaivet -a corr, » Xylander ; ayevvws (dyevws -n, 
Vat. Reg. 80) dv eTraivfj (iuaivcl -Tolet. 51, 5 1 , Vat. Reg. 80) 
-all other mss. 9 rovro -B. 

10 raw (followed by erasure in next line) -X ; raws (with s 
erased) -a ; raw (followed by erasure) -A ; raw -all other 
mss. u ovKavan vac. 3 -g. 

12 <8'> -added by Wyttenbach. 



diversity, and had appended a most irrational argu- 
ment, namely that the peacock's tail on account of 
its beauty is the purpose for which the peacock has 
come to be, in his work on Commonwealth a again he 
has vehemently censured people who keep peacocks 
and nightingales. It is as if he were legislating in 
competition with the lawgiver of the universe and 
deriding nature for bestowing her love of the beauti- 
ful upon animals of a kind to which the sage denies 
room in his city. Is it not clearly absurd to object to 
those who keep the creatures that he praises pro- 
vidence for creating ? Well, in the fifth book con- 
cerning Nature b after having said that bugs are 
useful in waking us up and mice in making us 
attentive about putting things away carefully c and 
that nature probably loves the beautiful as she 
delights in diversity he has stated the following in so 
many words : " The tail of the peacock would be an 
especially impressive example of this, for here nature 
makes it evident that the creature has come to be 
for the sake of the tail and not contrariwise, {and) 
the existence of the male, which had this origin, 

a This passage is missing from S. V.F., but see 1044 d-e 
infra (S. V.F. iii, frag. 714). 

b S.V.F. ii, frag. 1163 (p. 334, 24-31). 

c Cf. S. V.F. ii, frag. 1 152 from Porphyry's De Abstinentia 
iii, 20 (pp. 209, 15-210, 2 [Nauck]) and the following 
criticism of such teleology (pp. 210, 4-211, 7 [Nauck]), all 
drawn by Porphyry from Plutarch (frag. 145=Moralia vii, 
pp. 171, 20-173, 18 [Bernardakis] = frag. 193, 59-101 [Sand- 
bach]), who had at least part of the critique from Car- 
neades(c/. p. 210, 2-4 [Nauck] = p. 172,9-11 [Bernardakis] = 
frag. 193, 71-73 [Sandbach]). 

13 ycvo/xcvoj -a 2 ( ytv changed to y'Cv) ; ytvo^vov -g ; ytvo- 
ficvco -all other mss. 



(1044) dr)K€V. in €V §6 TO) 7T€pl HoXlTClOLS, CLTTCOV OTL iy~ 

yvs iafiev rod /cat tovs Koirpobvas £ojypa^>£ti/, /xer' 
oXiyov tcl yecopytKa <f>rjaL KaXXcont^eLV 2 rivas dva- 
SevSpdcri 3 /cat pvppivais " /cat raws* /cat Trtpiorepas 

E Tp€(j)OVGl KOLL TTephLKCLS IvCL /Ca/C/Ca/3t£ojatl> 4 aUTOtS" 

/cat d7]Sovas , . M ^S€a>9 S' ay avrov TrvQoipxp) ri cf>po- 

V€L 7T€pl (JLcXlTTCOV /Cat (JLzXlTOS' TjV (jL€V yap OLKO~ 

or^pr^GTOJS cf)dvaL yeyoveVar et 8e tolvtolls tottov iv 
rfj & TroXeL Stoojcrt, 8lol tl tcov 7Tp6$ olkotjv /cat oi/jlv 7 
eiTLT€pTra)v a7T€tpy€t tovs ttoXltcls ; KaOoXov ok ojct- 

7T€p O 8 TOVS aw8€L7TVOVS fjL€[JL(f)6jJL€VOS OTL ^pGiVTaL 

TpayypLaoL /cat otVoj /cat oiJjols rov S' 677 1 raura /ce- 
kXitjkotol /cat tclvtol TrapeoKevaapLtvov* Ittollv&v ojto- 


F l^Ovs /cat opvL0as /cat a^'At /cat otvov 7rapaa/cei>dcra- 
oav eyKaXwv 8e rot? /zi) rrapaTrepLTTovoL TavTa {jltjS^ 

OLS, 12 CL7T€p TTOLpeOTL /Cat 7T€(f)VK€V TjfJL&S TplfytLV 0\)8£vCL 

77oteta#at Adyov eot/ce tou rdvavrta Ae'yetv iavTtp. 

1 17 OrjXvs avvr]Ko\ovdr)K€v -Pohlenz ; 7} dTjXeta ovyr)KoXovdr]K€V 
-Emperius (Op. Philol., p. 340) ; rj (t) -X) OrjXvoovv (6rjXv yovv 
-B) rjKoXov9rjK€v (rjKoXovdrjcrav -g) -MSS. 

2 KaAAcu-n-L^t -affinal v added superscript). 

3 avavoev&pdoL -a, A, y. 

4 KCLKKafidloocnv -y 1 , n, E ; K<iKKafidt,ovoiv -Tolet. 51, 5 1 . 

5 to -X ^corrected to rw -X 3 ), g. 

6 T ?? "g" ? omitted by all other mss. 

7 oi/av -E 2 (over erasure) ; rip^tv -all other mss. 

8 o -omitted by jS. 

9 . . . ivov -X 3 (over erasure) ; irapaaK^vaud^vov -g. 

10 /xep -omitted by g and Tolet. 51, 5. 

11 a/err]? X J (? erased -X 3 ). 

12 iroiMai re vop-qxoois (vopo\ooi,s -g) -mss. (c/. 1043 e and 
1044 b supra). 



implied the existence of the female." a Yet in his 
work on Commonwealth b he says that we are almost 
at the point of painting pictures on the privies too 
and a little later that some people embellish their 
farm-lands with tree-climbing vines and myrtles 
" and they keep peacocks and doves and partridges 
for their cackling and nightingales." I should like 
to have asked him what he thinks about bees and 
honey, for it would have been consistent with the 
assertion that the existence of bugs is useful to say 
that that of bees is useless ; and, if he gives room in 
his city to the latter, for what reason does he debar 
the citizens from the things that are pleasing to eye 
and ear ? To put it generally : as the man is absurd 
who rebukes his table-companions for taking desserts 
and wine and relishes but praises the host w r ho has 
had these things prepared and has invited guests to 
share them just so does he seem to have no scruple 
about contradicting himself who extols providence 
for having provided fishes and birds and honey and 
wine c but objects to those who do not forgo these 
things and content themselves with Demeter's grain 
and draughts of water clear, things ready to hand and 
our natural sustenance. d 

a The last clause is meant to forestall the objection that, 
since the hen does not have the beautiful tail, the tail cannot 
be the purpose for which the fowl exists : the existence of 
the female being necessarily involved in the existence of the 
male, the final cause of the cock's existence would be that of 
the hen's as well. 

6 S.V.F. iii, frag. 714. 

c 6 ttjv Trpovoiav . . . TrapaoKevauaoav— S. V.F. ii, frag". 1 160. 

d Plutarch here adapts to his prose sentence the second 
and third lines of Euripides, frag. 892. See 1043 e (with 
note c there) and 1044 v supra. 



(1044) 22. Kat firjv iv rep (. . ,) x tlov YiporperrTiKcov, 
elncov otl /cat to pa\Tpdoiv rj dvyarpaoiv rj dSeA- 
tfials 2 ovyyeveoOac /cat to <f>ayeiv rt 3 /cat npoeXdelv 
and Xe-^ovs* rj Oavdrov rrpos lepov aAoyw 8iafie- 
1045 jSA^rat, /cat 77009 ra 5 6r)pia (f>rjcrl 8etv drro^XeTreiv 
/cat rot? vn eKelvcov yiyvoj.i<=voLS T€Ki±aip€o6ai to 
fxr]8ev droiTov fjL7)8e Trapd cfivoiv etvat tcov toiovtcov 
evKOLipujs yap 77/309 raura yiyveoQai tcls tcov dXXcov 
t,cocov napadeaets els to firjTe ovyyiyvo\ieva pjpe 
yevvcovra yjf\r evaTTodvy)oKovTa* ev toIs lepols pa- 
aivetv to OeZov. ev 8e tco ne\nrTcp rrdXiv nepl Ou- 
oecos Xeyei KaXcos fiev arrayopeveiv tov 'Hat'oSov els 
TTOTapiovs /cat Kprjvas ovpeZv ert 8e pbdXXov dcfreK- 
Teov 7 elvai tov npos f3co[.i6v ovpelv rj a<j>i8pvp,a deov' 
fj/r) yap elvai 9 npos Xoyov, el Kvves /cat ovot touto 
B ttolovol /cat Traihdpia vryma, pLrjSejjLLav e7TiOTpocf>rjv 
fir]8 em,XoyiopLov e^ovTa irepl tcov 9 toiovtcov . aro- 
ttov jjiev lQ ovv to eKeZ piev evKaipov elrreZv tt)v 
tcov dAoyoji' 11 t,cocov anode coprjoiv 12 evravda S' dno 
Xoyov. 13 

1 Lacuna indicated by Xylander ; <rpiTa>> -added by 
Rasmus (Prog. 1880, p. 8). 2 ahcX^ais rj Ovyarpamv -g. 

3 rt <tojv a7T€ipr)fievwv> -Xylander ; but cf Thucydides, 
ii, 74 (. . . r)v tl ttolco/jlzv . . .) and Theopompus in Athenaeus, 
xii, 517 e (. . . ov fiovov avrovs eV to) pLeao) tl ttoiovvtcls dAA* 
ovhk Trdoxovras). 

4 Emperius (Op. Philol., p. 340), cf. Wyttenbach, Index, 
s.v. Ae^cu; Xexovs -mss. 

6 /cat rrpos rd -X%Trp6s added superscript), g, B ; /cat ra 
-all other mss., Aldine ; em rd -Basil. 6 dTToQvqoKovTa -g. 

7 d(f)€KT€ov -A corr -(in margin), E, Vat. Reg. 80 ; oVa/c- 
reov -X, g ; dveicriov -all other mss. 

8 yap elvai -Reiske ; rrapelvai -mss. 

9 rcov . . . opt -(1047 a infra) -missing in X 1 ( = ff. 148- 
149) and supplied by another hand (X 4 ). 



22. Moreover, in the <(...) book of his Exhorta- 
tions a after stating that cohabitation with mothers 
or daughters or sisters, eating certain things, and 
going directly from childbed or death-bed to a holy 
place have been condemned without reason he says 
that we must look to the beasts and from their 
behaviour infer that no such act is extraordinary or 
unnatural, since here it is apposite to cite the case of 
the other animals as evidence against the divinity's 
being polluted by their coupling, giving birth, or 
dying in holy places. b On the other hand, in the 
fifth book concerning Nature c he states that Hesiod's 
prohibition d against urinating into rivers and 
fountains is good but all the more must one refrain 
from urinating against an altar or the shrine of a 
god, for, if dogs and asses and little children do it, 
that is not relevant, since they are without any 
regard or understanding for such things. It is extra- 
ordinary then e to say in the former case that it is 
apposite to consider the example of the irrational 
animals but in the latter that it is irrelevant. 

S. V.F. iii, frag. 753 ; cf. S. V.F. iii, frags. 743-752 and 
i, frags. 253-256. 

b Cf. Herodotus, ii, 64. For the irrational animals as the 
criterion of " natural " behaviour cf. Plutarch, De Amore 
Prolis 493 b-e. The notion was satirized by Aristophanes in 
Clouds 1427-1429 and Birds 757-768. 

c 8. V.F. iii, frag. 754. d Works and Days 757-758. 

* The ficv ovv here is " corrective," the droirov being 
echoed from arorrov in the assertion of Chrysippus (1045 a 
supra). The inconsistency here criticized is " resolved " by 
A. DyrofF (Die Elhik der alten Stoa, p. 373) but not so 
satisfactorily as he appears to believe. 

10 fiev -omitted by g. ll dXXcov -g. 

12 aiToOewprjow -g ; aTTodypiiDGiv -all other mss. 

13 oltto Xoyov -Hutten ; dnoXoyov -MSS. 



(1045) 23. Tov KaT7)vayKaodai SoKodvres 1 vtto tcov e£co- 
0ev alritov rat? opticus arroXvoiv iropi^eiv evioi tcov 
c/yiXoa6(f)(x>v €7TeXevoTLK7]v riva klvtjolv ev rep r)ye- 


fxdXtara ytyvouevrjv eKSrjXov orav yap hvelv toov 
Svvaaevcov Kal ouolcos 1\6vtcov Odrepov fj Xafielv 
avdyKr), uiqheuias airias enl Sdrtpov dyovorjs rep 
prjSev 3 rod eTcpov Siacfrepetv,* 7) eTreXevcTTiKrj 8v- 
C vapis avTTj 5 rrjs ifjvxfjs erriKXtOLV 6 e£ olvttjs Xafiovoa 


avTiXeycov y cos fiial^opJvovs 8 tco dvaiTicp* ttjv 10 (f>v- 
otv, ev ttoXXoIs TrapaTiOrjoi tov aoTpdyaXov Kal tov 
tyyov Kal 77oAAa tcov prj Svvauevcov aAAor' aAAa? 
Xapfidveiv TXTcooeis Kal ponds avev tlvos alTias Kal 
8iacf)opas rj rrcpl aura ndvTcos rj Trepi ra e^codev 
ytyvopevrjs' to yap avabriov oXcos avvirapKTOV el- 
vac Kal to avTopiaTOV, ev 8e Tats vtt* 
evlcov Kal Xeyopievais TavTacs erreXevoeotv atTcas 

1 &okovvt€s -Madvig (Adversaria Critka, p. 60S) ; Sokovv 
tos -mss. 

2 a-napaWaKTcov -A corr -(in margin) ; TrapaAAaK-rtov -all other 


3 /xijSev -Stegmann (Prog. Geestemiinde, 188?) ; Li-qScia 


4 With Bia<j)€p€iv the text in F begins again (see 1044 c 
supra : ttcDs). 5 avrr] Svvafus ~g« 

6 €ttik\igiv -B ; i-rriKXrjoiv -all other mss. 

7 tovtois -X 4 , g, y, n, E. 

8 jSijSa£o;a€vous -X 4 ; /Siafofte'vovs (is subscript under us -g) 
-all other mss. 9 avaiTico -g ; ivavrlto -all other mss. 

10 rrjv <f>voiv . . . ttoAAo. tcov ju.17 -omitted by g. 

a rod KarrjvayKaoQai . . . tcov vtt* avrov ttoW&kis €ip"f)iievu)v 
(1045 J) infra)~8.V.F. ii, frag. 07o. It is not Ariston 
(Rieth, Orundbegrlfe, pp. 105-108 ; Elorduy, Sozialphilo- 
sophie, p. SO) but the Epicureans against whom Chrysippus 



23. Some philosophers, thinking to provide the 
impulses with release from the constraint of external 
causes, contrive within the ruling faculty a kind of 
adventitious motion which becomes manifest especi- 
ally in the case of indistinguishable alternatives. 
They argue that, when it is necessary to accept one 
of two things that are alike and of equal import, 
there being no cause directing us to one of the two, 
since it is no different at all from the other, this 
adventitious force in the soul takes a swerve of itself 
and resolves the perplexity. Disputing them as men 
who constrain nature with no cause, 6 Chrysippus in 
many places cites as evidence dice and scales and 
many of the things that cannot fall or incline now 
one way and now another without the occurrence of 
some cause, that is of some variation either entirely 
in the things themselves or in their environment, it 
being his contention that the uncaused is altogether 
non-existent and so is the spontaneous and that in 
these movements which some people imagine and call 
adventitious obscure causes c insinuate themselves 

here polemized : c/. 1050 b-c infra> De Sollertia Animallum 
964 c, De An. Proc. in Timaeo 1015 b-c ; Lucretius, ii, 251- 
293 ; Cicero, De Fato 18, 22-23, and 46 and De Nat. Deorum 
i, 69 ; Philodemus, ITepl cn7/j,€ia><xea>v xxxvi, 11-17 ; Diogenes 
of Oenoanda, frag. 33, col. iii ( William) = frag. 30, col. iii 
(Grilli) = frag. 32, col. iii (Chilton); Galen, De Placitis 
Ilippoc. et Plat, iv, 4 (p. 361, 14-16 [Mueller]); Plotinus, 
Enn. in, i, 1, lines 15-16. See also Plutarch, De Gent'o 
tiocratis 5S0 f— 581 a with M. Pohlenz, Gnomon y xxi (1949), 
pp. 351-352 and Sambursky, Physics of the Stoics, pp. 56 
and 64-65. 

b Apparently a pun was intended : (1) forcing upon 
nature the state of causelessness and thereby (2) violating 
nature v% ithout cause. 

c Cf. S. V.F. ii, frags. 965, 966, 967, 970, and 971. 



(1045) a8rjXovs v7Torpex €Lvl K0 ^ Xavddveiv rjpias irrl Bdrepa 

rqv opfirjv ayovoas. ravra fikv ovv iv tols yvajpi- 

D fjLcordroiS 2 iorl roov vtt* avrov rroAAa/as" elpr^piivoov. 

a 8e rovrois ttoXiv* avros it; ivavrias etprjKev, 


7rapadr]oopLai roov €K€lvov Xi^ecov. iv ptev yap rep 
7T€pi rod AiKa^ecv vrroOipievos 8vo Spofiels optov 

aVV€K7TL7TT€lV dAA^AotS" ScGL7TOp€L Tt Tip fipafievrfj 

KaOr]K€i TTOiijaai. " rrorepov " (frrjolv* i( e^eari rov 
fipafievrrfv* rov <f)OLV(,Ka oirorepcp fiovAercu oltto- 
Sovvai kol6 av* rvyojoiv avroo avvrjdearepot ovres 
<Ls av ivravda rcov avrov 7 ri x a P to "o/xevov 8 <j}) 9 
rporrov rivd /xaAAoy cos koivov rov cJiolvikos yeyo- 
voros dpb<j>orepa)v otovct tivos KXrjpov yiyvopiivov 
E [iv aAAaj] 10 Kara rr\v €ttIkXioiv xx ws krvx^ Sovvat 12 
avrov ; Xiyto 8e tjv Zrvxtv eTTiVAtaiv 13 ota 14 yiyverai 
oraVy SveTv 7TpoK€Lfievojv 8paxpL<jjv opioiajv Kara rd 
Xoi7rd, irrl rrjv kripav imKXivavreg XapifidvcopLev 
avrrjv. cv be rep €Krcp 7T€pi KaurjKovros, eirai 
riva (frrjaas 7TpdypLara pr] irdvv ttoXXtjs a£ia [ei- 
vgu] 16 7Tpayp,ar€ias pLf]8e Trpooox^S > a<f>iivai rrepl 

1 viTOTp€(f>€iv -n ; v7Tapx€Lv -Vat. Reg. 80. 

2 yvojpiiLajT€pois -X 4 , B. 

3 a 5e 7roAAaAa? ttoXiv rovrois -X 4 , B. 

4 <t>-qalv -omitted by g. 

5 tw Ppapevrrj -F, g. 

6 Ka6* av -Madvig (Adversaria Critka, p. 668); kclv -mss. 

7 roov avrov -Wyttenbach ; rov avrov -g ; rcov avrov -all 
other mss. 

8 x a P L(J( *iJL€vov -g, E ; XapLOVpi€VOV -B. 

9 <7?> -added here by Sandbach (Class. Quart. , xxxv 
[1941], pp. 114-115), after rporrov nva by Wyttenbach ; <^ 
KadrJK€i> rpo-nov nva Pohlenz (Hermes, lxxiv [1939], p. 11, 
n. 2). 

10 [iv dAAaj] -deleted by Sandbach (Class. Quart., ibid. : 



and without our notice direct our impulse in one way 
or the other. Now, these are among the most 
familiar of the assertions that he has frequently 
made ; but he has himself again made statements 
contrary to these, and, since they are not similarly 
accessible to everyone, I shall quote them in his very 
words. So, for one, in his work concerning Decision a 
he supposes that two racers have run a dead heat and 
raises the question what the umpire ought to do. 
11 Is it permissible," he says, " that the umpire 
award the palm to whichever he pleases depending 
upon their comparative intimacy with him consider- 
ing it in this case to be one of his own possessions 
which he would be giving away <(or^ that in a way 
rather considering the palm to have become the 
common property of both he give it, as if by casting 
a lot, according to his chance inclination ? By 
* chance inclination ' I mean the kind that occurs 
when two drachmas that are for the rest alike have 
been set before us and we incline to one of them and 
take it." Again, in the sixth book concerning Duty 
he says b that some matters are not worth much 
trouble or attention at all, and he holds that in 

° 5. V.F. iii, frag. 699. 
6 S.V.F. iii, frag. 174. 

xXrjpov y€VOfi€vov <Ka.Ta ttjv €-itlk\lolv> [iv dXXa) Kara rr)v k-ni- 
kXtjctlv]) ; KXrjpovfJbdvov iv aAAo> -g ; KXrjpov yiyvop.4vov ivdXXws 
(eVaAAa;? -Vat. Reg. 80) -all other mss. ; KXrjpov yivofUvov a&f)~ 
Aco? -Pohlenz. 

11 €ttlk\t)olv -F 1 , g, d, y\ n, B. 

12 Sowcu Sowat -a. 

13 inUXrjoiv -F, g, d, n, B. 

14 ota -B ; ola -all other mss. 

15 €k6lt<x> -a, A x (a erased), Aldine. 

16 [. . .] -omitted by Basil. ; Sura -E ; elvai -all other mss. 



(1045) tclvtol rfj <l)s €tv%€v IttikXiozi 1 rfjs 8iavola$ olerai rrjv aXp€<jw aVoKA^paWai/ras* " olov " <j>7]olv 
" el tcov 2 SoKifia^ovrcov rda8e nvds Spa^ua? 8vo 
irrl roaovSe ol /j.ev rrjv8e ol 8e rrjvSe cf>atev elvai 
kaXrjv 8eot 8e filav 3 avrcov \aj3eiv, TiqviKavT a<f>- 

F €VT€S* TO €776 TtXzZoV €77 lQr)T€iv TjV €TV)(€ Xr)lfj6/jL€0a, 

/car d'AAov 5 rtva diroKXiqpajoavTes avrds Aoyov, 6 
/ecu el' pdXiora rr]v pioxOr]pdv XrjifjopLeOa avrcov." 

» / v >8 << > "\ ' M » l< / *\» « 


ervx^v €7tlkXlvov rrjs Siavolas " fro] dvev 10 rraorjs 
air lag elodyei 11 rcov 12 a8ia<f>6pcov 12 XijipLV. 1 * 

24. 'Ev rco rplrco 7repl 15 rfjs AiaXeKTLKrjs, 16 V7T€i- 
ttcov on YlXdrcov eorrovSaoe rrepl rrjv 8iaXeKriKrjv 

1 i7TlK\rj(J€l -F 1 , g. 

2 el tcov -Emperius (Op. Philol, % p. 3-10) : ot rcuv -mss. ; 
rj roov -Aldine, Basil. ; el TpaTre^iToov -Reiske; tjixoZv -Wytten- 

3 Scot Se fj,lav -Wyttenbach ; be ovhefxiav -mss. 

4 a<f>evT€S -Reiske ; d<j>evTas -g ; a^evra -all other mss. 

5 oSr^Aov -Wyttenbach. 

6 auras Xoyov -Wyttenbach ; aur . . . vac. 3 . . . Xoyov -E ; 
avra eXeye (or avrd' eXeye) -all other mss. 

7 et -Diibner ; en -mss. ; cfyc -Wyttenbach. 

8 dp 9 -H. C. ; yap -mss. 

9 <ro> -added by Reiske. 

10 [to] dvev -Wyttenbach ; to x^/hs ~S '•> ro * V€V " a ^ other 
mss. ; Trjv dvev -Reiske. 

11 elcdyeiv -g. 

12 Trjv -X 4corr -(r>7 superscript over to), B. 

13 dbia<f)6pcov -Meziriac ; hiafyop&v -mss. 

14 tt)v Xrjijfiv -n. 

15 jrepl -omitted by X 4 , B. 

16 8iaA€K-ri?s -F 1 (ik superscript over rq -F 2 ). 

rt em TooovSe . . . kolXtjv^" fine to this extent,*' i.e. to the 
quantity of a drachma. 



these we should make a random cast and leave the 
choice to the chance inclination of the mind : " for 
example," he says, " if of those assaying two given 
drachmas some should say that one is a sound 
drachma a and some that the other is and if we 
should have to take one of them, we would at that 
point give over further investigation and choosing 
from them at random according to some other 
principle would take whichever we chanced to, even 
at the risk of taking the bad one." With these 
notions, then, " random choice " and " the chance 
inclination of the mind," he introduces acceptance 
entirely without cause b of the things that are 

24. In his third book concerning Dialectic d after 
remarking that dialectic was treated as a subject of 
serious concern by Plato and Aristotle and their 

6 If Wyttenbach's emendation in the preceding sentence 
(xrar' dBrjXov riva) is correct, Chrysippus referred quite 
clearly to the alrlas dbrjXovs (1045 c supra) to which he is 
there said to have ascribed the apparently random impulses ; 
but even with the text of the mss., kclt dXXov tlvo. . . . Aoyov, 
his statement here cannot fairly be called inconsistent with 
his explanation as there reported. 

c Chrysippus was here speaking of the " middle class " 
or " zero grade" of d&cdcfropa (see note a on 1047 >: infra), 
matters of absolutely no moment (n.b. the use of A^ts, for 
in Stoic terminology only the dSid<j>opa Kara <j>volv are X-q-rrrd, 
whereas only the true dya9d are alperd) : cf. S. V.F. i, frag. 
191 and iii, frags. 118-122, 131-132, and 142; Plutarch, 
De Comm. Not. 1068 a, 1070 a, 1071 a. 

d S.V.F. ii, frag. 126. The work here referred to is 
thought by von Arnim to be identical with that entitled 
7T€pl rrjs StaAe/crtK-r}? 7rpo? *ApioTOKp€ovTa (cf. S. V.F. iii, p. 194, 
35-37). For the importance attached to " dialectic " by 
Zeno and Chrysippus see 1034 e supra and S.V.F. ii, frags. 
45 and 130. 



(1045) /cat AptGTOTeXrjs /cat (ol) 1 oltto tovtcov a\pi IIoAe- 

1046 fjiwvos /cat Hrpdrcovo? ttdAtcrra oe HcDKpdrrjg /cat 

€7TL(f)a>VTJaa9 otl /cat ovve^apiapTdveiv dv tls deXrj- 


<f>epei /caret Xe^iv " el p,ev yap €/c irapepyov Trepl 
avrcov elprjKeoav, ra^' dv tls OLeovpe t6v tottov 
tovtov ovra) S' avrcov 3 emp,eXd)s elprjKOTCov ojs iv 
rats pLeycGTais Swa/xeat /cat dvayKaLOTaTaLS avrfjs 
ovgtjs^ ov rndavov eTrl togovtov oiapaprdveiv av- 
tovs, ev rots' 6'Aots ovras olovs V7rovoovpLev. y) ri 
ovv ov, (jyrjGai tls dv, avTOS dvopdoL tolovtols /cat 
togovtois ovSeiroTe Travorj fxaxopievos ovS* eXey- 
B X cov > ws vopn'^eis, ev toIs KvpiajTaTois /cat jxeyi- 
gtols SiapLapTavovTas ; ov yap StJttov Trepl pev Sta- 
XeKTiKrjs 5 €G7TovoaGpi€V(A)s eypaifsav, Trepl S' dpxvjs 
/cat TeXovs *<al dewv /cat oiKaioovviqs e/c rrapepyov 
/cat rrai^ovTes s ev ols TV(j>X6v avTibv airoKaXeis tov 
Xoyov /cat pLaxdpievov avTcp /cat pvpias dXXas dpap- 
Tta? exovTa. 

25. Trjv €7rt^atp€/ca/ctav ottov puev dvvTrapKTov* 
elvai cf>rjGLV, inel tcov pev aGTelcov ovSels in dAAo- 

1 <ol> -added by Wilamowitz ; /cat aVo tovtojv <ol> -Mezi- 

2 ideAfjoeie -g. 

3 aiiTovs -g^ovs changed to d>v -g 2 ). 

4 avTals ovaais -g 2 (cu superscript over 77 and 77). 

6 Kepi /x€v StaAe/crt/ci?? -F, g ; /itev omitted by all other 
mss. ; TT€pl Be aAtKTiKrjs -a, A 1 (?[i'a of StaAe/cn/c^s' over erasure 
-A 2 ]). 

6 dv avvTrapKTOv -y, n, Tolet. 51, 5. 

Polemon of Athens, who in 315/14 succeeded Xenocrates 
as head of the Academy, died in the archonship of Philo- 
crates (now dated 276/5 by B. D. Meritt) ; and Strato of 



successors down to Polemon and Strato a and especi- 
ally by Socrates and after exclaiming that one would 
be willing even to go wrong with so many men of 
such stature as these b he continues in so many 
words : " For, if it had been in passing that they 
spoke of the matter, one might perhaps have dis- 
paraged this subject c ; but, since they have taken 
such care to speak as if dialectic is among the greatest 
and most indispensable of capacities, it is not plau- 
sible that they, being on the whole such men as we 
surmise, are so utterly mistaken." Why then, one 
might say, will you never yourself stop quarreling d 
with so many men of such stature and convicting 
them, as you believe, of being utterly mistaken in 
the greatest and most important matters ? It is not 
the case, I presume, that, while they wrote of 
dialectic with serious concern, they wrote in passing 
and in jest of principle and goal and gods and justice, 
matters in which you stigmatize their discourse as 
being obscure, self-contradictory, and full of countless 
other faults. 

25. In one place he says e that spiteful joy is non- 
existent since no decent man has joy in another's 

Lampsacus, who upon the death of Theophrastus (288/7 or 
287/6) became head of the Peripatetic School, died between 
270 and 268. 

b Cf. Cicero, Tusc. Disp. i, 39-40 (for a similar remark con- 
cerning Aristarchus the grammarian see Scholia in Homeri 
lliadem IV, 235 = 1, p. 182, 6-7 [Dindorf] = I, p. 493, 44-45 
[Erbse]) ; and contrast Plato, Republic 595 c 2-3 and 
Aristotle, Eth. Nic. 1096 a 14-17. 

c Diogenes Laertius (vii, 39 = S. V.F. ii, frag. 37) says 
that the three parts of philosophy were called tottol by 
Apollodorus but €i8r) by Chrysippus. 

d S.V.F. ii, frag. 31. 

• S.V.F. iii, frag. 672 (p. 168, 10-12). 



(1046) rpiois KaKoZs 1 x a ^P ei (j&v oe (fxivXtov ovSels ^cu- 
/)6t) 2 to Trapa-nav. €V Se ra> d Sevrepw rrepl 'Aya- 
#ou 4 rov (f>66vov €^rjyr]adp,€vos on AvTrrj lonv 
£77* aXXoTpiois ayaOols, <h$ SrjTrore fiovAopevcov ra- 


ovvaiTTCL (ravrrf) ttjv ernxGLipeKaK tav G • " ravrrj 1 Se 

OVV€XV)S Vj £7Tt>X ai P €KaKLa ytyVCTOLl, TCLTT€lVOVS /3ot>- 

AofjL€V<x)V etvat rous ttAtjolov 8lol tcls opioids air las* 
/<a#' irepas Se 8 (fcvaucas <f>opas 9 eKTpGTropi&vwv, 6 
eAeos ytyverai" St)Aos ap 10 tartv €VTai30a tt^v 
€m)(aip€KaKLav vnapKrrjv ojcnrep rov <f)66vov Kal 
tov eAeov 11 airoAmajv , rjv 12 iv ire pots avvrrapKrov 
elvai (f>7)OLV ojorrep ryv pioonovj]piav koX rrjv at- 

26. 'Ev 770AA01S elprjKws on irapo. tov 13 7rA€t- 
ova xP° vov ov8kv paAAov evhaipiovovoiv dAAa 

1 kolkoZs -omitted by g. 

2 <. . .> -added by Meziriac. 

3 Se tC) -omitted by F padded superscript -F 2 ). 

4 rayaQov -g. 

5 v-TTcpixojoi Kal avrol -X 4 . 

6 <rai/T77> ti)»> €7rixaip€KaKLav -H. C. ; eVt t^s" x at P eKaK *- a s 
-F 1 (t?;[?] superscript over cm, t^j cancelled, v superscript 
over final s -F 2 ) ; to. rrjs emxat/je/ca/aas' ~S * T7 ? v €7nxaip€KaKiav 
-all other mss. 

7 ravT-qs -F, a, A J (?[erasure after 17]). 

8 §€ -omitted by g. 

9 &ia<f>opas -g. 

10 a/o' -Pohlenz ; yap -mss. 

11 tov <f>96vov Kal rov cAeoy -E 2 ; tov eAeov /cat tov (f>96vov -g ; 
<f>06vov Kal tov cXeov -all other mss. 

12 Sv -n. 13 ort ro»/ 7rapd -F ^corrected F 2 ). 

a C/. £. F.F. i, frag. 434 (especially pp. 95, 33-96, 3) = 
Dionysius of Fleraclea reported by Cicero, Tusc. Disji. iii, 19. 
b Cf. S. V.F. iii, frags. 435 and 071. 
c S. V.F. iii, frag. 418. At 1048 a infra and Be Comm. 



ills a (and no base man has joy)> at all b ; but in the 
second book concerning Good c he explains envy as 
grief for another's goods, taking it to be felt by 
people who desire their neighbours' abasement in 
order to be superior themselves, and then (with this 
grief) he connects spiteful joy : " And conjoined 
with this grief spiteful joy occurs when people 
through similar causes desire their neighbours to be 
abased ; and, when they are diverted along the line 
of other natural tendencies, there occurs pity." d 
Here, then, he has clearly admitted that like envy 
and pity spiteful joy has existence, though in other 
places he says e that like hatred of evil and covetous- 
ness it is non-existent. 

26. Although in many passages he has said / that 
the happyiare no more happy for being longer happy 

Nm. 1070 d what ra presumably the same work is called 
^rrepl 'AyaQtov. 

* Pity like <j>96vos is according to the Stoics a species of 
Xvm) (cf. S.V.F. iii, frags. 412-416). For <£opa cf. S.V.F. 
iii, frag. 169 : ttjv 8e opfirjv etvat <f>opav ifrvxys hri rt Kara to 

e S. V.F. iii, frag. 672 (p. 168, 13-14). Different defences 
of Chrysippus against this charge of self-contradiction are 
attempted by C. Giesen (De Plutarchi . . . Disputationibus, 
p. 91) and E. B. Stevens (A.J.P., lxix [1948], p. 186). In 
fact, Chrysippus by his arguments against the " existence " 
of iiTixcLLpeKCLKiai p.LGOTTovrjpLa^ and aloxpoKcpSeLa probably 
meant not to deny the existence of the emotions commonly 
so designated but rather to impugn the designations them- 
selves as self -contradictory and strictly meaningless. 

* S. V.F. iii, frag. 54 (p. 14, 5-7). Cf. De Comm. Not. 
1062 a ; Stobaeus, Eel. ii, 7, lie (pp. 98, 17-99, 2 [Wachs- 
muth]) ; Themistius, Oratio viii, 101 d (these three passages 
printed as parts of 6\ V.F. iii, frag. 54) ; Cicero, De Finibus 
iii, 45-48 ; Seneca, De Beneficiis v, 17, 6 and Epistle lxxxv, 
20-23; Goldschmidt, he systeme sto'icien, pp. 198-205. 



(1046) opoiojs kcll €7Tlo7js tois rov dpcepfj \povov x evSai- 
jjiovias peraoxovoiv, ev ttoXAoIs rrdXiv eiprjKev a>9 

D ovSe 2 rov SolktvXov KadrjKei rrporelvai yd? lv <*/x€- 
piaias <j>povrjO€co$ Ka9a7rep z daTparrrjs huTTrape- 
vrjs.* dpKeaec Se TrapaOelvai rd ev ra> €Kto) rd>v 
'HdiK&v X^rrjpdrojv in avrov yeypappeva nepl 
rovrojv vrr€L7T<hv yap ws oxire ttclv dyadov cmcnjs 5 
els X a P^ v 7T ^ 7T ^ r€t ovre tt&v Karopdwpa els oepwo- 
Xoyiav eirevrfvoye ravra- " kolI yap, el povov peXXoi 
dp,eprj -%p6vov rj rov eoyarov e^ew <f)p6vrjacv, 
ov8* dv rov SaKrvXov KadrjKoi 6 etcrelvai eve/<a rrjs 
ovroj 7rapeaopevr}s cfrpovrjoecDs," Kairrep napd rov 
rrXeiova xpovov ov8ev paXXov evSaifiovovvrtov ov8e 
rrjs diSiov ev8aipLovlas alperojrepas yiyvopevrjs 7 

E rrapa rrjv dpLepiatav . €t pev ovv rrjv (frpovrjow 
rjyeLTO* rcoiryriKov elvai rrjs ev8aipbovias dyaOov 9 
Loorrep 6 'KrriKOVpos, avrrjs e8et povov rrjs drorrias 
koX 7rapa8o£oXoylas eTTiXapfidveadai rov 86yparos' 
errel 8e rj cfipovrjois oi>x erepov eon rrjs ev8aipo- 

, vtas kclt avrov 10 dXX evBcupovla, ttojs ov pd^erai 
to Xeyetv €7TLorjs p,ev alperrjv 11 elvat rrjv dpepiaiav 

1 After xpovov g has ovSev fi&Wov evSaifiovovai repeated 
from the previous line but dotted for deletion. 

2 ov&€ -F, g ; ovbh -all other mss. ; oi)S' av with KaOrjKoi 

3 (jypovrjoccos kclI KaBaircp -F, g. 

4 &i€pxofJi€vr)S -g. 

5 €mo7)s -omitted by g. 

6 KadrjKti -B. 

7 y€vopi€V7)s -A, j8, y, E, n. 

8 rjyoiTO -g. 

9 dyadov -g ; ro dyaOov -all other mss. ; ro deleted by 
Reiske ; ti dyadov -Usener. 

10 tear avrov -g ; KaB* avrov -F 1 (v erased -F 2 ), n ; KaQ* avro 
-all other mss. 



but are happy in the same manner and degree as 
those who have had happiness for an instant, yet 
again in m^ny places he has said a that one ought 
not even t<^ extend a finger for the sake of prudence 
that is moinentary like a fleeting flash of lightning. 
It will suffice to cite what he has written on this 
matter in the sixth book of the Moral Questions, for 
after remarking that neither does joy apply to every 
good in the same degree nor glorification to every 
right action b he has proceeded as follows^ " For in 
fact, if it should be that a man would get prudence 
for only an instant or for his final moment, it would 
not behoove him even to stretch out his finger on 
account of such possession of prudence," — and yet 
the happy are supposedly no more happy for being 
longer happy and everlasting happiness when com- 
pared with that which is momentary turns out not to 
be more an object of choice. Now, if he had held 
prudence to be a good productive of happiness, as 
Epicurus did, c only the mere absurdity and para- 
doxically of the doctrine would have had to be 
attacked ; but, since prudence according to him d is 
not different from happiness but is happiness, how is 
it other than inconsistent to say that momentary 
happiness is an object of choice in the same degree 

° flf, V.F. iii, frag. 210 (p. 50, 18-26). Cf. De Comm. Not. 
1062 a (S. V.F. iii, p. 50, 27-30) ; Goldschmidt, Le systems 
sto'icien, p. 201, n. 7. 

b Cf. 1038 e— 1039 d supra. 

c Frag. 515 (Usener, Epicurea, pp. 316-317, where 
Alexandri Libri De Anima Mantissa, p. 160, 1 [Bruns] is 
also given) ; cf. Epicurus, Epistle iii, 132 and K. A. v. 

d S. V.F. iii, frag. 53. 

11 alper-qv -g 2 (in margin and t superscript over a in text) ; 
aperrjv -all other mss. 



(1046) evSaifjLOVLap koli rrjv cllSlov, jjLrjSevos S' 1 d£lav rrjv 
dfiepialav ; 

27. Ta? dperds aSaoiv 2 dvraKoXovOelv dAATyAats 1 , 
ov jjlovov rep rov fxidv k'xovra 3 ttolools ex €lv aAAa 
/cat tw rov Kara fiiav* oriovv ivepyovvra /cara 5 
Trdaas ivepyetv ovre yap 6 dvopa <f>aa¥ reXeiov 
F etvat 8 rov firj rrdoas k'^ovra ras dperas ovre rrpa- 
£iv reXeiav rjris ov Kara Trdoas rrpdrrerai rag 
dperds. dXXd pLTjv 9 ev rto eKrco rQ>v WOikwv 1*7]- 
rrjfidrojv 6 ^.pvoirrrros ovk del (frrjoriv 10 dvSpi^eoOat 
rov dorelov ov8e &€iAaiv€tv rov <f>avXov, a>? heov 
ev 11 (^avraaiais em<f)epopLevojv rivwv rov 12 fiev efx- 
1047 p,evew rols Kptfiaoi rov 8' d^icrraodaiy mOavov 8e 
(f)rjai /x^S' 13 aKoXaaraiveiv del rov cf>avXov. eirrep 
ovv to avSpi^eaOai roiovrov 14 iarcv olov 15 avSpeta 
XprjoOat /cat 16 ro heiXaiveiv olov SetAta xp7]cr#at, 
fxaydfieva Xeyovoi Xeyovres Kara rrdoas fxev a/xa 

1 S' -omitted by g. 

2 <f>aoiv -F, g, E ; (f)-qoLv -all other mss. 

3 rov fMiav €\ovTa -g ; ttjv fxiav exovra -B , Tolet. 51, 5, 
Basil. ; ttjv fiCav ex oVTl " a ^ other mss., Aldine. 

4 TOV filOV -g. 5 TCLS -X 4 . 

6 yap -g, omitted by all other mss. 

7 (frqol -d. 

8 etmt -omitted by g. 9 *ai -g. 

10 ^cnv -F, g, E ; <j>acrLv -all other mss. 

11 o»s- Be iv -Wyttenbach ; c6? Beiv&v -Madvig {Adversaria 
Critica, p. 668) ; cos 8ecov ev -Sandhach {Class. Quart., xxxv 
[1941], p. 115) ; cos Se <oVtci toiovt>oi' eV . . . Beivcov (instead 
of tlvcov) -Pohlenz {Hermes, lxxiv [1939], p. 1 1 , n. 3) ; ws Biov 
beivcov -R. G. Bury. 

12 tcov -g (corrected in margin). 

13 f"7 * 

14 toioStoi' -F, g, a ; toSto -all other mss. 

15 ofa -X 4 . 

16 K-at to . . . SeiAta xpTJcrtfou -omitted by g. 



as that which is everlasting and yet that momentary 
happiness is worthless ? 

27. They say a that the virtues imply one another 
not only in the sense that he who has one has all but 
also in the sense that hp who performs any act in 
accordance with one doek so in accordance with all, 
for they say that neither is a man perfect if he have 
not all the virtues nor a deed perfect which is not 
done in accordance with all the virtues. But now in 
the sixth book of the Moral Questions Chrysippus 
says b that the decent/ man is not always being 
courageous or the base^man cowardly, the necessary 
condition being that when there are certain presenta- 
tions in mental images the former abide by his 
resolutions and the latter recoil c ; and it is plausible, 
he says, that the base man is not always being 
intemperate either. If then being courageous 
amounts to exerting courage and being cowardly 
to exerting cowardice, they make conflicting state- 
ments when they say that he who has virtues or 

a S.V.F. iii, frag. 299. For the doctrine cf. S.V.F. iii, 
frag. 557 ; Diogenes Laertius, vii, 1:25-126 (S. V.F. iii, frag. 
295) ; Sextus, Pyrrh. Hyp. i, 68 ; 8. V.F. ii, frag. 349 and 
iii, frag. 275. With S.V.F. iii, frags. 302 and 310 (from 
Olympiodorus and Proclus) cf. Albinus, Epitome xxix, 3-4 
(pp. 143-145 [Louis] = pp. 182, 30-183, 14 [Hermann]). 
Plutarch has already raised difficulties (1034 c-d and 1041 
a-b) about the Stoic theories concerning the unit}' of virtue 
and the interrelation of the virtues, which like the vices are 
according to the Stoics real entities (1042 e-f supra, cf. 
S. V.F. iii, frags. 305-307 [with all of Seneca, Epistle cxiiij). 

6 S. V.F. iii, frag. 243. 

c Cf. Aulus Gellius xix, i, 15-20 = Epictetus, frag. 9 
(L.C.'L. ii, pp. 448-452) ; 6'. V.F ii, frag. 988 (p. 288, 7-35) 
and iii, frags. (33 (p. 16, 1-12), 64 (p. 16, 13-24), 229 a (p. 5^ y 
7-11), 394 (p. 95, 38-41), and 473 (p. 123, 9-12 and 28-33). 



(1047) ras* dperds /cat tcxs /ca/ctas" ivepyelv rov k'xovra, 1 
prj del 8e rov dcrrelov 2 dvSpt^eaOai prjhe SctAat- 

V€LV TOV (fiavXoV. 

28. TrjV prjropacrjv 6pit,erai 3 reyyy]v irepl ko- 
upov 4 elpopevov Xoyov /cat 5 rd^iv en S ev rco 
rrpcorco /cat 6 ravra yeypa<f>ev " ov povov 8e rov 
eXevdepcov /cat dcpeXovs Koopov helv olopai em- 
arpecpcadai (aAAa) /cam rco Xoyco 4 /cat rcov ot- 

K€LU)V VT70KpLG€Q)V KCLTO, TOLS emfiaXXoVLjaS T<i(J€lS* 

B T779 (jxjovfjs /cat ax^pariapov? rov re rrpoocoTTov /cat 
rcDv xeipojv." ovrco Se ris <f>iX6ripos evravda rrepl 
rov Xoyov 9 yevopevos rrdXiv iv rco avrco pifiXicp, ire pi 
r^s* ra>^ cpcovt]evrcov ovyKpovoecos vrreiTrcov, ov 

1 rov €x ovra <p-lav> -Kronenberg (Mnemosyne, lii [1924], 
pp. 104-105). 

2 darelov -F, g ; dvSpetov -all other mss. 

3 With £erat the first hand of X begins again (f. 150 recto). 
See 1045 b supra. 

4 KOGfiov -Xylander ; Koapov -g (u made from v [?]) and 
all other mss. 

5 elpopevov Xoyov /cat -Wyttenbach (/cat elpopevov Xoyov 
1 -Meziriac) ; /cat elprjpevov (/cat . . . vac. 2 . . . p-qpevov -E) 

Adyou -mss. 

6 /cat -X, g ; omitted by all other mss. 

7 <dAAd> Kani tw Adya> -Sandbach (privately communicated, 
1955) ; Karri (koltto -y, E, n) twi^ Adyaw a> -mss. ; /cam rcov 
Xoycov dXXd -Xylander. 

8 Tctaets- -X, g, B ; ordaeis -all other mss. 

9 77-cpt rov (Xoyov omitted) -a, A 1 ; /cat rrepiTTos -A 2 , j3, y, E, 

10 €7T€l7TdjV -X, g, B. 

a r^v pr}TopiKr)v . . . /cat rtov yetpCjv (1047 b) = S. V.F. ii, 
frag. 297. In 1034 b supra Plutarch cited the 7T€pl 'Prjropucrjs 
of Chrysippus, which is assumed to be identical with his 
rrepl rrjs 'PrjTopiKTJs rrpos AioaKovpiorjv in 4 books (cf. S. V.F. 
ii, p. 9, 36 and iii, p. 203, 29-37). 


vices acts in accordance with all of them at once 
and yet that the decent^ man is not always being 
courageous and the base bnan cowardly. 

28. Rhetoric he defines a as an art concerned with 
the order or arrangement of continuous speech b ; 
and in his first book, moreover, he has even written 
as follows : "I think that) attention must be given 
not only to unconstrained/ and smooth order <(but) 
also besides the speech even to the kinds of delivery 
suitable according to thj6 appropriate modulations of 
the voice and expressions or gestures of the counten- 
ance and hands." c Yet, after having thus been a 
zealot for speech in this passage, in the same book 
again, d when he has mentioned the matter of 

b Cf. S.V.F. i, p. 22, 2-3 and 8-9 ; S.V.F. ii, p. 18, 24 
and p. 95, 33-34 ; Alexander, Topics, p. 5, 7-13 ; and 
especially Seneca, Epistle lxxxix, 17. For koct^ios cf. Philo- 
demus, Rhetorica ii, p. 274, 7-9 (Sudhaus) : ov& em ra>v 
avvrd^ecov eftcfxiais kocj/xou ti? tJv. 

c For delivery, recognized by the Stoics as a part of 
rhetoric (S.V.F. ii, frag. 295), see besides Aristotle (Rhetoric 
1403 b 21 — 1404 a 19) especially Theophrastus as cited by 
Athanasius (Prolegomenon Sylloge, p. 177, 3-8 [Rabe]), 
Longinus (Rhetores Graeci i/2, pp. 194, 21-197, 12 [Spengel- 
Hammer]), and [Cicero], Ad Herennium i, 3 and in, 19-27 
(with the notes of H. Caplan, L.C.L., pp. 6 and 188-204); 
cf. also W. Kroll, R.-E., Suppl. vii (1940), col. 1075, 23-61. 
Taaas rrjs ^cuvrjs, which sometimes means specifically the 
" pitch," i.e. the " accents " (cf. Dionysius Hal., De Comp. 
Verb, xix, 133 = p. 86, 18 [Usener-Radermacher]), may 
include also the quantities and aspirations (cf. Scholia in 
Dionys'ti Thracis Artem Grammaticam, p. 131, 25-30 [Hil- 
gard] ; Philo Judaeus, Legum Alleg. i, §§ 14-15). For 
oxr/fMaricrfMovs cf, Dionysius Hal., De Vi Die. in Demosthene 
liv, 1120 (p. 246, 3 [Usener-Radermacher]) and Plutarch, 
Demosthenes ix, 2 (850 a). 

d S. V.F. ii, frag. 298. 



(1047) jxovov (f>rjal ravra Trapereov rov jSeArtovos" ixofxe- 
vovs dXXd /cat 77010,9 daa<f)€Las /cat iXXeli/jecs /cat vi] 
At'a aoXoLKiGfiovgy efi ols aAAot dv alaxvv9eLr]oav 
ovk oXiyoi. to Srj rrore jiev aXP 1 X €L P < * )V KCLL o^rofia- 
ros €VTrpc7T€ias emxcopelv rols Xeyovoiv iv /coct/xoj 
rov Xoyov 1 Siarldeodcu rrore he pirjr iXXelifjewv 
€morp€(f)€odai /cat doa^eccbv jx r qrc ooXoikl^ovtols 
ata;(tWa#at 2 tcAcoj? o ri dv €ttlt) 3 Xtyovros ioriv. 
C 29. 'Ev Se rat? Qvolkcus Qeoecrt rrepl rtov €/x- 
ireipias /cat Loroplas Seo/xevcov hiaKeXevodjievos rrjv 
r/ov)(iav £X eiv ®- v * f^V TL kp € lttov /cat ivapyeorepov 
excopLev Xeyecv, " tva M (/>r)al c< pu/jre YlXdrcovi irapa- 
rrXrjolojs vrrovo'qocojjiev rrjv uev vypdv rpo<f>r)v 
6tV rov 7rXevfiova 5 ayepeodai rrjv 8e £rjpdv etV rr)v 
KotXiav \xr\ff erepa rrapaTrXrjoia yeyovora rovrois 

1 rov \6yov -omitted by E. 

2 <toAoiki£,ovtos (aiVxwea^at omitted) -g. 

3 eVifl -lieiske ; eirroi (with tvx i superscript) -B ; e^ri -all 
other mss. 

4 av . . . iva -omitted by F, a, A, £, y, E, n. 

5 TrXevfMova -F, X 1 ; nv€VfjLova -X 3 and all other mss. 

a Cf. Plutarch, Be Gloria Athenienxium 350 e and Be 
Vitioso Pudore 534 f ; Demetrius, Be Elocution* 68-74 
(Theophrastus, FTepi Ad^ecos Li bri Fragment a coll. A. Mayer, 
pp. 122-124) ; F. Blass, Bie Attische Berefhamkeit, ii (1892), 
pp. 139-144. b S. V.F. ii, frag:. 763. 

c Cf. S.V.F. iii, frag. 548 (p. 147, 20-21) : ouS' virovotlv 
oe <f>aoi rov ao(f>6w kcli yap rrjv virovoiav dKaraX^vroj €ivcll tw 
y€V€t ovyKardOcGLv. Observe that in the present passage 
" surmise " is contrasted to that conception which because 
of its " clarity " {ivapyiorepov) is according to Chrysippus 
worth maintaining. For the Stoic " advocacy " of Ivapytia 
and its relation to their theory of Koival ewoiai see Be Comm. 
Not. 1083 c and 1074 b infra ; and cf Sandbach in 67. 
Quart., xxiv (1930), pp. 50-51, who argues that the Stoics 
adopted the term from the Epicureans. 



hiatus, he says that we must hold fast to what is 
better and disregard not oifily this matter but also 
certain kinds of obscurities arid ellipses and — yes, by 
heaven — solecisms, of which not a few other people 
would be ashamed. Now really, at one time to 
concede to speakers the orderly disposition of their 
speech even as far as the decorum of hands and mouth 
and at another to concede neither attention to 
ellipses and obscurities ^rior shame for the com- 
mission of solecisms, this is the mark of a man who 
says absolutely anything that may come into his head. 
29. In the Physical Propositions b he has exhorted 
us to be quiet about matters requiring scientific 
experience and research if we have not something of 
greater force and clarity to say, V in order," he says, 
" not to make surmises c either like Plato's that the 
liquid nourishment goes to the lungs d and the dry 
to the belly or other errors that there have been like 

d Timaeus 70 c-d and 91 a. The theory is refuted by 
Aristotle (Part. Animal. 664< b 6-19) and by the author of 
chap. 50 of the Hippocratic ITepl vovckdv iv (vii, pp. 604-608 
[Littre]) ; it is discussed at length and Plato is defended in 
Plutarch's Quaest. Conviv. 698 a— 700 b (cf. Auhis Gellius, 
xvrr, xi and Macrobius, Sat. vii, xv). Galen observes (T)e 
Placitis llippoc. et Plat, viii, 9 = pp. 721-728 [Mueller]) that 
elsewhere in the Timaeus (70 d-e, 72 e, 78 a-b, 78 e— 79 a) 
drink as well as food is said to go to the belly ; and so he 
would take Plato to mean that only a small part of the liquid 
drunk goes to the lungs, the theory which is found in the 
Hippocratic Uepl Kapblrjs § 2 (ix, pp. 81-82 [Littre]; cf 
G. Leboucq, Rev. fij. Grecques Ivii, [1944], pp. 23-25) and 
Tiepl 6ot€cov <f>v<jios, § 13 (ix, pp. 1 84-186 [Littre]) and which 
Galen himself here defends (cf. Galeni In Platonls Timaeum 
Commentarli Fragmenta ed. H. O. Schroder [Teubner, 
1931], p. 17, 31 if.). See also M. Welhnann, Die Fragment* 
der Sikeliuchen ArzU (Herlin, 1901), pp. 98-102 and pp. 1 12- 
113 (-Philistion, frag. 7). 



(1047) SiaTTTtofiaTa" So/coo 8rj to ey/caAew> erepois elra 

7T€pi7TL7TT€LV CLVTOV OLS ey/CaAet KaX 1 fJLTJ <f)vAaTT€- 

adac T(hv ivavricofidrojv fxeytarov elvac /cat tlqv 
8ia7TTO)fxdrcx)V aia^tarov. dAAd fj,rjv olvtos ra? Sid 
Scfca d£ioj/xdrtov ovfjarAoKas 77A176V1 <f>rjolv virep- 
/JdAAety €Karov fivpidSas oiire 6V avrov tpqriqoas 
D eTTifJLeA&s ovre Sta rtov ifnreipwv rdArjOes loTopr\- 
cras > . /catrot TlXdrcov jaev e'^et rcov larptov rovs 
ivSo^ordrovs pbaprvpovvras y 'iTTTTOKpdrrjv <DtAt- 
OTicova Alco^lttttov tov ^YTTTTOKpareLoVy 2 /cat rtov 
TroiTjrcbv ISiVpLTriSrjv 'AA/catov EuVoAtv 'Eparoa^c- 
vtjv, Aeyovras on to 3 ttotov Sid tov ttXzv jjlov os 4 
SU^eioc yLpvaiTTirov Se TrdvTes iXeyxovatv ol dptd- 


Sta77TO)/ia tov Xoyiapiov TrapLfieyedes aura) yeyovos, 6 
€iye to fiev /caravan/coy Troiet GVpLTTeTrXeyfJievcov 
d^twfidTOjv pLvpidSas Se/ca /cat rrpos TavTais Tpio- 
^tAia TeoaapaKovTa kvvia to S' dwofyovriKov eva- 

E /coata 6 7T€VTr]KovTa Svo 77/009 TptaKovTa /cat pud 

1 jjbvpidoi. 

1 /cat defended by Castiglioni (Gnomon, xxvi [1954], p. S3) 
against deletion by Pohlenz. 

2 iimoKpariov -F 1 and X 1 (t changed to et in both). 

3 to -F, X, g, a, B ; tov -all other mss. 

4 7rAev/xoyoj -H. C. (cf. 1047 c supra) ; 77v<ru/xovos -mss. 

5 ytyovos -X 3 (erasure of 2 letters between o and ?), g, B ; 
ycyovoros -all other mss. 

6 Corrected by Pohlenz ; ZwaKoma -mss. 

£. V.F. ii, frag. 210 ; cf. Quaest. Conviv. 732 f. 

b Quotations from these four poets and from Homer are 
given, and the physicians Philistion, Hippocrates, and 
Dioxippus are cited in Quaest. Conviv. 698 a — 700 b to sup- 
port Plato's statement in the Timaeus. The mss. there 
(except T 1 : real o>£i7tttov) like those here all read hiw^unrov (so 



this." Well really I think that to lodge complaints 
against others and then to fall oneself into the errors 
of which one complains and not to be on one's guard 
is the height of self-contradiction and the most 
shameful of errors. But now he says himself a that 
the number of conjunctions produced by means of 
ten propositions exceeds a million, though he had 
neither investigated the matter carefully by himself 
nor sought out the truth with the help of experts. 
Yet, while Plato has testifying for him the most 
renowned of physicians — Hippocrates, Philistion, 
Dioxippus the Hippocratic — and among the poets 
Euripides, Alcaeus, Eupolis, Eratosthenes, b who say 
that what is drunk passes through the lungs, Chry sip- 
pus is refuted by all the arithmeticians, among them 
Hipparchus himself who proves that his error in 
calculation is enormous if in fact affirmation gives 
103,049 conjoined propositions and negation 310,952. c 

also Aulus Gellius, xvn, xi, 6) ; but this is changed to 
Ae'f lttttov by M. Wellmann (Die Fragmente der Sikelischen 
Arzte, p. 112, no. 7 and R.-E. v [1903], col. 294, 6 ff.). 

c Scil. " as Hipparchus says they do " ; i.e. eiye . . . 
expresses Plutarch's own cautious reservation about the 
results of the calculations, which — with the variant xi'Aia 
for Tpttfxt'Aia here (i.e. 101,049 instead of 103,049) — he says 
in Quaes t. Conviv. 732 f Hipparchus " demonstrated." In 
Stoic logic a proposition (a£lcofMa) is either " atomic " (anXovv) 
or " molecular " (ovx a-n-Xovv) and a " conjunction " (aufinAoicq 
or avfiTrtTrXtyiJuzvov <a£ia)/j.a>) is a molecular proposition pro- 
duced by joining atomic propositions by means of the con- 
nective Kal, while " negation " (drro^anKov) is a proposition 
to which the negative ovk has been prefixed and " affirma- 
tion " (Kcrra<£aTiKov) is a proposition without the prefix ovk 
(cf. Mates, Stoic Logic, pp. 27-33 and the Glossary, pp. 132- 
136). These technical Stoic definitions should have been 
assumed by Hipparchus if his calculations were supposed 
to refute Chrysippus (though the latter may himself have 



(1047) 30. TcOV 7Tp€ofivT€pU)V TIV€S CL TW TOV O^lVTjV 6- 

\ovti avvefiacve \ir\ff cos o£os drrohoaO at Swafxevcp 1 
tirjO* cos olvov €(j>aoav too TjTjvcovi ovpifialveiv * 
to yap irpor)yp,€vov 2 avTco prj6' cos dyaOov prjO* 
cos dhiaq^opov* ex €tv OiaBeaiv. aAA' o 4 Xpvoi7T7ros 

€.Tl /XaAAoV TO TTpdyfXa SvoSlddeTOV 7T€TT0L7)K€V ' 

6t€ (lev yap <f)Yjcn 5 pLaiveadai tovs top ttXovtov 
Kal tt)v vyUiav koX ttjv drroviav Kal ttjv 6X0- 
KXripiav tov ocopuaTos e^ 6 firjSevl rroiovpilvovs /^S' 
dvTe^ofJievovs tcov TotovTCov, Kal 1 rrapaOefjievos 8 tcl 
tov 'HoloSov " ipyd(,ev, Uepar), Slov yevos " em- 

1 ovvafjuevcov -F 1 , X^final v erased in both). 

2 7rpor)yovjX€vov -B. After to both F and X have an asterisk 
and in the margin in the first hand of each a scholium which 
is out of place, referring as it does to r-qv ficv vypav rpo^rjv 
kt\. in 1047 c supra (ef. Pohlenz, Hermes* lxxiv [1930], p. 4 
and Pohlenz-Westman, Moral ia vi/2, p. iv). 

3 ahia<f>opov -X 3 ( first a added superscript), g ; 8id<f>opov 
-all other mss. 4 6 -omitted by g. 

5 cfxio-i -F, X 1 , a, A, /?, y, n. 

6 eV -omitted by X 1 , F, a, A 1 . 

7 ore 8e -B ; Kal -all other mss. 

8 TTapaQepiivovs -n. 

used GVfjLTrXoKi] non-technically in the context criticized) ; 
but, whether they were or not, his calculations must them- 
selves have been methodical and serious, for this Hipparchus 
is certainly Hipparchus of Nicaea in Bithynia (ra. 194- 
120 B.C.), the astronomer whom Plutarch mentions in several 
other places (De Pythiae Oraculis 402 f, T)e Facie 921 d, 
Non Posse Suaviter Vivi 1094 c) and who Mas celebrated for 
his industry and accuracy. Nevertheless, how he could have 
obtained the results which Plutarch records or any ap- 
proximation to them remains, so far as I know, an unsolved 
mystery {cf. A. Rome, Annates de la Societe Scientifique de 
Bruxelles, 1 [1930], Se'rie A, Sciences Mathematiques, 
pp. 101-104; K. R. Biermann and J. Man, Journal of 
Symbolic Logic, xxiii [1958], pp. 129-132). 



30. It was said by some in earlier times that Zeno 
was in the predicament of the man with wine gone 
sour which he could sell neither as vinegar nor as 
wine, for there is no disposing of Zeno's " promoted " 
either as good or as indifferent. Chrysippus, how- 
ever, has made the disposition of the matter still 
more difficult. For at one time he says b that they 
are raving mad who set at nought wealth and health 
and painlessness and soundness of body and do not 
hold on to c such things and, quoting the words of 
Hesiod, " Perses, noble of race, keep labouring,' 1 d 

a Among the a&t,a<j)opa Zeno and after him Chrysippus 
distinguished from what is of absolutely no moment (cf. 
1045 e-f suj)ra) two classes, to. /xeaa Kara (j>voiv and napa 
<j>voiv (cf. 1042 d supra), which were called respectively 
Trpor^yfieva and atroirporiy^va (cf. S.V.F. i, frags. 191-196 
and iii, frags. 127-139 and especially Cicero, De Finibus iii, 
50-54 and Diogenes Laertius, vii, 104-107). These terms, 
which Cicero found impossible to translate adequately, are 
often rendered in English by " preferred " and " unpre- 
ferred " (or " rejected ") ; but such words are likely to be 
misleading, for the TTporry\xiva and a-noTTpo-qyixeva are in- 
commensurable with good and evil and so are not objects 
of choice and avoidance (cf. Dyroff, Die Ethik der alt en Stoa, 
pp. 108-126 ; Kilb, Ethische Grundbegriffe, pp. 64-91 ; 
Pohlenz, Stoa i, pp. 121-123 and ii, pp. 69-70). Ariston of 
Chios (see 1034 d supra) rejected the distinction made among 
a8Ld<f>opa (S. V.F. i, frags. 351 and 360-362). To him, there- 
fore, Dyroff (op. eit, % p. 115) ascribed the bon mot at Zeno's 
expense which Plutarch here reproduces ; but Pohlenz sug- 
gests that Arcesilaus was its author, and Festa (Stoici 
Antlchi i, p. 65) calls it " probably Academic. " The phrase 
€x*w htadeoiv is a pun, of course, meaning "to be market- 
able " and " to be in a (certain) condition." 

b S.V.F. iii, frag. 138. With tov ttXovtov . . . ttjv oXokXtj- 
plav here cf. tov tfiv . . . oXoKXrjplas in 1041 e supra. 

c Cf. dvrexeaflcu (S. V.F. iii, p. 34, 36) and BonhoiTer, 
Die Ethik . . ., pp. 170 and 234. 

d Hesiod, Works and Days 299. 



(1047) i ' / ~ / i > 

v j; 7T€(pajvrjK€v on ravavrta irapatvetv fiaviKov eart, 

F > u ^ » / v 2 FT ' £~ ' >> * * 

to firj epya^ov, lleporj, otov yevos. /cat rov 
ptev ao(j)6v iv rots Trepl Hicov /cat fiaotAevot avv- 
ecreordac 3 cfrrjoiv eve/ca xPVI JLaTLa f Ji0 ^ KaL vofyiorev- 
cretv 4 €7r' dpyvptcp, nap* <Lv ptev TTpoAaptfidvovra 
rrpos ovs Se ovvrtOepievov rwv ptaOrjrcov , iv Se rep 
efiSofjuo rov 5 VLadrjKOVTOS /cat Kvfitorrjaetv* rpls irrl 
1048 rovrcu 1 Aafiovra rdAavrov. 8 iv Se ra> n pair cp rrepl 
Ayadcov rporrov rtvd avyxcopeu /cat oiogjoi tols 
fiovAoptivots rd Trporjyptiva 9 KaAetv ayadd /cat /ca/cd 
ravavrta ravrats rats* Aegeotv €t res povAerat 
Kara 11 rds rotavras rrapaAAayds rd ptev dyadov av- 
tojv 12 Aeyetv to oe /ca/cov, 13 em Tairra 14 cfrepoptevos tc\ 
TTpdyfiara /cat /x^ dAAco? d7T07^Aavc6/>t6vos , / 5 (a7ro- 
oeKreov a>?) 16 cV /xev Tots orjptatvoptivois ot) Sta- 
TTLTTrovros 11 avrov rd S* dAAa 18 aTo^a^o/zeVoi; ttJs* 
/card Ta? ovopaoias owrjffelas." ovra) Se to 7700- 

1 avdyKT] -g. 2 ipyd^v -g. 

3 ovveadaL -g ; avvdOeoOai -Vat. Reg. 80. 

4 oo(j>ioT€V€iv -X, g, B, Vat. Reg. 80. 5 <7r<r/3i> tou -Pohlenz. 
6 Kvpiarciv -B. 7 rovro -F, a, A, /3, y, n, E. 

8 TaAavra -X ! (? [ — ov over erasure -X 3 ]), g. 

9 7rporjyovfi€va -B ; TrpociprjfMeva -Vat. Reg. 80. 

10 <e£€oriv> et rts -Wyttenbach ; <ccmv> ei ns -Diibner. 

11 Kara -F, X, g, a, B; ara/cd -all other mss. 

12 avTwv -X 3 (dV over erasure), g, B, Marc. 218 ; atVrai(i) 
-all other mss. 

13 to Se kolkov -X 3 (after erasure of 10 letters), g, B ; to 8e 
kclkov (*a/cd -F 1 ) to Se kolkov -F 2 , a, A, /?, y, n, E. 

14 eV avra -Reiske ; hrt y avrd -Wyttenbach ; em ravrd 
fopofievos [rd] -A. Riistow (Der Liigner, p. 80). 

15 Kai fir) dXXcos aTTOTrXavioiAtvos -omitted by g. 

16 <a7Tod€KTeov cbs> -added by Sandbach ; <d7ro8ex<>^0' oj?> 
-von Arnim ; <ov Karayvojareov> -Pohlenz. 

17 htamirrovTOS -X, g, A corr -, B ; SiamVrovTa -all other MSS. 

18 dAAa -X 3 (a over erasure), g, B ; dXXcos -all other mss. 



he has exclaimed that it is mad to recommend the 
contrary, " Labour not, Perses, noble of race " ; in 
the books on Ways of Living he says a that the sage 
will both live with kings for the sake of profit and 
give lectures for money, from some of his pupils 
collecting his fee in advance and with others making 
a contract for it, and in the seventh book of Duty b 
that the sage will even turn three somersaults if he 
gets a talent for it ; and in the first book concerning 
Goods he gives way in a sense to those who wish to 
call the " promoted " things goods and their con- 
traries evils and grants the point in these words c : 
" If one in conformity with such distinctions wishes 
to use the designation ' good ' for the one class of 
them and the designation ' evil ' for the other, pro- 
vided that these are the objects intended by his 
reference and it is not a random aberration, {it must 
be accepted on the ground that) in the matter of the 
significates he is not in error and for the rest is 
aiming at the customary linguistic usage." d Yet, 

a S. V.F. iii, frag. 693 (p. 174, 21-24) ; cf. 1043 c-e and 
1043 f— 1044 a supra. b S. V.F. iii, frag. 688. 

c S. V.F. iii, frag. 137 ; cf. I. G. Kidd, Class. Quart., 
N.S. v (1955), 188-189. 

d In this sentence /card rds roiairras -napaWayds has 
usually been taken to mean " by such a change of termin- 
ology " ; but Chrysippus here permits the use of dyadov and 
kclkov instead of nporjyfizvov and d7ro7rporjy/jL6vov only on con- 
dition that the distinctions signified by the latter pair are 
not thereby obscured, and this is clearly expressed only if 
7rapaAAaya5 refers not to the terminological variation but to 
the distinctions in the significates that Ariston denied (. . . 
/jLTjBe tjvtlvovv iv avrols TTapaX\ayr)v dnoXcLTrovTa [S. V.F. i, p. 
79, 8]). Tavra to, frpdyixara does not mean external entities 
or events but is identical with rd orjiAouvofieva, the significates, 
which the Stoics also called Ae/cra and which, being in- 
corporeal (whereas rd o^/xaiVovTa, the signs such as vocal 



(1048) rjypievov 1 rdya9a> 2 ovvayayajv eyyvs evravda /cat 

(jvfifjit^as, ev erepois ttolXiv ov8ev etvai cf>7]ai rov- 

tcxjv kolooXov irpos r^jxas, dXX dnocnrav rov Xoyov 

B Tjfjidg /cat aTToarp€(f)€Lv aTravrcov rcov tolovtojv. 

TOLVTCL yap €V TO) TTpa)TO) 3 7T€pl TOV II pOTp€7T€od(Ll 

yeypacfrev, iv 8e rep rptrco 7repl <&voea>s fxaKapc^e- 
adai (frrjGLv iviovs ftaoiXevovras /cat nXovrovvras 
ofiocov el -^pvoais a/xtat p^ooj/xevot /cat ^pvaols Kpa- 
07T€8ols efiaKOLpl^ovTo to) o' dyadto r6 4 T7p ovoiav 
dTrofiaXeiv otovei Spaxp-rjv 5 aTrofiaXeTv /cat to voarj- 
crat 6 olov rrpoGKOifjai. Sto tcov evavr icopidr ojv tov- 
ra>v ov piovov rrjv dperrjv dAAa 7 /cat rrjv upovoiav 
dva7T€7rX7]K€v. rj piev ydp dperrj piiKpoXoyos eoyd- 
tcds 8 (fxxvelrat /cat dvorjros rrepl ravra npaypLa- 
revo(JL€vrj /cat rovrcov eW/ca rrXelv els Boorrropov 
C KeXevovaa /cat Kvptcrrav rov oofyov, 6 8e Zeus* 
yeXolos el Kr^atos" x a ^P €L Kat 'E7rt/cdp77tos" /cat 

1 TrpoTjyou/xcvov -B ; irpottpTjfxtvov -\ at. R<?g. 80. 

2 to dyadov -a, A 1 . 

3 ra> -omitted by Tolet. 51, 5 ; ra> 7rpa)rco to> -E. 

4 to -X 3 (o over erasure), B ; tco -all other mss. 

5 Spayfxrjv -F 1 , X 1 . 

6 votjctcu -a, A 1 , E, Tolet. 51, 5, Vat. Reg. 80. 

7 dAAa -X 3 (in margin), g, B ; omitted by all other mss. 

8 toxaToj -F 1 ; omitted by g. 

expressions, and tol TvyxdvovTa, the external entities, are cor- 
poreal), are according to the Stoics not oVra (S. V,F. ii, 
frags. 329-335) ; and I have therefore translated npdyfiaTa 
not by " entities " but by " objects," using that word in 
the sense of " what is presented to the mind " (cf. S. V.F. ii, 
p. 48, 19-20). With the phrase, p,7) aAAa>s dnoTrAavconcvos, cf. 


after having thus in this passage closely united and 
combined with the good the class of " promoted,'' 
elsewhere again he says a that none of these is of any 
concern to us at all but reason b pulls us back and 
turns us aside from all such matters. This, in fact, 
is what he has written in the first book on Exhorta- 
tion ; and in the third book concerning Nature he 
says c that some men are felicitated upon their royal 
position and their wealth much as if they were being 
felicitated for using golden chamber-pots and wearing 
golden tassels d but that to the virtuous man the loss 
of his fortune is like the loss of a drachma e and 
falling ill is like having stumbled. Consequently he 
has infected with these self-contradictions not only 
virtue but providence as well. For, while virtue will 
look utterly petty and stupid busying herself about 
these matters and bidding the sage for their sake 
sail to the Bosporus f and turn somersaults, Zeus will 
look ridiculous if he delights in being addressed as 
Steward of the Household and Guardian of Harvests 

>S'. V.F. ii, p. 107, 1-2 : . . . rod or^iaivo^evov tcAcco? arro7rAa- 

a S.V.F. iii, frag. 139 (p. 34, 3-8) ; cf. 1041 e supra and 
De Comm. Not. 1060 d-e. 

b In the version of this statement given in 1041 e supra 
tovtov rov Xoyov means " the doctrine " propounded {cf. rov 
-nepl dyaOcov kcll ko-kcov Xoyov at the beginning of the pre- 
ceding sentence there) ; but here whether purposely or 
by inadvertence Plutarch has interpreted the original differ- 
ently, for the simple rov Xoyov in this context can be taken 
and could have been meant to be understood only as 
44 reason." 

c S.V.F. iii, frag: 153 (p. 36, 36-41). 

d Cf. De Comm. Not. 1069 c. 

e Cf. 1043 e supra. 

f Cf 1043 c-d sujtra. 



(1048) X.api8oT7}s Trpooayopevofievos , on SrjXaSrj xpw&s 

dpciSas Kal xP VG a Kpdo7re8a x a P^ €raL T °is <j*av- 

Xols tols 8' ayaOols d£ta SpaxpLrjs 1 orav ttXovolol 

yevojvrai /caret ttjv rod 1 Alos irpovoiav en 8e 

yeXoiorepos 6 * AttoXXojv el rrepl xpvawv KpaoneScov 

Kal d/jLtScov KdOrjTCu depuoTevcov Kal rrepl rrpoo- 

KOjLi/xarcov drroXvoeajs . 

31 . "En 8e n&XXov rfj drro8ei^eL to evavTiajpua 

TTOiovoi <f)ave poire pov. to yap eoTiv ev xp 7 ')0~ao9ai 

Kal KaKibs, tovto <f>aoL paqr dyadov etvai p/tyre 

Kai<6v. ttXovtoj 8e Kal vyteia Kal poj/xr} aco/xaros" 

D KaKcbs XpdWai rravreg ol dvorjroL' hioirep ovhev 

eon tovtojv dyaOov. elrrep ovv 6 Oeos dperrjv fxev 

ov 8l8o)olv dvdpojiTois dXXd to koXov avdaiperov 

eoTi z ttXovtov 8e Kal vyleiav x w P^ dperrfs 8L8ojoiv, 

ovk ev xp 7 ] 00 ! 1 ^ 01 ^ SISwmv dXXd KaK&s, tovt€gtl 

/3Xaj3epa>s Kal aloxp&s kcu oXedpiojs. koLtoi el 

fiev ovvavTai ttjv dpeTrjv irapex^v ol 9eol, ovk eloi 

Xprjorol jxrj rrapexovres' el 8e firj SiWvtcu Troielv 

dyaOovSy oi)S' uj(f)eXeZv 8vvavTai y pLrjSevos ye A tcov 

1 Spares -F 1 , X 1 . 

2 rod -omitted by A, jS, y, n, E. 

3 cotlv dvols (but with v dvolg cancelled) -g. 

4 ye -Reiske ; re -mss. (omitted by B). 

S.V.F. ii, frag. 1177 (p. 338, 22-23). For Kr^aio? cf. 
De Vitando Aere Alieno 828 a-b and Cornutus, ix (p. 9, Ifi 
[Lang]) ; for 'EmKapmos cf. Cornutus, ix (p. 9, 12-13 [Lang]) 
and [Aristotle], De Mundo 401 a 19. XapiSorris is an epithet 
of Dionysus in Sept. Sap. Conviv. 158 e and Quaesf. Conviv. 
613 i) and of Hermes in QuaeM. Oraecae 303 u (cf W. It. 



and Giver of Joy a for the reason, no doubt, that lie 
bestows golden chamber-pots and golden tassels upon 
the base and upon the virtuous things worth a 
drachma when in the course of his providence they 
get rich ; and Apollo will look still more ridiculous 
if he sits giving oracles about golden tassels and 
chamber-pots and about deliverance from bruises on 
the shin. 

31. Moreover, by the demonstration they give 
they make their self-contradiction still more mani- 
fest. For what can be put to good use and to bad, 
this, they say, & is neither good nor bad ; but wealth 
and health and bodily strength are put to bad use 
by all who are stupid ; consequently none of these 
things is good. If, then, god does not give men 
virtue but what is fair is an object of free choice c 
and does give wealth and health without virtue, he 
gives these to men who will put them not to good 
use but to bad, that is to injurious, shameful, and 
pernicious use. Yet, d if the gods are able to grant 
virtue, they are not benignant if they do not grant 
it ; and, if they are not able to make men virtuous, 
they are not able to benefit them either, if in fact 

Halliday, Plutarch : Greek Questions, pp. 306-207). Sec 
further A. B. Cook, Zeus ii, pp. 1065-1067 and iii, pp. 91:2 
and 964 ; and for lists of cult-names and epithets of Zeus 
and their Stoic connexions see J. Amann, Die Zeusrede des 
A'dios Aristeides (Stuttgart, 1931), pp. 100-109. 

b S. V.F. iii, frag. 123 (p. 29, 40-44) ; cf S. V.F. iii, p. 28, 
14-16 and p. 29, 28-31. 

e S. V.F. iii, frag. 215 (p. 51, 24-26) ; cf S. V.F. iii, p. 10, 
2-5. The dilemma developed from this (cf. S. V.F. ii, p. 324, 
31-34) is answered by Marcus Aurelius, ix, 40 (cf. W. Theiler, 
Phyllobolia fur Peter Von der Miihll, p. 83, n. 3). 

d kcutoi . . . v7t6 tcov av8pu)7Ta>v~S.V.F. Hi, frag. 215 (p. 
51, 26-31). 



(1048) aXXcov ovros dyadov p,r)8* ojfeXipov . to 8e tovs 
dXXa>s ycvofievovs dyadovs Kpiveiv kclt aperrjv r) 
laxvv ov84v £otc /cat yap tovs 0€ovs ol dyadol 1 
E Kpivovai kolt ap€T7]v kolI laxvv 2 ' wore [irjoev /xaA- 
Aov 3 d)(j)€\eiv rj oj(f>cXeiodai tovs Oeovs* V7to tojv 
avOpionaiv. Kai jJLrjv ov6* aurov 5 o XpvoiTTTTos drro- 


Kadrjyefjiovcov. ri ovv rrepl tojv dXXojv <j>povovoiv ; 
r] TavTa drrep Xeyovoc fjLatveodcu rrdvTas, d<f>pai- 
veiv, dvooiovs elvou, napavopLovs, €7r' aKpov tJk€lv 
8vGTVxia$, KCLKOoaijiovias aTrdorjs; €ltcl irpovoia 
Qecov 8tOLK€ta6at ra KaQ* rjpds ovtojs d9Xiojs* irpdr- 

TOVTCLS ; €L yOVV ol 0€ol pi€Taf5aX6pL€VoC f$XdrTT€lV 

ideXotev r/puds kcu kolkovv kcu oiaoTp€<f>ew kcu irpoo- 
€7TiTpif$€iv, ovk dv 8vvcuvto 8ia9eivcu 9 x € ty ov V 


F virepfioArjv dTroXeirreLV firjTe KaKooaipLovlas tov jStov 

1 dyadol -X 3 (a#ot over erasure) and all other mss. ; dvol 
(i.e. dvdpwTroi) ? -Westman. 

2 Ivxvovoiv -F 1 , X 1 . 

3 fidXXov fiahXov (second fxdXXov erased) -a. 

4 tovs deovs -F, X, g, B : tov? -a, A 1 ; avrovs -A 2 , jS, y, 
n, E. 

5 avros -g. 

6 adXitos -omitted by X, g. 

7 fJL€T(lpaAX6fjL£VOl -F 1 , X 1 , g, B. 

8 hiaOelvai hvvaivro -E. 

9 €\oyicv -omitted by B. 

a Soil, except virtue, as the Stoics maintained : cf. S. V.F. 
i, frags. 188 and 190 (cf. i, frag. 362) ; S. V.F. iii, frags. 30, 
75, 76, and 658 (p. 165, 21). See, however, S. V.F. iii, p. 23, 
22-26, p. 24, 3-8 and 13-17, pp. 24, 41-25, 3, p. 26, 27-37 
with Rieth, Grundbegriffe* pp. 29-35 ; and for the formula- 
tion, " only the fair is good," see 1038 d and 1039 c supra. 

b There is no justification for the many attempts to emend 


nothing else is good or beneficial.® Their judging by 
the criterion of virtue or of strength men who have 
become virtuous otherwise (than by their aid) 
amounts to nothing, for virtuous men judge the gods 
too by the criteria of virtue and strength, the result 
being that the gods confer benefit no more than they 
receive it from men. & What is more, c Chrysippus 
does not represent as a good man either himself or 
any of his own acquaintances or teachers. What, 
then, do they think of the rest of mankind ? Or do 
they think just what they say, that all are madmen 
and fools, impious and lawless, at the extremity of 
misfortune and utter unhappiness ? d And yet that 
our state, thus wretched as it is, is ordered by the 
providence of the gods ? e At any rate, if the gods 
should change and wish to injure, maltreat, torment, 
and finally crush us, they could not make our con- 
dition worse than now it is/ as Chrysippus declares 
that life admits no higher degree either of vice or of 

the first part of this sentence. As Madvig saw (Adversaria 
Critica, pp. 668-669), Plutarch here rebuts the suggestion 
that the beneficence of the gods consists in their favourable 
judgment of human virtue. For the sense of lo\vs see 
1034 d supra and 8. V.F. iii, frags. 278 and 173 ; and for 
the criteria according to which the gods are revered cf. 
Plutarch, De Facie 935 c (. . . to Kpeirrov dperfj kclI Suva/uei 


c S. V.F. iii, frags. 662 and 668 (p. 167, 14-i>8) ; cf. De 
Comm. Not. 1076 B-c. 

d Cf. S. V.F. iii, frags. 657-676. 

e For the role of providence in the Stoic system cf. 1050 
a-h and 1051 d-e infra, De Comm. Not. 1075 e and 1077 d ; 
S.V.F. ii, frags. 634, 933, and 1107; Pohlenz, Stoa i, 
pp. 98-101 and ii, pp. 55-5$ ; (loldschmidt, he systeme 
stoic ten, pp. 79-111. 

1 Cf. Cicero, De Nat. Deormn iii, 71 (in reply to the Stoic 
defence given in iii, 70 [S. V.F. ii, frag. 1186]). 



(1048) LOOT , €L XdftoL (f)OJVTjVy €L7T€lv LXV OLVTOV 1 TO. TOV 


ye/Licu kliklov Stj, ko.1 ovk 2 eod' orrov 3 TeOfj. 
Tivas ovv dv tis evpoi pLaxofJievas lllxXXov dXXrjXatg 

a7TO(f)d(J€LS TTJS 7T€pl 0€LOV XpVOL7T7TOV KCU T7JS 7T€pV 

1049 dvOptoTToWy tovs fJLtv los €Vl j3eATicrra s 77povoeu> 
tovs Se cos evt yeiP l(jra ^pdrreiv X4yovTos ; 

32. 'EyKaXovocv avrco rives tlov TlvOayopLKLov* 
iv tols Trepl AiKcuoowns ypd(f>ovri rrepl tlov aAeK- 
Tpvovtov oti u xpr)oipLLOs yeyovaotv CTreyeipovoi 
yap rjpL&s /cat tovs OKopTriovs eKXeyovot koX Kara ras" 
/xa^as imoTp€<f>ovoL, t^rjXov Ttva irpos dXt<r)v epiTToi- 
ovvt€S' opLLos 8e 7 Sec kolt€o9l€lv klxl tovtovs, lvlx 
l^irj ttjv xpeiav vTrepfiaXrf to 7rXrj6os tlov v€ot- 
tlov.' 1 6 8e ovtojs KaTayeXa tlov irrl tovtois iy- 

1 avrov -omitted by B. 

2 Kal ovk -mss. here and in Be Comm. Not. 1063 i> ; kqvkct 
-Euripides (cf. Sandbach, Class. Quart., xxxv [194-1], pp. 1 15- 

s > o7tov -mss. here and E in De Comm. Not. 1063 u ; onr] 
-Kuripides (L, P) and B in 1063 d ; ottol -De Subl imitate 
xl, 3. 

4 ttjs 7T<-pl -omitted by B. 

5 fidXiara -g. 

G irvdapiKcov -a, A 1 . 
7 Se -omitted by j3. 
H vnepPdWrj -X 3 , E. 

Euripides, Hercules Furens 1245, quoted again in De 
Comm. Not. 1063 d. 

b 8.V.F. iii, frag. 705. For the Pythagorean reverence 
of the cock and especially of the white cock see Plutarch, 
Quaest. Conviv. 670 c-d ; Diogenes Laertius, viii, 31 : 
Aelian, Var. Hist, iv, 17 ; lamblichus, Vita Pyth. 84 and 



unhappiness, so that, if it should get the power of 
speech, it would recite the line of Heracles : 

I'm now replete with woes, and there's no room. 
What more inconsistent assertions, then, could one 
find than the two about gods and about men made 
by Chrysippus saying that the former exercise pro- 
vidence in the best possible fashion and that the 
latter are in the worst plight possible ? 

32. Some of the Pythagoreans object to him for 
writing of cocks in the books concerning Justice b 
that " they have come into being for a useful purpose, 
for they wake us up c and pluck out scorpions d and 
arouse us for battle by inducing an eagerness for 
valour e ; but all the same they too must be eaten, 
in order that the number of chicks may not exceed 
what is useful/' / Those who make these remarks 
ground for objection he so far laughs to scorn, how- 

147, Protrepticus 21 (pp. 107, 18-19 and 116, 11-12 [Pistelli]) ; 
cf. A. Delatte, Etudes sur la Litter at ure Pythagorlcienne 
(Paris, 1915), pp. 289-290 and F. Cumont, Lux PerpHua 
(Paris, 1949), pp. 409-411. Notice that the " Pythagoreans " 
who object to the statement by Chrysippus are not said to 
have been contemporaries of his (contra R. Philippson, 
Philol. Woch., lviii [1938], col. 1040, n. 3) ; Plutarch may 
mean to refer to such Neo-Pythagoreans as are mentioned 
in Quaest. Cortviv. 727 b-c. 

c Hence, it was supposed, their name : Athenaeus, ix, 
37 1 d ; cf. Aristophanes, Birds 488-492 and Pliny, N.H. 
x, 4(5. 

d Cf. L)e Capienda ex Inimicis Utilitale 87 a-b and 
Aristophanes, Wasps 794. 

c Cf. Aelian, Var. Hist, ii, 28. 

f Cf. Quaest. Conviv. 729 f — 730 a and Porphyry, De 
Abttmentia i, 11 (pp. 93, 23-94, 22 [Nauck]) = Hermarchus, 
frag. 24 (pp. 25, 29-2(>, 18 [Krohn] ; cf. M. J. Boyd, Class. 
Quart., xxx [1936], pp. 188-191 and M. Gigante in Eplcurea 
in menion'am Hector is Bignone [Geneva, 1959], pp. 105-112). 



(1049) kglAovvtoov, coot€ irepl rod Atds, rod ^LooTrjpos Kal 


Elprjvqs, ravra ypdfew iv rep rpircp irepl Qecov 
B u cos 8e ai iroAeis irAeovdoacrai els airoiKLas drr- 
aipovat 2 tcl TrAtfdr) /cat noAepLovs ivlaravrac rrpos 
rivas, ovtoos 6 Oeds <f)9opas dpxas 8l8oool"- kolI tqv 
ILvpiTrlSrjv [idprvpa Kal tovs dAAovs rrpoodyeTat 


decov dnavrArjaeoos eW/ca 3 rod ttAtjOovs tcov dvQpoo- 
ttcov* yevoLTO. tovtcov 8e rds pLev dAAas droTTtas 
d<f>es (ov yap 5 el tl pur] kglAcos dAAd ooa rrpos eav- 
tovs 8ca(f>6pajs Aeyovaw i^erdacu pLovov TrpoKetrac 6 ) 
okoit€i 8e on too Oeop KaAds pev emKAr]aeis /cat 
<j>iAav9poo7Tovs deV dypia 8* epya 8 Kal jSapjSapa /cat 
TaAariKa 9 rrpoarLdr\aLV. ov yap dtroiKiais eot'/ca- 
C olv at roaaurat <f)dopal /cat TravooAedpiaL tcov dv- 
OpcoTTOov, otas o TpooiKOS ctpyaaaro rroAepios /cat 
7raAiv d M^St/cds /cat UeAoTrovvrjoLaKos, 10 el purj 

1 yeverrjpos -X, g, B. 

2 atrapvTovoi -Wyttenbach ; a-nepdoi -Bernardakis ; but 
c/; Quaest. Conviv. 673 a (e<£' r)8ovas . . . rrjv Bidvoiav airal- 

3 x^ tv ; g \ 

4 rod rwv av9pu)iru)V yevovs -g. 

5 dAA' -F, X, g ; ov yap -all other mss. 

6 7rpoarJK€i -B. 

7 €iriKXrja€ts ad Kal <f>i\avd pwirovs -g. 

8 epya -omitted by g. 

9 yaXariKa. Kal pdpfiapa -B. 

10 o M. Kal 6 II. -g ; o n. Kal M. -B. 

a iSf.r.F. ii, frag. 1177. As observed by W. Burkert 
(privately) Plutarch means not that Chrysippus wrote the 
following in reply to a Pythagorean objection but that it 
shows what scorn he had for any possible objection of the 
kind (of. Quomodo Adolescens Poetas Audirf Debeat 2o c : 



ever, as to write the following a in the third book on 
the Gods about Zeus the Saviour and Sire, the father 
of Right, of Order, and of Peace b : " as states, when 
they have become too populous, move the masses off 
into colonies or begin wars against someone, so god 
gives occasions for destruction to begin " ; and he 
calls Euripides to witness and the rest who say that 
the Trojan war was brought about by the gods for 
the purpose of draining off the surplus population. 
Never mind the other absurdities in these remarks 
(for the subject of our examination is not whether 
the Stoics say anything wrong but only how much 
they say in disagreement with themselves) ; but 
observe that, while his epithets for god are always 
fair and humane, the deeds which he imputes to god 
are harsh, barbarous, and Galatian. d For there is no 
resemblance to colonization in the destruction and 
annihilation of human beings to the extent wrought 
by the Trojan war and again by the Persian and 
Peloponnesian, 6 unless the Stoics know of some 

. . . fj 'Ofiypov 77oAAa Trdvv rols ^tudkoIs x a ^P eLV <t > P^ 0Vaa • • • an d 
35 C : ovtios "Ofxrjpos KarayeXd rtov alaxvvoficvujv irrl xwXottjolv 
. . .). 

b Cf. Hesiod, Theogony 901-902 and Cornutus, Theologia 
Uraeca 29 (p. 57, 6-12 [Lang]) ; for acorrjp koX yeverojp cf. 
[Aristotle], De Mundo 397 b 20-2!. 

c Cf. Cypria, frag, i {Humeri Opera v, pp. 117-118 
[Allen]) ; Euripides, Etectra 1282-1283, Helen 38-10, and 
Orestes 1639-1642. 

d S.V.F. ii, frag. 1177 (p. 338, 19-21). 

e l$y the Persian war Plutarch means that which was 
waged from 490 to 449/8 b.c, i.e. the " peace of Callias " (cf. 
Plutarch, Cimon xiii, 4-5 [486 i — 487 b] with \V. VV. How 
and J. Wells, A Commentary on Herodotus II [Oxford, 1928], 
pp. 188-191 on Herodotus, vii, 151) and by the Pelopon- 
Hesian thai which lasted from 431 to 404 r.c. (cf. Plutarch, 



(1049) rtvas iv "AlSov /cat vrro yrjs 1 taaatv ovrot KTt£o- 
fjievas rroXeig, 2 dXXd rep TaXdrrj Arjiordpto Troiel 
Xpvonnros ofiotov rov deov, os, rrXeiovcov aura* 
iraihiov yeyovorcov ivl fiovXopievos rrjv dpx^jv drro- 


ocfxitjev, cooirep dfiTreXov fiXaorovs d7TOT€{i(l)v /cat 
KoXovoas Iva els 6 Xei^>6els laxvpo? yevrjrai /cat 
Lieyas. kolitoi ye h 6 /xev dpLTreXovpyos ere puKptbv 
ovtcov /cat doBevcbv* rovro iroiei tcov KXrjfidrcov, 7 
/cat rjpi€i$ veoyvcov /cat tvc/)Xcov ovtcov tcov OKvXa- 
D klcov v(f)aipovfjL€v rd TroAAa (jyzihoLievoi ttjs kvvos' 6 
8e Za)? ov jjlovov edaas /cat 7Tepa8cbv 9 iv rjXiKLa 
yevofievovs aAAa /cat <f>voas avros 9 /cat av£rjoas 
dTroTVjjLTTavL^et,, <j>6opas /cat 6X4.8 pov pb^avoo p.evos 
TTpcxfadoeis, Seov air las /cat dpxds yeveaecos fir) 

33. lovro Liev ovv eAarrov earc /ca/cetvo ^itet- 
£ov" ovSels yap c/werat (rrap^y 12 dvdpcoTrois voXe- 

1 yrjv -g, B. 2 TToXzts KTi£o/H€vas -g. 

3 d7ToXi7T€Lv rrjv dpx^ v ~^' 4 ZkcZvos -a, Aldine, Basil. 

5 ye -omitted by B. 6 kou dodevwv ovtcov -X, B. 

7 tcov KXrjfiaTcov tovto ttol^l -E. 

8 KCLL7T€p IBcOV ~E. 

9 avrovs -g. 

10 ovv -omitted by A, /S, y, n, E. 

11 iariv kolkelvo -F, a ; ion Ka/mvo Se -E. 

12 <irap> -added by Castiglioni (Gnomon, xxvi [1954], p. 

Pericles xxxiii, 4 [170 b] ; Fabins Maximus xxix, 3 [190 f] ; 
and Lysander xiv, 5 — xv, 6 [441 a-f]). For the comparative 
magnitude of these and of the Trojan war and of the de- 
vastation caused by them cf. Herodotus, vii, 20-21 and 
Tlmcydides, i, 2:>, 1-3 and with these Plutarch's famous 
remark that almost all tiie inhabited world and especially 



cities colonized in Hades and beneath the earth. No, 
it is the Galatian Deiotarus a that Chrysippus makes 
god resemble, Deiotarus who, since he had got many 
sons and wished to bequeath his realm and household 
to one, slaughtered all the rest just as if he had 
pruned and cut back the shoots of a vine in order 
that one, the one he had spared, might grow large 
and strong. The vine-dresser, however, does this 
while the twigs are still small and weak, and we out 
of consideration for the bitch make away with the 
majority of her puppies when they are newly born 
and blind ; but Zeus after he has not merely from 
inadvertence let men grow up but has himself 
created them and caused them to grow then tortures 
them to death, contriving pretexts for their ruin and 
destruction whereas he ought to have disallowed the 
causes and origins of their coming to be. 

33. This is a minor point, to be sure. It is the 
former that is the more serious, 5 for no war springs 

Greece had been depopulated by earlier wars (De Defect u 
Orac. 413 f— 414 a). 

a See B., R.-E. iv (1901), cols. 2401, 18-2403, 61 
with Suppl. iii (1918), col. 328, 38-45 ; F. K. Adcock, J. U.S. 
xxvii (1937), pp. 12-17. Niese questions the identity of the 
Deiotarus of Mvlienim Virtutes 258 d with this tetrareh of 
the Tolistobogii of whom Plutareh speaks in Pompey (x>S i>, 
Cato Minor 16\ u and 765 e 766 a, Antony 945 h, and 
Crassus 553 b-c. See also P. A. Stadter, Plutarch's His- 
torical Methods (Cambridge, Mass., 1965), pp. 107 and 134. 

6 The difficulties that have been made about these words 
arc groundless, tovto refers to the last point in the pre- 
ceding passage, i.e. that Zeus permits men to be born and 
to grow to maturity before destroying them ; and eKcluo 
refers to the main point preceding, i.e. that the gods in- 
stigate wars, the point which is now taken up again and 
developed in what follows, ouSeis* yap . . . , to show that 
Chrysippus explicitly contradicts himself. 



(1049) jjlos avev /ca/aa?, dAAd rov fiev (f>iXrj8ovia rov 8k 
rrXeoveljia rov Se <j>iXoho£la ris rj <j>iXapx^o} ovp- 
p-qywoiv. ovkovv 2 et rroXepiovs o 3 Otos €V€pyd£c- 
tcu/ /cat KdKias, rrapo^vvojv /cat Siaarpecfxvv rov? 
avOpojirovs. KCLiroi Xeyet S >5 avros iv rep rrepl rov 
E At/cd£etv /cat 8 rrdXiv ev rep Sevrzptp rrepl ®€tov a>s 
rwv aloxp&v to delov Trapalriov yiyveoOai ovk 
evXoyov iorcv ov rpoirov yap ovre vofios rov 
Trapavofxeiv irapairios av yevoir 7 ovQ* oi deol rod 
aoefieiv, ovrws evXoyov /X77S' aloxpov /jLrjSevos etvai 
rrapatrtovs . ri ovv ataxtov avdpcoTrois <f>6opas tJtt* 
dXXrjXcov yiyvojievrjs , fj$ (f>rjoi XpvoLTnTos ivSiSovat, 
ras apx^S tov Qeov; " dAAa vrj Ata," <f>rjcr€i 8 rts*, 
" irratvel 9 ttolXiv rov 10 Ev/nmSou Xtyovros 

el 0€oi rt SpcooLV aloxpovy ovk elocv 11 deoi 

to pqorov eliras, alriaaaodai deovs" 
coorrep rjfjicov dXXo rt vvv rrparrovrcov 7} ras ivav- 
rlas avrov <f>oJvas /cat VTroXrupets 7TapaTL0€fieva>v. 
F 34. Ov pjr]v aXX avro ye rovro 12 to vvv irraivov- 

1 </>iAapyvpla -/?. 8 ovk otiv -F. 

3 o -omitted by 0. * e/oyaferai -g. 

5 y -Reiske ; [5*] -deleted by Wyttenbach. 

6 hiKa&iv . . . vac. 11-13 . . . ko! -B. 

7 yivoir av -g. 

8 ^ffi'-F, X 1 , a, A 1 . 

9 iiraivct -Hartman (De Plutarcho, p. 606) ; iiraivtlv 


10 TrdXiv to -Reiske ; ndXiv <to> tov -Hartman (loc. ciL). 

11 eloiv -A 2 , j8, Vat. Reg. 80 ; elm -all other mss. 

12 tovto -omitted by g. 

a Cf. Plato, Republic 373 d-e and Phaedo 66 c 5-d 2 
(quoted in the Consolatlo ad Apollonium 108 a), and the 



up (among) men without vice but one breaks out 
from lust for pleasure, another from greed, and still 
another from a lust for glory or for power. Well 
then, if god induces wars, he induces vices too by 
inciting and perverting human beings. And yet 
Chrysippus himself states b in his work concerning 
Decision and again in the second book on the Gods 
that for the divinity to become an accessory to 
shameful things is not reasonable, for just as law 
could not become accessory to illegality or the gods 
to ungodliness so it is reasonable for them not to be 
accessories to anything shameful either. What, 
then, is more shameful for human beings than their 
destruction of one another, for the beginning of 
which Chrysippus says c god presents the occasions ? 
" Yes, but by heaven," someone will say, " he 
applauds again when Euripides asserts 

If gods do something shameful, they're not gods d 

You've made the easiest plea, to blame the gods, 11 e 
as if we are now engaged in anything else but citing 
the utterances and notions of his that are contrary to 
one another. 

34. All the same, there would be countless occa- 

implication of the remark ascribed by Plutarch to Lycurgus 
(Lycurgus 52 B — Apophthegmata Laconica 228 e [27]). 

6 S. V.F. ii, frag. 1125. c 1049 b supra. 

d Frag. 292, 7 (Nauck, Trag. Graec. Frag. 2 , p. 447). In 
Quomodo Adolescens Poetas Audire Debeat 21 a, where 
Plutarch quotes this verse, the mss. have <j>\avpov or <j>av\ov 
instead of alaxpov. 

e Frag. 254, 2 (Nauck, Trag. Graec. Frag. 2 , p. 434), 
quoted with the preceding line, to which it is the reply, in 
Quomodo Adolescens Poetas Audire Debeat 20 d. 



(1049) fxevov oi>x airat; ovbe big ov8e rpls dXXd pLvpidias 


to paoTov eliras, alriaoaadai deovs. 

rrptoTov yap iv rco rrpcoToj 1 irepl Qtvoews to alSiov 2 
rfjs KivrjaecDs KVKetiovi TrapecKaaag, aAA' aXXtos 

1050 €lp7)K€V' " OVTCO 0€ TTj9 TOJV 8X0JV OLKOVOfALCLS TTpO- 

ayovorjs, dvayKalov /caT<x tclvttjv, chs dv ttot e'xoj- 
(Atv* ^X €LV y^as, £lt€ napa 6 <\>voiv ttjv lolav 

VO(JOVVT€S 61T6 7T€7T7)pU)fJL€VOL €LT€ ypafX/jLOTLKOL 

yeyovoTes rj [jlovolkol" /cat ttoXlv (x€t oXiyov 
kclto, tovtov Se t6v Aoyov to. 7rapa77A^aia ipov/xev 

/Cat 7T€pl T7JS dpZTfjS TjfJLWV KOLl 7T€pl TTJ? /CaKta? KCLL 

to oXov tcov Ttyy&v koX tojv aTexvicov, cos €<f>7p>" 


8ev yap zotlv dXXtos tojv Kara iiipos 6 yeveadaL 

ovoe TovXdxicTTov rj /cara Trjv kolvtjv (frvotv /cat 

/card 7 tov e/cetv^s- 8 Xoyov." otl Se rj Koivrj envois 

B /cat o kolvos tt}s </)VO€ojs Xoyos etjaapjLteVn Kal rrpo- 

voia Kal 7j€v$ €otlv ovSe tovs avTLirooas* XeXrjOe- 

1 7Tpwra) -X, g, B ; omitted by all other mss. 

2 aihtov -E ; albolov -all other mss. 

3 Tp€<f>ovTt -F, a, A, j8, y, n. 

4 € X ofxev -B, Tolet. 51, 5, Vat. Re*. 80. 

5 7T€ P L -g. 

fi /xcpo? -X, g, B, E ; pipovs -all other mss 
7 Kara -omitted by g. 

8 €K€lVOV -F 1 , X 1 . 
9 avnVatSa? -X 3 , g, B. 

a S.F.F. ii, frag. 937 (p. 269, 1-18). 

b Chrysippus apparently meant the solid bits of the posset 
to represent matter and the liquid to represent the pervasive 
and perpetual motion which continually reshapes and re- 
arranges it (<•/. 8.V.F. ii, frags. 311, 916, and 919). The 


sions and not just one or two or three for addressing 
to Chrysippus this very remark which is here the 
object of applause : 

You've made the easiest plea, to blame the gods. 
In the first place, in the first book concerning 
Nature, a after having likened the perpetuity of 
motion to a posset turning and jumbling in different 
ways the different things that come to be, & he has 
made this statement : " Since the organization of 
the universe as a whole proceeds in this way, it is 
necessarily in conformity with this organization that 
we are in whatever state we may be, whether 
contrary to our individual nature we are ill or are 
maimed or have become grammarians or musicians." 
Again a little later : " We shall on this principle 
make similar statements both about our virtue and 
about our vice and generally about skills and the lack 
of them, as I have said." And a little later, removing 
all ambiguity : " For no particular thing, not even 
the slightest, can have come about otherwise than in 
conformity with the universal nature and its reason." c 
Now, that the universal nature and the universal 
reason of nature are destiny and providence and 
Zeus, of this not even the Antipodes are unaware, 

simile is supposed to have been suggested by a saying 
of Heraclitus (frag. B 125 [Diels-Kranz] ; cf. Philodemus, 
De Pietate c. 14, 12-18 [Gomperz] with Petersen's supple- 
ment). Marcus Aurelius (iv, 27 ; vi, 10 ; ix, 39) uses kvkcojv 
in a pejorative sense of the Epicurean world as opposed to 
the Stoic Koafxos hiareray^vos. For the composition and 
uses of the posset cf. A. Delatte, Bull. Acad, R. de Belgique, 
CI. des Lettres, 5 Ser. xl (1954), pp. 690-751. 

c Cf. 1050 c-d and 1056 e infra and De Comm. Not. 
1076 e. For 7) koivt) <f>vois, " the universal nature," see note 
c on 1085 c supra. 



(1050) Travraypv yap ravra dpvXclrat 1 vtt* avrtov, /cat to 2 
" At09 S' ireXetero 3 fiovXrj " top "Ofxrjpov tlprjKe- 
vou <f)7)olv A 6p9(jos €7rl rrjv €ifiapfjL€V7]v b dva<f)lpovTa* 
kglI ryv ra>v oXivv (frvoiv kclO* fjv Trdvra Stot/cetrai. 
Trios ovv dfia [lev ovSevos alaxpov Trapairios 6 
Beds 7 dfia S' ovSe tovXolxkjtov eVSc^CTat 8 yiyve- 
odai aXAws ?}* /cara rrjv Koivrjv <f>vatv /cat rov e/cet- 
vr]s Xoyov; iv yap tt&ol rots ytyvo/xeVots /cat t<x 
alaxpd SrjTrovdev 10 eoriv. Kabroi 6 jjl€V 'Ettlkovpos 
dpLO)Gy€7Ta)S arp€(f)€Tac /cat (f>iXor€xy€i, ttjs aioiov 
C KivrjoecDS fjLrjxavwfjievos eXtvdepcboai /cat a.7roAi}crat 

TO €KOVOlOV V7T€p TOV 11 fir) KaTaXlTT€lV dl'dyKXrjTOV 12 

rrjv KaKtav, 6 oc Xpvot7T7ros 13 avail ttTafiivrfv Trap- 

1 epvXXctrai -X 3 , g, n, E, B (cf. Be Facie 935 f [L.C.L. 

xii, p. 144, n. 4]). 8 to -X, g, B ; omitted by all other mss. 

3 8t' ircXclero -y ; Si€TeAei€To -Tolet. 51, 5. 4 <f>a<jli> -g. 

5 €iprfij,4v7]v -E. a ava<f>aipovra -F 1 . 
7 6 dcos -omitted by /?. 8 eVSc'xcorflai -B. 
9 rj -omitted by g. 

10 brjiTovdw -g ; 8177701; 0e6s -F* 1 , X ; Stjttov Oeatv -F 2 and all 
other mss. 

11 V7T€p 8c TOV -X 3 , g, B. 12 aV€7TlK\r\TOV "g. 

13 o 8e Xpvonnros -A 3 (added in margin), Yat. Reg. 80 ; 
omitted by all other mss. ; " sufficeret ctiam <o 8'> " 
-Pohlenz ; " cestui-ci " -Amyot. 

a Cf. S.V.F. i, frag. 176 and ii, frags. 1024 and 1076 
(p. 315, 1-11) ; Seneca, Nat. Quaest. ii, 45 ; W. Theiler in 
Phyllobolia fur Peter Von der Miihll, p. 46, n. 2. 

6 Iliad i, 5. For the interpretation which follows cf. 
Scholia Graeca in Homeri Iliadem ed. Dindorf, i, p. 6, 7 ; 
Eustathius, Ad Iliadem, 20, 10-13 (i, p. 33, 11-15 [Van der 
Valk]) ; and Plutarch himself in Quomodo Adolescens Poetas 
Audire Bebeat 23 d. 

c Frag. 378 (LTsener, Kpkurea, p. 254). Cf. 1045 b-c 
stipra and the passages cited in note a there, in all of which 
it is said or implied that the l> swerve M of the atoms was 
introduced for the purpose of avoiding determinism and of 



for the Stoics keep harping on this everywhere a and 
Chrysippus declares that Homer was right in his 
statement, " and Zeus's design was maturing," 5 
since he was there referring to destiny and the 
nature of the universe as a whole, in conformity with 
which all things are ordered. How, then, can it be 
that god is not accessory to anything shameful and 
at the same time that not even the slightest thing 
can come about otherwise than in conformity with 
the universal nature and its reason ? For among 
all the things that come about are included, I pre- 
sume, the shameful also. Yet, while Epicurus, in 
order not to leave vice free from blame, squirms 
this way and that and resorts to artifices in devis- 
ing the liberation of volition and its release from 
the everlasting motion, Chrysippus gives bare-faced 

providing for free choice and moral responsibility. Epicurus 
opposes determinism without referring to the " swerve," 
however, in Epistle iii, 133-134 and in JJcpl <f>vo€a)s incerti 
libri . . . reliquiae, frag. 7 (Epicuri Ethica ed. C. Diano, 
pp. 30-5 1=G. Arrighetti, Epicuro Opere 2 , pp. 335-358 [but 
see the latter's note, pp. 631 f., on 7, iii, 13 ff.]) ; and the 
" swerve " is mentioned without reference to the moral 
problem in Aetius i, 12, 15 and 23, 4 (Dox. Graeci, pp. 311 
and 319-320) and Plutarch, De Pythiae Oraculis 398 b. From 
Lucretius, ii, 216-250 and Cicero, De Finibus i, 18-19 it 
would appear that the device was introduced primarily to 
explain how atoms falling in the void could intercept and 
clash with one another ; and that its original purpose was to 
answer this physical problem posed by Aristotle's objection 
to Democritean atomism appears to be confirmed by a com- 
parison of Epicurus, Epistle i, 61-h46 b with Aristotle, 
Physics 215 b 21-22 and 216 a 20 (cf. J. Katz, A.J. P., lxiv 
[1943], pp. 432-435; G. Capone Braga, Studi su Epicuro 
[Milano, 1951], pp. 43-45 and Sophia, xxiii [1955], p. 109 ; 
D. J. Furley, Two Studies in the Greek Atomists [Princeton, 
1967], pp. 173-183 and pp. 232-233, and on this M. C. Stokes, 
Class. Rev., N\S. xix [1969], pp. 288-289). 



(1050) prjaiav avrfj 818ojgw cue ov /xovov i£ dvdyK7]s ov8e 
Ka6 elfiappievrjv dXXd /cat 1 Kara Xoyov deov /cat 
Kara <f)vaiv rTerroirjfjievrj rrjv dplorrjv. en 8e /cat 
tolv9' oparai 2 Kara Xe^iv ovtojs eypvro? % " T V^ Y^-P 
Koivfjs <f>voeojs els rravra 8iareivovorjSy 8er\oei rrav 
to ottojoovv yiyvoptevov ev rep 6'Aa> 4 /cat ra>v /jlo- 

pLOJV 5 OTtpOVV* KdT €K€lVrjV yCVeodcLl /Cat TOV 6/C€t- 

vrjs Xoyov /caret to 7 i£rjs aKOjXvroJS Sta 8 to [irjr 
e£ojdev elvai ro evorrjoouevov rfj oiKovofMia paqre 
D rcov fiepojv fjLTjSev eyeiv orra>s Kivr\Br)oerai fj oyr\- 
oei* d'AAa^ x/*}) 10 Kara rrjv koivtjv (j>vcriv" rives 
ovv at rojv ptepajv o^eoeis elol /cat 11 Kivrjoeis ; 8r)- 
Xov fiev on o^eoeis at /ca/ctat /cat ret vocr^/xara, 
(f>iXapyvpiai cf)tXrjSovlaL <f>iXo8o(;iai SetAtat dSt/ctat 12 * 
Kivrjoeis 8e jitot^etat kXottoX rrpo8ooiai LZ dv8po<f)o- 
vlai TTarpoKrovlai. rovrojv oterai Xpyoirrrros ovre 
fjuKpov ovre pceya rrapd rov rov Aids Xoyov etvai 1 * 
/cat vopLOV /cat 8lktjv /cat rrpovoiav wore fxrj yiy- 
veodai rrapa rov vojjlov to rrapavofxelv fJLrj8e rrapa 
rr)v 8lkt]v to dSt/cetv 15 (irj8e 1(i rrapa 11 rr)v rrpovoiav to 

1 /cat -omitted by X, g, B, E. 

2 opare -Meziriac ; opa rd -Wyttenbach ; eip^rai R. G. 
Bury. 3 €xovtl -g. 

4 oXa) -Wyttenbach ; Aoyo> -mss. 

6 TOO fJLOplCO -B. 

6 on o$v -X 3 ; OTiOW -g, a 1 (?), B, E. 

7 tcl -n. 

8 Here the first hand of d begins again, as does the text in 
v and z : see 1044- c supra. 

9 oxters -X, g, B. 

10 <t}> -added by Meziriac. 

11 ko\ -X, g, B ; omitted by all other mss. 

12 (f)i\ohot;ia. (<£iAo8oftai -X, g) 8aAm ahiKia -F, X, g, a. 
18 npooohiai -K 1 , V, z. 



licence a to vice as having been caused not merely of 
necessity or according to destiny but also in confor- 
mity with god's reason and with the best nature. This 
too, moreover, is seen put word for word as follows b : 
" For, since the universal nature extends to all things, 
everything that comes about in any way whatever 
in the whole universe and in any of its parts w r ill ne- 
cessarily have come about conformably with that na- 
ture and its reason in due and unimpeded sequence, 
for neither is there anything to obstruct the organiza- 
tion from without nor is any of its parts susceptible of 
being moved or of assuming any state save in con- 
formity with the universal nature." What, then, are 
the states and movements of its parts ? Obviously 
the vices and disorders — the lusts for riches, for 
pleasures, for glories, the forms of cowardice and of 
injustice — are states ; and acts of adultery, thefts, be- 
trayals, homicides, and parricides are movements. 
Of these Chrysippus thinks that none either great or 
small is contrary to the reason and law and right and 
providence of Zeus — with the consequence that 
illegality does not occur contrary to law or wrong- 
doing contrary to right or knavery contrary to 
providence. d 

a This phrase, used also in Conjugalia Praecepta 139 e 
and Quaest. Conviv. 712 a, is a reminiscence of Plato, 
Phaedrus 240 e 6. 

» .9. V.F. ii, frag. 937 (p. 269, 19-33) ; cf. A. A. Long in 
Probl&ms in Stoicism, p. 196, n. 24 and pp. 178-183. 

c Cf. S. V.F. iii, frags. 421-430. 

d Cf. Plotinus, Enn. in, ii, 16, lines 1-8. 

14 ctvcu Aoyov -E. 

16 fj,r]he . . . aSiKeiv -omitted by g. 

16 fn?Se -X, g, B ; jlltJtc /j/qv -d, v, z ; fnJT€ -all other mss. 

17 Kara -E, Vat. Reg. 80. 



(1050) 35. 'AAAd fjLTjv rov deov KoXd^eiv (frrjol rrjv 


cjorrep 1 iv rep 8evrepq) rrepl Qetov 7rore piev rd 
SvaxprjGTa ovp,fiaiveiv 2 <f>rjGL rols dya9ois z oi>x oyo- 
7T€p rols <f>avXois KoXdoeajs \dpiv aAAa kojt dXXrjv 


rovrois' " 7rpa>TOV Se tojv /ca/ccov 7ra/>a7rA / nata>9 
eorlv aKovoreov rols TrpoeiprjpLevois. et0' on ravr 
arrovejierai Kara rov rod* Aids Xoyov rjroi eirl 
KoXdoei rj /car' aXXy]v typvoav irons irpbs rd oXa 
oiKovopiiav" eon piev ovv Kal 5 rovro Seivov, ro 
Kal 6 yiyveoQai rrjv /ca/ctav Kal KoXd^eaOai Kara 
rov rod 1 Aids Xoyov. enrireivei Se rrjv vTrevavria)- 
F oiv ev ra> Sevrepcp rrepl (pvoecos 8 ypd<f>ojv rdSe- 
li rj Se /ca/cta 7Tpos rd Seivd ovp/rrrojpiara loiov riv 
eyei> opov • yiyverai fiev yap /cat avrrj ttojs Kara 
rov rrjs (j)voeojs Xoyov /cat, tva ovrojs etna), ovk 

1 wot€ -d, v, z. 

2 aviLfialvtiv -X, g, n ; av^aivei -all other mss. 

3 tols dyaOols (f>7)crl -B. 

4 rov -omitted by a, A, jS. 

5 Kal -X, g, B ; omitted by all other mss. 

6 Kal -omitted by d, v, z. 

7 tov -omitted by A (~ in margin), /?, y. 

8 xPV (7€a>s ~P- 

a opov -Rasmus (Prog. 1872, p. 15) from De Comm. Not. 
1065 a ; \6yov -mss. here. 
10 Kal -X, g, B ; omitted by all other mss. (avrlirws ~y» n). 

a S. V.F. ii, frag. 1 176 ; cf. 1040 c supra (S. V.F. ii, frag. 

b Cf Maximus of Tyre, Philos. xli, iv g (p. 480, 4-8 
[Ilobein]) and the ultimate source, Plato, Laws 903 b 4-d 3; 
so with the example given by Chrysippus of his " incom- 
moda . . . per sequcllas quasdam necessarias facta, quod ipse 



35. Nevertheless, he says a that god chastises vice 
and does many things with a view to chastisement of 
the wicked. For instance, in the second book on the 
Gods he says that inconvenient things do sometimes 
happen to the virtuous not as they do to the base for 
their chastisement but in the course of other arrange- 
ments, as happens in cities ; and again he puts it in 
these words : " First, evils are to be understood after 
the fashion of what has been said before ; and then 
it must be understood that these things are dispensed 
according to the reason of Zeus either with a view 
to chastisement or in the course of other arrange- 
ments the nature of which is relative to the uni- 
verse as a whole." & Now, this is itself dreadful, 
that the origin and the chastisement of vice are both 
in accord with the reason of Zeus ; but Chrysippus 
intensifies the contradiction by writing as follows in 
the second book concerning Nature c : " Vice is 
peculiarly distinguished from dreadful accidents, for 
even taken in itself it does in a sense come about in 
accordance with the reason of nature and, if I may 
put it so, its genesis is not useless in relation to the 

appellat Kara napaKoXovO-qaiv " (Aulus Gellius, vn, i, 9-11 = 
S. V.F. ii, p. 336, 15-25) cf. Plato, Timaeus 75 a 7-c 7. 

c S. V.F. ii, frag. 1181 (p. 339, 14-19) ; cf. De Comm. Not. 
1065 a-b, where the quotation begins 17 Se KaKia 77700? ra 
Aoi7ra oufjL7TT<x>iJLaTa ex €i opov. In the present passage Xoyov 
of the mss. is probably a mistake for opov induced by Xoyov 
in the next line, but otherwise the text here probably repro- 
duces the words of Chrysippus more accurately (cf. Pohlenz, 
Hermes, lxxiv [1939], p. 12, n. 2). The authenticity of 
Scwi is supported by Plutarch's play on the word just above 
(can ficv ovv . . . Scivdy) ; Chrysippus distinguishes from the 
dreadful accidents that may befall virtuous men (cf. 1050 e 
supra and 1051 on Infra) kciklo., which according to him is 




(1050) axprjvTOJS yiyverat rrpos ra oAa* ov8e yap dv rdya- 
66v rjv." 1 /cat ovtos 2 imTifxa rots iTrcorjs irpos 
1051 rdvavria ScaXeyofievots, os vtto rod rravrcos ri fiov- 
Aea#ai kclL irepl 7ravro5 3 emelv i8iov /cat TTtpirrov 
ovk dxp^crrcos Xeyet jSaAAavrt orofielv avKotftavrelv* 
heal dcppatveiv, 5 ovk dxp^orojs 6 dxptfvrovs etvai, 
fiXafiepovs, /ca/coSat/xovas. elra rrolos ris 1 6 Zeu?, 
Aeyco 8k rov 8 XpvoiTT7rov } KoXd£a>v 77/oay/xa pjryv 
d<£' avrov jjirjT* dxprjVTCjos yiyvofievov ; rj fxev ydp 
kclklcl rrdvrojs dveyKXrjros cart /caret rov rod 9 Xpu- 
oittttov Xoyov 6 8k Zeus* iyKXrjreos eiV dxprjerrov 


dxptfoTaJS KoXd^ei. 

36. ndAu> iv ra) rrpcorco rrepl AiKaioovvrjs , €t- 

TTLOV TTepl TWV 0€Cl)V OJS €VLOrajJL€VOJV ivloiS 10 dSiKTJ' 

B /xacu, " KdKiav 8e M cprjoi " /ca#oAoi> dpat oure 
cWardv iortv ovr e^et 11 /caAtu? dpdrjvai." (aAA' 
6t /xcv ou/c e^a KaXtds dpdfjvai) 12 rrjv dvofiiav rrjv 
dhiKiav rrjv dfieXreplav 1 * ov rov irapovros earl Ao- 
yov to 1 * ^relv avros 8k lb rrjv kclkIolv, ooov €(/>' 

1 ovbe . . . ?Ji> -D<? Comm. Not. 1065 it (Rasmus, toe. cit. 9 
and Emperius, Op. Phttol.* p. 3i0) ; oure ydp rayafla tJv 
-mss. here. 

2 ovtos -Meziriac ; ovrcos -mss. 

3 Trzpi rod 7ravro9 -g. 

4 K(U OVKO(f>aVT€LV -B. 

5 €u<£pcuV€(,v -d, z ; cu^atvetv -v. 

6 dxp^crrou? -E. 

7 77-OtOCTTl -F 1 . 

8 rdy -F 1 , X 1 , d, v ; d -z ; ro -all other mss. 

9 rov -omitted by d, v, z, j3. 

10 eviorcLfievcov ivlots -^{-cov and -ois over erasures), g, d, 
v, z, B; iviara^ivoLs {u>v superscript over ois -A corr ) eViW 
-F, a, A, j3, y, n, E. 

11 e^€tv -v, z. 



universe as a whole, since otherwise the good would 
not exist either/' a And this man censures those who 
impartially argue the opposite sides of a question, b 
this man who from a desire at all costs and on every 
subject to say something original and extraordinary 
asserts that purse-snatching, blackmail, and folly are 
not useless, that it is not useless for there to be men 
who are useless, injurious, and wretched. What kind 
of being, then, is Zeus, I mean the Zeus of Chrysippus, 
who chastises a thing that comes about neither of 
itself nor without use ? For, while vice according to 
the reasoning of Chrysippus is entirely free from 
blame, Zeus must be blamed whether he has created 
vice which is without use or having created it not 
without use chastises it. 

36. Again, in the first book concerning Justice 
after having spoken of the gods as opposing some 
wrongful acts he says c : " To abolish vice com- 
pletely, however, is not possible ; nor is its abolition 
a good thing." The present treatise is not concerned 
with the investigation (whether the abolition of) 
lawlessness, injustice, and stupidity <(is not a good 
thing) ; but, as by philosophizing he is engaged in 

a Cf. De Comm. Not. 1066 d ( = S.V.F. ii, p. 340, 1-6) ; 
Aulus Gellius, vn, i, 2-6 (where Chrysippus refers to Plato, 
Phaedo GO b-c) and 13 ( = S. V.F. ii, frag. 1169 and frag. 
1170 sub fin.) ; Diogenes Laertius, vii, 91 (from Posidonius = 
frag. 29 [Edelstein-Kidd]) ; Plato, Theaetetus 176 a 5-8 (cf. 
Proc. American Philos. Soc, xlviii [1954], p. 24, n. 7). 

6 See 1035 f— 1037 c supra. 

c S.V.F. ii, frag. 1182. 

12 <. . .> -supplied by Bernardakis after Reiske (dXX y el fiev 
ov K-aAois ex et apOrjvai) ; omitted by all mss. without indication 
of lacuna. 13 d^eXT-qptav -mss., corrected by Diibner. 

14 to -omitted by g. 1S &e -omitted by g. 



(1051) eavrcp, Bid rod cfriXoaocfreZv dvaiptov, fjv ovk k\m 
kclAcos dvaipeZv, p.aypp.evov ri rcoiaZ Kal rep Xoyco 
/cat to> deep. irpds Se 1 rovrois Ae'ycov iviois dSiK7j- 
fxaaiv ivtaraoOai rdv dedv epi(/>aoiv ttoXiv rfjs 2 reov 
dpiaprr^ par ojv SlSojgiv dvicrorrjros . 3 

37. "Et* 4 7T€pl rod purjoev ey/cA7?T6v €ivai pirjSe 
p^epmrov (iv rep} 5 Koopitp, Kara rrjv dpiarrjv <f>voiv 
amdvroyv irepaivopiivojv , Q '/roAAdfa? 7 yeypacjxos, €a- 
riv ottov irdXiv iyKXrjrds rivas a/xeAeia? ov rrepl pn- 
C Kpd Kal cf>avXa KaraXeinei. iv yovv rep rpirco ire pi 
Ovoias pivrjoOelg ore avpifiaivei rivd roZs KaXoZs 
KayadoZs roiavra, <( irorepov " cf>7)alv " dpieXov- 
pL€va>v nvebv, KadaTTtp iv oiKiais* piei^ooi Trapa- 
rrlrrrei rivd rrirvpa Kal voool 9 irvpoi rives 10 rebv 
oXojv ev oiKovopLovpidvojv, Tj 8 id to KadiaraoOai em 
rwv roiovrwv Saipiovia <j>avXa iv ols rep ovri yiy- 
vovrai Kal ey/cA^reat d/xe'Aetcu; " cf>r)ol Se ttoXv Kal 
to rrjs dvdyKTjs 11 piepZxOai. rd pkv ovv rd roiavra 

1 8€ -omitted by 0. 

2 rrjs -omitted by a (>y in margin), A, /?, y, n, E. 

3 H. C. after Amyot (". . . qiTil y a doncques quelque 
inegalite entre les pechez ") ; avooioTrjTos -mss. 

4 en -a corr - ; on -all other mss. 

5 <cV to>> -added by Wyttenbach and implied by Amyot's 
'* en ce monde " ; /xc/x77tov /coa/xo> {koo^iov -Vat. Reg. 80) -mss. 

8 irapayofievcuv -X 3 (ay over erasure), g ; Trapayoficvrjv -B. 

7 TToXXdtas -omitted by E. 

8 oIkciclis -d, V. 

9 7TOoi -a 1 , y* n (7roat 7rupt), E. 

10 rives -omitted by g (but r/. 8.T.F. ii, p. 223, 21 : tto- 
oovs rtva? xP^ l/ol ' s )* 

11 to cav Kal -g. 



abolishing so far as it is in his power to do so the vice 
which it is not a good thing to abolish, he is himself 
doing something that conflicts both with his doctrine 
and with god. Besides, in saying that god opposes 
some wrongful acts, he suggests in turn that there is 
inequality among wrong actions. 

37. Moreover, although he lias often written on 
the theme that there is nothing reprehensible or 
blameworthy <(in the)> universe since all things are 
accomplished in conformity with the best nature, b 
yet again there are places where he does admit 
instances of reprehensible negligence about matters 
which are not trivial or paltry. At any rate, in the 
third book concerning Substance he mentions the 
fact that things of this kind do happen to upright and 
virtuous men and then says c : Is it because some 
things are neglected, just as in larger households 
some husks get lost and a certain quantity of wheat 
also though affairs as a whole are well managed, or is 
it because base spirits have been appointed over 
matters of the sort in which there really do occur 
instances of negligence that must in fact be repre- 
hended ? " And he says that necessity also is involved 
in large measure. d Now, I say nothing about the 

In saying that the gods make such a distinction Chrysip- 
pus implicitly contradicts his doctrine that all wrong actions 
are equally wrong, for which see 1038 c supra, De Virtnte 
Moral i 449 o (S. V.F. iii, frag. 4(38), and S. V.F. iii, frags. 
527-5J9 and 581-533. 

b Cf. 1050 C supra: Kara Xoyou deov /cat Kara <f>vaiv . . . ttjv 

c 8. V.F. ii, frag. 1178. Cf Cicero, T)e Nat. Deorum ii, 
167 and iii, 8<J and llahut, Phttarqn? ft le Stoicism*, pp. 291- 
293 and p. 439. 

d Cf. [Plutarch], Dp FlaeUh 885 k-8.V.F. ii, frag. 976 
with Plato, Thaaeu* 47 i: 5 -48 \ i. 



(1051) ovpjrrdypara rtov kclXcov i<dya9tbv dvSptbv, olov rj 
Hco Kpdrovs KaraSiKT] kcli 6 YlvOayopov i^ojvros ifji- 

ArjfJivXoV 1 TOV TVpaVVOV KOL 'AvTl(f)CJ0VTOS 2 VTTO Ato- 

D vvoiov oTpefiXovpAvwv avaipeozis , TTirvpois* Trapa- 

TTLTTTOVOIV (X7r€tKa^€tV OOTjS €<JTIV €X)-)(£p€iaS €OJ * TO 

Se (fxivAovs SacpLovas ck irpovoias irrl rds Toiavras 
€7TiOTaoLas Kadioraodai ttlqs ovk ecrrtv ey/oY^a 4 
rod deovy Kaddirep f$aaiXiu)S kolkois kcll €littXt]k~ 


kol TTapoivovfxevovs rovs apLorovs ; kcll fjir)v el ttoXv 
to rrjs dvayK7]s LieiLiKrai tols TTpdyfiaoiv, ovt€ 
Kparel Trdvrcov 6 deos oiire Trdvra Kara rov €K€lvov 
Xoyov StoiKeZrai. 

38. 11/309 rov 'Rttlkovpov pLaXiora ^a^erca /cat 

Trpos rovs dvaipovvras rr)v rrpovotav cirro 6 rcov iv- 

E voitov 7 a9 exop-tv Trepl deojv evepyeriKovs kol <f>tX- 

1 SifAvXov -X 3 (t over erasure), g, B (so also E, B in Adv. 
Colotem 1126 i) ). 

2 ' Avtl<J)(x)vtos -Basil. ; rv<f>a)vos -mss. 

3 avaipeocis, KLTvpoiS -g ; avaiptoei im TTLTvpois -1» X 1 (e7Tt 

erased -X 3 ), a ; avaipeoec TTLTvpois ~B ; avaiptosis {-pe -d, Z ; 
-piav -v) em Trirvpais (rvpLOis -v) -all other mss. 

4 dvcyKATJ/Liara -d, v, z. 

5 iTTLTpaTTCVTOS -d, v, z. 

6 ano -X, g, B ; €k -all other mss. 

7 cvvolwv -a, A 1 . 

° For the term cru/x7TTc6/j,aTa see 1050 f supra. 

b Of. Plutarch, Nicias xxiii, 4 (538 f) and Adv. < 'olotem 
1126 b ; Cicero, De Nat. hfonnn iii, 82 ; Diogenes Laertius, 
ii, S8-42. 

c Cf. l)e Genio Socratis 588 a, where Plutarch doe< not 



degree of insensibility manifested in likening to husks 
that get lost the accidents a to upright and virtuous 
men such as were the sentence passed upon Socrates b 
and the burning alive of Pythagoras by the Cy- 
loneans c and the torturing to death of Zeno by the 
tyrant Demylus d and of Antiphon by Dionysius e ; 
but to say that base spirits have been providentially 
appointed to such offices of charge, how can this be 
anything but an accusation of god as of a king who 
entrusts provinces to evil and demented governors 
and generals and pays no attention to their neglect 
and abuse of the most virtuous men ? Moreover, if in 
events necessity is involved in large measure, then 
god does not control all things nor are all things 
ordered in conformity with his reason. 

88. He fights especially against Epicurus and 
against those who do away with providence, basing 
his attack upon the conceptions that we have of the 

say explicitly that Pythagoras himself died in the fire set by 
Cylon's partisans. For references to the various accounts of 
his death cf. Zeller, Phil. Griech. 1/1, p. 417, n. 2 and A. 
Delatte, La Vie de Pythagore de Diogene Laerce (Brussels, 
1922), pp. 186-137 and pp. 241-244. 

d The Zeno referred to is the Eleatic, the friend and fol- 
lower of Parmenides. The name of the tyrant, which 
Plutarch gives here and in Adv. Colotem 1126 d-e but omits 
in be Gar nil itate 505 n, varies in the various versions of the 
story (cf. Diogenes Laertius, ix, 26-27 ; Zeno, frags. A 
6-9 [D.-K.]; Cicero, De Nat. Deorum iii, 82 with A. S. 
Pease's note in his edition, ii, p. 1190). 

c Cf. Quomodo Adulator ab Arnica lnternoscatur 6$ a-u 
and Aristotle, Rhetoric 1SS5 a 9-13. The Antiphon meant 
here is the tragic dramatist (cf. Nauck, Trag. Graec. Frag. 2 , 
pp. 792-793 and Dieterieh, R.-E. \ [1894], col. 2526, 40-61), 
who is confused with Antiphon of Hhamnus in the Pseudo- 
Plutarchean VUae herein Oratomm 833 »*, and by Philo- 
stratus in his VUae Sophitttarum i, 15, iii. 



(L'51) avdpwnovs imvoovvres. koli tovtojv iroXXaxov 
ypa(f)OjJL€va)v Kal Xeyofievojv 1 Trap* avrols ovSev €§et 
Xd^eis TrapartOeaOai. 2 kcu'toi 3 ^p^OTou? ov rrdvras* 
€ikos 5 rovs 0€ovs 7rpoAa/xjSav€ty. 6 Spa yap ota 'Iot>- 
Satot Kal YiVpoi rrcpl deatv <f>povovcriv, opa ra tojv 
TroirjTOiV Troarjs i jjltt €TrXr] or at 7 SciaiSai/xovtas. 8 <f>Qap- 
rov Se Kal ytvrjTov 9 ovSeis ojs 67709 eiTmv Sta- 
voctrat 0cov. cov Tva tous aAAot>? d<£a> rrdvras, 
'AvTLTrarpos 6 Tapaevs ev tw rrepl @eajv ypdcf>ei 
ravra Kara Ae£iv " 7rpo 10 Se tou ovpiTTavros Xoyov 
TTfV ivdpyetav 11 rjv e^o/xev nepl Oeov Sid jSpa^ctov 
F €7TiXoyiovixe6a. 6eov roiwv voodfiev £a>ov /xa/ca- 
piov /cat acf)6apTov /cat 12 evTroirjTtKov dv9ptx)7Ta>v" 
elra tovtojv eKaarov 13 vcfrrjyov/JLevos 1 * <f>rjaiv ovtojs' 

1 ypa<l>ofji€vo)v /cat Xcyofxevcov -X, g, B ; Xeyofievwv /cat Aeyo- 
fxevcov -F ; Xeyofidvcov /cat voovfidvcov -d, v, z ; Xcyofievcuv (alone) 
-all other mss. 2 7repiTt0€a0ai -d, v. 

3 /cat to -X 3 (over erasure), g, B ; /catrot -all other mss. 

4 X( yr l (J ' TO vs drravras -g, E ; ou xP r } aT0 ^ >s drravTas -B. 

5 et/cos- -A. D. Nock (cf. Sandbach, Class. Quart. , xxxiv 
[1940], p. 22, n. 2) ; etvai -mss. 

6 TTpoaXanfidveiv -F, X, g, B ; irpoftalvtiv -V ; 7TpoAajLt|8av€tv 
-all other mss. (r/. iVow Posstf Suaviter Vivi 1092 c). 

7 ipLTri-nXrjTai -a 1 ; €fM7T€7rXrjKrai -Vat. Reg. 80. 

8 octSat/LtcWas -g; 8o toat/zoytas -a 2 (erasure between 8 and o 
and between o and t) ; SuatSat/xovt'a? -n. 

9 yevyrov -X 3 (yc over erasure), A corr -, E ; yevv-qrov -g, £, y, 
n, B ; wv7]tov -F, a, A 1 , d, v, z. 

10 77-po -X, g, #, B ; 7rpos -all other mss. 

11 ivdpyetav -Meziriac ; ivepytiav -mss. 

12 zeal -omitted by v, z. 

13 €Kaoros -/?• 

14 v<f>r)yovfj,€vos -H. C. ; dfayovficvos -mss. (defended by 
\Yestman in Pohlenz-Westman, Moralia vi/2, p. 2:M ; but 
(•/*. jP? 6V Ipsum Laudando 513 a, iVW Po.s'^ Snav'ttfr Vivi 
1097 a, and especially ./)<? Jv. Proc. in Timaeo 1027 e with 
af>jj>. wit.)* 



gods in thinking of them as beneficent and humane. 
Since this occurs frequently in what the Stoics write 
and say, there was no need to give quotations. And 
yet the likelihood is that not all men have pre- 
conceptions of the gods as benignant, for look at the 
kind of notions Jews and Syrians have about gods b 
and see how full of superstition the notions of the 
poets are. One may say, however, that no one 
supposes god to be subject to destruction and 
generation. Not to mention any of the others, 
Antipater of Tarsus in his book on the Gods writes 
word for word as follows d : " As a preliminary to the 
whole discourse we shall take a concise reckoning of 
the clear apprehension e which we have of god. Well 
then, we conceive god to be an animate being, 
blessed and indestructible f and beneficent towards 
men." Then, explaining each of these predicates, he 

a TTpos tov 'Emxoupov . . . TrapariBcaOai^ S. V.F. ii, frag. 
1115. Cf. De Comm. Not. 1075 e (S.V.F. ii, frag. 1126), 
and for Epicurus on providence see 1043 b, page 492, note a. 
In the text here there is no need either to change ISet to Sei, 
as Reiske did, or to suppose with Pohlenz (Hermes, lxxiv 
[1939], p. 12, n. 2) that it is the apodosis of a condition 
contrary to fact, the protasis of which has been lost. 

6 Cf De Superstitione 166 a, 169 c, 170 d ; Jones, 
Platonism of Plutarch, pp. 26-27 and Latzarus, Jdees 
Relig leuses, pp. 161-166. 

c Cf De Comm. Not. 1074 e— 1075 a. 

d Antipater, frag. 33 (S. V.F. iii, p. 249, 10-15). 

e Pohlenz adopts Wyttenbach's hvotav, giving as his 
reason for rejecting ivdpyciav a reference to Bonhoffer, 
Epictet und die Stoa, p. 220, n. 2 ; but see Sandbach, Class. 
Quart., xxiv (1930), pp. 50-51 and note c on 1047 c supra. 
Besides the passages cited in that note see also S.V.F. i, 
frag. 346 (Ariston of Chios). 

1 Cf. Plato, Phaednts 246 u 1-2 ; Aristotle, MHaphysicn 
1072 b 28-30 and Eth. Nic. 1 178 b 8-9. 



(1051) " Kill jJLTjV CL(j)9dpTOVS OLVTOVS rjyoVVTOLl 77(XVT€9. n 

ouSeis" ovv eon rcov rrdvrojv 6 ¥*.pvunnTos /car' 

'AvTLTTCLTpOV 0lf8ev ydp oUtCLI TtXt)v TOV TTVpOS 

1052 d(j)9apTov etvat rcov 9ecov dXXd Trdvras dfxaXcos 1 kcu 
yeyovoras kcli (fadapYjcrofjLevovs. ravra 8e ttcxv- 
tclxov, 6l>? e7Tos elrrelv, vtt* avrov Xeyerai. rrapa- 
9y]ao[Lai 8e Xe^iv €/c rod rpirov Trepl Qecov il kcl9* 
erepov Xoyov ol fiev dpa 2 yevrjrol 2 etvat koX <f)9ap- 
rol Xeyovrat 4 ol S' dyevrjrot,.* koX ravr drr* dpx^\s % 
vTroheiKWodai (f>voiKcorepov. tjXlos Liev ydp kcli 
oeXrjvrj kcll ol 7 dXXoi 9eol TrapaTrXrjOLOV exovres 
oyov yevrjrot etatv, o oe /j€v$ aidios eoriv. koll 
TrdXiv rrpoeXBcov " o/xota 9 he koX Trepl rov <f>9lveiv™ 
i<al rrept rov yeveodai 11 prj9r]oerac rrepi re rcov a'A- 
Xojv detov kclI rov 12 AioV ol Liev yap <f>9aprol eloi rov 
Se rd Liepv) dcf)9apTa." rovrois ert fiovXoLiat rrapa- 
B fiaXelv LLiKpd rcov vtto rod ^ Kvrirrdrpov Xeyo- 
fxevwv tl ogoi 8e rrepiaipovvrai to evTroirjriKov eK 

1 6pa\a>s -omitted by d, v, z. 

2 dpa -H. C. ; yap -mss. (deleted by Wyttenbach ; re- 
tained by Pohlenz, who places a colon after KaO y erepov Xoyov, 
taking this as a formula of transition, which is improbable 
in view of 7rapa7rXr]OLOV €X OVT€S Xoyov infra). 

3 X 3 , d, E ; yevv-qToi -all other mss. 

4 Xiyovrai -X 3 (in margin), g, B ; omitted by all other mss. 

5 X 3 , E ; dydvvrjToi -all other mss. 

6 dTrapxrjS -F, E. 

7 ot -omitted by g ; ol dXXot deol <ol> -Pohlenz. 

8 X 3 , d, E ; yevvrjTol -all other mss. 

9 OfJLOLOS -g. 

10 <f>6iv€iv -Diibner ; </>pov€iv -mss. ; <j>dapijvat -Leonicus. 

11 aioddveGQai -X, g, B (F 1 in margin : yp. aladdveaOat). 


v -E. 



says ; " Moreover, all men hold them to be in- 
destructible." In that case, Chrysippus is not one of 
Antipater's ''all men," a for he thinks that in the 
gods there is nothing indestructible except fire but 
that all of them alike have come into being and are 
going to be destroyed. This he states practically 
everywhere ; but I shall give a quotation from his 
third book on the Gods b : " Corresponding to a 
difference of constituent principle some, therefore, 
are said to be subject to generation and to destruction 
and others to be unsubject to generation. An ex- 
position of this from the beginning is rather a topic 
for physics, for sun and moon and the rest of the 
gods, since they have a similar principle of constitu- 
tion, are subject to generation, but Zeus is everlast- 
ing." And again further on: " Similar assertions 
will be made about decaying and having come to be 
in regard to Zeus and the rest of the gods, for the 
latter are subject to destruction but the parts of the 
former are indestructible." c Beside these state- 
ments I wish to set a few more words by Antipater a : 
" Those who divest the gods of beneficence are in 

Cf. Plato, Republic 398 c 7-8 ; 1 Lip pi as Major 293 a 

b S. V.F. ii, frag. 1049 (p. 309, 14-25) ; cf. De Comm. Not 
1075 a-c and De Defectu Orac. 420 a (S. V.F. ii, p. 309, 26- 
36 and p. 310, 1-4). 

c Pohlenz, referring to S. V.F. ii, frags. 589 ff., says that 
one would expect to find here p^cprj ptev <f)6apTd, avros Se 
dcf)0apTos. In frags. 589-595, however, the Stoic contention 
that the Koapios is <f>dapTos is supported by the principle, ov 
ra fi€pr] <f>9apra ion koli to o\ov (ii, p. 181, 1-2) ; and in the 
face of this Chrysippus is not likely to have asserted that 
Zeus is himself d^dapros though his parts are ^Oaprd. 

a Antipater, frag. 34 (S.V.F. iii, p. 249, 16-20); cf. 
Rabnt, Pint cirque et le Stole is me, p. 461, n. 1. 



(1052) tcov 1 decov and fiepovs TrpoafidXXovoL 2 rfj tovtojv 
rrpoXrjxlsei Kara tov avrov Xoyov Kal oi. vopit^ovTes 
avrovs yeveaeoos re kqI <f>dopas Koivoovelv." elirep 
ovv €7TiGrjg aroTros 6 <f>daprovs rjyovfievos tovs 
deovs r<p firj vopLi^ovTi TrpovorjTiKovs elvai Kal 

(f)l\av6pU)7TOVS , €7TL(jr}S 8ia7T€7TTCOK€V 'JLTTlKOVptp 

Y^pvonnros* 6 jxev yap ro evnoirynKov 6 Se to 
a<f)dapTov a<f>aipelTai tcov decov. 

39. Kat (jLrjv ev too TptTCp rrepl Qetov 6 XpvcrtTT- 

TTOS 7T€pl TOV 3 Tp€(f>€odat TOVS dXXoVS QeOVS TClSe 4 

Xeyec u Tpo<j>ij t€ ol p,ev aXAoi Qeol \powTai irapa- 
TrXrjoloJS, avve^op^evoi Si avTrjv 5 * 6 8e Zeis* Kat 6 


TrepioSovs twcls els Trvpy dvaXioKOfievcov Kal £k 
Trvpos yiyvopL€va>v." 7 evTavda p,ev ovv B a7To<f>aL- 
veTai TravTas tovs aXXovs 9 deovs Tpecfiecrdai TrXrjv 
tov koojjlov Kal tov Aids, ev 8e too rrpcoTco rrepl 
Upovoias tov Aia <f>rjolv av^eodat /xe^pi 10 av els 
avTOV airavTa KaTavaXcoorj 11 '• " eirel yap 6 OdvaTos 

1 ra)v -omitted by F. 

2 TrpoofSaXXovoi -g ; npopdXXovoi -all other mss. 
8 tov -X, g, B, E ; to -all other .mss. 

4 to.Bc -omitted by E. 

5 avrov -n. 

6 <. . .> -H. C. ; lacuna indicated by Xy lander ; <£jj tu>v 
ds TTvp> -Giesen (De Plutarchi . . . Disputatinnifmx, p. V2). 

7 yevofM€vcjv -F, z, a, A, jS, y, n, E. 

8 ovv -X 3 , g, B ; omitted by all other mss. 

9 dXXovs -omitted by B ; tovs dXXovs iravTas -d, v, z. 

10 fxc'xpi -X, d, v, z ; (idxpLS -all other mss. 

11 KaTavaXoior) airavTa -d, v, z. 

« Cf. Plutarch, Non Posse Suaviter Vivl 1100 k— 1101 c 


partial conflict with the preconception of them in the 
same sense as are those who believe them to partake 
of generation and destruction." If, then, he who 
holds that the gods are subject to destruction is as 
absurd as is he who believes that they are not 
provident and humane, Chrysippus has erred as much 
as has Epicurus, for the latter eliminates the bene- 
ficence of the gods a and the former their indestructi- 

39. Moreover, in the third book on the Gods 
Chrysippus makes the following statement about the 
nourishment of the rest of the gods b : " Nourish- 
ment is used in a similar way c by the rest of the gods 
— it is through it that they are sustained, but Zeus 
and the universe {sustain themselves]) in a different 
way {from those that periodically) are absorbed {into 
fire) and arise out of fire." d Here, then, he declares 
that there is nourishment of all the gods except the 
universe and Zeus, but in the first book on Providence 
he says e that Zeus goes on growing until all things 
have been consumed in his growth : " For, since 

and 1103 d; Adv. Cololem 1108 c; Pyrrhus, chap. 20 
(395 e-f). 

b S.V.F. ii, frag. 1068. 

e For 7TapcnrA7)(ji(x)s Pohlenz refers to 1050 e supra {irapa- 
7r\r]oia)S eorlv aKovortov), but cf. rather 1052 a supra : ot 
aAAot deol 7Tapa7rArjaiov <e\ovt€S Xoyov. 

d As the first clause of the next sentence shows, Plutarch 
did not understand Tpo<f>ij ypaWcu or anything with a similar 
meaning to be the predicate of 6 Zcvj kcli 6 kogiios- Giesen 
was therefore right in rejecting the conjectures of Reiske 
and of Rasmus, and the same objection holds against 
Madvig's emendation and against von Arnim's supplement 
with or without Pohlenz's variation of it. 

e S. V.F. ii, frag. 604 (pp. 185, 43-186, 3). Cf. he Comm. 
Not. 1075 n and 1077 u ; S.V.F. ii, frag. 526. 



(1052) ptev eon ifjvx?)S x^P 10 ^^ 1 ( * Tr ° T °v vwjjLaros tj be 
rod Kocrfiov fax?} ov x 0J P^ eraL f^ v av^erat 8e 
ow€)(6)S ^XP l% ®* v € ^ a VTV]v i^avaXcoarf rrjv vXtjv, 
ov prjreov ajroOvrjOKetv rov koctjuov." ris olv ow 4 
evavnojrepa Xeywv eavrco 5 fyaveLt) rod rov avrov 
Oeov vvv puev av£ea9ai vvv 8e p/r\ rpe<j>eodai Xeyov- 
ros; 6 Kal rovr ov 8et ovXXoy i t^eoQai • oacfrtbs yap 
avros ev rep avrco yeypatf>ev " avrdpicrjs S* elvai 
D Xeyerai piovos 6 Koopios 8ia ro ptovos ev avrco ttolvt 
ex eiv & v 8elrai y Kal rpe<f>erai et; avrov Kal av- 
^eraiy rebv aXXojv pbopLcov els a'AA^Aa KaraXXar- 
ropLeva>v.' n ov piovov ovv ev eKelvocs rov$ aXAovs 
6eovs aTro<f)aiva)v 8 rpecpopievovs ttXtjv rov Koopiov 
Kal rov Alos ev rovrois 8e Kal rov Koopiov Xeycov 
rpe<f>eodai puayerai rrpos avrov aAA' ere 9 pcaXXov 
ore rov Koopiov av£eo6al (f>r]aiv e£ avrov rpecf)6- 
puevov. rovvavrlov 8 elKos rjv rovrov piovov p/rj 
av^eoOai rrjv avrov cf>6ioiv 1Q e^ovra rpocprjv rols §' 

1 x^P 10 ^ faxys ~s» 

2 fM€Xpi X, d, v ; dxpLS -z ; iiexpcs -all other mss. 

3 eavrijv KaravaXajor] -g. 

4 tls ovv dv -B. 
° iavrov -E. 

6 vvv p.kv . . . XiyovTos -X, g, B ; omitted by all other mss. 
(one line left vacant by E). 

7 KaTaXXaTTOftevcov -Meziriac; Karar^Tpofievcov -V ; Kararro- 
fji€va)v -a, A 1 ; KarararTOfjidvajv (Kararraro . . . -d) -all other mss. 

8 a7ro(£aivo/xcvcov -y, n, Tolet. 51,5. 

9 aAAa ri -g ; aAA' eWt -Vat. Reg. 80. 
10 <f>vaiv -g. 

a Cf. S.V.F. ii, frags. 790 and 791 and for this deBnition 
of death Plato, Phaedo 67 d 4-5 and G org las 524 b 2-4. 
From it follows the distinction referred to in De Co mm. Not. 
1075 c : dvrjrov zlvai rov avOpcoirov, ov dvqTov Se rov Seov dXXa 



death is the separation of soul from body a and Hie 
soul of the universe is not separated but goes on 
growing continually until it has completely absorbed 
its matter, the universe must not be said to die." 
Now, who could more plainly contradict himself than 
the man who says of one and the same god now that 
he grows and again that he does not take nourish- 
ment ? And inference is not needed to reach this 
conclusion, 6 for in the same book he has himself 
clearly written c : " The universe alone is said to be 
self-sufficient because it alone has within itself every- 
thing it needs, and it gets from itself its nourishment 
and growth by the interchange of its different parts 
into one another. " So he is in conflict with himself 
not only because in the former passages he declares 
that except for the universe and Zeus there is 
nourishment of the rest of the gods and in the latter 
he states that there is nourishment of the universe 
also but even more because he says that the universe 
grows by getting nourishment from itself. The 
likelihood was just the contrary, that this alone does 
not grow, since it has its own decay for nourishment^ 

b Cf. De Comm. Not. 1075 is : ravra 5' oi>x cos aAAa TroAAd 
. . . ai>AAoyi£d/i€0a. . . . 

c S.V.F. ii, frag. 604 (p. 186, 4-7). Cf. Plato, Tiwaeus 
33 c 8-d 3 and on the imitation of this passage by Chrysippus 
see Brehier, Chrysippe, p. 148, n. 1. Not recognizing the 
origin of the notion, Sambursky says (Physics of the Stoics, 
p. 114) : " Here the Stoics hit upon an important physical 
law which applies to closed systems that are not subject to 
any interference." 

d Against the use that Chrysippus made of Timaens 33 
c 8-d 3 Plutarch turns the words immediately preceding that 
passage (Timaeus 33 c 7-8) : avro yap iavrco rpo<f>r)v ttjv iavrov 
<f>0iOLV 7rapexov. 



(1052) aAAots Otols €^a>0€v rpecfxyfievois €ttl8ooiv yLyve- 
aOai Kal av£r}cnv Kal pi&AAov els tovtovs Karava- 

\L(JK€odai TOV KOOpLOV, €L y €K€LVOJ fl€V i£ OLVTOV 

E rovrois S* €177' €Ktivov Aaufidvecv del re Kal rpe<f>€- 
adai ovtifiefiriKe. 

40. AevT€pov roivvv rj tcov Oecov h'vvoia Tcepiiyzi 
to evSatfMov Kal paKapiov Kal avTOTeAes. 816 Kal 
tov Evpi7ri8rjv irraivovoiv elrrovTa 

Setrat yap 6 Oeos, etrrep <=or opOats 1 Oeos, 
ovSevos' doi8<x>v otSc 2 8vott)vol Aoyoi. 

aAAa o ye XpvcnTriros iv of? 3 TrapedipLrjv* avTapKT) 
fxovov elvai tov Koofiov cf>r)ol 81a to pLovov iv avTto 
ttovt iyeiv wv SeiTai. t*. ovv erreTat to) jjlovov 
aifTapKr) tov koojjlov 6 elvai ; to pafjT€ tov rjXtov ai)T- 
dpKTj firjTe Trjv oeArjvrjv etvat jjltJt dXXov Tiva tujv 
6ea>v. avTapKeis ok per) ovt^s ovk av €iev ev8at- 
pLoves ov8e puaKapioi. 

41. T6 fipi<f>os iv Trj yaoTpl c/)vo€L Tpefeodai, 
F vojiti^et Kaddnep cfrvTov orav 8e rexdfj, i/ar^o/xevov 6 

vtto tov dipos Kal OTopbovpievov to rrvevpLa /xeTa- 

1 mss. and Clement, Strom, v, 75, 2 ; ovrcos -Euripides 
(L, P). 

2 doi8a>v ofcSc -Clement, Strom, v, 75, 2 ; aoioajv S' otoe 
-Euripides (L, P) ; ai)Aa>v ol Se -F 1 , X, g ; avrcov ol hk -F 2 
and all other mss. 

3 The testimony of d, v, z ends here. In all three mss. the 
words iv ots are followed without warning bj r De Defect u. 
Orac. 412 c, tov xpV aT VP^ ov KT ^' 

4 7rapadifMr)v -a, A. 

5 to fiovov tov Koofiov avTapKr} -g. 

6 i/jvxo^vov -X 3 , B ; (/ruxaiftcvov -g ; ifsvxov^ievov -all other 


Hercules Furem 1345-1346. The " wretched tales " are 


whereas the rest of the gods, since they get nourish- 
ment from without, do have increase and growth and 
that it is rather the universe that is consumed in 
their growth if it is a fact that, while it is its own 
source, they are always drawing upon it for their 

40. A second factor included in the conception of 
the gods, moreover, is happiness, blessedness, and 
independence. That is the reason why they applaud 
Euripides too for having said : 

God wants for nothing if he's truly god ; 

It's poets who contrived these wretched tales. 

Chrysippus, however, in what I have quoted b says 
that the universe alone is self-sufficient because it 
alone has within itself everything it needs. What, 
then, is the consequence of the assertion that the 
universe alone is self-sufficient ? That neither the sun 
nor the moon is self-sufficient nor any other of the 
gods. And, not being self-sufficient, they would not 
be happy or blessed either. 

41. He believes c that the foetus in the womb is 
nourished by nature d like a plant but that at birth 
the vital spirit, being chilled and tempered by the 

the stories of the illicit loves and internecine wars of the gods 
referred to by Theseus in lines 1316-1319 (cf. 1341-1344). 

6 1052 n supra. 

c to fip€<l>os . . . fJ.ax6fj*vos olvtoj = S.V.F. ii, frag. 806 (p. 
222, 18-24). Cf. 1053 c-d infra, Be Comm. Not. 1084 d-e, 
I)e Primo Frigido 946 c, and Porphyry in Eusebius, Praep. 
Kcang. xv, 11, 4 (all printed as part of S. V.F. ii, frag. 806) : 
S. V.F. ii, frags. 804, 805, and 807 ; and Pseudo-Galen (i.e. 
Porphyry), Ad Gaurum xiv, 4 (p. 54, 15-20 [Kalbfleisch]) ; 
F. W. Kohnke, Hermes, xeiii (1965), pp. 383-384. 

d " Nature " (<f>vais) as the Stoics used it technically to 
designate the " vegetative grade " (<j>vtik6v) of the vital spirit 
(mvpa) : cf S. V.F. ii, frags. 710-712, 714-716, 718, and 787. 



(1052) jSdAAetv /cat yiyveoQ ai t^toov o9ev ovk diro rporrov 

rrjv ifjvxrjv (hvojiaadat rrapd rrjv ifsv^tv. avros Se 

rrdXiv ttjv i/jvx^v dpaiorepov TrvevfJLa rijs cfrvaetos 

K(ll A€7TTOjJL€p€<JT€pOV rjyelrai /xa^d/xevo? avrcp. 1 

1053 7TC0S y^p OlOV T€ XtTTTOpLtpeS €K 7TCL)(Vpi€pOVS KaP 

dpatov yeveoOai /card Trepi\\iv^iv /cat ttvkvcjolv ; o 
Se ^tet£dv ion, 7Ta>s rrepiifjvtjei yiyveodai to epufjv- 
Xqv a7Tocf)aLv6fji€vo9 efjojwxov rjyeirat rov i]Xiov, ttv- 
pivov ovtol /cat yeyevrjpievov e/c rrjs dvaOv jjudoetos 
etV TTVp fJL€Taf3aAovor)s ; 3 Xeyet yap eV ra> Trpcorcp* 
rrepl Qvoew i( tj Se rrvpos pierafioXr} eart tomlvtt)* 
St' depos etV vScop r/oeVerat* /cd/c rourou, yrjs* 
v<f>LOTapi€vr}s , d^p dvatftuxidrar Ae77TWo/xeVou Se 
rot? depos, 6 afflrjp 7rept%etrat 7 /cd/cAa>, ot S 5 dare- 
pes e/c 0aAaTT7]s /x€Ta rod rjXiov dvdirrovrai" ri 
ovv dvdipet 7T€pufjv£eajs ivavrtcorepov rj Sta^uaet 
B irvKvdjaeoJS ; rd /xev 8 u'Sojp /cat yijv 9 e/c irvpos /cat 

1 iavTtp -g. 2 TTaxvfjLepovs yevtodai koli -g. 

3 /xcTajSaAAouo^s -F, X^first A erased -X 3 ), g corr - (second 
A added superscript), a. 

4 rrpcoToj -g ; rpiToj -all other mss. (but cf. 1049 f and con- 
trast the topics of the third book in 1038 c, 1042 a-b, 1048 b 

5 etV -omitted by B. 

6 rrjs-Y, X 1 . 

7 -ntpixelrai -W yttenbaeh ; 7T€pUx^ Tai -;VISS ' 

8 <<5v> to, jll€v -Reiske ; rd ^iev <ydp> -Bernardakis ; <d>$> 
tcl fj,ev -Pohlenz. 

9 rrjv -F. 

a i.e. ipuxv is derived from ^v^ls, " chilling " (#. F.JF. ii, 
frags. 807 and 808), an etymology which is pre-Stoic (cf 
Plato, Cratyhis 399 d \Q~y. 3 and Aristotle, T)e Anima 405 
b 28-39). 

b C/. 5. F.F. ii, frags. 715, 780, 785, 787 and i, frag. 484 
(p. 108, 28-29). 


air, changes and becomes animal and that hence soul 
has not inappropriately been named after this pro- 
cess. On the other hand, he holds soul to be vital 
spirit in a more rarefied and subtile state than 
nature b ; and so he contradicts himself, for how can 
a subtile and rarefied state have been produced from 
density in the process of chilling and condensation ? 
What is more, how is it that, while declaring anima- 
tion to be the result of chilling, he holds the sun to be 
animate, when it is igneous and the product of 
vaporous exhalation which has changed to fire ? c For 
he says in the first book concerning Nature a : The 
transformation of fire is like this : by way of air it 
turns into water ; and from this, as earth is pre- 
cipitated, air evaporates ; and, as the air is subtilized, 
ether c is diffused round about, and the stars along 
with the sun are kindled from the sea." Now, what 
is more opposed to kindling than chilling or to 
diffusion than condensation ? The latter produce 

c e/jupvxov ■Y)y€irai . . . fi€Ta^aXovarjs= S. V.F. ii, frag. 579 
(p. 179, 28-30) ; cf. Be Comm. Not. 1084 e and S.V.F. ii, 
frags. 652, 655, 663, 677, and 690. The self-contradiction 
is denied by liieth {Grundbegriffe, p. 125), who contends 
that the c ' tempering " at birth was supposed to intensify the 
toi'o? of the vital spirit by concentrating the heat within it. 
Some support for this might be found in S. V.F. ii, frag. 446 
(p. 147, 13-25) ; but even this would not wholly resolve the 

d S.V.F. ii, frag. 579 (p. 179, 30-34); cf. ii, frag. 581 
and frag. 413 with \V r . Spoerri, Spathellenistisclie Berichte 
iiber Welt, Kultur und Goiter (Basel, 1959), pp. 40-42. 

e The Stoic ether was not a " fifth essence " like Aris- 
totle's but o kind of fire : cf S.V.F. i, frags. 120, 134, and 
171 ; it, frags. 527 (p. 168, 17-31), 580 (p. 180, 10-12), 596 
(p. 184, 2-5), 601 (p. 185, 11-15), and 1067 (p. 313, 18-20) ; 
Plutarch, De Facie 928 c-n. 



(1053) depos 1 Troiel, to, 8' els rrvp Kal depa Tpeirei to vypov 
kcll yeooSes. dXX ofiws onov pcev tt)i/ dvai/jcv 2 6'itov 
ok rrjv irepLifiv^tv 3 apx^v e/x^fu^tas ttoicl. koli firjv 
brav €K7Tvptocns yevrjrac SioXov, (rov kog/jlov Sto- 
Aov} 4 t^rjv Kal £a>ov etvai (f>r]Gi ofievvvpLevov S' au- 
0ls koli iraxwojxevov els vSajp Kal yrjv Kal to ooj/JLa- 

TO€lO€S Tp€TT€<J0ai. Xeyei S' e*V Tip TTpOJTO) 7TC/H 

Tlpovolas' " oioXov fiev yap wv° 6 KOGfxos TrvpcoSrjs 
ev0vs Kal faxi zotiv iavTod Kal rjyepioviKov ot€ 
8e, fjL€Taj3a\<ji>v els t€* to vypov kcll ttjv evairoXei- 
(j>0€Laav ipvxtfvy Tpoirov tlvcl els odjpia Kal ifrvxty 
pteTefiaXev 7 a>oTe wveoTavaf e/< tovtojv, dXXov 
C Tiva. ea\e Xoyov." evTav0a Stjttov oa^tos 777 p,ev 
eKTrvpwaei Kal to. difjvxa tov Koopcov cfrrjolv els to 9 
epuftvxov Tpeneo0ai ttj Se ofieoei ttolXiv Kal tt)v 
*P V XV V dvieG0ai Kal dwypaiveo0ai fieTafiaXXovoav 
els to oiopiaToeihes. oltottos ovv <f>aiveTat ttj irepi- 
ifjv£et vvv fxev i£ avaiodrjTOJv rroitav epufwxa vvv 
S' els avaio07]Ta Kal aifruxa* fJLeTafidXXwv to 

1 depa -B. 2 dvdu/jv£tv -n. 

3 TTtpiipvttv -X 3 , g, B, E ; irapdipv£iv -X 1 and all other mss. 

4 <tov kog^ov 8ioAou> -H. C. ; <tov Koafxovy added after 
etvai <f>T]oi by Wyttenbach {not Amyot), after £o)oi> by 
Bernardakis ; SidAou Qfjv Kal £ak>v KepL\pvxov tov kooixov> -Poh- 

5 ojv -a (0rr - (co over erasure), A, j8, y, n, B, K ; dv -F, 
X, g (preceding yap omitted), adopted by Pohlenz with 

<S/evr]Tai> after TTvpwSrjs- 

6 [re] -deleted by Wyttenbach (but rf, f)e An. Proc. in 
Timato 1018 C : wte rrjs dpxrjs Kal rov . . . ; Gonda, MflP- 
mosyne, 4 Ser. vii [19541, Pl>- 284-i?85), 

7 fjLCTtftaXev -Reiske ; fiera^aXot dv -X : \ ^r ; - fieTafidWcov -all 
other mss. (rponov . . . iierafidXhtov -omitted in text but added 
hi margin by X 1 ). 



water and earth from fire and air, and the former 
turn into fire and air what is liquid and earthy a ; 
but nevertheless in one place he makes kindling and 
in another chilling the origin of animation. More- 
over, he says that, when conflagration has become 
thorough, <(the universe is thoroughly) alive and 
animal but, as it burns out again and condenses, it 
turns into water and earth and what is corporeal. In 
the first book on Providence he says b : " For the 
universe, being thoroughly fiery, is ipso facto both its 
own soul and its own ruling faculty ; but when, 
having changed into liquid c and the residual soul, it 
has in a way changed into body and soul so as to be 
a composite of these, it has got a different con- 
stituent principle." Here, surely, he plainly says 
that even the inanimate parts of the universe are by 
the conflagration turned into what is animate and that 
by the burning out again even the soul is slackened 
and liquefied, changing into what is corporeal. So his 
absurdity is manifest in that by the process of 
chilling he now makes animate beings out of in- 
sensible objects and now changes into insensible and 
inanimate objects the largest part of the soul of the 

a " The latter " = chilling and condensation, " the former " 
= kindling and diffusion. 

b S. V.F. ii, frag. 605 ; cf. S. V.F. ii, frags. 606 (De Couim. 
Xot. 1067 a), 1059, and (from the point of view of Peri- 
patetic polemic) 1047. For ether as the ^j^ovikov of the 
universe cf. also S.V.F. ii, frags. 642 and 648 with 611- 
(l)iogenes Laertius, vii, 139). 

c Pohlena adds < K al to yea>5e9> after to vypov, but against 
this see the following paraphrase in c infra, . . . rr^v 4 jv XV v 
avUadax kcll avvypaivcad at . . ., without mention of yetobes or yrj. 

8 ovvioravai -F, X J , a 1 ; ovvcardi'iu -A 3 . 
9 tou -g. 



(1053) TrAetoTov ptepos rrjg tov Koaptov if/vx^S- dvev 8e 
tovtojv 6 rrepl ifivxfjs yeveaea>s avrco Aoyos 1 pta- 
XOf-ievrjv k\et TTpos to ooypta ttjv drroSe t^tv. ytyve- 
aOat ptev yap frqcrt ttjv foxyv orav ro fipecfrog 
OLTTorexOfj Kaddrrep GTOptwoet rij Treptifjv^et rod 
D TrvevptaTos 2 pteTafiaAovTog 3 drroSei^et Se xPV rat T °v 
yeyovevat ttjv ifrvxyv «al pteTayeveoTepav elvat ptd- 
Aiora to) 4 Kal rov rporrov /cat to rjOos e^optotovuQat 
to\ T€Kva toZs yovevot. fiAerreTat he r\ tovtojv 
ivavTiaJGis' ov yap otov t€ ttjv ipvxyv ^po ??}$ 
a7TOKvr)G€Oj$ r)do7rot€Lo-dai t ytyvoptevrjv b pterd ttjv 
diroKvrjatv, rj orvptfirjcreTat, rrplv 7} yeviodai ifjvxtfv, 
optoiav elvat ipvxfj, TovTeoTt Kai elvat tyj opLotoTTjrt 
Kal i^iTj elvat ota to paqnaj yeyovevat . el Se frrjaet* 
Tis OTt y rat? Kpdueot tu)V aco/Aarcov eyytyvoptevrjs 7 
Trjs optotoTrjTos, at iftvxal yevoptevat 8 pcTafidAAovcrt, 9 
Stacf)0etpet to TeKpJ\ptov tov yeyovevat T7jv ipvxtfv' 
evSexeTat yap ovtojs Kal dyevrjrov 10 ovaav, otov 
E eTretaeAOrj, pteTafidAAetv Trj Kpdaet tt\$ 6pLotoTr)TO$. 
42. Tov depa rroTe ptev dvax/)eprj Kal Kov(f>ov 
elvat (f)7]ai iroTe 8e ptrjTe fiapvv ptrjTe K0V(f>ov. ev 
ptev ovv to> hevTepco Trepl K.tvrjaeojs to re irvp 

1 Aoyos avrco -g, E. 2 Trvev^iovos -V , a 1 . 

3 fitrafidAAovTos -g, a 1 (tirst A erased), E. 
* tov yeyovivai . . . tw -omitted by y 1 but added in margin 
by y corr - 

5 yLVOfJL€vr]v -X 3 , g, B corr * ; yevofjLevrjv -E ; yevajfievYjv a 1 , 
Vat. Reg. 80 ; yevvojfievrjv -F, X 1 , B 1 , a con \ A, 0, y, n. 

6 <fnjo€t -g, and note in margin of X : el Se <j>ycret ns lotos 
officii ; <f>r)crl -all other mss. 

7 ywofievrjs -E. 

8 yevofxevai -X 3 , g, E ; yewwfievai -all other mss. 

9 jjL€Ta^dA0VGCV -X 1 . 

10 dyevrjrov -X 3 , E : dyivmirov -all other mss. 


universe. ■ Apart from this, however, in his account 
of the generation of soul the demonstration is in 
conflict with the doctrine, for, while he says a that 
the soul comes to be when the foetus has been 
brought to birth, the vital spirit having changed under 
chilling as if under tempering, yet as proof that the 
soul has come to be and is junior to body he uses 
mainly the argument that the offspring closely re- 
semble their parents both in bent and in character. b 
The discrepancy of these assertions is obvious : it is 
not possible for the soul, coming to be after the 
birth, to have its character formed before the birth 
or else it will turn out that before soul has come to be 
it is similar to a soul, i.e. both exists, in that it has 
similarity, and, because it has not yet come to be, 
does not exist ; but, if one should say that, the 
similarity originating in the blends of the bodies, the 
souls change after they have come to be, the argu- 
ment for the generation of the soul is ruined, since in 
this way the soul may also be ungenerated and upon 
entering the body c may change under influence of 
the blend that constitutes the similarity. 

42. Sometimes he says that air has an upward 
tendency and is light and sometimes that it is 
neither heavy nor light. Thus in the second book 
concerning Motion he states d that fire, being weight- 

a S. V.F. ii, frag. 806 (p. 222, ?o-35) ; cf. the beginning 
of this chapter and note c on page 569 supra. 

b For this argument cf. S.V.F. i, frag. 518 (Cleanthes) 
and Cicero, Tusc. Disp. i, 79 ( = van Straaten, Panaetii 
Rhodii Fragmenta [1962], p. 27, 25-27) ; Verbeke,, 
pp. 152-156 ; van Straaten, Panetius, pp. 116-117. 

c For the expression cf. Aristotle, l)e Gen. Animal. 736 
b 28 (dvpadev cVeicneWi). 

d 5. V.F. ii, frag. 434. The fact that here and in S. V.F. 



(1053) afiapks ov avoj<j>epks etvai 1 Xiyec /cat rovtw 2 napa- 
ttXtjoioos tov dipa, tov fxev vSaros rfj yrj fiaXXov 
7TpocrvejLto/xevot> 3 tov S' depos ra> rrvpi. iv 8e rats 
(bvaiKcus Te'^vats irrl ttjv irepav perret Sd£av, a>s 
nrfre fidpos i£ avrov p,rjT€ Kov(f)6rrjra tov dipos 

43. "En tov* dipa (f>voet £o<j>€p6v etvac 5 Xeyei y 

/cat TOVTCp T€K(JLrjpito xPV T€Li T °v Kat *P V XP° V €* vaL 

irpojTOJS' avTiKetcrdai yap clvtov* to jiev ^o<f)€p6v 

F Trpos ttjv AapLTTpoTrjTa to Se ifjvxpov rrpos ttjv dep- 


tcov 7 <S>volkcov Tj^Tr^iaTOJv irdXiv iv toIs Trepl 
"E^cojv ovhev dXXo ras* eljeis* ttXtjv aipas* elvai 
<f>r}ocv " vtto tovtojv yap cruv€X €rai T( * a-cu/LtaTa* 
/cat tov ttoiov €KaaTOV elvai to>v e£et ovvexopiivojv 
airios o crvveyutv arjp eoTiv, ov OKkqpoTTjTa jxev 

iv aihfjptp TTVKVOTTjTa S' iv XtOtp AtVKOTTjTa 12 S' iv 

1 afiap€S elvai (fyqoi tlr avcofepts -B. 

2 rovro -n. 

3 tov /xev . . . irpoav€fiofjL€vou -omitted by X, g. 

4 en tov -Sandbach (Class. Quart., xxxiv [1910], p. 21, 
n. 3) ; ^ tov -F J (^ erased -F 2 ), X, g, B ; tov -all other mss. 

5 efvat -omitted by g. 

6 avro) -E. 

7 TTCOt -g. 

8 Tai> (at end of line) £eis -g. 

9 depos -E. 

10 o avvi\oiv clitlos -g. 

11 ov -F, X, g, B ; os -a corr - and all other mss. 

12 OKArjpoTdTOV . . . 7n>Kv6VaTOv . . . Aeu/coraTov -g. 

i, frag. 99 (especially pp. 97, 81-28, 1) dpapis and not kov^ov 
is used is made much of by Sambursky (Physics of the 
Stoics, pp. 6-7 and 111), who insists that the Stoics really 


less, has an upward tendency and that the case of air 
is much the same as this, since water is more closely 
associated with earth and air with fire ; but in the 
Arts of Physics he leans to the other opinion, 
assuming that of itself air has neither weight nor 

43. Moreover, he states b that air is naturally 
murky ; and this he uses as an argument for its 
being primarily cold also, saying that its murkiness is 
opposed to the brilliance and its coldness to the heat 
of fire. This argument he advances in the first book 
of the Physical Questions, but in the books on 
Habitudes again he says c that habitudes are nothing 
but quantities of air : " For it is these that produce 
the cohesion in bodies ; and each of the things that 
habitude makes cohesive owes its particular quality 
to the cohibiting air, which in iron is called hardness, 
in stone solidity, and in silver whiteness." d These 

regarded fire and air as " gravitationally neutral " ; but cf 
S.V.F. ii, frags. 473 (p. 155, 32-36), 555 (p. 175, 19-22 and 
31-35), and 571, where these elements are explicitly called 
Kov<l>a. On the other hand, according to the Stoics the 
primary natural motion of all bodies is to the centre of the 
universe (1055 a infra= S. V.F. ii, p. 173, 31-33 ; cf. S. V.F. 
i, p. 27, 25-29), and so all could be said to have weight (cf. 
the doubtful text in 8. V.F. ii, p. 115, 39-40 ; Pohlenz, Stoa, 
i, p. 76). 

a S.V.F. ii, frag. 435; cf. Pseudo-Galen on Stoic matter, 
S. V.F. ii, frag. 327. 

b S.V.F. ii, frag. 429 (p. 140, 35-39); cf. ibid., pp. 140, 
40-141, 4 and frag. 430 ( = De Primo Frigido 952 c-d and 
948 d— 949 b) and also 8. V.F. ii, p. 143, 14-17, p. 178, 6-10, 
and p. 180, 8-9 ; O. Gilbert, Die meteorologischen Theorien 
des griechischen Altertums (Leipzig, 1907), pp. 243-244. 

c S. V.F. ii, frag. 449 (p. 147, 38-43). 

d On this passage and what follows cf. P. Duhem, Le 
Systeme du Monde i, pp. 302-308 and Sambursky, Physic* 



1054 dpyvpco /caAot/at," 1 ttoAAtjv aTorriav /cat \iayy)v rov- 

TOJV ixoVTOJV €L fJL€V ydp LL£V€l 07TOtdV €GTL cf>VGei, 
77X0? TO (JLcAcLV €V Tip (17) AeVKO) AeVKOTTjS yiyvGTai 

/cat to fiaAdaKov 3 iv to) lltj GKArjpcp 4 OKArjpoTrjs 


fAiyvvpLevos iv tovtois i^iararai /cat ovvofioiovTai, 
irtos e£ts iarlv rj 7 Svvapus fj atria tovtojv ixfS tov 
Kpareirai ; 7Taa^ovro? yap ioriv, ov &pajVTos } ov8e 
owexovTOS dAA' i^aaOevovvrog rj roiavrrj fiera^oArj 
kclO* fjv arroAXvoi rds olvtov noioTrjTas. Kairoi 


VTTOKeZauai rats* ttoiottjgiv a7rocj>aivovai tols 8e noi- 

r) ' f >/ 9 \ / 5 ' £ ? 10 


dv iyyivajvrai Liepecri rr\s vAtjs elhoiroitlv e/caora 
/cat ax^fiCLTi^eiv. ravra S' 11 ovk eveari Aeyeiv av- 
tois, rov depa <j>vaei toiovtov viroTidtLLevois' e£is 
yap tov /cat rovos avrtp ovve^oLLOiojoei rtov oco\xd- 
tojv eKaoTov, c5ctt€ jiiAav 12 elvai /cat piaAdaKov el 
Se rfj Trpos €K€iva Kpdaei tcls ivavrias AapifidveL 

LLOp<f>CLS at? 13 £X €iV 7T€(f)VK€V s vAt) TpOTTOV TtVCX TTJS 

vArjs ovk airiov ovSe Svvafits itJTiv. 

1 KaAouai -omitted by E (dpyvptp . . • vac. l£ lines . . . 

2 ottoIos -X 3 , g, B ; orrolos t -all other mss. ; ottolos y 
-Reiske. 3 tw fiaXOaKco -F l , X 1 . 4 gkXtjpov -y. 

6 tw -X 3 (added superscript), g, B, n : omitted by all 
other .-mss. 6 ^avco -g. 7 r) -g : kclI -E. 

8 apyr)v ko.1 aKLvqrov ££ iavrrjs -E. 

9 ovoas -X 3 (as over erasure), g, B ; ovs oe -all other .mss. 

10 otos -X 1 (erasure left vacant between ol and s -X 3 ). 

11 8' -X, g, B ; omitted by all other mss. 

12 fxeXav -X, g, B ; p.d\a -all other mss. 

13 Sis -X 3 , g, B. 

o/ M^? Stoics, pp. 1-11. Bodies that are cohesive units 


assertions are full of absurdity and inconsistency, for, 
if air remains such as it naturally is, how does what 
is dark become whiteness in what is not white and 
what is soft become hardness in what is not hard and 
what is subtile become solidity in what is not solid ? 
If, on the other hand, by being mixed in these things, 
it alters its character and conforms to them, how is it 
a habitude or a power a or a cause of the things that 
dominate it ? Change of a kind that makes anything 
lose its own qualities is characteristic of a patient, not 
of an agent, and not of something that cohibits but 
of something too feeble for resistance. Yet every- 
where they declare b that matter is of itself the inert 
and immobile substrate of qualities and that qualities, 
being vital spirits or aeriform tensions, give character 
and shape to the various parts of matter in which 
they come to be. To say this, however, is not 
possible for them, supposing air to be naturally the 
kind of thing they do, for as a habitude and tension 
it would make every several body conform entirely 
to itself so as to be dark and soft ; but, if by blending 
with them it acquires characteristics contrary to 
those which it naturally has, it is in a way the 
matter's matter and not cause or power. 

(^vto/xeva) and not mere aggregates of discrete units (StearcoTa) 
or combinations of separate but contiguous units (owrj^i- 
ficva) are each held together by the tension of the weCpa 
which by pervading them constitutes the peculiar, homo- 
geneous character of each, the If is- being thus at once the 
bond " and the " state " of the cohesive body. Cf. S. V.F. 
ii, frags. 368, 391, 458, 473, 474, 716, 989, 1013, and 1132 ; 
Rieth, Grundbegriffe, pp. 125-126, 130, and 171-172 ; Poh- 
lenz, Stoa i, p. 83 and ii, p. 49. 

a Cf. De Comm. Not. 1085 c-n (S. V.F. ii, p. 146, 33-34) ; 
S.V.F. ii, p. 113, 1-7 ; p. 308, 17-18 and 38-42. 

b S. V.F. ii, frag. 449 (pp. 147, 44-148, 2). 



(1054) 44. "On tov Koafjiov Kevov cktos airetpov eon 
to S' direipov ovr apxy v °vre fxecrov oiire TeXev- 


fidXtara ttjv Xeyofievqv vtt 'Qttikovpov rfjs ard- 

C fjbov k(itu) cf)opav ££ avTrjS avaipovoiv, ovk ovorjg 

ev aTreipco §ia<f>op&s /<a0' tjv to p,ev dvoj to 8e 

KOLTtxi voevrai ycyvofievov. aAA' ev ye tco T€T<xpTto 

7T€pl Avi'CLTCJV fieOOV TWO. T07T0V KCLl fl€G7)V yOjpCLV 
V7TO0€fl€VOS eVTOLvOd <f>7)CriV ISpVCrOai* TOV KOOflOV 

eoTi be rj A€£i9 avTT)- bio /cat ern tov Koofxov ei 
prjTeov <j>6apTov elvac clvtov 5 Xoyov oiojitat 6 helo6ai. 
ov fJLrjv dXXd jjl&XXov 7 ifjLol (^cuVctcu ovtojs e\eiv 
[olovel S'] els ttjv olovel 6 d<f)6apalav rroXv ti avTco 
avvepyel /ecu rj tt}$ ^cu/oas* KaTdXrjifjts, olov 8id to 
ev fxecra) elvai, eirel, el dXXa\rj vor)9elr) ojv, koll 
rravTeXtos av avTcp ovvdnTOi rj <j)6opd." kcu /xera 
D jiiKpov avdis* " ovtcx) yap ttojs kcll rj ovaia ovvTe- 

1 reXevr-qv -X 3 , g, B ; reXevralov -all other mss. 

2 rovrio -X, g, E ; rovrwv -B ; rovro -all other mss. 

3 IhpvoaoBai -A, /?, y, n. 

4 el -F| X, g, B ; omitted by all other mss. 

6 X, g, B ; avrov <f>6apTov elvai -all other mss. 

6 otofiai -\ 9 g, B ; olofievov -all other mss. 

7 dXXa Kal fidXXov -g (not X or X 3 , pace Pohlenz). 

8 els oe rrjv olovel -NYyttenbach (cf. Be Defect u Orar. 425 
d-e) ; olovel S' els ttjv uicnrep -MS*. ; oXa re 6' els rrjv cjorrep 
(with ovvepyelv for avvepyel) -Pohlenz after Keiske [ookcI S* 
. . . ovvepyelv). 

a S. V.F. ii, frag. 539. Of. 8. V.F. ii, frags. 524,, 535, 543, 
552, 554 and i, frags. 94-96. 

b Of. Be Befectu Orac. 425 d and Adv. Colotem 1111 u, 
printed with this passage as frag. 299 (I'sener, Epicurea, 
pp. 21^-213). For the downward motion of the atom cf. 
Epicurus, Ej)istle i, 60-61 and frags. 276 and 281. 

c S.V.F. ii, frag. 551 (p. 174, 5-17). Cf. Be Defect* 
Orac. 425 d-v (S. V.F. ii, p. 174, 20-29) and l)e Facie 925 f— 



44. It is frequently asserted by Chrysippus a that 
outside of the universe there is infinite void and that 
what is infinite has no beginning, middle, or end ; 
and this the Stoies use especially to annihilate the 
downward motion which Epicurus says b the atom 
has of itself, their contention being that in an infinite 
there is no difference by which to distinguish one 
part as being up and the other as down. In the 
fourth book on Possibilities, 6 however, he assumes 
that there is some middle place and midmost space d 
and says that here the universe is situated. These 
are his words : " Consequently, even in the case of 
the universe the question whether it should be said 
to be subject to destruction requires deliberation, I 
think. All the same, to me the case seems rather to 
be as follows : to its virtual indestructibility a good 
deal is contributed even by the position that it has 
occupied in space, that is to say through its being in 
the middle, since, if it should be imagined to be else- 
where, destruction would most certainly attach to it." 
And again after a bit : " For it has also in some such 

926 a (with my notes in L.G.L. xii, pp. 76-77). In what 
follows here concerning the middle of the infinite void 
Plutarch has been charged with obvious misinterpretation 
both by Pohlenz (Stoa i, p. 77) and by Sambursky (Physics 
of the Stoics , p. 1 12) ; but see rather the treatments of the 
question by Brehier (Theorie des Incorporels, pp. 44-51) and 
by Goldschmidt (Le systeme sto'icien, pp. 29-30 and p. 43). 
According to the latter Chrysippus meant that the position 
of the universe determines the centre of the void ; but, if so, 
how could he have thought that the position occupied by the 
universe makes any difference to its indestructibility ? 

d For the Stoic distinction of place (tottos) and space 
(x<l)pa) and void (kcvov) cf. S. V.F. i, frag. 95 and ii, frags. 
503, 504, 505, 1141 ; see Brehier, Theorie des Incorporels, 
pp. 52-53 and Goldschmidt, Le systeme sto'icien, pp. 26-28. 



(1054) revx^v aiSlcos tov jieaov KaretXr](f)vla tottov, €v9v$ 
roidSe tis ovaa, toore Kad' erepov rporrov dAAd Kal 
Std ttjv ovvTvylav jiff] CTTihex^adai avrrjv <f>dopdv 
(kclV) /car avTO tovt 1 etvou aioiov" ravra [liav 
jjlcv exec KCLTacfxxvf} Kal ^X€7TOfjL€vr]v ivavTia)o~iv, 2 iv 
aneipco fxeaov tlvcl tottov Kal fieorjv ^copav a7roAet- 
7tovto5, oevTtpav S' aSrjXoTepav pukv dAoycorepav Se 
TavTiqs. olopicvos yap ovk av a<f>9apTov Sta/jLtveiv 


gvvt€T€VX€ ycviaOai ttjv Ihpvoiv, SrjXos ioTt SeStcus* 
fjLrj 3 Ttbv pcepajv Trjs ovolas iirl to fxiaov <f)€pop,€va)v, 
E SidXvorts Kal cf>8opa tov Koafxov yivoiTo. razrra §' 
ovk av icfrofieiTo, jj/rj <j>voei tcl crco/xara tfrepeadat, 
navTaxoOzv Zttl to puiaov r)yovpL€vos ov Trjs ovaias 
dAAd ttjs mepiexovorjs ttjv oucrtav 4 ^c6pa?. Trepl ov 
Kal ttoXAolkis €ipr]K€v a>9 ahvvaTOV Kal napa (f)vacv 
ovtos' ov yap vrrapx^v iv Ttb Kevtb 8ia<f>opav b fj G 
tcl orwfxaTa Bevpl jjlolXXov r) Sevpl TrpoadyeTat, ttjv 
8e tov Koafxov 7 avvTa^tv air lav eivai ttjs* Kivqaecos 
irrl to KevTpov Kal to fieoov avTOV vevovTOJV Kal 
(frepojAevajv (jrdvTOJv Ttbv /xepaw) 9 TravTaxodev . dp- 
k€l S' els tovto 10 TrapadiaOai Xi£iv Ik tov 11 SevTepov 

1 <kol> -added by Reiske ; kclt avro tovt -X 3 , B ; Kar 
avrov r -F 1 , X 1 ; Kal tovt' avro -g ; Kara tovt' -F 2 and all 
other mss. 

2 evavTicos -F 1 , X 1 . 

3 vol? -g. 

4 alrlav -j9. 

6 Sta<t>9opav -F 1 . 

6 g -X 3 , g ; rj -F\ XH?), a 1 , n ; ? -F 2 , a 2 , A, 0, y , E, B. 


8 Trjs -omitted by g. 

9 <. . .> -suggested by Pohlenz (cf. 1055 a infra and 8, V.F. 

i, p. 27, 27-2$). 

10 rod -F, a, A 1 . 


way been an accident of substance, from the very 
fact that it is the kind of thing it is, to have occupied 
everlastingly the middle place, so that otherwise but 
also accidentally it does not admit of destruction 
<(and) in this very way is everlasting." There is in 
these statements one discrepancy which is manifest 
and glaring, the admission of some middle place and 
midmost space in an infinite ; but there is a second, 
which, while less evident, is more irrational than this, 
for in thinking that the universe could not be remain- 
ing indestructible if by accident it has got situated 
in another part of the void he is evidently afraid b 
lest the universe be dissolved and destroyed because 
the parts of substance move towards the middle. 
This he would not fear, however, did he not hold 
that bodies naturally move from all points towards 
the middle — the middle not of substance but of 
space that encompasses substance. Yet of this he 
has very frequently said c that it is impossible and 
contrary to nature because in the void there exists 
no difference by which bodies are drawn in one 
direction rather than another but the structure of 
the universe is responsible for the motion <of all the 
parts) moving from all points and tending towards 
its centre or middle. For this it is sufficient to give a 
quotation from the second book concerning Motion, 

The central position, while sufficient to make substance 
everlasting, is only incidental to substance, which in its 
essential nature also — and so Kad' Zrepov rponov — is ever- 
lasting (cf. S. V.F. i, frag. 87 ; ii, frags. 317 and 599). 

b StjAos- core . . . y€voLTo = S.V.F. ii, frag. 551 (p. 174, 

c 8. V.F. ii, frag. 550 (p. 173, 15-33). 

11 rov -over erasure in X ; omitted by g ; 8e rod -F 1 (8e 
erased -F 2 ). 



(1054) TTepl Kivrjoeu)$. virenrajv yap ore reXeov piev 6 
F KoofAos aoo/xa iorw ov reXea 8e ra tou Kooptov 

jJL€pV) TO) 1 TTpOS TO 0X0V 7TOJ9 eX 6 "' 2 KCLL I 17 ) KCL ^ 

avrd etvai Kai irepl rr)s KLvrjcrccus avrov SieAflojy 


Kivelodai hid ra>v pieptbv ttolvtcov rre^VKoros, ovk 

€7rl Tr)V SldXvOlV Kai rTjV dpVlfjlV, TOUT €7Teip7]KeV 3 ' 
" OVTix) §€ To{» 4 6X0V TCLVOjJLeVOV 5 6tV TOLVTO KCLt* 

Kivovpievov Kai revv pLopiwv 1 ravrrjv rrjv Kivrjoiv 
1055 exovrojv e/c rrjs rov oojpiaros <f>vaetos t mdavdv iraoi 
rols aojpiaoiv ecvac rrjv 7rpu)T7]v Kara <j>voiv Kivrjaiv 
TTpos to rod Koafiov pieoov, rw piev Koopao ovrojcrl 
KivovpJvw 8 rrpos avrov rots Se piepeoiv oj? av pie- 
peoiv ovoiv." elra, (j>7]oai rig av, & avdpajTre, ri 
iradcbv erreXddov rd>v Xoywv rovrojv, a>ore rov koo- 
piov, el firj rrjv pieorjv x < ^ ) P av * K tvxtjs KareiXijcfrei, 9 
SiaXvrov Kai (f)6apr6v drro(f>aiveiv ; el ydp avros ye 
veveiv ein ro avrov pieoov aet TrecpvKe Kai ra pieprj 
TTpos rovro Karareiveiv 7ravraxd6ev y ottol 11 nor av 
rov Kevov 12 fieraredfj, owe'xojv eavrov ovrws Kai 
B TreptoreXXojv, d(f>6apros Kai dOpvrrrog Siapievei 13 * rd 
yap dpvrrropieva Kai oKehavvvpieva rovro 7raa^6t 

1 to -a, A, j3, y, n. 

2 3ga-F, X 1 , a, A 1 . 

3 eVetpry/cev -X, g, B ; etprjKev -all other mss. 

4 tou -omitted by g. 

5 ytvofxevov -g ; omitted by B. 
elaavro (ctV auro -X 3 ) kol -X ; els iavro Kai -g ; omitted by 


TOV jJLOptOV -F 1 , X 1 . 

KLVovfiivov -F, X 1 (?), a, A 1 . 
tear (illegible erasure of 3 spaces) AtJ^ci -X 1 . 
avrov -F, X, g, B ; avro -all other MSS. 
6irt) -g. 

TOV K€LVOV -F 1 , X*(?) ; €K€lVOS "X 3 , g. 



for after remarking that the universe is a perfect 
body whereas the parts of the universe are not 
perfect, since their existence is not independent but 
is their particular relation to the whole, and after 
explaining its motion as that of something which by 
means of all its parts is naturally moving towards its 
own continuance and cohesion, not its dissolution and 
dispersion, he has added this statement : " Since the 
tension and motion of the whole have thus a single 
direction and its parts have this motion as a result 
of the nature of body, it is plausible that motion 
towards the middle of the universe is the primary 
natural motion for all bodies, 6 for the universe, which 
thus is in motion towards itself, and for its parts, 
inasmuch as they are parts." Why then, sir, one 
might say, what made you so far forget these argu- 
ments as to declare the universe subject to dissolution 
and destruction if it had not by chance occupied the 
midmost space ? If, in fact, it is always natural for it 
to tend itself towards its own middle and for its parts 
to strive towards this from all points, then by cohibit- 
ing and compressing itself in this way it will remain 
indestructible and undispersible in any part of the 
void to which it may be transferred, for what 
happens to things that are dispersed and dissipated 

a See Rieth, Grundbogriffe, p. 87 (but the passage of 
Cleomedes cited ibid., p. 84, n. 3 is neither parallel nor 
relevant) ; and for Stoic formulation of the relation of part 
to whole cf. Sextus, Adv. Math, ix, 336 and xi, 24. 

6 Cf. on 1053 e supra page 575, note d sub fin. 

e Cf. Plutarch's argument in I)e Facie 924 d-f with my 
notes ad loc. in L.C.L. xii, pp. 68-71 and especially p. 68, 
note c. 

13 Sutyievet -Heiske (implied in the versions of Amyot and 
Xylander) ; Sia/i€vei -mss. 



(1055) ScaKpcaet rajv pLtpojv it<d<jTov kcli btaXvoec rrpos 
rov oIk€lov tottov £k rov napd cjyuoiv drroppeovros . 
ov o , €i kclt aAAo rov kzvov reveirj o kogjjlo^ 
olofxevos ovtoj TravrcXel avvdrrrecrdai (f)6opa* Kal 
Xeyojv ovrtos kcli oid rovro [xdcrov ev rco firjSev 
€X € w tt^vkotl pbeaov* ^rjrcZv aTT6Lpco s b ras (xev 
rdcreis kolI ovvoxds* Kal vevoeis €K€iva$ d>$ ovSev 
ix^yyvov els aojrrjpiav ixovoas dtfrrJKas rfj 8e kcltcl- 
Xrjifjci rod ronov rrjv ovjjLTraoav alriav rfjs Sea- 
jjiovfjs 7 aveOrjKas. Kairoi rols TrpoeLprjfxevois ravrl 
ovvdirreis, coorrep avros iavrov 6 i£eXey £ai <f>iXo- 
ripLovpLtvos* i( ov rporrov 8e 9 Ktvctrat €Kaorov rcov 
C fioptojv ovfX(j)V€g ov rco Xolttco, eiiXoyov ovrcos kcu 10 
Koff avro KLvecadaLy Kal el Xoyov X^P lv vor\uai\itv 
avro Kal viroOolpLeda 11 elvat iv K€va> rivi rov koo- 
fjiov rovrov cog yap av ovvexofxevov irdvroOev e/a- 
vetro irrl ro pioov, fJL€V€i 12 iv rfj Kivrjoei ravrrj, kov 
Xoyov X^-P LV €^ai(f>vr)s rrepl avro lz yevqrat K€v6v." 
eira fxipos p,ev 6riovv li vtto kzvov TTzpiXrjcfrOev ovk 
drrofidXXei rrjv irrl ro 15 rov koct/xou p,€oov 16 dyovoav 
pOTrrjV, avro? Si o 17 Koofiog, av p/r] rrjv fieorjv 1 * 

1 av 8' a -Basil. ; 6'5' et -F, n ; 6 8t) -X 3 (r) over erasure), 
B ; o St) -g ; o'8' el -all other mss. 

2 reOelrj 6 Koafxos -F 2 , a, A, j3, y, n, K ; redev 6 Koofios -l ,n » 
X 1 ; redevra rov koo\lov -X 3 , pf, B. 

3 navreXel o. (f>6opa -X 3 , g, B ; TravreXrj a. (j>9opav -all other 


4 fieaov . . . atreipip -omitted by E (tt^vkoti . . . vac. J line 
. . . ras)' 

5 tjqrGjv arrelpu) -Diibner {a-neipep -Meziriac) ; rfj (rt -B, 
rijs -Tolet. 51,5) rcov aireip<x)v -mss. 

6 Kal ras ovvo\as ~g> 

7 hiafiovfjs -X, g, B ; hiavop,'fjs -all other mss. 

8 oeavrov -B. 9 ov be rpoirov -B. 

10 Kal -omitted by B. u 7Tv9oip,e0a -g ; VTroOeiiieOa -B. 



is the separation and dissolution of their parts, each 
of which glides away towards its proper place from 
that which is unnatural to it. But you, in thinking 
that for the universe to be put anywhere else in the 
void is tantamount to its being involved in utter 
destruction and in asserting this a and for this reason 
seeking out a middle in the infinite, which by its 
nature has no middle, you abandoned, as affording no 
assurance of preservation, those " tensions " and 
" cohesions " and " tendencies " of yours and at- 
tributed the entire cause of its persisting to its 
having occupied the place it has. Yet to the afore- 
said you subjoin the following 6 like a man ambitious 
to refute himself : It is reasonable that the way in 
which each of the parts moves when cohering with 
the rest is also the way in which it moves by itself, 
even if for the sake of argument we should in imagina- 
tion suppose it to be in a void within this universe, for 
as it would be moving to the middle when cohibited 
from all sides so will it continue in this motion even 
if for the sake of argument all about it suddenly 
comes to be void.' , Then in that case, while no part 
whatever, though encompassed by void, loses the 
inclination that draws it to the middle of the universe, 
yet the universe itself, unless accident provide it with 

° Cf. 1054 c supra. 
6 S. V.F. ii, frag. 550 (pp. 178, 34-174, 4). 

12 fjLcvel -Pohlenz (" il demourera " -Amyot) ; fievet -mss. 

13 avro -X, g, B ; avrov -all other mss. 

14 on ov vvv -F 1 , X 1 ; onovv vvv -X 3 , g. 
15 to -X 3 , g, B ; omitted by all other mss. 

16 fieoov -l\ X, g, B ; piaov -a ; fxeorju -all other mss. 

17 o -omitted by a. 

18 to fjieoov -n. 



(1055) irapaoKevdor) ^copav ai5ra> to auro/xarov, diroXel 
tov avv€KTiKov rovoVy d'XAois aAAa^ocre rrjs ouata? 
avrov fiepeai fapofievois. 1 

45. Kat 2 ravra ficv eyei jieydXas vrrevavTitooeis 
D TTpos tov (f>vaiKov Xoyov, eKelvo S' 7]8r) /cat rrpos 


aiTLtov* rovrois avaridevra to Kvpuorarov dthai- 
peloOai /cat jieyiGTOV. ri yap eon KvpitoTepov rrjs 


vrjv toIs [xepeai aw4x €a ^ at ^pos dVTrjv; aAAa tovto 
ye crvjjLTr€7TT<jJKev avTopLaTcos Kara 5 XpvoLTnrov. el 
yap rj tov tottov KaTaXrji/jis atVta Trjs a<f)6apaias 
iaTiv avTf\ 8e awrv^ia yeyove, 8rjXov otl ovvtv- 
Xtas* epyov r) atOTrjpla tcov SXcov cotiv* ovx el- 
fxappLevrjs Kai irpovoias. 

46. e O 8e tcov SvvaTtov Xoyos npos tov tt)s el- 
fjLapfJbevrjs Xoyov avTco ttcos ov fJLaxdfJLevos 7 eoTiv; 

E et 8 yap ovk eoTi 8vvaTov orrep rj Iotiv d\r)8es r) 

1 <f>aiwiJ.€voi$ -F J ; <t>aivofjL€vr)s -X 3 (rj over erasure and 
erasure before <£), g ; <f>€pofi€vois -F 2 and all other mss. 

2 et* -F\ X, g. 

3 alriojv -X 3 , g ; alrt&v -all other mss. 

4 Kai rov -B ; /cat (tov omitted) -g ; /cat to -all other mss. ; 
rj to -Basil. 


6 l} TO)V SXoJV eOTL OCJTTjpla ~g ; TCtJV oAcOV Tj OOiTTjpia €OTLV "B. 

7 fjLaxofji€vos -F, X, g, B ; fxaxofievov -all other mss. 

8 et yap . . . hwarov Iotiv -omitted by g. 

° Not that this was his intention but that it is implied by 
his expressions quoted in 1054 on supra (cf. Giesen, De 
Plutarchi . . . Disputationibus, p. 54). 

6 S. V.F. ii, frag. 202 and Doring, Megariker % frag. 134 ; 
cf. A. A. Long, Archiv fur Geschkhte tier Philosophic, lii 
(1970), p. 247, n. 3. 

c With this Diodorus, nicknamed " Cronus/' son of 



the midmost space, will lose its cohibiting tension 
with the various parts of its substance all moving in 
different directions. 

45. Moreover, while his physical theory is involved 
in serious contradictions by these statements, his 
theory of god and providence too was already so 
involved by that in which he attributes to them the 
most trivial of causes and takes from them the 
greatest and most important. For what is more 
important than that the universe persist and that its 
substance by unification with its parts be cohesive 
with itself? Yet according to Chrysippus this has 
happened accidentally, for, if its having occupied the 
place it has is responsible for its indestructibility and 
that has come about by accident, the preservation of 
the universe as a whole is obviously the work of 
accident, not of destiny and providence. 

46. And how does his theory of possibilities b not 
conflict with his theory of destiny ? For, if " pos- 
sible " is not defined in the manner of Diodorus c as 

Ameinias of Iasus and pupil of Apollonius of the school of 
Eubulides, Zeno, the founder of Stoicism, is said to have 
studied dialectic {cf. P. Natorp, R.-E. v [1903], cols. 705, 
29-707, 5 and K. von Fritz, R.-E. Supplement v [1931], cols. 
719, 19-721, 25 and 723, 54^724, 25). For the definition of 
" possible " formulated by Diodorus, in support of which 
he is said to have constructed the argument called 6 Kvpicvtov 
(see note e on De Comm. Not. 1070 d infra), and for the 
rejection of it by Chrysippus cf. Cicero, De Fato 12-20 
{S. V.F. ii, frag. 954) ; Epictetus, Diss, n, xix, 1-9 (8. V.F. 
ii, frag. 283) ; Alexander, Anal. Prior., pp. 183, 34-184, 6 ; 
Boethius, In Librum Aristotelis irepl epfir^vcias Secundae 
Editionis iii, 9 (pp. 234, 22-236, 4 [Meiser]) ; Mates, Stoic 
Logic, pp. 36-41 ; Sambursky, Physics of the Stoics, pp. 73- 
79 ; Win. and Martha Knenle, The Development of Logic 
(Oxford, 1962), pp. 117-128; M. Frede, Die stoische Logik 
(Gottingen, 1974), pp. 110-117. 



(1055) earat Kara AioStopov, aAAa, 7rav to emheKTixov 1 
rov yeveadai, kov firj pLeAAr) yevrjaeodai, Svvarov 
ioTLV, carat Svvara 7toXXol tcov per) kclO* elfjLapfie- 


TrepiyevTjTiKrjv drrdvTtov rj elpLapp,evrf SvvajjLLV olttoA- 
Xvoiv rj* TavTTjs olav h d^iol Xpyocrnros ovorjs to 
€7tl§€ktlk6v tov yeveoOai 7ToAAa,KLS els to aSvvaTov 

ifJL7T€O€LT0U. KCLt TTOiV fJL€V dArjOeS dvayKOLOV €GTOLl, 
TTJ KVptCOTOLTr) 7T0LOWV dvdyKTj KaTetArjjJijjieVOV 3 7T&V 

Se ifjevSos clSvvcltov, T7]v \ieyioTrp> eyov alriav 
dvTiTTiTTTOvoav avTco rrpos to dAr]8es yeveodai. to 
yap ev OaAaTTT] Trenpojiievov eaTiv drroOaveiv rrcos 6 

F 0I0V T€ TOVTOV eTTlheKTIKOV €tVat TOV £v yfj (1770- 

Oavelv, tl Se 7 tov Meyapoi Svvarov ioTiv eAOelv els 
'AOrjvas vtto ttjs eljjio,pixevr)s KcoAvofievov ; 

47. 'AAAa fjirjv kgll ra 8 rrepl tcov (jjavTaaccov 
AeyojJLeva veaviKCos rrpos ttjv elfiapjJLevrjv evavTiov- 
rat. ttjv yap cjyavTaoiav fiovXofievos ovk ovoav av- 

1 cTTibeKTiKov -X 3 (ti/c >x over erasure), B, E ; emSe/crov -all 
other mss. 

2 <akrr' r) tt)v> -added by Pohlenz ; <rj dpa ttjv> -von 
Arnim (S. V.F. ii, p. 64, 44), who conjectured a lacuna here. 

3 7) €LfJLapfi€vr) -Reiske ; r) €.[\Lap\xiv\-]V -mss. 

4 of -g. 

5 otav -B ; otov -all other mss. (added superscript -g). 

6 TTOOS o.v -g. 

7 Se -omitted by g. 

8 ra -omitted by X 1 . 

a Cf. 8.V.F. ii, frags. 201 (p. 64, 17-18 and 21-29) and 
959 (p. 279, 15-18) ; and see the " stricter definition " of 
to Svvarov in [Plutarch], De Fato 571 a sub ftnem. On the 
circularity of the Stoic definition see Wm. and Martha 
Kneale, op. cit. (see preceding note), p. 125. 

b Whereas according to Chrvsippus what is true may not 
be necessary (cf. S. V.F. ii. p. 64, 22-2S and p. 279, 81-33). 



that which either is or will be true but if everything 
is possible that is susceptible of coming about, even 
if it is not going to come about, a many of the tilings 
that are not in accordance with destiny will be 
possible. {Consequently, either) destiny loses her 
invincible and ineluctable and all-prevailing force ; 
or, if she is what Chrysippus maintains, that which is 
susceptible of coming about will often fall into the 
category of the impossible, and everything true will 
be necessary, b being constrained by the most 
sovereign necessity of all, c and everything false 
impossible, since the mightiest cause is adverse to its 
becoming true. For how can he whose death at sea 
has been determined by destiny be susceptible of 
dying on land, and why is it possible for the man at 
Megara to go to Athens when he is prevented by 
destiny from doing so ? d 

47. But furthermore what he says about mental 
images is in violent contradiction to the doctrine of 
destiny/ For in his desire to prove that the mental 

c i.e. destiny. Cf. the thesis of Chrysippus, to navd* vtto 
ttjs dvdyKrjS Kai rrjs €lfxapp,evi}S KaT€i\fj(j>Qai (S. V.F. ii, p. 266, 
36-37) and the expression of Plotirms, elfiapixevrjv ravr-qv Kai 
KvpicoTaTrjv alrlav d€fX€voi (S. V.F. ii, p. 273, 37). 

d The same two examples occur in the Stoic reply to 
Diodorus as given by Boethius, In Librum Aristotelis TTtpl 
£pfj.r)V€ias Secundae Editionis iii, 9 (p. 235, 6-26 [Meiser]). 

* In order to reconcile the Stoic doctrine of destiny as a 
universally coherent causal nexus and that of individual 
human responsibility involving a voluntary choice of action 
Chrysippus denied that in human beings the cause of re- 
action to a mental image is the image itself. The images 
presented to the mind, being fully determined and so links 
in the causal chain of destiny, are a necessary precondition 
of action ; but. action or impulsion follows only upon the 
mind's assent to the image presented, and the mind is free 
to give or to withhold this assent which is of itself the 



(1055) roreXrj rrjs ovyKaraOeoeojs 1 alriav 2 arroheiKvvciv, 
elprjKev on fiXdifjovotv ol oo<f)ol iftevSels (j>avraolas 
ijj/TToiovvres, av at <f>avraolai rroioioiv auToreAcos 3 
ras ovyKaradeoecs' iroXXaKis yap ol aocfyol ifjevSei 
1056 xpojVTCu irpos rovs (f)av\ovs /cat <f>avraoiav rrapi- 
ordoi A mdavrjv, ov firjv alriav rrjs ovyKaraOeoeojs , 
€7T€t Kai rrjs vrToXrjifjeoJS atrta rrjs ifsevSovs carat 5 
/cat rrjs drrdrrjs. ravr ovv av rtc drro rod oo(f>ov 
fi€racf>4pa)V irrl rrjv elfiapfievrjv Xeyrj* fir) Sid rrjv 
elfiapfiivrjv yiyveoOai rds ovyKaradeoets, errel hid 
rrjv elfiapfievrjv eoovrai /cat ifjevBets ovyKarade- 
oeis 7 /cat V7ToXrjifj€is /cat drraTat /cat fSXafirjoovrai 
Std rrjv elfiapfievijv, 6 rov fiXdrrrziv rdv oocf)6v 
e^aipovfievos Xoyos dfia /cat ro fir) rrdvrojv alriav 
etvav rrjv elfiappievrjv drrobeiKWoiv. 8 el yap 9 prjre 
8o£d£ovoL firjre fiXdrrrovrai Sid rrjv elfiappievrjv, 
B SrjXov on ov$e Karop8ovcnv 10 ov8e cfrpovovoiv ov8e 
viroXafifidvovoi j3ej3ata>9 ov8' oj(j>eXovvrai Sta rrjv 

1 auy KaAeaetos -n. 

2 alriav -omitted by B. 

3 7tv . . . vac. 8 (at end of line) . . . airroTeAeis -g. 

4 TTaptoTcoaL -E, Vat. Reg. 80. 

5 ift . . . vac. 3. . . carat -g. 
8 Acyct -F 1 ; Aeyot -E, B. 

7 €7T€i . . . i/f€uo€t5 auyxarafleaas -omitted by g : in Vat. 
Reg. 80 misplaced after ttoiwoiv avroreXws in 1055 f supra. 

8 d7To8et*vuouaiv -g (oua over erasure). 

9 €i yap -omitted by F 1 and X 1 ; et 8e -X 3 . g, B. 
10 Karopdovvrat -j3. 

sufficient and decisive cause, although whether any individual 
will assent to any image depends upon his own character 
as it has been formed by nature and by education. For a 
summary of this theory <•/. Aulus (lellius, vn, ii, 1-15 (8. V.F. 
ii, frag. 1000) and xix, i, 1.3-30 = Epictetus, frag. 9 (L.C.L. 



image is not of itself a sufficient cause of assent he 
has said a that, if mental images suffice of themselves 
to produce acts of assent, sages will be doing injury 
when they induce false mental images, as in dealing 
with base men sages do often employ falsehood and 
suggest a specious mental image, which is not, how- 
ever, responsible for the assent, since in that case 
it would be responsible also for the false assumption 
and the deception. 6 Then, if one transfers to destiny 
this statement about the sage and says that not 
because of destiny do acts of assent occur, since in 
that case erroneous assents and assumptions and 
deceptions would be due to destiny too and men 
would be injured because of destiny, the argument 
that exempts the sage from doing injury proves at 
the same time that destiny is not cause of all things. 
For, if it is not because of destiny that men get 
fancies and suffer injuries, obviously it is not because 
of destiny either that they perform right actions or 
are sensible or have steadfast conceptions c or are 

ii, pp. 448-452) and see Pohlenz, Stoa i, pp. 104-106 and ii, 
pp. 60-61 ; Pohlenz, Griechische Freiheit (Heidelberg, 1955), 
pp. 135-140; and especially W. Theiler, Phyllobolia fur 
Peter Von der Miihll (Basel, 1946), pp. 61-66 and A. A. 
Long in Problems in Stoicism* pp, 173-199. See also Sam- 
bursky, Physics of the Stoics, pp. 61-65. 

a 8. V.F. ii, frag. 994. 

6 The Stoic sage does no injury and cannot be injured 
(S.V.F. iii, frags. 587 and 588) ; he neither deceives nor is 
deceived (S. V.F. iii, frag. 567 [p. 150, 14]) ; and, though he 
employs falsehood in certain circumstances, he never " is 
false " or " a liar" (S.V.F. ii, frag. 132 [p. 42, 35-39]; 
S. V.F. iii, frags. 554 and 555). 

c Cf. S. V.F. iii, frag. 548 (p. 147, 2-3) : p^Scr vnoXafi- 
fidv€iv (sell, tov oo<j>6v <f>aot) dadevcos aAAu fxdXXov do(f>aAo>s ko\ 
^ejSoutos', Sto koX firjSe Sofafeiy tov oo<f>6v. 



(1056) el^apfxev-qVy dXX o^erai to rravTCov alriav elvai 
tt)v elfjiapiJLevrjV. 1 6 Se Xeycov on Xpvoi7T7ros ovk 
avroreXij tovtcov alriav dAAd TrpoKarapKTtKrjv fxo- 

VOV €TTOL€LTO TT)v €L/JLapfJi€V7]V €K€L TTOlXlV aifTOV 06770" 

Sei^et ixaxojxevov vrpos avrov ottov tov fiev "O/Jirjpov 

V7T€p<f)V(A)S €7TaiV€L 7T€pl TOV AtO£ Ae'yOVTCt 

to/ zytff) orri Key vpLpu KaKov TrepLrrrjoiv €kclotco 

r] dyaOov Kal tov Evpi7Ti8r)v 

c5 "Lev, ri Sjjra tol>? raXaiTrtopovs fiporovs 
(fypovelv Ae'yot/x' dv; 3 gov yap e^pr^/xefla, 
SpcbjjLev T€ to tdS' av ov Tvyxdvrjs* <f>pova>v. 5 

C avros Se 77oAAd tovtois opLoXoyovfieva ypdcfyei, reXos 
Se' 6 (frrjot fJirjSev iox^o-dac fxrjSe Kivelodai /jLrjSe rov- 
Xdxiarov aX\a)s r) Kara, tov tov 7 A109 Xoyov, 
ov rfj el/JLappLevrj tov avrov elvai . en roivvv 6 to 
fiev TrpoKaTapKTiKov 9 ainov doOeveorepov ion tov 
avroreXovs Kal ovk e^iKvelrai Kparovfievov vtt* 
dXXojv ivLCFTafjLevojv, 10 rr)v Se elp J ap[iivr]v alriav dvi- 

1 dAA' o?X€tou, . . . tj\v dfJLapfidvqv -omitted by X and g. 

2 tck -X 3 , g ; omitted by B ; tw (or rcu) -all other mss. 

3 Xiyovoi -Euripides. 

4 roiavd' av ov Tvyxdvrjs -Diogenes Laertius, ix, 71 ; Toiao* 
a ov rvyxo-v€is -MSS. ; roiavO^ av (a -P, corr. p) ov rvyxdvrjs 
-Euripides ; ToiavO* a orj Tvyxdveis -Suidas, ff.w. Jlv ppcovecoi. 

5 6i\u)v -Euripides. 

6 tcAojs yap -X 1 ; re'Aos yap -X 3 , g. 

7 tov -omitted by y, n, Tolet. 51, 5. 

8 tolvvv -omitted by g. 

9 irpoKarapKTiKov -X 3 , g, B, n ; KaTapKTiKov -all other mss. 
10 ei'LOTafxevcov -X, g ; i^avioTafievcov -all other mss. 

° <S T . V.F. ii, frag. 997. 

b Against Schmekel's contention that this formulation 
comes not from Chrysippus himself but from the interpreta- 
tion of his position by Antipater of Tarsus see W. Theiler, 



benefited ; and there is nothing left of the doctrine 
that destiny is cause of all things. One who says 
that for these things Chrysippus considered ° destiny 
to be not a cause sufficient of itself but only a pre- 
disposing cause b will show him to be again at odds 
with himself there where he gives Homer extravagant 
praise for saying of Zeus 

Therefore accept, each and all, whatsoe'er he may send 
you of evil c 

or of good and Euripides for saying 

O Zeus, why should I say that wretched men 
Take thought at all ? For from thee we depend 
And act such deeds as thou may'st chance to thinks 

He writes at length himself in agreement with these 
sentiments and finally says e that nothing at all, not 
even the slightest, stays or moves otherwise than in 
conformity with the reason of Zeus, which is identical 
with destiny/ Furthermore, the predisposing cause 
is feebler than that which is of itself sufficient, and it 
falls short when dominated by others that obstruct it ; 
but Chrysippus himself, declaring destiny to be an 

Phyllobolia fur Peter Von cler Muhll, p. 64, n. 1. On 
avToreX-qs and irpoKarapKriK-q (usually translated " initia- 
tory " or " antecedent ") cf. Cicero, 2)e Fato 41-44. (S. V.F. 
ii, frag. 974) with A. Yon's introduction in his " Bude " 
edition, Traite du Destin, pp. xxvi-xxxii ; Pohlenz, Grund- 
fragen> pp. 104-112; W. Theiler, op. cit., pp. 62-63; and 
A. A. Long, ArchivfiXr Geschichte der Philosophies lii (1970), 
pp. 248-254, 257, and 260-262. 

• Iliad xv, 109 ; cf. S. V.F. ii, frag. 925. 
d Euripides, Supplices 734-736. 

• S. V.F. ii, frag. 937 (pp. 269, 39-270, 2) ; cf. 1050 a-e 
supra and De Comm. Not. 1076 e. For the expression 
tax^oOat Kal Kivtladai see Rieth, Grundbegriffe, pp. 171-172. 

1 Cf. S. V.F. ii, frags. 929 and 931, and see note a on 
1050 b supra. 



(1056) ktjtov Kal aKwAvrov Kal arperrrov 1 drro^alvajv av- 
ros "ArpoTTov KaXel Kal 'ASpdoreiav Kal *AvdyK7)v 
Kal YleTTpaJiJLevrjv ais* Tripas airaoiv liririQ^ioav. 
norepov ovv rds ovyKaradeoeis fxrj Ae'yeo/xey 2 €</>' 
rjiJLLV etvai firjoe ras dperds paf]0€ ras KaKias pLTjok 
D to Karopdovv firjSe ro dfiaprdvetv, t} 3 rrjv eifiap- 
fjLevrjv Aeyoj/xev* iAAeiTrovoav* elvac Kal rrjv Y[e7Tpu)- 
fjbevrjv dnepdrajrov Kal ra? rod Atos" Kivrjoeis Kal 
ax^crecg davvrtAeorovs ; rovrcov ydp eVcrat ra fiev 6 
rep avroreArj ra oe rep irpoKaTapKTiKrjv fiovov 
air Lav elvai rrjv eifiapjjievrjv. avroreXrjs jxev ydp 11 
atria rravrosv ovaa to €<j6' rjpuv Kal ro zkovoiov 
dvaipzl TTpoKarapKTiKT) ok ro olkojAvtos 12 elvai Kal 
reXeoiovpyos diroXAvaiv. ovSe yap aVa^ rj 8ls aAAd 
Travraxov pL&XAov S' iv Trdat rots Qvgikols yeypacfae 

1 arptorov -n. 

2 Aeyco/xev -A, 0, y, n, E, B, Tolet. 51, 5 ; Xeyofiev -all 
other mss. 

3 rj -\ 2 (r) in margin), E ; ct -all other mss. 

4 Ac'yco/xev -E ; XiyoipLtv -X 3 , B ; Xtyofxev -all other mss. 

5 gXXcIttovoiv -g. 

6 ra fxkv yap -F\ X^yap erased -F 2 , X 3 ). 

7 avTOTcA^ -X, a 2 , E 2 , Tolet. 51, 5 ; avroreXuv -Vat. Reg. 
80, Aldine ; avroreXei -all other mss. 

8 ra> -omitted by F, a, A, 0, y, n. 

9 7rp(DTOKaTapKTLK7)V -F, X J (?), a 1 (?). 

10 fjLomjv -g. 

11 ya/> -omitted by F, X, g, a, A 1 . 

12 aKtoAvToy -F, a 1 . 

° For "Arponos etymologized as aTpexrro?, 'ASpaareta as 
aya7ro8pa<7Toy, and Yl€7Tpu>fX€in) as irtpas ZiriTidtZoa or 7rc7r€- 
paofx€vr} cf. Plutarch, frag, xv, 2 (vii, p. 1 12, 3-8 [Bernardakis] 
= frag. 21 [Sandbach] = Stobaeus, £c/. i, 5, 19 [p. 81, 21-26, 
Wachsmuth], where in lines 23-24 read : Kal ti€Trpo)p.4vr)<v> 
Sta rovro . . .) ; [Aristotle], Be Mundo 401 n 8-22 ; Cornutus, 
Theoloyia Graeca 13 (p. 13, 1-17 [Lang]) ; S. V.F. ii, pp. 169, 



invincible and unimpedible and inflexible cause, calls 
her Swerveless and Inescapable and Indomitable and, 
as setting a term for all things, Determination. So 
then, shall we say that we do not have control over 
acts of assent or over virtues or vices or right action 
or wrong-doing ; or shall we say that destiny is 
deficient and Determination is indeterminate and the 
motions and stations of Zeus are frustrate ? b For 
the former is the consequence if destiny is a cause 
sufficient of itself, and the latter if it is only a pre- 
disposing cause, since, if it is of itself sufficient cause 
of all things, it abolishes the sphere of our control and 
volition and, if a predisposing cause, loses the 
character of being unimpedible and fully effective. 
Not once or twice but everywhere, in fact, or rather 
in all his Physical Works he has written c that 

34-35 and 265, 8-22 and 319, 25-26 ; Etymol. Gudianum, cols. 
9, 57-58 and 460, 57-461, 8 (Sturz). The etymology intended 
for y AvdyK7] is uncertain. In the De Mundo (loc. cit.) it 
seems to be derived from oV/c^to?. Cornutus (loc. cit.) 
ofters two etymologies : rjv d£ai . . . ovk Zanv rj ifi rjv nav o 
av yevrjTai ttjv dvaya)yr)v XapLpdvei. In the Etymol. Gudianum 
(p. 129, 17-22 [De Stefani]) there are three : it is connected 
with ayKas and ayKrj, iireihr) to rats dytcdXais Kparovfievov Kara 
SvvafjLLV d<f>vKTOT€pov Kparelrai, it is derived from dxos as that 
against which no remedy can be found, and as the name 
of the goddess it is derived from dvdocrw. For dtcwXvTos as 
descriptive of destiny cf. S.V.F. ii, pp. 296, 15 and 297, 8 
and aKcoXvTCJS in 1050 c-d supra. 

6 As dnepaTcoTov and dovvreXearovs are sarcastic references 
to the use made by Chrysippus of the Homeric tag, Ai6s S' 
ircXeUro fiovXrj (cf. 1050 b supra), and to such formulations 

aS TT]V TL€7TpO)fjL€VT)V 7re7T€pacriX€VT]V TLVa dvai /Cat <JVVT€T€XeOll€VT)V 

hioLKrjaLv (S.V.F. ii, p. 265, 10-11), so is iXXei-novoav to the 
doctrine that destiny is a universal causal nexus eipovaa rds 
indarayv dVcAAtTrcus /cat a8iacn-aTa>s alrias (S. V.F. ii, p. 265, 
5-7 and pp. 272, 38-273, 19). 
' S. V.F. ii, frag. 935. 



(1056) rats' piev Kara ptepos <f>voeoi /cat Kwqoeow 1 evoTrp- 

fiara rroXXd yiyveoOcu /cat KOjXvfjLara rij 8e rwv 

E oXojv pLrj8ev. /cat ttcjs etV ras Kara pepos r) tojv 

oXojv hiareivovaa klvtjols, epLTro8i£,opLeva)V /cat 


Xvtos eoTiv ; ov8e yap rj rov dvdpojrrov <f>vois dve/x- 
tt68iotos el pr)8e r) rov 7To86$ r) rfjs X €l P°$> oif8e r) 
T7)S vecbs KtirqoLS aKcoAvros av eh) av at 2 rrepl to 
lotlov rj TTjv elpeoiav evepyeiaf KOjXvoeis tlvcls 
Zyivoiv. dvev 8e tovtojv, el pev at <f>avTaolai pur) yiy- 
vovtcu 4, Kaff* elpappevrjv, (ouS' auriav elvat Set tt)v 
elpappeviqv)* tcov ovyKaTadeoewv el 8e, otl rroiel 
(fravTaoias dyojyovs errl rrjv ovyKarddeoiv, kqlO* 
elpbappevrjv at ovyKOTaOeoets yiyveoOcu Xeyovrac, 
ttcjs ov fidxeTat, rrpos eavTrjv rroXXaKts ev rot? 
F pieyioTois 8ia<f>6povs rrotovoa <j>avraoias /cat rrepi- 
ottojocls errl TavavTia rr)v 8idvoiav, ore tovs rrpoo- 
TiOepevovs* Tfi irepa /cat pur] errexovTas dpaprdveiv 

1 kcu Kiinjoeaiv -omitted by X and g. 

8 av at -X 3 (added in margin), g, B ; omitted by all other 

MSS. v 

3 elpeoiav evepyeiai -X, g, B ; elpeoiav evepy eiav -F, a 1 ; 
elpeoias evepy eLav -a 2 and all other mss. (elpeoias evepy eiav av 

4 yivonnai -F 1 , X, g. 

5 <ovo* . . . €LfjLapfi€vr)v> -H. C. ; lacuna first indicated by 
Xylander ; <7ra>s eloiv alriaO -Meziriac ; <ovo $ alrla> -Em- 
perius (Op. Philol. % p. 340) ; <jta>s epovfiev alriav elvat ttjv 
€Lfiapfj,€vrjv> -Bernardakis. 

6 TrpooTtftudvovs -X 3 , g, B, A corr s 0, Tolet. 51, 5 ; iTpcm- 
depevovs -F, X 1 , a, A 1 , y, n, E. 

a Cf. 1050 c supra : rfjs yap kolvtjs </>voea)s els iravra hia- 
Tctvotiaris . . . (S. V.F. ii, p. 269, 22-28). 

b S. V.F. ii, frag. 993, of which only ore rovs npocrn- 



to particular natural entities and motions many 
obstacles and impediments present themselves but 
none at all to that of the universe as a whole. Now, 
how does the motion of the universe as a whole, 
extending as it does to the particular motions, itself 
remain without hindrance or impediment when those 
motions are being hindered and impeded ? The 
nature of a man is not free of hindrance if that of his 
foot or his hand is not unhindered too, nor could the 
motion of a ship be free of impediment if there be 
any impediment to the operation of its sails or its 
oarage. All this apart, however, if it is not in con- 
formity with destiny that the mental images occur, 
(destiny need not be responsible either) for the acts 
of assent ; but, if because she produces mental 
images conducive to assent the acts of assent are said 
to occur in conformity with destiny, how is it that she 
is not in conflict with herself when often in matters 
of the greatest moment she produces mental images 
which differ from one another and drag the mind off 
in contrary directions ? When this happens, the 
Stoics say b that they err who instead of suspending 
judgment adhere to one of the images, that they are 

depivovs . . . 8o£d£ovras (p. 291, 9-12) reproduces Stoic 
doctrine (cf S.V.F. ii, frag. 131 [pp. 40, 9-41, 2 and p. 41, 
23-27 with Cronert, Gnomon, vi, 1930, p. 143] and iii, frag. 
548 ; for the wise suspense of judgment cf. S. V.F. ii, frags. 
275-277 and 763 [ = 1047 c supra] and Epictetus, Diss, n, 
xviii, 23-26 and in, xii, 15). Of what is stated in the previous 
clause (ttoXXolkls . . . rrjv Sidvoiav) the Stoics admitted, of 
course, that the mind is often torn between different mental 
images ; but, while they held that these are " products of 
destiny," they explicitly denied that therefore the acts of 
consent to which these are conducive can also be said " to 
occur in conformity with destiny " {cf Cicero, De Fato 42- 
44 = i9. V.F. ii, p. 283, 12-38). 



(1056) Xeyovoiv, av fxev 1 d&rjXois €lkcocfl TTpoTrirrTovra^ , 2 
av Se ipevSecn Sta^efSo/xeVou?, av he kowqjs a/cara- 
Xtjtttois 3 So£d£ovras; kolltoi Set/ rpia>v ovrtov, 
: q jjuy] iraoav elvai (pavraalav 3 elfiappievris k'pyov 
rj rraaav 7rapaho)(7]v <f>avraaios Kal avyKardde- 
olv 6 dyajaapT7]Tov rj' p,7]& avTT)v ryv clpLappLevrjv 
1057 av€TriXrj7TT0V ovk olha yap 8 ottods dveyKXrjros ion 
Toiavras Troiovaa cpavraaias at? to prf f^dye- 
o6ai jjLTjS^ dvTifiaivetv dAAd eTreodai Kal eiKeiv iy- 
kXtjtov 10 ion. Kal p/qv ev ye -rot? rrpos tovs 
' AKaSrjpLatKovs 11 dyoooLV 6 TrXeloros Xoyos 12 avra> re 
XpvoiTTTTcp Kal AvTLTrarpcp rrepl tivos 13 yeyove; 
rrepl rod firJTe TTpdrretv p-rjO* oppiav davyKaraOe- 
ro)s dXXd rrXdap.ara Xeyetv Kal Kevds vrrodeaets 
rovs d^iovvras otKeias 4 (f>avraoias yevo/xevT^ 15 ev- 
1 av fx-q -g, E. 2 Salmasius ; -npooTTLTrrovros -mss. 

3 KOLUOLS (koMoLS - g) aKttTaAl77rT6US' -X, g, B. 

4 Set -Wyttenbach (implied by the versions of Xy lander 
and Amyot) ; b-q -MSS. 5 fiavraaias -F, a, A '(J). 

6 <fiavraoias Kal ovyKaradtOLV -g ; /<*ai ovyKardQeoLV cf>avTaotas 
-all other mss. 

7 t) -X 3 (over erasure), g, B, E ; et -F, a, A 1 , (8, y, n, 
Tolet 51 y 5 ; ^ et -A 2 (in added superscript), \'at. Keg. 80. 

8 yap -omitted by X 3 (erased), g, B. 

9 fjL-q -omitted by X padded superscript -X 3 ). 

10 dveyKXrjTov ~E. 

11 'AKabrjfiLKOvs -X ; 'AKaor)fiiaKovs -F, a, A, /?, y, n. 

12 Ao'yos -X 3 , g ; omitted by all other mss. 

13 Trepl rivos -X 3 , g; tiVos -X 1 , Tolet. 51, 5; toi^o? -all 
other mss. ; ttovos -Stephanus ; 6 ttXzZotos [Aoyos] . . . ttovos 
7T€pl rivos -Pohlenz (Hermes, lxxiv [1939], p. 7). 

14 toi)s d^i.ovs (or d^toos [?]) rds olkzlovs -i 1 l ; rds amicus tt^s 

oLKetas -X 3 (as and -fj over erasures), g, B ; tol>? d^ovvras 
oUdas -E 2 and all other mss. (tous -omitted by Yat. Reg. 80). 

15 y€vopL€vas -X 3 (i/ tt £ over erasure), g, B. 

° C/. Diogenes Laertius, vii, 51 (/xer' eigcujs /cai ovyKara- 


precipitate if the images to which they yield a are 
obscure, deceived if the images are false, and fanciful 
if the images are commonly inapprehensible. And 
yet of three things one must be true : it must be that 
not every mental image is the work of destiny or that 
every acceptance of a mental image, i.e. every act of 
assent, is faultless or that destiny herself is not in- 
culpable either, for I do not understand how she is 
free from blame for producing the kind of mental 
images that it is reprehensible to yield to and follow 
and not to struggle against and resist. Look you, 
what is the subject to which Chrysippus himself and 
Antipater in their contentions with the Academics b 
have devoted the most extensive argument ? The 
thesis that there is neither action nor impulsion with- 
out assent and that they are talking fiction and 
making idle assumptions who maintain that upon the 
occurrence of an appropriate mental image impulsion 

deaecos) and Bonhoffer, Epictet und die Stoa, pp. 164-165 
and 177-178. The opponents of the Stoics treat this moment 
in the process as if it were a purely passive " yielding " (e.g. 
Alexander, Be Fato> pp. 183, 21-184, 22 [Bruns]) ; but, as 
Plutarch knew (De Virtute Morali 447 a = S. V.F. iii, p. Ill, 
34-36), the Stoics themselves considered it to be an Ivlp- 
yeia rod rjycfioviKov (cf. W. Theiler, Phyllobolia filr Peter Von 
der Miihll, p. 61, n. 1). 

b S.V.F. iii, frag. 177 (Chrysippus [p. 42, 22-31]) and 
Antipater, frag. 19 {S.V.F. iii, pp. 246, 35-247, 2). The 
Academics in question are chiefly Arcesilaus and Carneades 
(see 1036 a-b with the notes supra). Chrysippus argued 
against the former, who had attacked the Stoic doctrine 
propounded by Zeno ; Carneades later attempted to refute 
Chrysippus and was attacked in turn by his own contem- 
porary, Antipater of Tarsus (cf. S. V.F. iii, pp. 244, 12- 
245, 4). On the course of the controversy see O. Gigon, 
Mus. Helveticum, i (1944), pp. 50-52 and 58-61 ; Pohlenz, 
Stoa i, pp. 174-175, 180, 184-185. 



(1057) Bits opfjL&v [AT] et^avras /JLrjSe oruyKaradefxcvov^. 

avdis oV <f>rjcn Xovcrt777709 /cat tov Beov 1 ifjevSels 

£fji7roULV (f>avraaias /cat 2 tov oo<f>6v, ov ovyKaraTi- 

B defxevajv oi5S' cikovtojv Seofievovs rjfJicov dXXa Trpar- 


rj/jLas 8e <f>av\ovs ovtols vtt* aoOeveias ai>y/ca7*aTt#e- 
adac rat? Totat/rats <£ai>raatats\ rj Se 6 tovtojv tojv 
Xoycov Tapax^J /cat 8iacf>opa 77009 clvtovs ov ttclw 
SvaOecoprjTos eartv. 6 yap ov Seopuevos cn/y/cara- 
Tidefjievcov aAAd irpaTTOVTOJV fiovov of? evhihojoi 
to\s ^avTaacas*, 6 €tre deos etre ao</>6s, olSev on 
rrpos to 7rpaTT€tv apKovoiv at <f>avTaoiat /cat nap- 
eXi<ovoiv at ovyKOLTadeoecs' ojs eV ye, yiyvuyoKcov 
otc TTpaKTiKTjv op/jLTfv ov irapioTrjcn <j>avTaoia % St^a 
ovyKaTadeozcos , ifjevSzls iv€pyd£,€Tai /cat mdavas 
C <f>avTaaias , eKcbv atrto? ea-rt tov 770077 L7TT€iv /cat 10 
apiapTaveiv d/caraA^rots" auy/carart^e/xcVoi;?. 

1 TCOV SCCJV "F 1 . 

2 Kara -y, n, E, Tolet. 51, 5. 

3 fxovcov -F, X 1 , a, A ! (?) ; omitted by K. 

4 els -g. 

6 ^ S£ -g. 

6 Taj <t>avTaaias -X 3 , g, 13 ; tcus <j>avraaiais -all other mss. 

7 ° " B " 

8 <f>avTaoiai -F. 

9 7rpoTriTTT€Lv -Passow (c/. Rasmus, Prog, 1880, p. 12) ; npoo- 
mrrTftv -mss. 

10 kcu -omitted by F 1 . 



follows immediately without any prior yielding or 
assent. a Again Chrysippus says, however, that both 
god and the sage induce false mental images, wanting 
of us not assent or yielding but only action and 
impulsion towards the presentation, but that we 
because we are base are led by our weakness to 
assent b to such mental images. It is not very 
difficult to discern the confusion and mutual discord 
of these statements. He who wants not assent c but 
only action of those to whom he presents mental 
images knows, be he god or sage, that the mental 
images suffice for action and that the acts of assent 
are superfluous, just as, if he knows that an effective 
impulse is not prompted by a mental image without 
assent and yet he induces in men false and specious 
mental images, he is by intention responsible for 
their precipitate and erroneous behaviour in assent- 
ing to images that are inapprehensible. 

° Cf. Adv. Colotem 1122 a-d (especially <j-d and the end 
of the chapter : otclv ovv <j>avfj to i}8i) oikcZov . . ., JjXOcv evdvs 
r) opfjirj . . . ) ; Cicero, Acad. Prior, ii, 108 (". . . Carneade 
quod ... ex animis nostris adsensionem . . . extraxisset ") ; 
Helfried Ilartmann, Gewissheit und Wahrheit (Halle, 1927), 
pp. 42-47 ; Babut, Plutarque et le Stoicisme, pp. 281-282. 

6 Cf. Adv. Colotem 1122 c (cffiv ovaav vn aadcvtlas tu> 
<f>atvon€vu>) and S. V.F. iii, frag. 473 (p. 123, 1-13). 

9 S. V.F. iii, frag. 177 (p. 42, 32-38). The content of this 
sentence, however, is not Stoic doctrine but argument in 
support of the charge of self-contradiction brought against 
that doctrine in the preceding sentence, which von Arnim 
omits. For the Stoic doctrine itself cf. A. A. Long in 
Problems in Stoicism, pp. 100-102. 











Among Plutarch's works listed in the Catalogue of 
Lamprias there is one (No. 79) called "On irapaSo^o- 
re pa ol UtwlkoI tcov ttoit]tG)v Xiyovai and another (No. 
143) called "Ore rrapaSo^orepa ol ' ErnKovpeioc twv 
TTOirjTwv \4yovoi. Of the latter nothing is preserved. 
The former has sometimes been identified with the 
present short piece, though this is entitled a EvvoiJjls 
of that essay in the Planudean mss., which alone pre- 
serve it a and where it is followed by an 'jEtt-ito/xt? 

a It is No. 40 in the Planudean corpus. M. Pohlenz main- 
tained that Euvoj/us rod was prefixed to the title by Planudes 
and that Plutarch wrote the piece as it stands for a -nalyviov 
or playful trifle which he may have read to his friends but 
did not publish (Hermes, lxxiv [1939], p. 2 and Moralia 
vi/2, p. 59). Amyot in his translation had omitted Hvvoipts 
rov from the title and had called the piece 4t une petite 
declamation " (" une vraie declamation " in the later edition 
by Brotier). J. J. Hartman argued that the extant piece 
is complete as Plutarch wrote it, but he called it a " frag- 
ment M and suggested that Plutarch may have done so him- 
self just as modern writers often publish their short pieces 
as " fragments " (De Plutarcho, pp. 594-596). Hartman in 
his earlier work on Plutarch had given a Dutch translation 
of the piece under the title, " Het fragment van Plutarchus' 
betoog ..." (De Avondzon des Heidendoms, ii, pp. 285-288). 
Bruno Snell in his German translation (Plutarch : Von der 
Ruhe des Gemutes und andere philosophische Schriften 
[Zurich, Artemis, 1948], pp. 75-76) omitted without com- 
ment both Tivvoxftis rod of the title and chapters 5 and 6 of 
the extant Greek text. 



of the lost ' Ap(,aTO(f)dvovs /cat Mevdvhpov ovyKpiois (No. 
121 in the Catalogue of Lamprias) and an ^EmroyLT] 
rod 7T€pl rrjs iv to) Ttfxalio i/jvxoyovias (1030 i> — 1032 F 
supra). The last of these three save for its first two para- 
graphs, in which the " epitomizer " refers to Plutarch 
in the third person, is not an epitome or compendium 
of the original essay, which is extant, but a single 
continuous excerpt from it. The second as it stands 
begins with a reference in the third person to the 
author of what follows, which seems thus to be 
introduced as an extract or extracts from the original 
essay. The first of these, the present piece, though 
it has no such introduction and contains no internal 
evidence of incompleteness, 6 is probably also a 
literal extract from the original essay of Plutarch's, 
for it is thoroughly Plutarchean in language and style 
and has none of the characteristics of a conspectus 
or summary but is unlikely to be the whole of No. 79 
in the Catalogue of Lamprias, since in an essay with 
such a title Plutarch would hardly have restricted 
himself to the Stoic statements and doctrines used 
in the extant piece and have refrained from exploit- 
ing others that in his opinion, as is shown by his 

° i.e. 853 A (. . . irpoKpivzi . . . ravra irpoaTlOrjai,' " to <j>op- 
tikov," faaw, " cv Aoyois . . .), cf. 853 B (. . . cVaivciTai yap," 
faoiv, l * on . . .). The first person singular in 853 d (olov 
Xcyaj paoiXeZ . . .) and in 854 c (/cat ovk olB* eV ots . . .) must 
be direct quotations from the original essay. 

6 In 1058 a (see note 6 there) something is missing ; but 
this need be no more than a sentence or a clause, which may 
have been omitted by a copyist rather than by the " epi- 
tomizer." Sandbach assumed a lacuna at the beginning of 
chapter 4 also, a reference to the change of sex in Caeneus ; 
but for what he took to be indications of this in the text see 
notes c and d on 1058 b infra. 



references to them elsewhere, were susceptible of 
similar treatment. Hvvoipis in the inscription is in- 
accurate, but it is no more likely that Planudes 
arbitrarily and mistakenly prefixed it to the title 
of this piece than that the equally inaccurate 
'ETnTOfirj is his arbitrary addition to the titles of the 
two pieces that follow it. 

The relative chronology of the original essay, if 
this were itself extant, might still be as difficult to 
determine as is that of the De Stoicorum Repugna?itiis 
and the De Commxinibua Notitiis. So, for example, 
even if in that original essay the change of sex in 
Caeneus, which is not mentioned in the excerpt, was 
used as it is in Quomodo Quis . . . Sentiat Profectus 
75 e, this latter passage would not be demonstrably 
later, for it contains nothing to suggest that Plutarch 
here intended b to recall or refer to the use of the 
theme in an earlier passage of his own. There is, 
however, near the beginning of the De Communibus 
Notitiis a passage thought certainly to be a veiled 
reference to the essay from which our excerpt was 
taken, c for there (1060 b) everyone is said to have 
had his fill of arguments against the Stoic paradoxes 
concerning those who alone are opulent and fair and 
alone are kings, citizens, and judges and these notions 
are dismissed as being " stale goods." These para- 
doxes do appear in our excerpt ; but this does not 
decisively identify it or the original essay, for what 

° Such e.g. as those in De Comm. Not. 10T6 c-d and 1083 
of and De Facie 923 b-c. 

b As Babut thinks he did {Plutarque et le Sto\cisme> 
p. 50, n. 3). 

c Ziegler, R.-E. xxi/1 (1951), cols. 757, 16-23 and 760, 36- 
54 ; but cf. Babut, Phctarque et le Stolcisme, p. 40. 



is essentially peculiar to them and not here mentioned 
at all is that they attempt not to refute the Stoic 
statements, that of which everyone is said to have 
had his fill, but, as the title itself indicates, simply 
to show that they are more paradoxical than those 
of the poets , a whereas even in another extant work 
of Plutarch's (Quomodo Adolescens Poetas Audire 
Debeat 25 c) the poets Homer and Euripides are cited 
in refutation of the Stoic doctrine that is the principle 
of the paradoxes specifically mentioned in 1060 b. 

For the text of the Uvvoi/jls here printed I have 
collated aA/3yEBne from photostats but for 
Toletanus 51, 5 have relied upon G. B. A. Fletcher's 
report in Class. Quart., xxi (1927), p. 173. The re- 
sulting apparatus differs from that of Pohlenz- 
Westman in several details, the most interesting of 
which are two in 1058 c-d (d 1-2 =p. 61, 13-H 
[Pohlenz-Westman]) : e alone has the correct wvelrcu, 
which may have been derived from a 1 (now illegible) ; 
and € with a, B, and n has the correct fxerairwu , where 
A 2 , /?, y, E, and Tolet. 51 , 5 all have /xera ra>v. 

a Ziegler (loc. cit. y col. 760, 36-39) may have intended to 
anticipate this objection by saying : " Da auch in . . . 1059 c 
Diadumenos die ruhmredigen Behauptungen der Stoiker 
mit den Erfindungen der Dichter auf eine Stufe stellt und 
dann 1060 b sagt. . . ." The former passage, 1059 c-d, calls 
comparably credible the Stoic claim of Chrysippus' pro- 
vidential birth — to turn life upside down, as Diadumenus 
adds — and the poets' story that the providence of the gods 
in chastising Tantalus overthrew Sipylus ; but this has no 
connexion whatever with the later passage about the Stoic 
paradoxes in 1060 b, where nothing at all is said about 
poets, poetry, or myth. 


(1057) STNOTIS 


1. 'O 4 TlwSdpov VLaivevs evdvvav 5 vtt*x)(€v, gltti- 

I) OdvtDS apprjKTOS oihrjpcp kcli aTradrjs to crco/xa 7rAar- 

TOjAevos €tra KaraSvs arpcoros vtto yrjv il cr^t'cras' 

6p9a> 7to81 ydv 6 Se Stou/cos* Aamftjj, (Zanep ££ 

dSapLavTivrjs vXtjs vtt* olvtcov rrjs diradeias /ce^aA- 

K€Vfl€VOS, OVK drptOTOS laTiV Ol5S' dvOOOS OuS' <XV- 

aAy^S" 8 d<j)of5os 8e fxevei /cat dXvTros kol drjrrrjTOS 
KCU dpLaaros, rirpcoaKopLevos dXytov arpejSAou- 
fxevos iv KaraoKacJHils irarpihos €v rrddeoi oIk€loi,s? 

1 tov omitted by E and B in title ; ovvoiJhs rod omitted by 
E in subscription and by Catalogue of LampHas 79. 

2 T<x>V TTOirjTWV Oi OTOKKOt -j3. 

3 Xcyovot -E (title and subscription). 

* f O -omitted by A. b €vdvvqv -B. 

6 dveAy^j -n ; ov8* dvaAy^s -omitted by B. 

7 oIkclols -Pohlenz (cf. Plutarch, Demosthenes xxii, 5-6 
[856 a-b]) ; toiovtois -mss. 

a Pindar, frag. 167 (Bergk, Schroeder, Snell) = 204 
(Turyn) = 150 (Bowra) ; for 6pda> rroSt cf. B. L. Gildersleeve 
on Olympian xiii, 72. Concerning Caeneus, the invulner- 
able Lapith who was overwhelmed by the Centaurs with 
tree-trunks and beaten into the ground, see Acusilaus, frag. 
22 (F. Jacoby, F. Or. Hist. I A, p. 33 and a, p. 379) = frag. 
40 a (i, pp. 59-60 [Diels-Kranz]) ; Apollonius Rhodius, 
Argonautiea i, 57-64 ; Orphei Argonautica 170-174 ; Ovid, 





1. The Caeneus of Pindar used to be taken to task 
for being an implausible fiction with his invulner- 
ability to iron and his physical insensitivity and his 
having at last sunk down underground unwounded 
" as erect on his feet he split the earth asunder " a ; 
but the Lapith of the Stoics, whom they have made 
out of insensitivity b as if they had forged him of 
steel, is not immune from wounds or disease or pain 
but remains fearless and undistressed and invincible 
and unconstrained while wounded, in pain, on the 
rack, in the midst of his country's destruction, in the 
midst of his own private calamities. And, while the 

Metamorphoses xii, 189-209 and 459-535 ; Apollodorus, 
Epitome i, 22 (L.C.L. ii, pp. 150-151) ; J. T. Kakridis, Class. 
Rev., lxi (1947), pp. 77-80. Plutarch in Quomodo Quis . . . 
Sentiat Profectus 75 e refers to the earlier transformation 
of Caeneus from a woman and does so there too in comparison 
with a Stoic paradox. C/. also Servius on Vergil, Aeneid vi, 
448 (ii, p. 69, 13-18 [Thilo-Hagen]) and E. Kraggerud, 
Symbolae Osloenses, xl (1965), pp. 66-71. 

b The Stoics in fact distinguished the dirddcia of the sage, 
which is imperturbability, from the callous insensitivity of 
base men (S.V.F. iii, frag. 448). For what follows con- 
cerning the sage in this paragraph cf. S. V.F. iii, frags. 363, 
381, 438, 567-588, 591 and the story of Persaeus in S.V.F. 
i, frag. 449. 



(1057) /cat 6 fxev UtvSdpov Katvevs fiaXXofxevos ov rirpuj- 
a/cerat, 6 Se rcov Htcolkcov ao<f>6s ey/cAct o/*€vo9 ov 
E KtoXverou, /cat KaTaKprjfjLvi^ojjLevos ovk avay /ca^erat 1 
/cat orpefiXovfievos ov ^aoavi^crai /cat Tn)povjJi€vog 
ov ^XaTTTerac /cat ttLtttojv iv ra> naXaUiv arjTTT)- 
ros" eon /cat rrepiretxi^o/jLevos airoXiopKriros /cat 


tojv ttXolojv 8ia(j)€pojv ot9 emyiyparrrai \ikv Eu- 
7rAota /cat Upovoia (/cat) 2a>£ouaa 2 /cat Qeparreia 
-)(€ip,dt<erai Se /cat crwrptjSerat /cat dvaTpeiTerai. 
2. c O Et)pt7rtoot; ToAaos" e£ aSpavovs /cat iraprj- 

XlKOS ZVXfj TLVl V€OS /Cat lo")(Vp6s €7Tt T^^ /^a^V 

a<f>va* yeyovev, 6 Se rcov Utojlkcov oocf)d$ X@*s ^ p 
r)v 3 ata^taros 4 a/xa /cat KaKtaro? Trjixepov 8' d<f>va> 
F fjL€ra^€^XrjK€v etV aperrjv /cat yc'yovey e/c pvoov 5 
/cat d>xpov /cat 6 /car' Aia^uAov 

e£ 6o<f>vaXyovs Ktb8vvoo7rd8os 7 Xvypov 

€V7Tp€TT7\s Oeoe&rjs KaXXt[jLop(j>og . 

1 tfarayay/caf €tgu -e. 

2 Kronenberg (Mnemosyne, lii [1924], p. 105) ; npovoia 
crojfofaa -MSS. 

3 V^v ^icv -€. 

4 aXax iar °s -Wyttenbach ; exOiarog -mss. 

6 /Wot; -a 1 ; pvoaov -a corr - and all other mss. 

6 k-cu -omitted by y and Tolet. 51, 5. 

7 Diibner ; /cat oBwoondSos -mss. 

a Hartman (D# Plutarcho, p. 593) thought dvayKatcTcu 
inappropriate here ; but cf. S. V.F. iii, pp. 88, 40-89, 6 and 
p. 150, 10-11. 

6 The formulation and implication of this sentence are 
compared with Paul, II Corinthians 4, 8-9 and 6, 10 by 
A. Fridrichsen, Coniectanea Neotestamentica, ix (1944), pp. 


Caeneus of Pindar is not wounded when he is hit, 
the sage of the Stoics is not impeded when confined 
and under no compulsion a when flung down a 
precipice and not in torture when on the rack and 
not injured when mutilated and is invincible when 
thrown in wrestling and is not blockaded by circum- 
vallation and is uncaptured while his enemies are 
selling him into slavery b ; he is just like the boats 
that are tempest-tossed and shattered and capsized 
while they bear inscribed upon them the names Bon 
Voyage and Providence ( and y Protectress and Escort. c 
2. The Iolaus of Euripides makes a prayer, and 
all of a sudden his superannuated impotence has be- 
come youthfulness and martial might d ; but the 
sage of the Stoics, though yesterday he was most ugly 
and at the same time most vicious, to-day all of a 
sudden has been transformed into virtue and from 
being a wrinkled and sallow and, as Aeschylus says, 

Lumbago-ridden, wretched, pain-distraught 
Elder • 

has become a man of comely bearing, divine aspect, 
and beauteous form/ 

c For these names of ships cf. F. Miltner's list in R.-E. 
Supplement v (1931), cols. 947-952, where ©cpatreia does not 
appear, however. 

d Euripides, Heraclidae 849-863. 

e Aeschylus, frag. 361 (Nauck 2 ) = frag. Ill (Mette). 
Plutarch's ascription was charged to an error of memory 
and the original of which he was thinking was claimed for 
Hipponax by A. D. Knox, who " restored " it as frag. 58 
(Herodes, Cercidas and the Greek Choliambic Poets [L.C.L.], 
pp. 40-41). 

1 According to the Stoics only the sage is beautiful (cf. 
S.V.F. i, frag. 221 and iii, frags. 591, 592, and 619) : for 
the instantaneous change see 1058 b infra. 



1058 S. Kat rov 9 08vaaea)s r/ *A0r]va ttjv pvaor^ra 1 
KaX <f>aXaKp6rr]ra Kal dfiopc^cav d<f>rjpr}K€v t on cos 
(fxivelr) kclXos' 6 8e tovtojv ootj>6s, ovk glttoXittov- 
tos* to acofxa rov yrfptos dXXd Kal (/ca/ca) 8 irpoo- 
erndevTos 4, Kal 7rpocr€7TLxa)C7avros , s [livtov Kvpros, 
dv ovto) tuxxi, va) $os irepocpdaXfios ovt altrxpos 

0VT€ 8vGfXOp<f>OS OVT€ KaK07TpOGO)7r6s €OTLV. (. . .)* 

6 ydp ILjTojikos epojs toonep ol Kavdapoi Xeyovrat 

to fji€V /JLvpov aVoAetWtv 7 rd 8e SvowSr] hiojKtw 

ovtcos rots aloxi<VTOi$ /cat ajxopcf>oraTois 6/mXqjv, 

orav els evpLop<f>lav Kal KaXXos vtto ao<f>ias fAera- 

PdXcooiv* dTTorpeirerat . 

4. *0 irapd rots Stok/coZs KaKtoros, dv ovrw 

B tvxT1> n pun SetXrjs dpwros, Kal KaraSapOcbv efM- 

7tXt)ktos Kal dfjLadrjs Kal dSiKos Kal aKoXaoros Kal 

vat /xd Ata SovXos Kal rrevrjs Kal drropos avOrjfiepov 

dvlorarai [Kal] 9 fiaoiXevs /cat nXovocos Kal SXficos 

1 pvaoTqra -a 1 ; pvaoor^ro. -a corr - and all other mss. 
a clttoXlttovtos -Bernardakis ; (wroAaVoKros -mss. 
8 <*a/ca> -added by Pohlenz ; <n> -Bernardakis ; <aAAa> 
-Castiglioni (Gnomon, xxvi [1954], p. 84). 

• 7rpoa€m.rid€vros -y ; 7rpo€7nrid€VTos -Tolet. 51, 5. 
8 TTpoemxcoaavros -Tolet. 51 , 5. 

• Lacuna identified by F. H. Sandbach (Proc. Cambridge 
Philological Soc. t cxlii-cxliv [1929], p. 11). 

7 d7roX€L7T€iv -van Herwerden (Leetiones Rheno-Traiectinae 
[1882], p. 122) ; aTroXureZv -mss. 

8 fjL€T<tpdAa><HV -E, B ; pLerapaXXwaiv -all other mss. 

• [*cu ] -deleted by Pohlenz. 

° Homer, Odyssey vi, 229-235 ; xvi, 172-176 ; xxiii, 156- 

8 As Sandbach saw, the next sentence has to do not with 
the immediately preceding paradox, that the sage with all 
the ravages of age upon him is nevertheless beautiful, but 



3. Moreover, that Odysseus might appear hand- 
some, Athena removed his wrinkles and baldness 
and unshapeliness a ; but without the body's having 
been quitted by old age, which on the contrary has 
heaped and piled additional {ills) upon it, the sage 
of these Stoics, though remaining hunchbacked, if 
so he chance to be, and toothless and one-eyed, is 
not ugly or misshapen or unhandsome of face. 
<\ . .) b The reason is that as beetles are said to leave 
perfume and to pursue foul-smelling things c so the 
Stoic love consorts with the ugliest and most un- 
shapely and turns away when by wisdom these are 
transformed into shapeliness and beauty. d 

4. Among the Stoics the man who is most vicious 
in the morning, if so it chance to be, is in the after- 
noon most virtuous/ Having fallen asleep demented 
and stupid and unjust and licentious and even, by 
heaven, a slave and a drudge and a pauper, he gets 
up the very same day changed into a blessed and 

with the additional one to which De Coram. Not. 1072 r — 
1073 b refers, that just because he is beautiful he is according 
to the Stoics unloved and unworthy of being loved. This 
must have been expressed at least in a lost sentence or 
clause, which may have begun with a contrasted and lesser 
poetic marvel, e.g. the love aroused in Nausicaa by the 
miraculously beautified Odysseus (Odyssey vi, 242-245). 

c Cf. Quaest. Conviv. 710 e and Non Posse Svaviter Vivi 
1096 a. 

d Cf. De Comm. Not. 1072 f— 1073 b and S.V.F. iii, 
frags. 716 and 717. 

c Contending that in the complete essay this sentence 
must have been preceded by a poetic parallel to the Stoic 
paradox, F. H. Sandbach appealed to ov yiveta <j>voas ovbe 
rjpTjv infra and to Quomodo Quis . . . Sentiat Profectus 
75 d-e as proof that the poetic parallel was the story of the 
transformation of Caeneus from female to male (Proc. Cam- 
bridge Philological Soc, cxlii-cxliv [19291, P* H)» 



(1058) yeyovujs, auxfrpojv 1 T€ /cat Slkouos /cat j3ej3ato? /cat 
abo^aoros, ov yeveca (frvaas ovSe rjfirjv iv adjfiari 
veo) /cat OL7raXa) dXX Iv aadevel /cat drraXfj ifjvxfl Kai 
avdvSpa) /cat a/fe/?ata> vovv reXeiov, aKpav (frpovrj- 
oiv, laoOeov Siddeaiv, dSo^aarov emarrjfjiiqv /cat 
djjL€rd7TTcorov e£iv 2 iaxrjKcos, ovSev iv8ovor)s 3 tt po- 
re pov avrw rfjs fioxOrjplas, dXX* i{jai<j>vr)s , dXiyov 
hito elrrelv, rjpws rig 7} haipajov rj deos €K drjpltov 
C rod KaKiurov yevofxevos. €K rfjs Urodg yap Xa- 
fiovra rrjv dperrjv eariv elneiv 

€v£ou €i rt 4, jSouAer rrdvra 001 yev-qoerai. 
TrXovrov c^e'pet, jSaatAetav e^^t, 6 rvyr\v St'Sojatv, ev- 

TTOrp,OVS 7TOl€L /Cat aiT pOO$€€lS* /Cat ai)rdpK€LS , fJLLCLV 

olko0€v &paxyw)v ovk k'xovras. 

5. f O jjl€V yap 7 7TOiy]riKos pivdos ro Kara Xoyov 

1 aaxfypov -n. 2 rrjv l£iv -B. 

3 elSovarjs A 1 (?), corrected by A 2 . 

* mss. (e? re -p [?]) ; eviai r el (S, M) or cS£aiT d (A, Tr) 
-mss. of Stobaeus (v, p. 743, 8 [Hense]) ; ev£aL tl -Comp. 
Menandri et Philistionis 73 ; €v£cll ri -Gesner 1 ; evf ct tl 
-Meineke ; cufar ri -H. Jacobi and J. Madvig ; cf. Poh- 
lenz, Hermes, lxxiv (1939), p. 2, n. 4. 

6 napexei -Hartman (De Plutarcho, p. 594). 

6 a-TTocrhzt'is -c. 7 yap -omitted by e. 

C/. Zte Comm. Not. 1060 b, D0 Tranquillitate Animi 
472 a, and & V.F. iii, frags. 617-622. 

b For dSofaoro? here and aSdfaoroy €7noTTjp.r)v infra see 
D# #foic. Repug. 1056 a-b and f supra and c/. 5. T 7 .F. i, 
frags. 53, 54, 347, 625 and iii, frags. 548-550. 

c 17/fy here probably means the pubic hair (Hippocrates, 
IIcpi apBpwv 41 = iv, p. 180, 13-14 [Litt.r6] ; Aristotle, Hist. 
Animal. 544 b 27-29 and De Coloribus 797 b 30-34 [cf. rj^av 
in De Gen. Animal. 746 b 23-24]). Even when the word 
means the hypogastric region itself, it is used of both sexes 



opulent king, sober and just and steadfast and un- 
deluded by fancies. 6 He has not sprouted a beard 
or the token of puberty c in a body young and soft 
but in a soul that is feeble and soft d and unmanly 
and unstable has got perfect intelligence, consum- 
mate prudence, a godlike disposition, knowledge 
free from fancy, and an unalterable habitude and this 
not by any previous abatement of his depravity but 
by having changed instantaneously from the most 
vicious of wild beasts into what may almost be 
called a kind of hero or spirit or god. e For, if one 
has got virtue from the Stoa, it is possible to say 
Ask, if there's aught you wish ; all will be yours. 1 
It brings wealth, it comprises kingship, it gives luck, 
it makes men prosperous and free from all other 
wants and self-sufficient, though they have not a 
single drachma of their own. 

5. The poetic fable, preserving its consistency, 

and not of the male alone (cf. Aristotle, Hist. Animal. 
493 b 3 and De Gen. Animal. 728 b 26-27 and 784 a 9-10). 
So what Plutarch here contrasts to the sudden transforma- 
tion of the Stoic sage is not, as Sandbach supposed, a 
mythical metamorphosis of female to male but the natural 
change of the youthful body at puberty. 

d Cf. Plato, Republic 563 d 5 and Theaetetus 173 a 5-7 
for d7raAi7 ipvxrj and Phaedrus 239 c 8-9 (aiTaXrjs teal avdvhpov 
hiaiT7)s). There is no reason, therefore, to question dnaXfj here. 

• For the Stoic thesis that, all wrong action being equally 
wrong, the change from viciousness to perfect virtue is in- 
stantaneous (1057 e-f supra) , so that the subject of the 
change may be unaware of its occurrence, see Quomodo 
Quis . . . Sentiat Profectus 75 c — 76 b, De Stoic. Repug. 
1042 f— 1043 a, De Comm. Not. 1061 e and 1062 b— 1063 c, 
S.V.F. iii, frags. 527-541. 

' Menander, frag 614, 6 (Koerte-Thierfelder) = frag. 537 
(Kock) = Stobaeus, Anth. iv, 31, 30 (v, p. 743, 8 [Hense]) ; 
cf. Philemon, frag. 65 t 3-4 (Kock). 



(1058) ff>vXdrro)v ov8ap,ov 7T/)oA€t7ret top 1 'Hpa/cAc'a rtov* 
avayKCLLtuv* Seofxevov, aAA' wairep £k Trrjyrjs iirip- 
pel (tov ttjs J AfAaXdeias K€paros ttolpt d<£06Va>s") 4 
avTtp /cat rots ovvovaw 6 8e rrjv ^itojiktjp Aa/3ajv 
' A/xdA0etav ttXovolos fiev yeyovev epavl^erat 8e 
Tpo<fyr\v nap* ircptov, /cat fiaoiXevs fxev ion fitadov 
8* dvaAuet eruAAoyta/xous, /cat iravra p*kv €^et jjlovos 
D ivoiKiov 8e reXu /cat dX<f>cT n aWtrat, 6 noXXaKis 8a- 

V€L^6pL€VOS Tj pLZTaVT&V 1 TCapd TWP Ol)8zV €XOPTOJP. 

6. Kat 6 fi€V *lQaK7]oi<ji)v jSacrtAeu? TrpooaireZ 
Xavddveiv os cart fJovXofjievos /cat 7toiojp eavrov cos 
/itaAtara " tttcoxQ XtvyaXew evaXiyKiov" 6 §' e/c 
ty)s Sroa? fiocbp /xeya /cat /ce/cpaycu? " eyd> jjlovos 
elfML jSaatAeifc/ €ya> fiovos elpl ttXovcfios " oparau 
iroXXaKig in* aXXorplais Ovpats Ac'yojv 

So? x^ a ^ va,/ c l7r7rojva/CTf /copra yap ptya> 
/cat j8a/i/?a/cu£a>.* 

1 to>v -a 1 (ov superscript -a 2 ), A*(o over a> erased -A a ). 


2 ex in erasure with a superscript over e (i.£. . . . Ac-raw) 
-a 2 . 8 dvay/ccu'cov -Leonicus ; dvayKcov -mss. 

4 <. . .> -H. C. after the supplements, Kravr* vel tz6.vt> 
-van Herwerden (Lectiones Rheno-Traiectinae [1882], p. 122) 
and <tou rrjs 'AfxaXdelas Keparos d<f>dov*> -Pohlenz (Hermes, 
Ixxiv [1939], p. 3); imppeZ avrco -mss. (excepting c, which 
omits impptl). 6 dX<f>Zra -a 2 (<j>Z over erasure), n. 

8 oWircu -c ; dveZrat -a 2 (?), n ; aveZvai -all other mss. 

7 /ieraiTcDv -a, B, n, c ; /actci toV -A 2 (a over erasure) and 
all other mss. 

8 iyu> . . . fiaaiXzvs -omitted by A padded in margin by 
A 2 ). 9 pafxpaKi^o} -€ ; )9afi0aAu£a> -Schneidewin. 

° In the text of the mss. as it stands the intransitive imppeZ 
wants a subject, and mention of the mythical horn of 
Amaltheia in this clause is almost certainly implied by rijp> 
Etoh*i)v 'AfxdXdaav in the next one. Pohlenz based his supple- 



nowhere leaves Heracles in want of the necessities 
of life, but on him and his companions stream as from 
a fountain (all things without stint from the Horn of 
Plenty) a ; but he who has got the Stoic Cornucopia, 
though he has become opulent, begs his bread from 
others and, though he is a king, analyses logical 
arguments for pay and, though he alone has every- 
thing, 6 pays rent for his lodgings and buys his bread 
and cheese, often doing so by borrowing or by asking 
alms of those who have nothing. 

6. Furthermore, whereas the king of the Ithacans 
sues for alms because he wishes to escape recognition 
and is trying to make himself as nearly as possible 
" like in mien to a pitiful mendicant," c he who comes 
from the Stoa loudly shouting and bawling " I alone 
am king, I alone am opulent " often is seen at other 
men's doors saying 

Oh please, a cloak, for Hipponax is freezing cold. 
My teeth are chattering.* 

ment on the passage in which Apollodorus (Bibliotheca ii, 
7, 5) after telling how Achelous recovered his horn from 
Heracles by giving him in place of it the horn of Amaltheia 
says that according to Pherecydes (frag. 42 [F. Jacoby, 
F. Gr. Hist. I A, p. 74]) this horn hvvafiiv cfy* toicivttjv wore 

fipOJTOV Tj TTOTOV, OTTtp <aV> CufdlTO TtJ, 7Tap€^€lV CL<f>doVOV. For 

Heracles and the Cornucopia see Scholia in Iliadem xxi, 194 
(Pindar, frag. 249 [Bergk] = 71 [Turyn] = 70 b [Snell]) ; 
Hesychius, s.v. *A/xaA0ei'as Kepas ; and Gruppe, R.-E. Sup- 
plement iii (1918), col. 1085, 8-46. 

6 Cf. S. V.F. iii, frags. 590, 591, 596, and 597. 

c Odyssey xvi, 273 and xvii, 337 (for-the begging of alms 
see xvii, 365 ff.). 

* Hipponax, frag. 17 (Bergk) = 24 b (Diehl) = 56 (Knox) = 
33 (Masson). The first line alone is quoted by Plutarch in 
De Cupiditate Divitiarum 523 e and in De Comm. N&t, 1068 
b infra ; cf. Iambi et Elegi Oraeci . . . ed. M. L. West, I, 
pp. 119-120 (frag. 32). 





The authenticity of this work, No. 77 in the Catalogue 
of Lamprias (where ra>v kowwv is omitted from the 
title) and No. 74 in the Planudean order, has been 
challenged and denied ; but the arguments ad- 
duced for doubting Plutarch's authorship were feeble 
and have all been successfully refuted. In rebutting 
one of them, however, the defenders of authenticity 
sometimes overreached themselves by professing to 
find in this work references to the De Stoicorum 
Repugnantiis or in that work references to this. There 
is in neither any certain intentional reference to the 
other ; and that Plutarch in writing either had the 
other before him cannot be inferred from the fact 
that in both many of the same Stoic passages are 
quoted or paraphrased. 6 Since such passages are 
used differently, in different contexts, and for differ- 
ent purposes in the two works, it is most probable, 

a They were most fully stated by Weissenberger (Die 
Sprache Plutarchs ii, pp. 51-53) and decisively refuted by 
Kolfhaus (Plutarchi De Comm. Not.). A review of the 
controversy is given by Ziegler (R.-E. xxi, 1 [1951], cols. 
758, 35-759, 46). 

b As both Pohlenz (Hermes, lxxiv [1939], pp. 17-18 and 
p. 32) and Sandbach (Class. Quart., xxxiv [1940], p. 23) 
conclude that such passages were taken by Plutarch from 
the De Stoicorum Repugnantiis and made to do duty again 
in the present work. See supra p. 400, n. a and p. 401, n. c 
in the Introduction to the De Stoicorum Repugnantiis. 



as has been said before, that Plutarch's source for 
both was his own note-books or his own compilation, 
Selections and Refutations of Stoics and Epicureans, 
and that this is the reason why neither work refers 
to the other and why their relative chronology can- 
not be decisively determined, though from the 
general impression made by the two the De Coin- 
munibus Notitiis may seem to be the later. & 

This begins without any indication of time or place 
as a dialogue between an Academic philosopher 
called Diadumenus c and an unnamed interlocutor, 
addressed as M comrade " or " companion." d The 
latter says that he comes to Diadumenus to be cured 
of the feverish perturbation induced in him by some 
Stoic friends, who have been denouncing the older 
Academics for subverting philosophy by nullifying 

a See supra, pp. 398-401 in the Introduction to the Be 
Stoicorum Repugnant Us. 

b For the contention that this in 1060 b contains a veiled 
reference to the original of the excerpt, Stoicos Absurdiora 
Poetis Bicere> see supra pp. 608 f. in the Introduction to that 

c He is so addressed in the first sentence and again in 
1060 a (chap. 3 intt.). No such person is mentioned by 
Plutarch in his other extant works ; but the name is frequent 
in inscriptions from the first to the third centuries (c/. also 
Martial, iii, 65 ; v, 46 ; vi, 34). Assuming, then, that under 
this name Plutarch is here representing himself as the head 
of a philosophical entourage whom a younger associate 
would recognize as authoritative, Babut contends that he 
could not have done this unless he had been at least forty 
years old when he wrote the dialogue (Plutarque et le 
Stolcisme, pp. 52-53). Its composition was assigned to 
Plutarch's thirties by Ziegler (R.-E. xxi/1 [1951], cols. 759, 
47-760, 19). 

d Cf. a> iraipt in 1063 e and 1066 n. Diadumenus is so 
addressed by him in 1072 d. 



the common conceptions and in whose belief divine 
providence sent Chrysippus to refute Arcesilaus, the 
initiator of the outrage against common experience, 
and to intercept Carneades by succouring sense- 
perception and eliminating the confusion -about pre- 
conceptions and conceptions (chap. 1). To this 
appeal Diadumenus responds with the retort that 
nature should then be believed to have produced 
Chrysippus providentially in order to turn life upside 
down, for he was most diligent in overthrowing 
common experience, that his dialectic by subverting 
the conception of demonstration and the preconcep- 
tion of proof destroyed its own principles and so left 
no other conception free of suspicion, and that the 
fault for which the Stoics blame the Academics is 
really their own, for they more than anyone else 
distort the common conceptions. Here Diadumenus 
checks himself, proposing to stop his denunciation 
and instead to speak in defence of the Academics on 
the charge brought against them by the Stoics (chap. 
2). To this the interlocutor demurs, however, saying 
that,, though he had come seeking such a defence as 
Diadumenus proposes to make, he has now changed 
and gone over to the prosecution instead, wishing to 
enjoy the revenge of seeing the Stoics themselves 
convicted on the very same charge that they had 
brought. This alteration in his attitude had been 

° This is the plain meaning of 1060 a (chaps. 2 sub fine m 
— 3). The complication made of it by Babut (Plutarque et 
le Stolcisme, pp. 35-38) is a mare's nest, for the interlocutor 
certainly does not " approve with enthusiasm," as Babut 
says he does (loc. cit., p. 35, n. 2), " the decision already 
taken by Diadumenus " to exchange the role of accuser for 
that of defendant but instead objects to the proposal, much 
as he later objects to the proposal to turn from the subject in 



dramatically prepared by the initial denunciation of 
the Stoics put into the mouth of Diadumenus (chap. 
2), who now without another word about the defence 
that he proposed to make a proceeds to prosecute 
the charge as formulated by the interlocutor : that 
the Stoics in their philosophizing are at odds with the 
common conceptions and preconceptions while yet 
maintaining that their system is developed from 
these as from its seed and is alone in agreement with 

Now, these " common conceptions " that the Stoics 
regarded as the seeds of their system they did not 
simply identify with " common opinion," what men 
generally assume or believe to be true, for this they 
held to be often false, the result of distortion or per- 
version. & Some of the former, on the truth of which 

hand to another (1066 n [chap. 16 init.]) ; and so there is 
nothing" enigmatic about the exchange between him and Dia- 
dumenus, nothing surprising in the fact that the latter, his 
proposal having been rejected, attempts thereafter not to 
defend the Academy but to prosecute the Stoics themselves, 
as he has been asked to do, and no reason to suppose him to 
mean and the interlocutor to understand him to mean by his 
proposal that he is provisionally renouncing the role of 
accuser and reserving for another work the direct refuta- 
tion of the Stoic dialectic and theory of common experience. 

° Any defence other than an attack of the kind that 
follows would, as Babut recognizes (Plutarque et le Sto'icisme, 
p. 38), hardly be possible for Diadumenus, who at the very 
beginning of the dialogue is said to be unconcerned about 
the charge that his school is at odds with the common con- 
ceptions, since he disdains their chief origin, the senses, and 
lacks the confidence in phenomena, which is their foundation. 

b Cf. S.V.F. iii, frags. 228-234; Musonius Rufus, vi 
(pp. 26, H-27, 10 [Hense]); Seneca, Epistle lxxxii, 23; 
Cicero, Tusc. Disp. i, 30 (" multi de dis prava sentiunt ; 
id vitioso more effici solet ") ; and on the other hand 



they insisted, they themselves called TrapdSo^a, i.e. 
contrary to common opinion or belief ; and to this 
Diadumenus calls attention when as a preface to the 
prosecution he gets his interlocutor's consent to 
exclude from it consideration of these Stoic para- 
doxes (1060 b [chap. 3]). Plutarch may have had 
him do this by way of acknowledging the obligation 
to prove his case by convicting the Stoics of con- 
tradicting not just u common opinion " but the 
common conceptions that they do themselves accept 
or can be required in consistency with some doctrine 
of theirs to accept as truly such. ft At any rate, in 
the course of his argument he several times expressly 
asserts that it shows them to be at odds not only 
with the common conceptions but with their own as 
well and even often to abandon their own in their 
eagerness to say something at odds with the former. 

Epictetus, Diss, in, vi, 8 : icrri rtva a ol pr) Travrd-naoiv $u- 
OTpanfAtvoi, rdv avOpcjirtov Kara, rds kolvcls d<f>opp.ds opwotv (cf. 
Bonhoffer, Epictet und die Stoa, p. 224). 

a Cf. Chrysippus in De Stoic. Repug. 1041 f supra : . . . 
7rXdajjLa(Ji BoKOVficv opuoia Xeyeiv. . . . 

b Cf. Babut, Plutarque et le Stoicisme> p. 40 and p. 42, 
lines 8-17. 

c Cf. 1068 d (chap. 20 sub finem) ; 1070 e (chap. 25) ; 
and 1062 a-b (chap. 8 sub finem) with 1084 d (chap. 46 init.). 
The last of these passages, occurring as it does in the second 
part of the prosecution, that which is concerned with the 
Stoic physical theory, is by itself enough to indicate that 
between this part and the first there is not the difference of 
" critical conception " that is found in them by Babut 
(Plutarque et le Stoicisme, pp. 42-45). According to him in 
the second part the conceptions and preconceptions of the 
Stoics themselves are no longer shown to be contradicted by 
the Stoic doctrines, as they were in the first part, but are 
now confused with the sensus communis and it is only with 
this that the Stoics are here accused of being at odds. 



Yet, as he brings the first part of his argument to 
a close, he says that he is trying to convict the Stoic 
system of doing violence to " our common concep- 
tions, 1 * i.e. those held by men generally a ; and 
throughout both parts of his attack he frequently 
cites as examples of conceptions with which the 
Stoics are at odds those that are held by " all men." b 
To such conceptions held by men generally the 
Stoics did themselves at times appeal as evidence in 
support of their own doctrines or in refutation of 
others, and even those that they rejected as errone- 

Such a simple differentiation between the two parts is in- 
compatible with the explicit statements at 1084 b in the 
second part and 1073 b-c (chap. 28) at the end of the first 
(see the next note infra) as well as with the intention of 
the arguments in both ; and, since the supposed " change 
of perspective " does not exist, Babut's hypothesis designed 
to account for it (loc. cit.> pp. 44-45) is needless. 

° In chapter 28 (1073 c) : ... rrjv alpeaiv avrdv iXdyxopev 
. . . ras Kotvas €Karpi<j>ovaav rjp.a>v Kal TTapa^ia^opievrjV iwoias 
and later specifically . . . ov iravres dvOpajnoi, Kal Traoai voovai 
K<d ovo/xd£ouai. 

b So in the second part besides 1079 a (ravra yap eTriaravrax 
kclI &Lavoovvrcu Trdvres dv fir} HtqhkoI yevwvrcu . . .), cited by 
Babut (Plutarque et Us Stolciens, p. 43, n. 3) as typical of 
that part and peculiar to it, cf. e.g. 1074 b (dreXes /xcv ovBels 
vo€t . . . ovroi 81 . . .), 1074 f — 1075 b (rls yap iariv dXXos 
av6po)Trcx)v rj ycyovcv os ovk d<f>Qaprov voct . . . ; ... dXXd Xpvo- 
ittttos Kal KXedvdrjs. . .), 1081 E-F (ol 5' aXXoi Trdvres avOpcoTTot 
. . . rlBevrai Kal voovoi Kal vojjll^ovgl. rovrwv <5'> ' Apxe8r)p.os 
pev . . . XpvaiTrnos oe . . .) but likewise in the first part 1061 
B-C (Trdvres yap . . . voovpev .... dXXd ovroi ye rovvavrtov . . .), 

1068 C (Trdvrcs yap dvdpajTTOi . . . vofiL^ovaiv . . . ol oe . . .), 

1069 a-b (kol p.r}v Trdvres avdpojTroi . . . v-rroAapt/Jdvouai . . . aXXd 
p.r)v rovro rrjs ?Lra)iKrjs o^ioXoyias . . .), 1070 B (enel Se KaOoXov 
rdyaOov d-navres avOpwrroi \aprdv voovoiv, . . . opa ro rovratv 
TTapanOels dyadov). 

c Cf. 1075 e (chap. 32 init.) with De Stoic. Repug. chap. 
38, 1076 c (chap. 34 init.), 1082 e (chap. 43 init.) ; Seneca, 



ous they regarded as distortions or perversions of 
the common preconceptions that they accepted 
themselves. Consequently, to prove that the Stoics 
are at odds with their own common conceptions 
Diadumenus besides showing that one of these is 
contradicted by some Stoic doctrine b or that those 
implied by different Stoic doctrines are incompatible 
or contradictory c may argue that some doctrine of 
theirs contradicts a conception generally held, a 
" common opinion " that they elsewhere themselves 
explicitly or by implication accept as a genuine 
common conception. d 

Epistle cxvii, 6 ; Sextus, Adv. Math, ix, 132 (S. V.F. ii, 
frag. 1018) ; Alexander, De Mixtione, p. 217, 2-9 (Bruns) = 
S. V.F. ii, frag. 473 (p. 154, 28-36). 

a See page 625, note b supra. 

b As e.g. in chapter 14 (1065 d-e) their own conception of 
god by their explanation of the origin of vice, in chapter 
40 (1080 e — 1081 a) their own conception of contact by their 
doctrines of interaction and of blending, and in chapter 47 
(1084 f — 1085 b) their conception of conception itself by 
their doctrine of the nature of the soul. 

c As e.g. those implied by the doctrines that the soul is 
generated by chilling and that the sun becomes animate by 
the change of liquid to fire (chap. 46 [1084 d-e]) and those 
implied by the doctrines that matter is without quality and 
that all qualities are bodies (chap. 50 [1085E-1086 a]). No 
genuine common conception or preconception can con- 
tradict or be incompatible with any other (cf. Epictetus, 
Diss, i, xxii, 1 and iv, i, 44). 

d So he argues e.g. in chapter 25 (1070 d-e) that the 
common opinion about the nature of the goal, with which 
statements by Chrysippus concur, is contradicted by the 
doctrine that no good is more or less good than any other ; 
in chapter 34 (1076 c-d) that the commonly held conception 
to which the Stoics appeal against a remark of Menander's 
is contradicted by their own doctrine of the origin of evil ; 
and in chapter 35 (1077 a-c) that the conception generally 



Beyond this, however, it may be asked by what 
right the Stoics use not all but only some of the 
common conceptions, which according to them are 
the natural criteria of truth , a what justifies them in 
appealing to those that seem to accord with their 
doctrines and rejecting as erroneous those that do 
not. So Diadumenus accuses them of playing fast 
and loose with the common conceptions, shifting 
them about like pieces in a game of draughts (1068 c 
[chap. 20]), and argues that instead of rectifying, as 
they ought to have done, the supposed confusions 
and aberrances they have left no conception intact 
(1074 e [chap. 31 init.]), that they reject as illegitimate 
those common conceptions that by their own canon 
of" clarity " have a better claim to legitimacy b than 

held of the relation of seed to its product, though implied by 
the Stoic etymologies, is contradicted by the Stoic doctrine 
of fire as the seed of the universe. 

a So Alexander, De Mixtione, p. 218, 10-21 (Bruns). 

b e.g. ovtojs ovhkv ivapyes ecrrt kcli tojv koivwv e^d/x€vo^ iv- 
voiu>v o>s . • . TavrrjV ovv avarptTrovoi ri)v cvapyciav outoi (1074 B 
[chap. 30]) ; Kairoi tto>s ovk ivapyis eart . . . av p.7] £tohkoi 
yiviovrai . . . (1079 a [chap. 38]) ; rovvavriov yap 6 Xoyos fiera 
Trjs evapydas voelv oLoohji . . . (1079 f [chap. 39]). Cf. Epictetus, 
JJiss. I, xxvii, 6 {npos ras rcov trpayp,6rro)v Tn.dav6T7)Tas tcls irpo- 
Xrnptis evapyds . . . €X €LV ^ ) w ith n, xx, 1 and m, iii, 4 ; and 
Alexander, De Mixtione, pp. 217, 32-218, 1 (Bruns) = £. V.F. 
ii, frag. 473 (p. 155, 24-30) and p. 227, 12-17 (Bruns) = £. V.F. 
ii, frag. 475 (p. 156, 19-23) with Alexander's reply, ibid., p. 
227, 20-22 (Bruns). According to Sandbach (Class. Quart., 
xxiv [1930], p. 50 ; cf. J. M. Rist, Stoic Philosophy [Cam- 
bridge, 1969], p. 141) the word eWpyciadoes not occur in any 
fragment of any Stoic earlier than Antipater (De Stoic. 
Repug. 1051 e-f) ; but in fact it occurs in a fragment of 
Ariston of Chios (S. V.F. i, frag. 346) and from what Plutarch 
says elsewhere it appears that the adjective had been used of 
conceptions by Chrysippus (see note c on De Stoic. Repug. 
1047 c supra). 



do the spurious ones that they seek to introduce 
instead, and that, while making themselves the 
advocates of " clarity " and the standards of the 
common conceptions over which they profess to keep 
watch and ward, 6 they force upon us misconceptions, 
conceptions that are inconceivable c and that involve 
the ruin of " clarity " and even of sense-perception,** 
the very basis of their own common conceptions sup- 
posedly made secure by Chrysippus against Academic 
assault (1059 b-c [chap. 1]). 

The proof of these charges against the Stoics con- 
stitutes the whole body of the work (chaps. 4<-50). It 
is in form a continuous speech by Diadumenus, which 
is interrupted only infrequently by a remark of the 
interlocutor's or a brief passage of dialogue with 
him e and which ends without any formal resume or 

* Cf. 1070 c (chap. 24, where n.b. also ... a p,dXXov eSa 
. . . aa<f>€GT€pav exeiv tt)v ivdpyeiav) and 1084 a (chap. 45 init.). 

b Cf. ol TTpohiKoi rrjs ivapyctas ovtol kcli kolvovzs ra>v tvvotcov 
(1083 c [chap. 44]), . . . oitlus uvvi&ys ov rpd-nov Ste^uAarre rds 
KOivas ivvolas (1079 c [chap. 38]), and ovtcos irrfpet rds ivvolas 
(1079 d [chap. 39]). 

e e.g. . . . ovok oiavo-qrov ion. tovto 8e /Jtafovrat voelv rjfids 
(1081 a [chap. 40]) and . . . ws napavotiv T) p,aXXov 77 voeiv 
dvay«d£ovras (1083 F [chap. 44]). 

d Cf. 1082 a (. . . ri)v irdoav e^et ovyx VULV T V^ ivapyelas) and 
1082 D (. . . ovBevos dnXdis aiadv,ais ioTiv. . . . ovhkv <ovv,> ouS' 
av napfj ri, alodrjrov ioriv . . .) in chapter 42 ; 1084 b (. . . 
VTrepfioXi] tls icrrw oXiyajplas kglI irapavop.las els rrjv ivdpyaav kclI 
rrjv avvrjOecav) in chapter 45, retorting the Stoic charge that 
Arcesilaus began rrjs els rrjv crvvqdetav vfipews nai irapavopilas 
of the Academics (1059 b [chap. 1]). 

e In chapters 4-50 there are only seven such passages : 
1066 d-e (chap. 16), 1068 e-f (chap. 22), 1071 b (chap. 26), 
1072 b (chap. 27), 1072 d-e (chap. 27), 1073 b (chap. 28), and 
1079 b (chap. 38). Against the argument that this paucity 
of dialogue in the body of the work is a reason for doubting 
Plutarch's authorship cf. C. Kahle, De Plutarcki Rutione 


conclusion. It is divided into two parts by Dia- 
dumenus himself, who in chapter 29 says that, having 
shown into what troubles the Stoics plunge ethical 
theory, he will now in what follows show how their 
physical theory " confounds the common precon- 
ceptions no less than does their theory of goals." 

In the first place, Diadumenus contends, the Stoics 
in professing that their doctrine is in agreement with 
nature are at odds with their conception of what is in 
conformity with nature, for the latter, the things to 
which man is by nature congenial, they conceive as 
being not good or useful but indifferent (chap. 4) ; 
and so it contradicts their conception of nature as 
indifferent to assert, as they do, that to be in agree- 
ment with nature is the greatest good, while either 
this assertion or their conception of nature as attract- 
ing us to things that contribute nothing to happiness 
is contradicted by the statement of Chrysippus that 
to live happily consists solely in living virtuously 
(chap. 5). b 

Moreover, they contradict their own conception 
of the good, according to which all good things and 
actions are equally good, for they maintain that not 
all good actions are equally estimable and not every 

Dialogorum Componendorum (Diss. Gottingen, 1912), pp. 

a See supra p. 396, n. a in the Introduction to the De 
Stoicorum Repugnant its. 

b The common conception said to be contradicted by the 
Stoic assertion that life in conformity with nature is a goal 
but the things in conformity with nature are indifferent, i.e. 
Kaddnep ra alpcra rrpos to ux^eXifMajs ovtojs to. Kara <f>voiv rrpos 
to r ijv Kara <f>voiv, is not one accepted as legitimate by the 
Stoics but one which Plutarch apparently thinks they can- 
not rationally reject (see infra note c on 1060 e). 



object of choice, i.e. every good, is commendable at 
all (chap. 6), that their sage, i.e. the perfectly good 
man, is indifferent to the presence or absence of some 
things that to them are great goods but not to that 
of what they call indifferent (chap. 7) a and is un- 
concerned even about the blessed state of perfect 
good that he has achieved upon his escape from what 
they regard as utter wretchedness and depravity, 
and that, though duration does not augment good- 
ness, i.e. virtue and happiness, there is no value at 
all in goodness and virtue of brief duration (chap. 8). 
Furthermore, their conception of the good as per- 
ceptible and greatly different from what is not good 
is contradicted by their contention that a man may 
have acquired perfect goodness without perceiving 
either its presence or the absence of the evil that has 
left him, a doctrine which implies besides other 
absurdities and contradictions of common concep- 
tions that, since according to the Stoics the change 
from the summit of progress to happiness and virtue 
is instantaneous, either progress towards virtue is 
contrary to their conception of it not a state of vice 
and unhappiness or the difference between evil and 
good is contrary to their conception so minute as to 
be imperceptible (chap. 9)- As do these conflicting 
propositions of theirs, so do their actions contradict 
their own common conceptions, for they conceive 

° In this the Stoics are said at the beginning of the 
chapter (1061 b-c) to be at odds also with the conception 
generally held of what is alperov Kal ayadov Kal iLfaXcfiov and 
of what is dSid<j>opov, for all men conceive the latter to he that 
about which one would not be concerned at all and the former 
to be that the presence of which is accompanied by advantage 
(ov-qcris) and the absence by a kind of want and yearning 
(c^Scta Kal ope&s). 


vice to be without difference of degree and insist 
that all men who are not sages are equally vicious but 
treat some of them as tolerable and some as men 
whose words and acts and lives are worthy of their 
own emulation (chap. 10). 

Twice in the foregoing (1060 c-d [chap. 4 subftneiri] 
and 1061 d-e [chap. 7 sub jinein\) Diadumenus has 
referred to the doctrine of the Stoics that suicide is 
justified by the absence of some things and the 
presence of others that they yet insist are neither 
good nor evil but are indifferent. Now reverting to 
this, he calls it contrary to the common conception 
to maintain, as the Stoics do, that the sage, possess- 
ing all good and so perfect and secure happiness, 
ought to renounce life because he lacks something 
indifferent whereas one who has not and never will 
have anything good ought to remain alive ; and he 
argues that the Stoics thus destroy their own con- 
ception of virtue as the good, which alone is an object 
of choice and alone beneficial, since it is by the 
things in conformity with nature and according to 
them indifferent that their own philosophy and their 
lives are governed, the standard by which life must 
be measured being according to Chrysippus himself 
not goods and evils but the things in conformity with 
nature and contrary to it (chap. 11). Having thus 
argued that the Stoics in fact esteem the indifferent 
as better than virtue and so contradict their own con- 
ception of the good, Diadumenus now adds (chap. 12) 
that Chrysippus puts the finishing touch to this him- 
self by his argument against the suicide of those who 
are not sages, for in saying that to live a fool forever 
is better than not to be alive he says in effect that 
what the Stoics call indifferent is worse than what 



they call evil and so contradicts their conception of 
evil as being without difference of degree and of folly 
as being the only object of avoidance. 

This leads to the reminder that Chrysippus ex- 
plicitly declared the genesis of vice useful to the 
universe because without vice the good would not 
exist either, a notion that, Diadumenus immediately 
objects, would imply the absence of good among the 
gods and in the state of the Stoic ecpyrosis and 
would require the gods to maintain depravity in the 
world in order to ensure the existence of virtue 
(chap. 13). The analogy drawn by Chrysippus 
between vice and the vulgar lines in comedy ascribes 
the origin of vice to divine providence, thus con- 
tradicting the Stoic conception of the gods as dis- 
pensers of good only and of vice as god-detested, and 
is in accord neither with the Stoic conception of the 
universe as a concordant commonwealth of gods and 
men nor with that of human life as entirely dis- 
ordered and vicious (chap. 14) ; and, moreover, 
when one asks for what in the universe is vice useful, 
one finds the Stoics themselves denying that it is 
useful either for things celestial and divine or for 
human affairs, so that the utility of vice is reduced 
to a name of nothing (chap. 15). 

When Diadumenus now proposes to drop this 
subject and turn to another, the interlocutor objects, 
saying that he is eager to know how the Stoics give 
evil and vice precedence of good and virtue, 1, and, 

° The implication of chapters 11 and 12 together is that 
the Stoics in esteeming the indifferent as better than virtue 
and as worse than evil do in fact give evil precedence of 

6 i.e. the implication of chapters 11 and 12. 
63 V 


himself eliminating as invalid one of the two Stoic 
arguments that Diadumenus gives in reply, asks for 
the Academic answer to the other, that prudence, 
being the knowledge of good and evil, would not 
exist if evil did not exist (chap. 16). This dialogic 
exchange is apparently meant to emphasize the im- 
portance of the answers now given by Diadumenus. 
In the first place, prudence is the name given to the 
means by which are distinguished the good and evil 
that do exist but do not exist in order that there may 
be prudence any more than black and white exist in 
order that there may be sight ; in the second place, 
the Stoic conception of prudence as necessarily im- 
plying the existence of evil is contradicted by the 
Stoic doctrine that in the ecpyrosis the whole of 
existence is prudent and sage though there is no 
evil a ; and it is merely a matter of names if the 
Stoics because of their conception of prudence as 
knowledge of good and evil refuse to call prudence 
the equivalent faculty by which good things alone 
or good and indifferent things would be known if 
only these and no evils existed (chap. 17). Moreover, 
even the notion that there could be no knowledge 
of good and evil, i.e. that the conception of evil is 
inconceivable, if only good existed is inconsistent 
with the assertion of the Stoics that men, who are ail 
entirely evil and vicious, can yet conceive of prudence 
and the good and without having virtue can yet in- 
duce an apprehension of it, the implication being 
that according to the common conceptions with 
which the Stoics profess to be in accord folly by itself 

a A similar argument was used by Diadumenus in his 
original objections to the doctrine that without vice good 
would not exist either (chap. 13 [1065 b]). 



can apprehend prudence but prudence by itself can 
apprehend neither itself nor folly (chap. 18). 

This use of the Stoic doctrine that in all men there 
is nothing of good but only evil suggests the argu- 
ment that the conception of evil as required by 
nature for the reason alleged by Chrysippus, even if 
this be granted, does not justify that doctrine of the 
viciousness of all men and even of those at the summit 
of progress (chap. 19) ; and this brings Diadumenus 
back to the usefulness of vice according to Chrysippus 
and specifically to the question in chapter 15 for 
what it is useful, since, as Chrysippus held that to 
these men who are not sages nothing is useful, vice 
cannot be useful for the base who have it (chap. 20 
[1068 a]). This leads to the argument that the 
Stoics wilfully pervert the common conceptions held 
by all men of " to have use for," " to be in need of," 
" to be in want of " a and in so doing abandon their 
own as well (chap. 20 [1068 a-d]). Returning to the 
Stoic assertion that no base man can receive any 
benefit, Diadumenus argues that from this, itself at 
odds with the common conceptions generally held, 
an inference is drawn which is nevertheless contra- 
dicted by the Stoics themselves. They infer that the 
base man, because he can receive no benefit, cannot 
be gratified and so cannot be ungrateful ; but they 
then extend gratification to the intermediates, admit- 
ting that these may gratify though not benefit even 
the base man, and thereby imply further that con- 
trary to their own conception one can be gratified 
by that for which one has neither use nor need 
(chap. 21). 

a Partially foreshadowed in 1061 b-c (see p. 632, n. a 



Here the interlocutor intervenes again, ostensibly 
to cut short a digression by asking Diadumenus what 
the highly prized benefit is that he has just said the 
Stoics reserve for sages alone. a This question with 
the brief reply that it is every act of every other sage 
everywhere serves as a transition and an emphatic 
introduction b to the contradictions now to be 
revealed in the Stoic conception of the beneficial. 
Whereas all other men suppose that selection is a 
beneficial action only if the objects selected are bene- 
ficial, the Stoics, while holding that the only good is 
the selection of what is in conformity with nature, 
maintain that these objects of the selection are not 
beneficial but are indifferent, though, if they are not 
selected and obtained, life is not worth living (chap. 
22 [1069 A_E ]) > and so in their attempt to deny that 
what is in conformity with nature is beneficial they 
call the same things unbeneficial but yet useful and 
of no concern to us but yet principles of our duties, 
appealing to nature for some of their doctrines and 
for others rejecting her or rather in their own actions 
cleaving to the things in conformity with nature as 
good and objects of choice but in their talk spurning 
them as indifferent and useless (chap. 23). Since 
they maintain that for the sake of these indifferent 

a The interlocutor says (1068 e-f) ravra fikv ovv d<f>€s. -q Se 
TroXvTifirjTOS ctx^cAeia tls eoriv, fjv a»S" \itya. ri rols oo(f>ols ^atperop 
</>v\aTToi>T€s . . ., referring to the words in the preceding 
chapter, to ixkv OK^eAeiv koli wfaXtiodcu cro<f>u)v £otl (see note d 
on 1068 e infra). 

6 This character of the interlocutor's question and the 
reply to it (*Av els oo<j>6s 6ttovBtJ7tot€ . *. . kclv firj ovvohjl ftrjBe 
yiyvixiGKovTzs Tvyxdvcoai [1068 f^-1069 a]) is disregarded by 
Sandbach, who calls the following koI i*r)v" the most abrupt " 
of the " fresh starts " in the first part of the work (Class. 
Quart., xxxiv [1940], p. 23, n. 1). 



things reason often requires the good to be sur- 
rendered and that without them life even with what 
they call the good is not to be endured, their con- 
ception of the good is at odds with that universally 
held of it as being what is of the highest value and 
sufficient in itself a ; and this, Diadumenus adds, is 
a prime example of the outrage they do to common 
experience and of their way of substituting spurious 
for legitimate common conceptions even in matters 
the clarity of which should be most manifest 
(chap. 24). 

A transition from the beneficial selection of un- 
beneficial objects to the topic of the goal is provided 
by the next chapter, where Diadumenus. argues that 
the Stoic conception of goods as not differing in 
degree is in conflict with the common conception 
generally held of the goal as a greater good than 
goods that subserve it and, in effect making what is 
not the goal equal to the goal, is therewith in conflict 
with Stoic doctrines too, since according to Chrysip- 
pus himself a good that subserves the goal is eo ipso 
not the goal, just as his recognition of evils that 
injure but do not make us worse, being in agreement 
with the common conception of these as lesser evils 
than those that do make us worse, contradicts the 
Stoic denial of a difference of degree in evil (chap. 25). 

The Stoic conception of the goal itself, Diadumenus 
now argues, requires the Stoics to accept one of the 
alternatives, both of which are in conflict with the 
common conceptions accepted by the Stoics them- 
selves, for they deny both that life has more than one 

° In chapters 11-12 it had been argued that this doctrine 
of the Stoics contradicts their own conceptions of good and 
evil (see pp. 633-634 supra). 



goal and that each particular action is to be referred 
to something other than this one goal. They say 
that the primary things conforming with nature are 
not themselves good and the goal is not the obtaining 
of them but is the rational selection of these things 
that are a kind of matter with selective value/ 1 and 
they thus deny both that the attainment and the 
rational selection are two separate goals and that the 
former is the goal of the latter ; but, since it is 
absurd to make the latter the goal of the former or 
its own goal, rational selection must have another 
and different goal, for according to the Stoics them- 
selves to be rational it must be related to some goal, 
and so in short the doctrine that the goal itself is 
rational selection contradicts the Stoic conception of 
rational selection (chap. 26). Testimony to this con- 
tradiction is provided by Chrysippus himself in his 
argument against Ariston that the conception of in- 
difference to what is not good presupposes a con- 
ception of the good unless indifference is to have 
subsistence prior to itself, for a fortiori then the 
Stoic conception of the good as prudence, this being 
knowledge of good and evil, requires a prior con- 
ception of the good, so that, if the only good is prud- 
ence, the conception of either requires the prior 
conception of the other. 6 The procedure is then 
applied to the Stoic conception of the essence of good 
as the rational selection of the things in conformity 

8 At this point (1071 Bj the interlocutor applauds the 
accuracy with which the Stoic position has been reported, 
but incidentally by the interruption he sets it off from the 
attack upon it which follows. 

* Here (1072 n) a brief exchange of question and answer 
emphasizes the circularity involved. 



with nature (1072 b-e) : since rational selection, as 
was said before (in chap. 26 subjinem), is selection 
that is made relative to some goal and the goal is 
rational behaviour in the acts of selection, this be- 
haviour proceeding from the habitude rationality so 
that no conception of good is involved, the conception 
of rationality presupposes that of the goal and that 
of the goal implies that of rationality ; and, since the 
objects of the selection are selected not because they 
are good but because they have value relative to the 
goal, the goal turns out to be rational behaviour in 
the acts of selecting the things that have value for 
rational behaviour. This argument is repeated and 
explicated in the form of a brief dialogue between 
Diadumenus and the interlocutor (1072 e), who pro- 
fessed not to understand from the first formulation 
of it how the result was reached (chap. 27). 

The first part of the work might have been ex- 
pected to end with this dialogue emphatically re- 
stating the argument that even the Stoic doctrine of 
the goal of life is in conflict with a common concep- 
tion employed by Chrysippus himself to refute 
Ariston ; but instead Diadumenus, conceding that 
his last argument is thought by some to be directed 
against Antipater rather than the Stoic system 
(1072 f [chapter 27 subjlnem]), makes this concession 
a transition to the charge (chap. 28) that all members 
of the school hold a doctrine of love that is in conflict 
with the common conceptions. They hold that none 
of the fair, i.e. the wise and virtuous, is loved or worth 
loving and that the lovers of the young, who being 

° Cf. the \iiv . . . Be connecting the last sentence of 
chapter 27 (dXXa tovto /zeV eloiv ol . . .) and the first sentence 
of chapter 28 (twv 8e nepl epcoros . . . tt&olv clvtoTs • . .)• 
640 "" 


base and stupid are ugly, stop loving them when they 
have become fair ; but, Diadumenus maintains, their 
notion that love is incited by a semblance of beauty 
in the ugly and vicious is in conflict with their own 
doctrine that the outward form is defiled by depravity 
of character, while it is contrary to the common con- 
ception for the ugly to be lovable because he will one 
day have beauty and once he has got it to be loved 
by no one (1073 a-b). Here the interlocutor inter- 
venes and intervenes for once to defend the Stoics, a 
explaining that by love they mean the pursuit of an 
undeveloped stripling with a natural aptitude for 
virtue. Whereupon Diadumenus replies that this is 
precisely the kind of thing of which he is trying to 
convict them, for it would have been unobjectionable 
to call the zeal of sages about young men a " pur- 
suit " or a " making friends " of them but in calling 
it " love," the common conception of which is entirely 
different, the Stoics use words in a Pickwickian sense 
to turn inside out our legitimate common conceptions 
(1073 b-c), which is to say that with the pretence of 
replacing spurious conceptions by legitimate ones 
they in fact substitute the former for the latter {cf. 
1070 c [chap. 24] supra). The particular subject of 
this chapter, which has been called " an inorganic 
appendix " to the tjOlkos ro7ro<;, b was chosen for the 
sake of the interlocutor's defence of this Stoic 
doctrine ; and this unique defence was introduced in 
order that Diadumenus in his reply to it might con- 

° This seems to have been misunderstood by C. Kahle, 
be Plutarchi Ratlone Dialogorum Componendorum (Diss. 
Gbttingen, 1912), p. 112. 

6 Cf. M. Pohlenz, Hermes, lxxiv (1939), p. 23 and Babut, 
Plutarque et le Stotcisme, p. 46. 



elude the first part of the work by clearly restating 
the nature and limits of his accusation. 

Dismissing the Stoic dialectic in a formal transition 
from ethical topics to the principles of Stoic physical 
theory, Diadumenus now proposes to prove that the 
latter confounds the common preconceptions no less 
than the Stoic theory of goals has been shown to do 
(chap. 29). He begins with what the Stoics call the 
sum of things (to tt&v), arguing that according to 
their own conception of the existent it must be non- 
existent, that their conception of it is identical with 
the common conception that all men have of nothing, 
and that in all this they subvert clear apprehension, 
i.e. the guarantee of legitimacy for the common con- 
ceptions with which they are at odds (chap. 30). 
From this, which he says may seem to be too much 
of a logical difficulty, he proceeds to matters of a 
more physical nature and of these first to the Stoic 
conception of divinity (chaps. 31-S6). a 

This, he argues, is in the first place at odds with 
the conception of the gods held by all men who have 
or ever have had a conception of god, for according 
to it divinity is indestructible and everlasting, where- 
as Chrysippus and Cleanthes hold that none of the 
gods is so excepting Zeus, in whom all the rest are 
consumed b and who also therefore has destruction 
as an attribute, so that moreover there is no genuine 

For theology as the consummation of Stoic physics cf. 
Chrysippus in JDe Stoic. Repng. 1035 a-b : ... twv Se <j>v- 
01KCJV iaxcLTOS clvai 6 nepi rwv 6*wv Xoyos' Sto kcu reAeras' npoo- 
rjyop€vaav ras rovrov irapabocrtis (-S.V.F. ii, pp. l(i, 38- 
17, 2). 

b In the ecpyrosis, the doctrine of the Stoics that was used 
for a different argument against them in chapters 13 and 17 



difference between the conception of man and the 
Stoic conception of god as a rational animal subject 
to destruction — and in fact according to Cleanthes 
even contributing to that destruction (chap. 31). 
Furthermore, the Stoics contradict their own con- 
ception of the gods, for they must accept as legitimate 
the common preconception of god as not only im- 
mortal and blessed but also humane, protective, and 
beneficent, since they denounce the Epicurean 
denial of providence for violating this preconcep- 
tion, and yet they maintain themselves that what 
the gods provide is only indifferent and neither good 
nor beneficial (chap. 32), that the human sage and 
Zeus himself are equally virtuous and blissful and 
of equal benefit to each other, and that human affairs 
are in the worst plight possible though administered 
by Zeus in the best possible fashion (chap. 33) ; and 
this contradiction is aggravated by their appeal to 
the common conception against Menander's making 
good the origin of human ills, for they make god, 
though good, the origin of evil, since according to 
their physics matter cannot be the cause of it and no 
part of the world, even the slightest of which is 
according to them a part of Zeus, can be otherwise 
than in conformity with the will of Zeus (chap. 34). 
This refers to the doctrine of Zeus as the differenti- 
ated and articulate world in the diacosmesis, as the 
first chapter of this section (chap. 31 [1075 b-d]) did 
to the ecpyrosis, when all the other gods are con- 
sumed in Zeus ; and now it is charged that the Stoics 
in their more strictly physical statements of this 
doctrine ° contradict their own common conceptions, 

° That this doctrine in chapter 35 has already appeared 
in chapters 31 and 34 is overlooked by Pohlenz when he 



for, whereas their etymologies of the words for 
" seed " and " nature " commit them to the common 
conception of the former as smaller and more com- 
pact than that which is developed from it, they 
assert that the seed of the universe, which is fire, is 
larger and more diffuse than the universe, which is 
developed from it by shrinkage and dwindling and 
which by diffusion of its lesser mass turns into its 
seed again (chap. 35). This fire, moreover, in the 
ecpyrosis is according to them both Zeus and pro- 
vidence, that is to say a single substance with two 
individual qualifications, which conflicts with the 
common conception as the Academic assertion of 
indistinguishable likenesses does not, though they 
attack this for confusing everything by requiring 
that there be several substances with one and the 
same qualification (chap. 36). a 

Here Diadumenus formally turns from theology 

says (Hermes, lxxiv [1939], p. 27) that what is said of it in 
35 " kniipft unmittelbar an 30 an " and that, whereas 30, 
35, and 36 treat physical problems, " die religios-ethische 
Kritik in 31-34 unterbricht den Zusammenhang." More- 
over, the more logical character of the difficulty raised in 
chapter 30 is admitted at the beginning of chapter 31 ; and 
it is there that Diadumenus says oupa>fjL€0a tcov <f>vaiKwT€pcov (see 
p. 642, n. a supra), to which apparently Pohlenz thinks Plu- 
tarch expressly returns with the ra>v (frvaiKturcpov Xeyo^ievcuv 
here at the beginning of chapter 35. 

a Here Plutarch does not make as clear as he might have 
done the argument that the Stoics are in conflict with their 
own conception. They maintain that two or more different 
substances cannot have one and the same individual quali- 
fication, because substance is differentiated by one such 
qualification ; but this conception of theirs of the differentia- 
tion of substance is contradicted by their doctrine that in 
the ecpyrosis there is a single substance with two such 
qualifications (see the notes on 1077 d-k infra). 



to the Stoic treatment of the elements, beginning 
with the doctrine of thorough blending, on which all 
the Stoic physics was held to depend. Whereas ac- 
cording to the common conception a continuous body 
that is a plenum cannot penetrate another such body 
and one of these cannot be the place of the other, 
the Stoics, he says, assume the contrary of this 
common conception and make a doctrine of it, with 
the consequence that they must admit propositions 
such as u three are four " which to other men are 
expressions of what is inconceivable and must main- 
tain that it is inconceivable for one body to encom- 
pass another or to be the receptacle of another, since 
in the blend the bodies thoroughly interpenetrate 
each other (chap. 37) ; and, whereas it is contrary 
to the common conception that body have no ex- 
tremities or ultimate parts, without which one magni- 
tude could not be conceived to be greater or smaller 
than another, so that inequality would be inconceiv- 
able and therewith unevenness and corporeal rough- 
ness also, all these are abolished by the Stoics, for 
whom bodies have no terminal parts but in number 
of parts all extend to infinity. For support of the 
common conception of all men that the parts of a 
man are more than those of his finger and those of 
the universe more than those of a man Diadumenus 
appeals to the canon of clarity, and he maintains 
that the Stoics must assert the contrary of this clear 
conception because their division of bodies reduces 
all to an equally infinite number of parts (chap. 38 
[1078—1079 b]). 

Here for the last time and the only time in the 
second part of the work the interlocutor interrupts 
Diadumenus, asking whether the Stoics do not 



grapple with these difficulties and by this question 
marking the transition from the preceding develop- 
ment of the difficulties to the specific " contradic- 
tions " in the Stoic resolutions of them. To the 
question Diadumenus replies ironically that the 
Stoics do grapple with them ingeniously and man- 
fully, and therewith he begins his detailed exposure 
of the way in which by these doctrines of theirs they 
" keep watch and ward over the common concep- 
tions/' First, he quotes Chrysippus on ultimate parts 
and, interpreting him to mean that the number of 
constituent parts of any body is " neither infinite 
nor finite,' ' argues that this implies either a concep- 
tion of an intermediate between finite and infinite, 
which Chrysippus does not identify, or the equival- 
ent of a premise neither true nor false, which is itself 
in conflict with the Stoic conception (chap. 38 [1079 
b-d]). Then he argues that Chrysippus involves 
himself in similar contradictions with regard to the 
equal and unequal when he tries to resolve the 
difficulties concerning them caused by the denial of 
ultimate parts and the doctrine of the continuity of 
body, 6 for his way of " preserving the common con- 

a And does not, it is implied, because such a conception 
is inconceivable ; cf. eiVovra ri tovt iorlv I5et Xvacu ttjv dnoptav 
here (1079 c) with the statement in the next chapter concern- 
ing an intermediate between equal and unequal : . . . kclI ravr 
laov Kal avlaov fxevov, o fLr)h€T€p6v eVriv, ovk exovras elirelv ovhk 
vorjaat, 8vvafi€vovs (1080 u). 

6 Since these are the first of the two kinds of difficulties 
raised in chapter 38 (1078 f), chapter 39, the whole of which 
is devoted to them, as 1079 b-d had been devoted to the 
second kind (1079 a-b), is not a " digression " as it is called 
by Babut (Plutarque et le Sto1cisme> p. 46 with n. 1), who 
cites with approval the suggestion made by Sandbach (see 
infra note b on 1078 e). 



ceptions " is to say that the inclined faces of a 
pyramid do not exceed where they are larger, though 
this implies that what is larger is not larger and what 
is unequal is equal, and his resolution of the Demo- 
critean dilemma about the cone is that of the conic 
segments the bodies are unequal but the surfaces of 
those bodies are neither equal nor unequal, though 
this is contrary to the common conception provided 
by reason together with clear apprehension (i.e. by 
what according to the Stoics themselves guarantees 
the legitimacy of a common conception) ; and, if it 
be granted that the surfaces of unequal bodies can 
be neither equal nor unequal, it must be granted 
that there can be such magnitudes and numbers too, 
though an intermediate between equal and unequal 
is inexpressible and inconceivable, while for the 
Stoics to posit bodies that are neither equal nor un- 
equal, as they must if they posit such surfaces, and 
to deny that not to be equal to each other is to be 
unequal is to contradict the conception implied by 
their censure of the Epicureans for supposing certain 
indivisible movements to be neither in motion nor 
at rest. Finally Diadumenus returns to his citation 
of Chrysippus at the beginning of the chapter, argu- 
ing that his " larger without exceeding " is a self- 
contradiction, since, if of two things neither exceeds 
the other, the two coincide and therefore neither is 
larger and, if one of the two is larger, they do not 
coincide and therefore one does exceed the other — 
unless according to Chrysippus and contrary to the 
common conception because neither exceeds the 

° Cf. in 1079 c the statement about an intermediate 
between finite and infinite (p. 646, n. a supra). 



other they do not coincide and because one is larger 
than the other they do (chap. 39). 

From these contradictions of the common con- 
ceptions into which the Stoics because of their denial 
of ultimate parts are supposedly forced by the 
problems of increments in the faces of the pyramid 
and of the contiguous surfaces of conic segments 
Diadumenus goes on to the question of bodily con- 
tact as such and argues that this for the same reason 
forces them into similar contradictions. To the 
Epicurean indivisibles the Stoics object that there 
can be no contact of whole with whole, for that is 
blending and not contact, or of part with part, for 
indivisibles have no parts (i.e. the Epicureans must 
contradict the common conception of bodily contact), 
and themselves maintain that bodies are in contact 
not at a part of themselves but at a limit, which is 
not body , but then, Diadumenus contends, con- 
trary to the common conception implicit in their 
refutation of the Epicureans they must admit that, 
since an incorporeal always intervenes between 
bodies and according to them only bodies are exist- 
ent, nothing ever touches anything and that, since 
bodies always touch each other with an incorporeal, 
they touch each other with nothing. Moreover, this 
conception of contact is contradicted by their own 
doctrine of interaction and blending, for, since it is 
by contact that bodies affect one another, they would 
have to do so by incorporeal limits ; but in the blend- 
ing of bodies these limits must either persist or be 
destroyed, and either alternative, the persistence of 
limits of bodies in a blend or the destruction and 
generation of incorporeals, is contrary to the common 
conceptions accepted by the Stoics themselves and 


inconceivable by anyone, as it is inconceivable also 
that a body should tinge, heat, or crush another by 
contact of incorporeal limits, though it is such mis- 
conceptions that the Stoics would force upon us in 
place of the common preconceptions of incorporeals 
and bodies that they annihilate (chap. 40). 

This denial of ultimate parts also entails contra- 
diction of the common conception of time as past, 
present, and future, for the Stoics must either deny 
the existence of present time altogether, as does 
Archedemus, who calls " now " a juncture of past 
and future and so unwittingly resolves the whole of 
time into limits, or though asserting its existence 
must divide it exhaustively into parts that are all 
either past or future, as does Chrysippus, who main- 
tains that of time only what is present exists and 
yet that of present time part is past and part is 
future, so that in fact he leaves no time existing 
(chap. 41) ° ; and this involves the utter ruin of clear 
apprehension, for, since actions and motions are 
divided in correspondence with time, it abolishes all 
initiation and termination of them, so that whatever 
is occurring never began and will never stop occur- 
ring and, as every part of it either has occurred or is 
about to occur but neither what is past nor what is 
future is an object of sensation, there are no objects 
of sensation at all (chap. 42), which is to say that this 
Stoic doctrine of continuity with its denial of ultimate 

° The pair of " contradictory quotations " from Chrysip- 
pus at the end of the chapter, which Sandbach unaccount- 
ably says 44 could be dispensed with " (Class. Quart., xxxiv 
[1940], p. 24, last paragraph), provides the evidence for the 
second alternative (17 . . . " lari xp° vo $ ^vearr}Kws, ,y ov to fiev 
€V€iar^K€L to 8' evoTiqotTan., . . .). 



parts destroys what the Stoics themselves hold to be 
the source and the guarantee of their own common 

So it does also when applied to locomotion , a for it 
constrains them to contradict the common conception 
more flagrantly than does Epicurus, whom they 
castigate for violating this by having his atoms all 
move with equal velocity, since by making infinitely 
divisible the space to be traversed they make it in- 
conceivable for one moving body to be overtaken by 
another or for any effusion of a liquid or locomotion 
of a solid ever to be completed (chap. 4-3). 

From this Diadumenus passes to the problem of 
growth, marking the transition with a reminder that 
he is confining himself to those of the Stoic ab- 
surdities " that are at odds with the common con- 
ception." b The Stoics, he says, accuse the Academics 
of annihilating the preconceptions and contradicting 
the common conceptions by concluding that what 

a It should be observed that Diadumenus reaches this 
topic after having treated in order the contradictions implied 
by the doctrine as to number (chap. 38 [1079 b-d]), to 
geometricals (chap. 39), to corporeal solids (chap. 4-0), and 
to time and temporal process (chaps. 4.1-42). 

b According to Sandbach (Class, Quart., xxxiv [1940], 
p. 24, n. 2) this is nearly a confession that chapters 40-43 are 
41 not really suitable to Plutarch's purpose " : but this shows 
disregard both for Plutarch's way of arguing that the im- 
plications of Stoic doctrine contradict common conceptions 
accepted by the Stoics themselves and for the sequence of 
his argument, for which in chapters 38-43 see the last pre- 
ceding note. The connexion of the topic of chapter 37 (also 
thought by Sandbach [foe. cit.} to be unsuitable to Plutarch's 
purpose) with that of chapters 38-43 and of both with the 
Stoic doctrine of the elements was recognized by Pohlenz 
(Hermes, Ixxiv [1939], pp. 29-30). 



is called growth and decay is really generation and 
destruction because substances are constantly in flux 
and with the accession and loss of particles are con- 
stantly passing from one existing state into another ; 
and yet these Stoics admit the Academic premises 
about the flux of substance and then invent for each 
individual as the persistent subject of its growth and 
diminution a quality that is affected in all ways 
contrary to the substance but is coalescent with it 
and not perceptibly distinguishable from it. This 
assumption of an undiscerned and indiscernible 
doublet of each individual, however, is contrary to 
the clear apprehension of which they are the ad- 
vocates and to the common conceptions of which 
they profess to be the standards and so by their own 
canon is a misconception, which they force upon us 
because they see no other way of saving the pheno- 
mena of growth (chap. 44) ; but there is not even 
such an excuse for them to abolish the common con- 
ceptions and substitute alien ones as they do by 
making virtues and vices and all mental states and 
acts corporeal and even living beings and by cram- 
ming them into a single point in the heart, where the 
ruling faculty of the soul is filled with this indis- 
tinguishable multitude of bodies (chap. 45). 

While they thus contradict the common precon- 
ceptions and scornfully outrage clear apprehension 
and common experience with their conception of 
states and acts as corporeal and animate and with 
their invention of an indistinguishable multitude of 
animate bodies within the soul, their doctrine of the 
soul itself implies preconceptions that are in open 
conflict with those implied by other doctrines of 
their own. So their account of the generation of soul 



implies the conception of animation as the product 
of chilling and condensation ; but, whereas according 
to this the sun too should be generated by chilling 
and condensation, they say to the contrary that it 
has become animate by the change of liquid into in- 
tellectual fire, i.e. by subtilization and heating, and 
do not in consistency with their doctrine of the soul 
generate by heat things that are cold, by diffusion 
those that are solid, or by rarefaction those that are 
heavy (chap. 46). a Moreover, according to them the 
soul is a vaporous exhalation perpetually in flux and 
constantly being altered and transformed and con- 
ception is a mental image, which is an impression in 
the soul ; but, since a substance continually in 
motion and flux cannot receive and retain an imprint, 
their conceptions of conception as a conserved 
notion, of memory as a stable impression, and of the 
forms of knowledge as unalterable and steadfast are 
contradicted by their own doctrine of the nature of 
soul (chap. 47). 

The whole attack upon the Stoics might have been 
made to culminate in this proof that their doctrine 
contradicts their own conception of conception, and 
it has been proposed to make it do so by removing the 

° There is a psychologically natural sequence from the flux 
of all substance and the indistinguishable doublet of each 
individual (chap. 44) to the indistinguishable multitude of 
animate bodies in the soul (chap. 45) to the generation of 
soul (chap. 46) to the nature of soul as flux in relation to the 
conception in the soul (chap. 47). Chapter 46 does not 
interrupt the continuity, as Pohlenz says it does (Hermes, 
lxxiv [1939], pp. 18 and 30 [where " unterbreitet " is a mis- 
print for " unterbricht "]) ; but it would be interrupted if 
chapters 48-50 were inserted between 44 and 45 as suggested 
by Rasmus (Prog. 1872, p. 24). 


following chapters to an earlier place in the speech 
of Diadumenus ; but the modern preference for such 
a climax need not have been shared by Plutarch and 
does not justify the proposed transpositions, which 
would themselves produce other difficulties, while 
with the text as it stands Diadumenus makes the 
conclusion of the last part of his attack the specific 
subject that upon leaving the theology he had de- 
clared it his intention to consider, the Stoic treatment 
of the elements. 5 

Beginning with the common conception generally 
held of element or principle as simple and incom- 
posite, he argues first that the Stoics contradict this 
conception in holding god to be a principle and yet 
to be intellectual body, for this is intelligence in 
matter and so not simple or incomposite, and then 
that their own conceptions of matter and of god as 

a That which would be created by the proposal of Rasmus 
has been mentioned in the last preceding note. Sandbach 
suggests that a better place for chapters 48-50 would be 
between 43 and 44 (Class. Quart., xxxiv [1940], p. 25, n. 2), 
saying that 44 would be linked to 50 by the subjects of 
ovaia and 77010x775 ; but this disregards both the real topic of 
44 and the express transition with which it begins, and it 
would place 43 and 48 in juxtaposition, though there is 
neither sequence of subject nor express transition from one 
to the other. 

6 Cf. 1077 e (chap. 37 init.), and for the relevance of the 
intervening chapters to this subject see note d on 1077 e. 
Sandbach maintains (loc. cit. y p. 24) that chapters 48-50 like 
chapters 40-43 (see p. 650, n. 6 supra) are " not really suit- 
able to Plutarch's purpose M but are his not very successful 
adaptation of some book of different aim. Whatever Plu- 
tarch's ultimate source may have been, the subsequent 
resum6 should show that he made the material serve the 
purpose of this essay as successfully as any of the rest that 
he used in it. 



both being principles, the former being without 
quality and the latter being rational body, are incom- 
patible, for the latter would require rationality and 
matter to be one and the same, so that matter would 
not be without quality, and the former would require 
them to be different, in which case god as rational 
body would be not simple but something composite 
participating in both (chap. 48). So also in the case 
of the corporeal elements, Diadumenus contends, 
the doctrine of the Stoics contradicts the conception 
of element that they apparently accept, for, though 
they call earth, water, air, and fire primary elements, 
yet according to their doctrine earth and water are 
not simple, primary, and self-sustaining as are air 
and fire, by which they are preserved in being and 
from which they derive their substantiality, but in 
fact are simply matter condensed and rarefied to 
different degrees by air (chap. 4<9). Furthermore, 
substance itself as the Stoics define it and what they 
say of quality imply incompatible conceptions. They 
call the former matter that underlies the qualities 
and say that qualities are corporeal substances ; but, 
if the latter is so, substance as defined is superfluous 
and, if the former is what it is said to be, qualities 
must be different from what underlies them and so, 
participating in body, are not bodies. In short, the 
conception of unqualified matter involved in the 
Stoic definition of substance implies the conception 
of quality as incorporeal, and the doctrine of the 
Stoics that qualities are corporeal makes inconceiv- 
able their notion of substance as unqualified matter. 
This dilemma, Diadumenus adds in conclusion, is 
not to be evaded, as some try to do, by contradicting 
the common conception even to the extent of assert- 


ing that substance is called " without quality " 
because it has all qualities, for nobody (and by im- 
plication not even a Stoic) conceives as M without x "■ 
what is " without part in no x," or by protesting 
that matter is always involved in the conception of 
quality, for even so it is conceived as other than 
quality and different from it (chap. 50). 

To comment on the justice and fairness of this 
attack, which is acknowledged to be a " speech for 
the prosecution," on the accuracy of Plutarch's 
quotations and paraphrases of Stoic texts, or on the 
validity of his own arguments would be merely to 
repeat what has already been said in the Introduction 
to the De Stoicorum Repugnantiis (pp. 4*01 -4?06 supra) or 
to anticipate the comments on particular passages 
in the notes to this essay. These will show that 
Plutarch sometimes clearly misunderstands or mis- 
interprets Stoic doctrines and expressions and some- 
times exploits for his own purpose their obscurity 
or ambiguity ; but it remains true nevertheless that 
the Stoic doctrine of common conceptions is a dubious 
one, a precarious base from which to attack the 
Academics as the Stoics did and itself vulnerable at 
many points to the kind of counter-attack here made 
upon it by Plutarch. 

The most recent translation of this essay known 
to me is that into French by E. Brehier revised and 
published with introduction and brief notes by 
V. Goldschmidt in Les Stdiciens (Paris, Bibl. de la 
Pleiade, 1962), pp. 88-92, pp. 135-183, and pp. 1264- 
1269- The studies of it that I have constantly con- 
sulted and to which frequent reference is made in the 
present introduction and in the notes on the text 
and translation are the following : E. Rasmus, De 



Plutarchi Libro qui inscribitur De Communibus Notitiis 
(Frankfurt a.O., 1872) ; C. Giesen, De Plutarchi 
contra Stoicos Disputationibus (Monasterii Guest- 
falorum, 1889) ; O. Kolfhaus, Plutarchi De Com- 
munibus Notitiis Librum Genuinum Esse Demonstratur 
(Marpurgi Cattorum, 1907) ; M. Pohlenz, " Plu- 
tarchs Schriften gegen die Stoiker," Hermes, lxxiv 
(1939), pp. 1-33 ( = Kleine Schriften [Hildesheim, 1965] 
i, pp. 448-480) ; F. H. Sandbach, " Plutarch on the 
Stoics," Classical Quarterly, xxxiv (1940), pp. 20-25 ; 
and D. Babut, Plutarque et le Stoicisme (Paris, 1969). 

The essay is preserved in two mss. only, E and B. 
These I have collated from photostats and have re- 
ported fully in the apparatus, correcting silently for 
the most part the occasional errors in Treu's report 
and in the latest Teubner edition (Pohlenz-Westman, 
Moralia vi/2). In this essay B and E have the same 
errors in 253 passages including 28 lacunae indicated 
by spaces left blank in both mss. Agreement in error 
does not prove, however, that one ms. depends upon 
the other, as is strikingly shown by the common 
omission of the necessary fxr] before pcovv in 1064 e 
(p. 74, 27 [Pohlenz]), for all mss. make this same 
mistake — and another besides — in De Stoic. Repug. 
1042 a (p. 22, 28 [Pohlenz]) where the same passage 
is quoted. As evidence that B is a copy of E one 
might adduce the fact that in 1071 a (p. 88, 17 
[Pohlenz]), where both have a lacuna of three letter- 
spaces before a#d, the lacuna in E is an erasure. On 
the other hand, in 1068 f (p. 83, 21 [Pohlenz]) B has 
avrols tols ao<f>ols despite the fact that in E the 
original 01 of avrols had been correctly changed to rj 
by the first hand. a There are seven passages in 

a For corrections in B which result in readings of E cf. 


which the readings of B and E are different but are 
both wrong. The variant of B in one of these was 
explicitly rejected by Manton as an erroneous con- 
jecture by B himself (Class. Quart., xliii [194-9], 
p. 103) ; and such originality or oversight might 
explain the other cases in this category and most of 
the 59 cases in which B is in error though E has the 
correct reading. Original conjecture might also ac- 
count for most of the twenty cases in which the 
reading of B is right though that of E is wrong. a 
There are cases, however, for which neither origin- 
ality nor negligence on the part of B seems to be a 
plausible explanation. The eleven cases in which for 
no obvious reason the order of words in B differs 
from that in E suggest that in the ms. which B 
copied these words had been inadvertently omitted 
at first and had then been added above the line and 
that B mistook the place where they were meant to 
be incorporated. This might well explain the strange 
misplacement of a single letter in the curious mistake 
at 1083 F(p. 117, 10 [Pohlenz]), w f here Bhas7rapavo^€iv 
rjds and E correctly irapavoelv rjfAas. If such w r as the 
exemplar of B, it might still, of course, have been 
not independent of E but the copy (77) of E that 
Manton postulated. Other phenomena remain, how- 
ever, that are not easily explained by this hypothesis. 
In 1060 c (p. 66, 1 [Pohlenz]) B has f (i.e. rov) whereas 
the scribe of R seems first to have written rov and 

aAAco in 1071 a (p. 88, 14 [Pohlenz]), npoLoju with a> changed to 
o in 1078 d (p. 105, 13 [Pohlenz]), and the miseorrection, 


Mpas in 1070 c (p. 86, 29 [Pohlenz]). 

Variations merely of spelling, aspiration, or accentua- 
tion are not included in this account. 



then to have corrected the o to w immediately. Here 
almost certainly B copied an abbreviation which E 
also had in his exemplar but which he expanded and 
then reinterpreted ; and there are other mistakes 
of B also that are most easily explained as erroneous 
interpretations of abbreviations which E had cor- 
rectly expanded : e.g. koI -B, 77 -E in 1077 b (p. 102, 
19 [Pohlenz]) ; to£> -B, to -E in 1079 b (p. 107, 7 
[Pohlenz]) a ; earw -B, ecrrai -E in 1080 a (p. 108, 23 
[Pohlenz]) ; Xenrofjiepearepov -B, XeTrrofx^pdararov -E 
in 1084 d (p. 118, 27 [Pohlenz]). Furthermore, in 
1078 c (p. 105, 5 [Pohlenz]), where E has Set to v and 
the right reading is certainly either 87777-01; or 877, 
anyone correcting E as he copied it would surely 
have written h-qirov ; but here B has simply 877, and 
this he is more likely to have copied from his exemplar 
than to have substituted for the two words of E. 
This being so, it is also likely that such readings of 
his as 77817 in 1064 d where E has Stjttov (a variant 
not recorded by Pohlenz, p. 74, 12) and fy in 1081 e 
where E has olov (p. 112, 20 [Pohlenz]) are neither 
emendations " nor oversights of his own. It is w r ell 
to remember that in essays where E and B can be 
compared with other mss. E has many unique read- 
ings which are probably his own emendations or 
errors. There is no good reason to suppose that in 
this essay E, even when he is right as against B, 
must always be accurately reproducing his exemplar 
while the source of variation in B can be only his 
own ingenuity or negligence. In 1071 a (p. 88, 19 
[Pohlenz]), for example, the hi of B need not be a 

a I have myself adopted the reading of E here ; but this 
too may be a mistaken expansion, and Wyttenbach's rat 
may be right. 


misreading of E's Set but may be the faithful copy 
of the archetype which was correctly emended to 
Set by E. 


Among the publications relevant to Plutarch's treat- 
ment of Stoicism which became available to me only 
after this volume had been set in type I call atten- 
tion especially to the following : 

L. Bloos, Probleme der stoiscken Physik, Hamburg, 

Buske Verlag, 1973. 
M. Lapidge, " * Apya'i an ^ oToiyjela : A Problem in 

Stoic Cosmology," Phronesis, xviii (1973), pp. 

Ruth Schian, Untersuchungen iiber das u argumentum 

e consensu omnium" Hildesheim, Olms, 1973, 

pp. 134-174. 
R. B. Todd, " The Stoic Common Notions : A Re- 
examination and Reinterpretation," Symbolae 

Osloenses, xlviii (1973), pp. 47-75. 
R. B. Todd, " Chrysippus on Infinite Divisibility," 

Apeiron, vii, 1 (May, 1973), pp. 21-29. 



1. ETAIP02. 2 Sot fJLCV elKOS, cS Aia8oVfl€V€, fJLTj 

F rrdvu pbeAeiv et tivl So/care irapa rds kowcls <£tAo- 
oo<f>elv ewolxLS, ofioAoyovvri ye /cat tcov alodrjoreajv 
7T€picf>pov€Lv dfi <Lv o^ehov at 7rAet(7Tat yeyovaow 
€ wo tat, rrjv ye 3 ire pi rd c/xiivo pueva ttiotiv eSpav 
exovoat /cat da<f)dXeiav . epce 8e 7ro?(Xrjs, a>9 y ep,- 
1059 avrtp (jxuvopiai, /cat dronov puearov tfKovra rapax^js 
elre rial Xoyois elr €7ra)8als elr dXXov* erriuraoai 
TpOTrov 7rapr\yopias ovk av <f)6dvocs larpevajv. ovtcd 
ooi 8iaoeoeiopi<n, /cat yeyova pberecopos vtto Stoh- 
kcov dvSpcov, ra p,kv aAAa fieXrloTUjv /cat vrj Ata 
ovv-qOcov /cat <j>LXu)v m/cpa)? 8' ayav eyKeip,evu)v rfj 
'A/caS^/zeta 5 /cat drrexdcjos , ol ye rrpos puKpd /cat 

1 E and B in title; twv kolvcov omitted in Catalogue of 
Lamprias 77 ; npos tovs otcolkovs Trcpl twv kolvujv evvoitov -E 
in subscription. 

2 Cf. a> iralpt (1063 e infra). The interlocutor of Diadu- 
nienus is never named in the dialogue (AAMIIPIAS -Amyot 
without reason), and in the mss. no name is prefixed to 
indicate change of speakers. 

3 E, B ; re -Aldine, Basil. ; [ye] -deleted by Wilamowitz. 

4 aXXov <ov> -Westman (Pohlenz-Westman, Moral la vi/2, 
p. 232). 

6 aKaSrjfila -E, B. 

a The conceptions which by implication are here excluded 


1. comrade. You are in all likelihood quite uncon- 
cerned, Diadumenus, if anyone thinks that the 
speculations of your school are at odds with common 
conceptions. After all, you admit that you disdain 
the senses themselves ; and from them have come 
just about most of our conceptions, the secure 
foundation of which is, of course, confidence in 
phenomena. 6 But here am I, full of tumult which, 
as it seems to me, is great and strange. Hurry and 
treat me either with arguments of some kind or with 
spells c or if you know some other way of assuage- 
ment. I have been thrown into such confusion as 
you see and so distraught by Stoics who, though 
otherwise excellent gentlemen and intimates, by 
heaven, and friends of mine, are bitterly and spite- 
fully vehement against the Academy. To my re- 
may be those which according to the Stoics are formed St' 
rj^ierepas StSaoxraAia? /cat eVi/zeAci'a? (S.V.F. ii, frag. 83 [p. 
28, 20-21]) ; or it is possible that Plutarch means to draw 
the distinction between moral conceptions and others that 
he draws in 1070 c Infra. 

6 The unreliability of all sense-perception was the basis 
of the Academic attack upon the Stoic epistemology (cf. Ci- 
cero, Acad. Prior, ii, 42 ; Robin, Pyrrhon, p. 80 ; O. Gigon, 
Must. Heloeticmn, i [1944], pp. 51-53). 

c Cf. T)e Facie 020 b-c and De Py thine Oraculis 395 f. 



(1059) fM€T y alSovs tcl Trap* ijxov Ae^eVra acfjbvtos (ov yap 
ipsvoofAai) /cat 1 7rpdu)$ evioravro? rovs 5e TTpzofiv- 
rcpovs jier opyrjs oo^iards Kal Av/xeajvas tlov ev 
<j)i,\o(jo(j)iq /cat Soypbdrojv 68a> fiaS l^ovtcuv dvarpo- 
ireas* kcli ttoAAcl tovtojv droTrwrepa Aeyovres /cat 
B o^'oua£o^>T€s ,4 reAog irrl ras iwolas eppvrjvav, cbs 8rj 
rtva ovyxvow /cat dvaSaafxov avrais iirdyovras 
rovs €K rfjs 'A/caS^a^tas". 6 etra tis etrrev avrtov 
cos" ovk drro rv^rfs dAA' €/c TrpovoLas Betov vojjli^ol 
pAT 'Ap/ceatAaov /cat rrpo HapvedSov yeyovevai 


deiav ilfipecos /cat 7rapavop,ias 6 S' rjvdrjae pbdAiara 
ra>v 'A/caS7y/xat/ccDv. Xpuo"t777709 yovv 1 iv p,eoto 
yevopuevos rats* 7Tp6$ 'Ap/ceatAaov avnypa^als /cat 
tt)v KapvedSov Setvorrjra ivecfrpaije > 7roAAa p,ev rfj 
aloOrjoet KaraAnrcbv warrep els rroAiopKLav fioiq- 
drjpLara tov 0€ rrepl ras 7TpoArjifj€ts /cat ras evvoias 

1 Kal -Wyttenbach (cf. Kolfhans, Plutarcht De Coram. 
Not., pp. 49-50) ; ov -E, B. 

2 ivioravro -IT. C. ; iiTidoavTO -E, B ; TyvTiacravro -Reiske ; 
airrivT-qoav -Kronenberg (Mnemosyne, lii [1924], p. 105) ; 
7)VTio.oav -Pohlenz after Wilamowitz (but n.b. irpos . . .). 

3 dvarpo-nias -LeonicilS ; dvarporralg -E, B. 

4 ovo/u,a£ovTes -Wyttenbach (cf. 1073 b Infra, Quomodo 
Quis . . . Sentiat Profectus 78 n, and Cobet's correction in 
I)e Herodoti Malignitate 868 a) ; vo/m'£ovt€s -E, B. 

5 a.Ka?)7}f.uas -E, B. 

6 <Sv -Leonicus, Basil. ; otov -E, B. 

7 yovv -E, B ; ovv -Aldine, Basil. 

a For to)v iv faAooofta cf. Plato, Republic 489 b 4 and 
Aristotle, Politics 1341 b 33. 

b See S.V.F. ii, p. 39, 31 and i, frag. 490 (Cleanthe.s' 



marks, which were few and respectfully made, they 
kept objecting in a sober (for I will not falsify the 
facts) and mild manner ; but of the older Academics 
they spoke in anger, calling them sophists and cor- 
rupters of philosophers a and subverters of methodical 
doctrines b and many things still more monstrous, 
and finally they swept in a torrent upon the concep- 
tions, talking as if the men of the Academy were 
moving to nullify and to rescind d them. Then one 
of them gave it as his belief e that not by chance but 
by providence of the gods had Chrysippus come after 
Arcesilaus and before Carneades, the former of whom 
had initiated the outrage and transgression against 
common experience and the latter of whom was the 
fairest flower of the Academics/ At any rate, by 
coming between the two Chrysippus with his re- 
joinders to Arcesilaus ° had intercepted the clever- 
ness of Carneades as well, for he had left to sense- 
perception many succours, as it were, against siege 
and had entirely eliminated the confusion about pre- 
definition of r^rj) ; and for ooa> /?aot£oWa>i/ cf. JDe Iside 
371 c, De Oenio Socratis 595 p, Lycurgus xxix, 1 (57 d). 

c Plutarch uses 17 evvoia (at evvoiai) in place of r) kolvtj 
ewoia (at koivoX evvoiat) where the context makes his mean- 
ing clear, e.g. 1060 d, 1061 d and e, 1063 c, 1067 c, 106S 
d, 1070 1: and f, 1071 a and r, 1073 d, 1076 a, 1077 a and e, 
1078 e, 1080 o, 1081 c, 1082 e, 1083 a. 

d For the metaphor cf. D. Ruhnken, Tlmael Sophistae 
Lexicon Vocum Platonicarum (Leipzig, 1828), p. 29, col. a. 

* S. V.F. ii, frag. 33. 

1 See the notes on De Stoic. Repug. 1036 a-b, 1037 a, 
and 1057 a supra ; for awrjdeia and the relation of Chrysip- 
pus to the Academic attack see also 1036 c supra and the 
note there. 

y The title of one of these is identifiable in the partially 
preserved list of the writings of Chrysippus (S. V.F. ii, 
p. 8, 20), Hpos to ' ApK€OiXdov p.e96htov TTpoS *L(f>alpov a '. 



^ 1 rdpaypv d^eXajv vavrdrraai Kal 1 hiapd pujcjas 2 £i<d- 

OT7)V KOI 6ejJL€V09 €1? TO OlKtZoV LQOT€ Kdl TOV9 

avdis eKKpoveiv rd vpayp^ara Kal TTo.pafSid^eoO ai 
fiovXoptvovs pr)8ev irepaiveiv aAA' iXeyxtvdai [fiov- 
Aopevovs] 3 KOLKovpyovvras Kal ao</>i£o/xevou?. vtto 
tolovtcov iyd> Xoyojv oiaK€Kavpevo$ ecodev afieorTT)- 
picov 4, oeopai, KadaTTtp rtvd <f)Xeypovr]v acfxxtpovv- 
tojv ttjv a7Topiav rrjg ^^rjs*. 


6as. €i Se ot TToirjrai ere tt€i6ovgl Aeyovres cLs ck 
decov TTpovoias avarpo7TT]v ecr^ey rj 7raAata ^lttvXos 
rdv TdvraXov koXcl^ovtcov , netdov tols gltto rrjg 
Sroas iralpois on Kal Xpuow77ov ovk drro TV\ris 

D dXX €K 7TpOVOLCLS Tj (f)V(JLS 7]V€yK€V, dvOJ TO, KaTCx) 

Kal rovpnaXiv dvarpeipai oeop,evr] rov fSLov <hs ov 
yeyove 7rpos rovro ra>v ovrcov ovozls evfivearepos, 
dXXd coarrep 6 YLdrwv eXeye irXrjv* Kalaapos e/cei- 
vov pr)8eva vrj(/)ovTa prjSe (frpovovvra em avyxvaei 
rfjs* nroXireias tols hr]poaiois irpoaeXdelv TTpdypa- 
aiv ovtojs ipiol ooKel perd TrXelcrTrjS eVu/xeAetas* Kal 

1 [/cat] -deleted by Pohlenz. 

2 Stapdpcjoas -Wyttenbach (cf. S. V.F. ii, p. 8, 28) ; 
hiopOojoas -E, B. 

3 [f}ov\ofjL€vous] -deleted by Reiske. 

4 Rasmus (Prog. 1872, p. 13, comparing Quaest. Vonvic. 
653 f) ; o^€orrjpix)v -E, B. 

5 ttXtjv -Diibner (" neminem alium praeter Caesarem " 
-Xylander's translation ; ... pu^beva <aXXov> vr)<f)ovTa -Xy- 
lander, Adnot., p. 55) ; n€pl -E, B ; -nplv -Meziriac ; npo 
-Bernardakis ; nepl Kaioapos <7?A^v> eVeivou -Reiske ; 7rc/>l 
Kaioapos pirjdtva <jrpo> iKttvov -Wyttenbach. 

6 ttJs -B ; omitted by E. 

a That is to say he not only defined each severally but he 
produced an articulated classification in which each had its 



conceptions and conceptions both by his differentia- 
tion of each one from the rest and by his assignment 
of each to its proper place ° ; and the result is that 
even those who thereafter wish to evade the facts or 
to do violence to them get nowhere but are exposed 
in their captiousness and sophistry. I have been 
overheated by such talk since early morning, and I 
want febrifuges that clear the mind of bewilderment 
as of an inflammation. 

2. diadumenus. What has happened to you is 
probably like the experience of many. Well, if you 
are persuaded by the poets when they say that the 
overthrow of ancient Sipylus proceeded from the 
providence of the gods in their chastising of Tan- 
talus,** believe what your comrades from the Stoa 
say, that nature brought forth Chrysippus too not by 
chance but providentially when she wanted to turn 
life bottom side up and upside down. Certainly 
there has not arisen any being with greater natural 
aptitude for this ; but, as Cato said that save for 
the famous Caesar no one while sober and of sound 
mind had entered upon public affairs for the purpose 
of ruining the commonwealth, so it seems to me 
that this man exerts the utmost diligence and 

own place in relation to all the others. For the implica- 
tion of SiapOpaxjas cf. Goldschmidt, Le systeme sto'icien, 
p. 162, n. 3. 

b Cf. Pherecydes, frag. 38 (F. Jacoby, F. Gr. Hist. I A, 
p. 73) ; Antoninus Liberalis, Metamorph. 36 (p. 118, 15-18 
[Martini]); Strabo, i, 3, 17 (58) and with this last Pliny, 
N.IL ii, 91 : " devoravit . . . Sipylum in Magnesia et priiis 
in eodem loco clarissimam urbem quae Tantalis vocabatur." 

c Cf. Suetonius, Divus Iulius 53 and Quintilian, Instit. 
Oral, viii, 2, 9. For Kaiaapos €K€lvov = Julius Caesar cf. 
Plutarch, Cato Minor lxvi, 1 (791 f). 



(1059) SeivorrjTos oiros 6 dvrjp dvarperrecv koX KarafidX- 
Xew tt/v ovvrjOeiav, cos evca yovv 1 kolvtoI* jxaprv- 
povoiv ol tov avSpa oepLVvvovres orav avroo rrcpl rov 
i/jevSofjievov pL&xoovTai. to yap dopiorcos* avpure- 
TrXeyfievov tl* 81 avrtKecfjievcov jjltj cf)dvai ipevSog ev- 
E Tropcos etvat Xoyovs 8e 7rdXiv av (j>dvai rivds dXrjdfj 

1 ma yovv -E, B, Aldine ; evi yovv -Basil. ; eVta^ou Turne- 
bus (but cf. Pericles xv, 1 [161 b] : ... vTroSpv-nroix^v^s evta 
Srjtiaycoyias and Menander, frag. 354 [Koerte-Thierfelder] = 
frag. 421 [Kockl). 

2 KavToi -II. C. (/cat avrol -Wyttenbach) ; /ccu'rot -E, B. 

3 aopiarojs -Wyttenbach ; a> dpiore -E, B. 

4 ti -E ; rot -B. 

a This paradox, mentioned again at 1070 c infra (see also 
De Recta Ratione Audiendi 43 c), is ascribed to Eubulides, 
who polemized against Aristotle (Diogenes Laertius, ii, 108- 
109 ; cf. Doring, Megariker, pp. 105-114). Aristotle refers 
to it as the argument that the same man lies and tells the 
truth at the same time, and he treats it as a sophism de- 
pending upon confusion of the qualified and the absolute 
senses of an expression (Soph. Elench. ISO b 2-7 ; see 
A. Rustow, Der Liigner [Leipzig, 1910], pp. 50-53 and 
against his criticism S. Ranulf, Der eleatische Satz vom 
Widerspruch [Copenhagen, 1924] and G. Calogero, Oiom. 
Crit. Filos. Italiana, viii [1927], pp. 418-419). It was the 
subject of a treatise by Theophrastus (Diogenes Laertius, v, 
49) and of many books by Chrysippus (Diogenes Laertius, 
vii, 196-197), who rejected all previous solutions, denying 
that the difficulty could be solved by impugning the truth 
of the premises or the validity of the inference from them, 
but explained the paradox himself, though Cicero seems to 
deny it (Acad. Prior, ii, 96 ; cf. Rustow, op. cit., p. 68), as 
involving an expression without significance (S. V.F. ii, frag. 
298 a [pp. 106, 34-107, 2] ; cf. Rustow, op. cit., pp. 80-86 ; 
I. M. Bochenski, Formale Logik [Freiburg/Mtinchen, 1956], 



cleverness in subverting and overthrowing common 
experience. So on occasion anyway even the man's 
devotees themselves testify when they quarrel with 
him about " the liar," a for what kind of conception 
of demonstration or what preconception of proof b is 
not subverted by denying that a conjunction formed 
of contradictories without qualification c is patently 
false and again by asserting on the contrary that 
some arguments the premises of which are true a 

pp. 152-153). The exact formulation that Chrysippus had 
in mind is not recorded and can only be conjectured on the 
basis of Plutarch's remarks and Cicero's in Acad. Prior, ii, 
95-98 {cf. Rustow, op. tit., pp. 88-91 and O. Becker, Zwei 
Vntersuchungen zur antiken Logik [Wiesbaden, 1957], pp. 52- 
51) ; but the strongest formulation is that given by Pseudo- 
Alexander, Soph. Flench., p. 171, 18-19 : "fie who says 
1 I am lying ' both lies and tells the truth at the same time." 
The position taken by the Stoics who according to Plutarch 
disagreed with Chrysippus is unknown ; but it has been 
suggested that on the basis of the definitions of true and 
false (Sextus, Adv. Math, viii, 10 = S.V.F. ii, frag. 195) 
they simply refused to accept the liar's statement as a pro- 
position (E. W. Beth, British Journal for the Philosophy of 
Science, iii [1952/53], p. 80). The modern as well as the 
ancient controversy about the paradox is reviewed by 
K. Riverso in Rassegna di Scienze Filosofiche, xiii (19(30), 
pp. 296-325 ; cf. also R. L. Martin, Paradox of the Liar 
(New Haven, 1970). 

b Cf. De Defectu Oraculorum 422 c (. . . /u^Se/xiav a.7r6htii;iv 
rov Xoyov fxrjSe irlcrnv im^povros) and S. V.F. iii, p. 147, 10- 

c For ovfi7T€7TX€yfjieuov n see note c on De Stoic. Repug. 
1047 d supra. For aoplorws cf. Ammonius, De Interp., 
p. 138, 15-17 ; Alexander, Anal. Prior., p. 91, 26-27 ; Galen, 
Jnstitutio Logica xiii, 5 ; and S. V.F. ii. p. 277, 8 with p. 66, 
16-18 and 38 ff. Notice the titles in S. V.F. ii, pp. 7, 39-8, 7 
(cf. Plutarch, De Recta Ratione Audiendi 43 a), on which 
see Rustow, op. cit., p. 66. 

d Cf. S.V.F. ii, p. 8,6. 



(1059) rd XrjfjLfiaTa kclI tcls aytoyas vytels 1 exovras, eri a 
kcu rd avTiKtijJLtva rd)v ovfirrepaofjidrojv e^€tv dXrj- 
dr\ s iroiav evvoiav aTTooet^eoJs rj riva 7Tiurea>s ovk 
avarpeirei 7TpoXrji(jcv; rov fiev ye TroXviroSd (f>aai 
tol9 rrXeKrdvas avrov TrepifiifiptboKetv cbpa ^e^o)- 
voSy 7j Se Xpyoirnrov SiaXeKriKTj rd Kvpccorara 
fJL€prj /cat rag apxds avrfjs dvaipovoa Kal nepi- 
KOTTTOvaa riva ra>v aXXojv evvoitov aTToXeXotrrev 
dvviTOTTTOv; ov yap o'iovrat 3 h-qirov Kal rd erroiKo- 
So/xoujLtcva 8t) 4 jSe'jSaia KeloOai Kal rrdyca, ra>v 
TrpcloTOJv (AT) fievovrajv aTropias he Kal rapa^as eypv- 
F rwv T7]XiKavras . dXXa tboirep ol tttjXov rj Kovcoprov 
€7ri rod ad)fiaros e'xovreg rov dirr6\xevov avrcdv koX 
7Tpooavaxpa)vvvpL€vov ov Kivetv dXXa irpoofidXXeiv 
ro rpaxvvov Sokovoiv, ovrojg eKelvoi 5 rovs 'A/caSry- 
pLaCKOVS alriojvrai Kal vofxi^ovoi rds alrias irap- 
iytw tov avail €7rXr)Giievovs a-noheLKvvovoiv avrovg- 
eirel rag ye 6 Kowas ivvoias rives pL&XXov hiaorpe- 

1 vyuZs -E, B 2 (superscript) ; aAi70€i<r -B 1 , Aldine, Basil. 

2 In -E, B ; eon -Aldine ; efra, -Rasmus (Prof/. 1872, 
p. 13). 

3 olovrai -E, B ; olov re -Turnebus. 

* S^ -H. C. : rf -E, B ; M} -deleted by Reiske. 
6 €Ketvoi -Wyttenbach ; eVioi -E, B. 
6 ye -Reiske ; re -E, B. 

For dycoyrj in this sense cf. Alexander, Anal. Prior., 
p. 265, 16-17 ; Simplicius, Phys., p. 531, 15-16 and p. 759, 
14 ; Pseudo-Alexander, Soph. Blench., p. 60, 6-7 and 
p. 188, 6-7. 

6 S. V.F. ii, frag. 250. Cf. Rustow, op. cit., p. 67 and 
pp. 92-93, who is in error, however, in charging Plutarch 
with saying that Chrysippus held the conclusion of the 
paradox to be " uneingeschrankt wahr." 

c Cf. JDe Sollertla AnimaUum 965 k (with Helmbold's 



and the inferences a of which are valid still have the 
contradictories of their conclusions true as well ? b 
The octopus is said to gnaw off its own tentacles in 
winter-time c ; but the dialectic of Chrysippus docks 
and destroys its own most important parts, its very 
principles, and what conception among the rest has 
it then left free of suspicion ? For surely they d do 
not think that what is in fact the superstructure rests 
steady and solid if the foundations are not stable but 
are in such great bewilderment and confusion. e Yet 
just as people with mud or dust on their bodies 
when they are touched or brushed against by some- 
one think that he has struck them with the thing 
that irritates them and not that he has just dis- 
turbed it, so these men blame the Academics in the 
belief that they are causing what they are proving 
them to be denied with,— as they are defiled, since 
what men distort the common conceptions more than 

note [L.C.L.]) and 978 f, where the story is called false as it 
is in frag, xi, 53 (vii, p. 77, 9-12 [Bernardakis] = frag. 72 
[Sandbach] on Hesiod, Works and Days 524) after Aristotle, 
Hist. Animal, 591 a 4-6 (cf. Athenaeus, vii, 316 e-f and 
Pliny, N.H, ix, 46) ; Hesiod is vindicated by T. F. Higham, 
Class. Rev., N.S. vii (1957), pp. 16-17. The comparison 
with the octopus is used differently against the Epicureans 
in Non Posse Suaviter Vivi 1098 e ; the comparison in the 
present passage is an adaptation of that made by Carneades 
(frag. 42 [Wisniewski] = Stobaeus, Eel. ii, 2, 20 (pp. 23, 23- 
24, 3, Wachsmuth]) : . . . /cat yap zKtivov (sell. iroXvirc^a) 
av^rjOeicras ras 77-Ac/crava? /careorfltctv, /cat tovtovs (sell. Sta- 
XcKTtKOVs) npoiovorjs rrj$ Svvdfitcos kcli ret o^e'repa dvarpiireiv (cf. 
Cicero, Hortensius, frag. 30 [Muller] = 27 [Ruch]). For 
Carneades on Chrysippus see De Stoic. Re pug. 1036 b-c 

d Scil. the Stoics ; cf. eVetvoi in the next sentence. 

e For the figure cf. Plato, Lairs 793 c ; Lucretius, iv, 513- 
521 ; Epictetus, Diss, n, xv, 8-9. 



1060 <f>ovaiv; el Se fiovXei, to Karrjyopelv eKelvcov afyev- 
res, VTrep &v eyKaXovaiv rjpLtv aTroXoyqaaypLeOa. 

3. ETA1P02. 'Eyco fJLOi ooko) 1 TrjjjLepov, (L Ata- 
8ovfjL€ve, ttoiklAos tls avOpojTTos yeyovevai /cat 
TTavrohairos ' dprc puev yap anoXoylas oeop,evos 

TTpOOTjeiV TCL7T€Lv6s KOI TedopvfirjpLeVOS , VVV 06 pLCTa- 

fidWofJLCLL rrpos rrjv KCLT7]yopiav /cat jSodAo/zat oltto- 
Xavaai rrjs apuvvrjs eXeyxopuevovs etV tolvtov tov$ 
avSpas eTTihuov, to 2 rrapa rds evvoias /cat ra? irpo- 
Xrjijjeis ras /cotvd? <j>iXooo(f)eZv , d<£' &v /xaAtara rrjv 
alpeoLV cos" cnre pfjidrcov dva^jSAaaretv) 8 ookovol /cat 
fjiovrjv SpioXoyeZv rfj (fivcrei Xeyovow. 


B TreptfiorjTa fiaoioreov , a Srj irapdoo^a /cat avrol 
p,er evKoXlas oeyopuevoi ttjv aTomav 67Toyo/xd^ou- 
ctl, tovs piovovs jSaotAct? /cat piovovs ttXovoiovs* 
/cat KaXovs auTcav /cat iroXiras /cat Si/caaTds" uo- 
vovs ; 5 r) ravrl puev els t^v tojv icoXwv /cat ifjvxp&v 
dyopav jSodAet irapoypiev ev Se Tots to? eVt udAtaTa 
TTpaypLdTiKOis /cat ueTa GTTovSrjs XeyopLevois ttoitj- 
oaypueda rov Adyou tov eijeraupiov ; 

ETAIP02. 'EjLtot yoiw rjStov ovtojs' tcjov ydp irpos 
€K€tva yevopuevuiv iXeyxoJV rls oo/c rfS^ Stair Acojs 

€GTIV ; 

1 SowS -E ; Sojcet -B, Aldine. 

2 to -Reiske ; ra> -E, B. 

3 H. C. (c/. Philo Jud., Zte Congressu Eruditionis Gratia, 
146 = hi, p. 102, 16-17 [Wendland]) ; ojgttcp im rcov cu>a . . . 
vac. 4 -E, B ; axr-rrcp e7npa6pa)V ava<paLV€tv> -Pohlenz ; alii 

4 nXovaiovs -B ; rrAoucrias -E. 

6 So both mss., pace Pohlenz and Treu. 

a Cf. Quomodo Adulator ab Amico Internoscatur 52 b. 


they ? But, if you please, let us give over denouncing 
them and make our defence on the charge that they 
bring against us. 

3. comrade. It seems to me, Diadumenus, that I 
have to-day become a man of protean form and 
colour. a It was just now that cast down and put to 
rout I came to you in want of a defence ; and here I 
am going over to the prosecution and wishing to 
enjoy the revenge of looking on as the gentlemen 
are convicted of the very same thing, speculation at 
odds with the common conceptions and preconcep- 
tions, 6 the very things whence, they believe, their 
system <(grew)> up as from seed and is alone, they 
maintain, in agreement with nature. 

diadumenus. Well then, should the first objects 
of our proceedings be the common and notorious 
notions which even, they in easy-going admission of 
the absurdity themselves entitle paradoxes, their 
notions as to who alone are kings and alone are 
opulent and fair and alone are citizens and judges, d 
or would you rather have us let these go to the 
market for stale and wilted goods e and direct our 
examination of their doctrine to the parts that are 
as material as is possible for them and are earnestly 
meant ? 

comrade. For my part, I prefer the latter course. 
For who has not already had his fill of the arguments 
in refutation of those paradoxes ? 

b See 1058 e-f and 1059 b supra, 

c S. V.F. i, frags. 281 (Zeno) and 619 (Cleanthes) ; Cicero, 
Paradoxa Stoicorum, Prooem. 4. 

d Cf. Stoicos Absurdiora Poetis Dicer e 1057 f-1058 d 
supra M'ith the notes there; S.V.F. i, frag. 222; Cicero, 
De Finibus iv, 74. 

• Cf. De Curiositate 519 a. 



(1060) 4. AlAAOYiM. "HSr) rolvvv avro rovro okottci 
7TpGiTov y el Kara ras koivos eartv evvoias 6{jloAo- 
yelv rfj <f>vaei rovs rd Kara cf)vuiv dSidcfropa vojjll- 

C £ovras /cat jxrjff vyietav ixtjt eve £ lav fjtrjre kolAAos 
firjT lo^vv rjyovfjievov? alperd pir)8' dxfreAifia firjSe 
AvcrireArj fji'qSe avfJLTr Ay] pwriKa rrjs Kara, <f)vaiv re- 
AeioT7)T09 fjbrjre rdvavria (f>evKrd Kal j3Aa/?epa, 
Trrjpwaetg dAyrjSovas atax 7 ) vdcrovs, tov avrol Ae- 
yovot TTpos a p,ev dAAorptovv rrpos a S' olKetovv 
rjfjL&s ttjv <f>voiv y ev jxdAa Kal rovrov irapd rrjv 
Koivrjv evvotav bvros, oiKeiovv rrpos rd ptrj ovpL<f>e- 
povra fJLrjS' dyadd rrjv <f)vatv Kal dAAorptovv TTpog 
rd firj /ca/ca ixrjSe fSAdrrrovra /cat, o fxel^ov eartv, 
oiKeiovv eirl , rooovro Kal dAAorptovv a>ore rcov 1 
fxev fxrj rvyxdvovras rot? 8e TTepnrnrrovras evA6ya)s 

D e^dyetv rod tfrjv eavrovs Kal rov j8tov drroAeye- 

5. NojLtt^a) S' ey<h /ca/cctvo 2 irapd rrjv ewotav 
AeyeaOat, rd rrjv fiev <j>vcriv avrrjv dotd(j)opov elvat 
rd 8e rfj (f>vo-ec opioAoyeiv dyadov fieytarov. 3 ovSe 

1 rcov -E (co corrected from o immediately ?) ; t (i.e. tov) 

2 E ; Ka.K€tva -B. 

3 {Ltyiorov -TurnebliS ; ybireariv -E, B. 

a i.e. whether the doctrine of the Stoics is itself in accord 
with M the common conceptions . . . whence, they believe, 
their system <grew)> up . . . and is alone, they maintain, in 
agreement with nature " (1060 a supra). 



4. diadumenus. Consider straight away, then, this 
very question a first. Is it in accord with the common 
conceptions to say that b they are in agreement with 
nature c who believe indifferent the things that are 
in conformity with nature and who hold health and 
vigour and beauty and strength not to be objects of 
choice or beneficial or advantageous or constitutive 
of natural perfection and their opposites — mutila- 
tions, pains, deformities, diseases — not to be in- 
jurious and objects of avoidance ? The Stoics 
themselves say that nature endows us with repug- 
nance against these latter things and with congeniality 
to the former ; and this too is sharply at odds with 
the common conception, to say that nature induces 
congeniality to the things that are not useful or good 
and repugnance against the things that are not bad 
or injurious , d congeniality and repugnance so intense, 
moreover, as to make suicide and the renunciation 
of life a reasonable course for those who miss the 
former things and fall in with the latter/ 

5. This too I believe to be at odds with the common 
conception/ the assertion that, while nature itself 
is indifferent, to be in agreement with nature is the 

b S.V.F. iii, frag. 146. 

c As the Stoics profess, for whom to rfj <j>va€i ofioXoyelv 
dyadov ficyioTov (1060 d infra and note g on De Stoic. Repug. 
1033 c supra). On the charge of inconsistency between this 
profession and the Stoic attitude towards ra Kara <f>vow cf. 
Grumach, Physis und Agathon, pp. 32-4-3 ; Pohlenz, Stoa 
i, p. 178 and ii, p. 90 (ad S. 178, Z. 2<2) and p. 68 (ad S. 119, 
Z. 6 v.u.) : I. G. Kidd, Class. Quart., N.S. v (1955), pp. 181- 
194, especially pp. 187-188 and 194. 

d Cf Cicero, De Finibus iv, 78. 

€ Cf. 1063 c-f infra and Be Stoic. Repug. 1042 c-e supra. 

1 For Trjv evvoiav see note c on 1059 b supra. 



(1060) yap to 1 vofux) KaraKoXovdetv 2 ov8e to Xoytp rcei- 
deadou aiTovhaloVy el pr) oirovhaios etrj Kal da- 
re tog o vojios kcu 6 Xoyos. Kal tovto fxev eAarrov 
ei 8e, cog y^pvoirrrros ev too rrpooroo rrepl rov TIpo- 
Tperreodai yeypa<f>ev y ev too Kar dperrjv fitovv jjlovov 
eon ro evoaifiovajg toov aAAoov, (prjoiv, ovoev 
ovtcov 7rpos rjfias ov8* els rovro ovvepyovvToov," OX) 
fiovov ovk koTiv a8id(f>opo$ r) cf>vaig dAA' dvorjros 
E Kal aTTorrXrjKTog, oiKeiovoa rjp,as 7rpo$ to, p,rj8ev 
rrpos rjfjbdg, dvorjToi 8e Kal rjfieig ev8aipioviav rjyov- 
fxevoL to tjj (j>vaec opoXoyetv dyovarj rrpos tol prj8ev 
ovvepyovvTa rrpos ev8aipioviav. KaiToi tl jjl&XAov 
eoTt /cara ttjv Koivrjv evvoiav rj Kaddrrep Ta alperd 
TTpos to co(j>eXipa>g ovtgos rd Kara (f>vaiv jrpos to 
t,r)v Kara c/)volv; ol S' oi>x ovtcos Xeyovoiv, dXXd to 
tfqv Kara <f>vaiv TeXos elvai Tidepbevot Ta /cara <f>vuiv 
d8cd(f)opa elvai vopil^ovcnv . 

6. Ovx tJttov 8e tovtov Tiapa ttjv koivtjv ev- 

1 to ... to -Meziriac ; rw . . . t$ -E, B. 

2 <aoT€Lov> -added here by Reiske ; <kcu aareiov} -added 
after oTrov&aZov infra by Pohlenz ; but cf. S. V.F. iii, frag. 
613 : toV T€ vofMOV OTTOvBaiov elvai <f>aoi . . . rov Se vofiov dorelov 
ovtos Kal 6 vofufjios aarelos* . . . 

a In saying that the Te'Aos is " to be in agreement with 
nature " the Stoics identified nature with the 6p96s Xoyos Bia. 
rravTiov €px6fi€vos y 6 avros wv rto Aa (Diogenes Laertius, vii, 
87-88 ; cf. S. V.F. ii, p. 273, 25-28 and p. 305, 33-36), and 
certainly did not call this " indifferent " {cf. Bonhoifer, Die 
Ethik . . ., p. 172, n. 1). Plutarch's intimation that they 
did is probably just an inference from the fact that they 
declared ra ;caT<x <j)vocv to be ahiafyopa. Cf. Cicero's infer- 
ence : " ergo id est convenienter naturae vivere, a natura 
discedere " (De Finibus iv, 41). 



greatest good, for it is not good either to comply 
with the law or to listen to reason if the law and the 
reason be not good and decent. This is a minor 
point ; but, if as Chrysippus has written in the first 
book on Exhortation b living happily consists solely 
in living virtuously, " all other things/' in his words, 
" being nothing to us and contributing nothing to 
this end," not only is nature not indifferent, but she 
is stupid and silly in endowing us with congeniality 
to things that are nothing to us, and we too are stupid 
in holding that happiness is to be in agreement with 
nature which attracts us to the things that contribute 
nothing to happiness. Yet what is more in accord 
with the common conception than for the things that 
are in conformity with nature to be related to living 
in conformity with nature as the objects of choice 
are to living beneficially ? The Stoics do not talk 
this way, however ; but, while making life in 
conformity with nature a goal, they believe the 
things that are in conformity with nature to be 

6. It is not less than this at odds with the common 

b S. V.F. iii, frag. 139 (p. 34, 9-12) ; cf. De Stole. Repay. 
1041 e and 1048 a-b supra. 

c Plutarch's point is that, if ra alperd in respect of ro 
d}(j>€\i(jiojs t,r\v are ra w^iMfia (as they are for the Stoics), one 
would reasonably expect ra Kara (j>vocu to be ra alperd in 
respect of ro Kara <f>vaiv t,f\v. To the Stoics, however, only 
the good is alptrov {cf. De Stoic, llepuy. 1042 n supra) and 
all good is both axfreXifxov and alperov (Diogenes Laertius, 
vii, 98-9!)), so that ra alperd are ra. cu</>eAt/xa inasmuch as both 
are good ; but ra Kara <f>vaiv as such are not good and so 
are not alperd at all but only Xrjnrd (cf. 1070 a infra ; S. V.F. 
i, frag. 191 and iii, frag. 142 ; note c on De Stoic. Repug. 
1045 F supra). On the inconsistency alleged see the refer- 
ences in note c on page 673 supra. 



(1060) voidv icm to (tov} 1 evvovv /cat $povi\xov avSpa 
irpos ra taa rwv dyadtZv /xt) eTriorjs *i^iv dAAd ra 
fikv ev fJLTjSevl Xoyco rideadai rwv Se eVe/ca irav 
F ortovv av vrTOfxelvat /cat iraOelv, fjLrjSev aXX-qXtov 
jjLiKporrjri /cat peyeOei 8ia<f>ep6vTLov. ravro 8e 
Xeyovoiv avrol tovtlo to (aaxfrpovtos diroG^od ai 
Aatoo? rj (&pvvr)s r) to dvdpecws TtpLVOfxevov /cat 
koll6jjl€vov Sia/caprepetv /cat to dv8peicos SrjyfjLa 
jLtvta? €veyK€tv 77 to) 2, aaxj>povojs 8vadavaTa>aav 
aTroTpiipaaOai rrpea^dTtv ojjloilos yap dpicpoTepoi 
KOLTOpdovatv . dAAd St' c/cetva pL€v cos Xap.Tr pa /cat 
1061 fji€ydXa klxv drroOdvoiev, irrl tovtois 8e oepvvveiv 
iavTov aloxvvr) /cat yeXtos. Xeyei 8e /cat XpuatTT- 

770? €V Tip 7T€pl TOV AbOS OVyypdp,\lOVTl Kol Tip 
TpiTCQ 7T€pl QetOV l/wXpOV €LVCU /Cat aTOTTOV /Cat dX~ 

XoTpiov rd ToiavTa tlov drf dp€Trjs ovpfiaivovTOJv 
€7TCuv€LV y otl 8rjypa pvias dvSpeltos vnepLecve /cat 
hvodavaTcoarjs ypaos aTrioyzTO vtotppovtos . dp* 
ovv Trapd ttjv Koivrjv cj>iXoao(j>ovaiv evvoiav, a? at- 
oyyvovTai trpd^eis i7ra1vG.1v, pLrjSev tovtlov KaXXiov 
6poXoyovvT€s ; ttov yap alptTOv 7} ttlos drroh^KTov 
o prf\T eTratvetv pa\Tt Oavfid^LV d£tdv iaTiv dAAd 

1 <tov> -added by Sandbach (Class. Quart., xxxiv [1940], 
p. 24, n. 3). 

2 <. . .> -H. C. (after CastigJioni, cf. Be Stoic, liepug. 
1039 a supra) ; avrol rovrco to oaxfrpovtos -E, B ; lacuna 
variously located and supplemented by Turnebus, Amyot, 
Xylander, and others, e.g. avrol [rov] ra> <av&peiu)s rvpawcov 
eXcvOepwoai rrjv Trarpiod> ro ouxfrpovajs -Pohlenz after Reiske. 

Cf. S. V.F. in, frag. 92 and, for this and what follows 
here, Be Stoic. Rejmg. 1038 c-d and 1038 f— 1039 a supra. 



conception to say that <the) sensible and prudent 
man is not impartial to equally good things but holds 
some in no esteem and for the sake of others would 
endure and suffer anything whatever, though they 
do not differ from one another in magnitude at all. a 
They say themselves that for this man b it is the 
same {soberly to abstain from Lais or Phryne or 
courageously to endure scalpel and cautery and 
courageously to bear the bite of a fly or) soberly to 
repulse an old woman with one foot in the grave, 
for they who do either are alike performing right 
action ; but for the former, as being great and il- 
lustrious actions, they would even suffer death, 
whereas to glory in the latter actions is a shame and 
a mockery. In fact, Chrysippus says c in the treatise 
on Zeus and in the third book on the Gods that it is 
insipid and absurd and repugnant to praise such in- 
cidental results of virtue as the courageous endurance 
of the bite of a fly and the sober abstention from an 
old crone with one foot in the grave. Aren't their 
speculations at odds with the common conception, 
then, when they acknowledge nothing to be more 
fair than those actions that they are ashamed to 
praise ? For where or how is that an object of choice 
or acceptance d which deserves neither praise nor 

6 i.e. for the sage (rov twow kcu <j)p6vLfj.ov avhpa), and for 
him because everything he does is done Kara ndcras ras 
aperds {cf. S. V.F. hi, frag. 557 and De Stoic. Repug. 1046 
e-f supra). 

c S.V.F. iii, frag. 212 (p. 51, 5-9) ; cf. De Stoic. Repug. 
1038 f— 1039 a supra. 

d Had Plutarch observed the niceties of Stoic terminology, 
he would here have written in referring to 7rpd£*is not alperou 
. . . cutoScktov but cupsreov . . . aTrohtKriov (S, V.F. iii, frags. 



(1061) /cat rovs irraivovvras r] davpcd^ovras cltottovs /cat. 


B 7. "En 8e piaXXov, oljxai, <^avetrat aot irapd rrjv 
koivtjv evvoiav, el ra>v fieytara>v dyaOcov 6 (f)povi- 
fJios fjLrjr' drrovrajv 1 p,ryr el Trdpearcv avTto <f>pov- 
tl^ol 2 aAA' 616s ioriv iv rots d8ia<f)6pois /cat rfj 
7T€pl ravra Trpaypbareta /cat oIkovo(jlicl tolovtos av 3 
kolv tovtols tit). rrdvres yap 8rj7rov9ev 

evpveSovs* ocrot Kaprrov alvvfieOa 5 )(8ov6s 

oS jikv /cat rrapovros ovtjols ion /cat p,r) rrapovros 
worrep ev8eia /cat Spelts alperov /cat aya^ov /cat 
ax^eAt/xov voovpLZV, €</>' to 8* ouoev aV Tt9 rrpay- 
fjLarevaairo fir) Tratotds" eveKev par]8e paorcovrjs tovt 
dSid(f)Opov. aXXcp yap ov8evl rov <f)iXo7Tovov rov 
C K€v6(i7Tov8ov d^opl^opLev iv rots' epyots* ovra rroX- 
Aa/cts r] ra> tov fiev els dvaxf)eXrj Trove iv /cat dSta- 
<f)6pajs,' rov 8e eW/ca rov rwv crufX(f)ep6vrcov /cat 
XvatreXcov, dXXd ovroi ye tovvolvtlov 6 yap oo<f>6s 
avrols /cat <f>p6vcfios iv TroXXals KaraXrjifjeai /cat 
fivrjfxais KaraXrji/jewv yeyovd>s oXiyas rrpos avrov 
r)yetrai rtov r dXXcov ov rrecppovrcKcbs ovr* eXarrov 


2 Madvig (Adversaria Crltica, p. 609) ; irdpaoiv avrco 
(fypovrl^ojv -E, B. 

3 av -deleted by Rasmus (Prog. 1872, p. 14) but cf. be 
Se Jpsian . . . Laudando 539 p, 544 n. 

4 Quaest. Conviu. 743 f, Be Fraterao Amove 485 c (G 1 ), 
and Plato, Protagoras 345 c and 346 i> ; evpv&ovs -E, B, J)e 
Tranquillitate Anhni 470 d (F exc. J J, l)e Fratevno Amove 
485 c (G corr -) ; evpvoSovs -all other mss. in 470 d and 485 c. 

6 So 470 d, 485 c, and Plato (cf. preceding note) ; Kap-nuv 
. . . vac. 5 -E, 4 -B . . . p,€9a. 

6 iv rots <avTo?s> cpyois -Sandbach (Class. Quart., xxxv 
[1941], p. 115) ; iv roi? tpyots <taov> -Pohlenz. 



admiration and of which the commenders or admirers, 
moreover, are believed by the Stoics to be absurd 
and insipid ? 

7. It will, I think, appear to you to be still more 
at odds with the common conception for the prudent 
man to be unconcerned about the presence or absence 
of the greatest goods but in their case too to be just 
as he is in that of indifferent matters and their treat- 
ment and management. For surely all 

Those of us who as men take the fruit of the spacious 
earth a 

think that that is beneficial and good and an object 
of choice the presence of which is accompanied by 
advantage and the absence by a kind of want and 
yearning and that that is indifferent which one would 
take no trouble about, not even for the sake of amuse- 
ment or recreation. In fact, we use no other criterion 
than this in distinguishing from the industrious man 
the frivolous bustler, busily at work as he often is : 
while the latter labours at useless things and without 
discrimination, the former labours for the sake of 
something useful and advantageous. These Stoics, 
however, think the contrary, for their sage and 
prudent man holds b that few of the many appre- 
hensions and memories of apprehensions which he 
has experienced have anything to do with him and, 
unconcerned for the rest, thinks himself to be neither 

« Simonides, frag. 5, 17 (Bergk) = 4, 16-17 (Diehl) = 542, 
24-25 (Page, Poetae Melici Graeci, p. 282). The line is 
quoted by Plutarch in De Trait quillitate Animi 470 n, De 
Fratemo Amore 485 c, and QuaesL Conviv. 743 f also ; cf. 
Plato, Protagoras 345 c 9-10 and 346 n 4-5. 

b S.V.F. in, frag. 213. 

7 ahid^opa -Meziriac. 



(1061) €^£tv ovre 1 ttXzov oUrai pLV7)p,ovevojv on irepvGi 1 
KaraXr^ipcv e'AajSe TrrapvypLevov &lojvo$ rj a<£aipt- 
£ovtos* Qeaivos* /catrot 7racra KardX-qijjig ev rep 
orocfrtp /cat pLvrj/jir] to docf>aXes eypvoa /cat fiefiaiov 
evdvs Iotiv l7noTr\\xj] koX dyaOov pieya /cat \xiyi- 
•D otov. dp ovv ofjLOicos vyieias imXecTro vo-rjSy* at- 
o-0rjT7]piov KapuovTos, ovolas drroXXvpLevrjs, aeppov- 
rts eart /cat rrpos avrov ovhev rjyovpievos tovtcdv 6 
aotfios ; rj voocov pev larpols TeXel puodovs xP^f^d- 
tojv he €V€kol TTpos AevKOjva TrXel tov ev BooTropto 
Svvdarrjv Kal TTpos 'IhdvOvpoov 6 aTTohrjpLel tov S/cu- 


as aTTofiaXtov ovhe tfqv VTropievei; ttcos ovv ov% 
opioXoyovoi Trapd rds ivvoias cf>iXooocj>€iv , irrl tois 
dSiacj)6pois roaavTa TtpaypaTevopevoi /cat GTTovhd- 
l^ovt€s ayadcov he pieydXeov /cat napovTtov koX p/r) 
napovTcov dhiacftopcos e'xovTes; 
E 8. 'AAAa /cd/cetvo 7rapa tcls kolvols ewoias eOTiv , 

dvdpOJTTOV OVTa p,7) X aL P € ^ v * K T&V jJLeyiGTOJV KaKCOV 

ev rols pbeyioTOis ayadols yevopbevov. tovto he 
TreTTOvdev 6 tovtcov aocf)6s. €K yap ttjs aKpas fca- 

1 out' . . . ovre -Pohlenz ; ov8e . . . ov&k -E, B. 

2 B ; irepiov -E. 

3 E ; o</>vpi£ovros -B. 

4 E ; eViAi7roucn]5 -B. 

6 E ; a<t>povTiar6s -B (cf. Kolfhaus, Plutarchl De Comm. 
Not., p. 59). 

6 ISduovpaov -E ; Ivhddvpaov -B ; cf. De Stoic. Repug. 
1043 c supra, 

a For the use of ACojv and ©e'eov cf. Quaest, Romanae 271 e 
and 1076 a infra ; S. V.F. ii, frag. i93 ; Sextus, Pyrrh. Hyp. 



better nor worse off for remembering that last year 
he had an apprehension of Tom sneezing or of Dick 
playing ball. Yet in the sage every apprehension 
or memory, being certain and steadfast as it is, is 
ipso facto knowledge and a great, in fact the greatest, 
good. 5 Is the sage, then, similarly without concern 
about failing health, the affliction of a sense-organ, 
the ruin of his substance and similarly of the belief 
that none of these has anything to do with him ? 
Or does he pay fees to physicians when he is ill and 
to make money sail to Leuco, the prince in the Bos- 
porus, and go abroad to Idan thyrsus the Scythian, 
as Chrysippus says, c and even refuse to endure life if 
certain of his senses be lost ? How, then, do they 
avoid acknowledging that their speculations are at 
odds with the common conceptions when they give 
themselves so much trouble and concern about in- 
different matters and are indifferent to the presence 
or absence of great goods ? 

8. Yet this is also at odds with the common con- 
ceptions, that one be human and not rejoice at 
having got out of the greatest evils into the greatest 
goods. So it is with the sage of these Stoics, however, 

ii, 227-228. With the example, o^aipil.ovTos Sewvos, cf. the 
remark ascribed to Cleanthes (S. V.F. i, frag. 598). 

* All the apprehensions of the Stoic sage are certain and 
steadfast (S.V.F. i, p. 17, 6-8 and iii, p. 147, 2-3) ; certain 
and steadfast apprehension is knowledge (S. V.F. i, p. 20, 
10-16 and ii, frag. 90) ; and this knowledge is a good, pure 
and per se (S. V.F. iii, p. 24, 35-36 and p. 26, 38-41). For the 
contradiction alleged between this doctrine and that in the 
preceding sentence cf. Bonhoffer, Epictet und die Stoa, 
p. 187. 

c S.p* ovv 6fjLOL<x)S . . . ovSe £rjv vnofjuevcL — S '. V.F. iii, frag. 691 
(p. 174, 3-9) ; but this is not a " fragment " of Chrysippus 
(see Be Stoic. Repug. 1043 b-d supra and note a on 1043 e). 



(1061) Kias fiera^aXcbv els ttjv aKpav aperrjv Kal tov dd- 
Xicorarov filov 8ta(f>vycbv djjia Kal KTrjadpuevos tov 1 
/naKapLcorarov ov8ev eTTtSrjXov els x a P^ v * a X ev °v& 

€7T7]p€V aVTOV OuS' CkIv7]G€V 7j TOO O.VT7J fJLeTafioXrj , 

KaKoScufioVLOLS dnaXXayevTa Kal [Moxdrjplas dTrdorjs, 
els §' da<j>aXr} riva Kal jScjSatav iravTeXeiav dya- 
6a>v i^LKOfjL€vov. Trapd 2 rrjv evvoidv eoTiv dyadcov 
\xev elvai [xeyioTOV to djucraTrTCOTOv ev tois Kpi- 
aeac Kal fiefiatov jjlt] 8elo6ai 8e tovtov tov eir* 

•F CLKpOV TTpOKOTTTOVTa fl7j8e (frpOVTl^etV 7Tapay€VOfJL€- 

vov TToXXaKts 8e fJL7]8e tov 8aKTvXov irpoTelvai Tav- 
ttjs ye eveKa ttjs dofiaXetas Kal fSef}aioT7)Tos , rjv 
TeXetov dyaOov Kal jxeya vopLi^ovaiv. ov jjlovov 
ovv ravTa XJyovotv oi dv8pes dXXd KaKelva irpos 
tovtols, on dyadov 6 XP° V °S °^ K oJj^ei irpooyi- 
1062 yvop,evos dXXd, kolv aKapes tis wpas yevrjTau (f>po- 
vijjlos, ov8ev s 7rpos ev8atjjLOViav drroXeicfyd^creTaL tov 
tov alwva xpu)\ievov ttj dperfj Kal pbaKaptajs ev 

1 rov -E ; to -B. 

2 <ert> irapa -Leonicus, but cf. the beginning of chap. 1 1 
and of chap. 26 infra. 

3 Rasmus (Prog. 1872, p. 14) ; ovBevl -E, B. 

a The Stoics, if they said any such thing, were probably 
referring to the man who was not yet aware of suddenly 
having become a sage (see the next chapter and De Stoic. 
Repug. 1042 r — 1043 a supra), for according to them joy is 
an evXoyos enapoLs of the soul which is experienced by the 
sage and by him alone (S.V.F. iii, frags. 431-435 and 671), 
though not constantly or necessarily even by him (S. V.F. 
iii, frags. 102-103). Since joy arises "cum ratione animus 
movetur placide atque constanter" (S.V.F. iii, p. 107, 7-8), 
what Plutarch here ascribes to the Stoics cannot be ex- 
plained, as Giesen supposed it could (De Plutarchi . . . 
Disputationibus, p. 100), merely by saying that the Stoics 
11 summam sapientis virtutem in animi constantia ponunt," 



for after his change from consummate vice to con- 
summate virtue and after his escape from the most 
wretched life and simultaneous acquisition of the 
most blessed one lie showed no sign of joj- r and was 
not exalted or even stirred by such a great change 
as this, a though he had left utter depravity and un- 
happiness and had arrived at a sure and steadfast 
culmination of goods. It is at odds with the common 
conception to hold b that to be unalterable and stead- 
fast in one's judgments is the greatest of goods and 
yet that the man who is progressing towards the 
summit doesn't want this c and is not concerned 
about it when it has come to him and in many cases 
didn't even extend a finger for the sake of this 
certainty and steadfastness which they believe to be 
a great and perfect good. Now, it is not only these 
assertions that the gentlemen make but besides 
these the following also d : a good is not augmented 
by addition of time ; but, if one be prudent even for 
a moment, one will not be at all inferior in happiness 
to him who exercises virtue for ever e and blissfully 

h S. V.F. iii, frag. 542. 

c That is because while he is progressing and until the 
very instant of his achievement he remains base (see 1062 e — 
1063 a infra), and Chrysippus maintained ou6' l^ctv xp**- av 
rov <j>av\ov ovhevos ouSe htlodai (1068 a-c infra and De Stoic. 
Repug. 1038 a supra). By this was meant that the base 
man does not need what he does not know how to use, but 
Plutarch here purposely takes the helodai to mean " to want " 
in the sense of to desire something of which one feels the 

d S.V.F. iii, frag. 54 (pp. 13, 38-14, 4). With this and 
the rest of the present chapter rf. De Stoic Repug. 1046 
c-t: (chap. 26) supra. 

9 For rov alo>va cf. S. V.F. ii, frag. 163 (". . . ato>^a, id ait 
Chrysippus del ov") and Aristotle, De Caelo 279 a 23-28. 



(1062) avrfj Karafiiovvros . ravra 8e ovrcos veaviKcos a.77- 
iGYypiva\L€voi rraAiv ov8ev etVat (f>acnv aperrjs S(f)€- 
A09 oAcyoxpovlow " rl ydp, av (leAAovrt vavayelv 
evdvs r\ KaraKp7]fxvL^€adai fipovrjots emyevrjrai; 
ri 8* , av 6 At^as* vtto rod 'HpctKAeovs drro- 
acj)€v8ovcx)jJL€vo9 els dp€rr)v €K kolklcls pLerafidArj ; " 
tout' ovv ov jxovov Trapa rds koivols ewotas iorl 
(f>tXoao(f)ovvTa)v aAAa /cat rds 18 las KVKa)vra)v y el 
to fipaxvv xpovov Krtfaaadai ttjv dperrjv ov8ev dno- 
B AeLireodai rijs aicpas evScu/jLOvcas a/xa /cat pL7]8ev6s 
6'Acos d^tov vojjii^ovai. 

9- Tovro o° ovk av ixdAiora 6avp,daais avrchv 
aAAa oTi tt]9 dpzrrjs Kal rrjs cuSai/xovta? Trapa- 
ycyvopLevrjs rroAAaKis ouS' aloddveadai rov kttj- 
odjxevov olovrai StaAeArjOevac 8e avrov 1 on jxiKpa) 
TrpoaOev ddAidyraros tov /cat d^poveoraros vvv ofxov 
(jipovipLos Kal pbaKapios yeyovev. ov yap /jlovov 
k'xovrd riva ttjv (f)p6vr)uiv rovro jjlovov pur) cj)povelv 
otl (fapovei tz^oc yiyvwaKeiv 6Vt to dyvoclv ota7re- 
<f>€vy€v evrpdrreAov iartv, dAAa /cat, oAojs etVetV, 2 
rdyadov dpperres ttoiovoi /cat dfiavpov, el ut^S' at- 
odrjViv avrov rroiet rrapayevopLtvov . (fivaei yap dv- 

1 Wyttenbach ; avrov -E, B (but cf. the last sentence of 
this chapter and the first of the next). 

2 oXojs <a)s> ehrelv -Rasmus (Prog. 1872, p. 14) ; but cf. 
S.V.F. iii, p. 42, 15 and Aristotle, Physics 202 b 19. 

a S. V.F. iii, frag. 210 (p. 50, 27-30). 

h The herald who had brought to Heracles from Deianeira 
the robe anointed with the blood of Nessus and whom 
Heracles in his torment flung into the sea (<•/. Sophocles, 
Trachiniae 772-782). 

c With the whole of this chapter cf. De Stoic. Repug. 1042 



lives out his life in it. But then again, after they 
have so vehemently insisted upon this, they say a 
that there is no use in virtue of brief duration : " For 
what's the use if prudence come to one who is 
straightway going to be shipwrecked or flung down 
a precipice ? Or what's the use if Lichas b change 
from vice to virtue while being hurled to his death 
by Heracles ? " These are assertions, then, of men 
who in their speculations are not only at odds with 
the common conceptions but are making a muddle of 
their own as well if they believe that to have got 
virtue for a little while is nothing short of consum- 
mate happiness and at the same time is absolutely 

9. What would most amaze you about them, how- 
ever, is not this but their belief that frequently the 
man who has got the virtue and happiness in ques- 
tion does not even perceive their presence but is 
unaware of having now become both prudent and 
blissful when a little earlier he was most wretched 
and most foolish. In fact, not only is it ludicrous d 
to say that the only thing not understood or known 
by anyone who has prudence is this, that he does 
understand and has escaped from ignorance ; but 
also, generally speaking, they make a slight and 
faint thing of the good if it does not even make itself 
felt when it has come to one, for according to them it 

E — 1043 a (chap. 19) and Stoicos Absurd iora Poet in Dire re 
1058 u supra with the notes on those passages. 

* For evrpdneXov in this sense (despite Pohlenz, Hermes, 
lxxiv [1939], p. 20, n. 1) cf. evrpa-nzXlav . . . /cat ye'Aajra /cat 
pajfjLoXoxiav in 1065 p — 1066 a infra and Paul, Ad Ephesios 
5, 4< (ficopoXoyia rj evrpaTreXia) ; and on the ambiguity of the 
word see F. Dirlmeier, Aristoteles : Nikomachhche Ethik, 
pp. 392-393 on Eth. Nic. 1128 a 12-15. 



(l062) , a >v > , / nu N w 

q €7rai(jurjrov ovk eari hear avrovs, aAAa /cat Aeyet 
hiapprjhrjv XpvoiTrrros iv rots Trepl TeAovs aladrjrov 
etvai rayaQov, (Ls S* oterai, /cat drToheiKwui. Ael- 

7T€TOLL TOLVUV dodeV€ia KOLL flLKpOTTjTL Sia(f)€Vy€LV 

avro rrjv aiadrjaiv, orrorav uapov ayvofjrai /cat 8ia- 
Aavddvrj tovs e^ovra^. en roivvv drorrov jxev eon 
rr)v tcov arpepia /cat p,eows AevKcov 1 alodavopLevrjv 
oi/jiv €K<f)€vyziv ra err* aKpov AevKa /cat rrjv ra 
jitaAa/ca>9 /cat dvei pevtos depp,d KaraAapufidvovaav 
d<f)r)v dvaiodrjrelv ra>v uc/)68pa OeppLOJV drorrcorepov 
8e, et ris to 2 kolv(x)s Kara (frvaw, otov eoriv vyieia 
D /cat eve^ia, KaraAapfidvajv rr)v dperrjv dyvoel irap- 
ovarav, rjv pbdAtara /cat a/cpa>? Kara <f>voiv elvai 
ridevrai. 77x05: yap ov irapa rrjv ewoidv eariv 
vyieias /cat voaov 8ia<f>opdv KaraAapifidveiv (</>po- 
vrjoetos 8e pry /caraAa^t/JdVetv) 3 /cat d(f>poovvrjs aAAa 
rrjv piev aTrrjXAaypLevrjv oieaOac rrapelvai rrjv 8e 

K€KT7]pL€VOV dyVOelv OTL irdpCOTlV ; €77€t 8' €K TTJS 

a/cpas" TrpoKOTrfjs pcerafidAAovoiv els ev8aipLoviav /cat 
dperrjv, 8velv dvdyKrj Odrepov, r) rrjv rrpoKOTrrjv 
/ca/ctW pur) elvai p,rj8e /ca/coSat/xovtW rj rrjv dperrjv 
rrjs /ca/cta? p,r) rroAAa) rrapaXAdrreiv p,rj8e rrjs /ca/co- 

1 Kolfhaus (Plutarchi Be Comm. Not., p. 52) ; Xcvkwv koll 
jxeacos -Diibner ; drpepia /cat fieacov Xcvkojv -K ; drpipia (not 
drp^fjuas) Xcvkcjv kol \iiaoiV -B. 

2 ra -Bernardakis. 

3 <. . .> -added by Bernardakis after Meziriac (<(f>povya€U)s 
Sc> /cai onfipoavvTjs </xi7 fcaTaAa/u,/?aveiv>) and Reiske (</xi7 /cara- 
Xanpdveiv Se (bpovrjerccos}). 

■ S.F.F. iii, frag. 85 (p. 21, 38-41). 

b C/. the Aristotelian doctrine that at virepfioXal rtov aladr)- 
ra>v avat<j0r)Toi : Be Anima 42.2 a 20-26, 424 a 28-32, 426 a 



is not by nature imperceptible to sense. To the 
contrary, Chrysippus in the books concerning the 
Goal even states a expressly that the good is per- 
ceptible and, as he thinks, also proves it to be so. 
The only way left, then, is to suppose that its weak- 
ness and minuteness cause it to elude sense-percep- 
tion whenever those who have it are ignorant of its 
presence and unaware of it. Furthermore, absurd 
as is the notion that the sense of sight which per- 
ceives slightly or moderately white things is eluded 
by things white in the highest degree and the sense 
of touch which apprehends tepid or mildly hot things 
is insensible to those that are extremely hot, & yet it 
is more absurd if one, while apprehending what is in 
the usual way in conformity with nature, such as 
health is and vigour, does not recognize the presence 
of virtue, which they suppose to be especially and 
supremely in conformity with nature. For how is it 
not at odds with the common conception for one to 
apprehend a difference between health and disease 
<(and not to apprehend any between prudence) and 
folly but to think that the latter is present after it 
has been removed and not to recognize that the 
former is present after one has got it ? And, since 
it is from the summit of progress that men change 
to happiness and virtue, one of two things must be 
true : either progress is not a state of vice and un- 
happiness or else virtue is not far removed from vice 
nor is happiness from unhappiness but the difference 
30-b 8, and 429 a 29-b 3 ; Theophrastus, De Sens i bus 32 
(Dox. Graeci, p. 508, 18-21). 

c With to kolvu)S Kara (f>vcnv cf. koivojs aKaraArjTTTois in De 
Stoic. Repug. 1056 f supra ; and for health and vigour as 
examples of what is Kara. <f>voiv on this level cf. 1060 b-c 



(1062) SatfJiovias rrjv euSatuwtav dXXd fiiKpdv /cat dv- 
€7Tatady]rov ehai rrjv Trpos ra /ca/ca tojv dyaOwv 
E 8ta<f>opdv ov yap av iavrovs 8ieXdvdavov dvr €K€i- 
vojv tolvt <exovt€s. 

10. "Orav fji€v ovv p,r]8ev6s eKcrrrjvai ra>v /xa^o- 
fjLevtov dXXd 7rdv9 y dfiov Xeyecv 1 /cat nOevai deXojoi, 
to tovs rrpoKOTTTovrag dvor)Tovs /cat kolkovs elvac, 
to <f)povLp,ovs /cat dyadovs yevGfievovs SiaXavddvecv 
iavTOVSy to fieydXrjv 8ia<f>opdv ttjs (frpovrjoeojs Trpos 
TTjv d(f)poGvvr)v v7rapx€iVy rj ttov ool Sokovgl davfia- 
aiojs €V tols Soyuaat r^v opLoXoyiav fieficuovv; ert 
8k [A&XXov iv tois rrpdyfJiaatv, oVav ndvTas irrCcnrjs 
kolkovs /cat dhiKovs /cat drriOTovs /cat dc/)povas tovs 
fj/rj oo<f>ovs drro^aivovTes etra -TTaAtv rous jjlzv clvtlov 


jLt^Se Trpooayopevojoi rots' oe ^p^uara ttiotcvojolv, 
dpxds lyx'E.ipi^ojoiv , e/cStScuat OvyaTepas ; Tatrra 
ya/> €t /x€v rraL^ovTes Xeyovoc, KaQeiodojoav z tols 

6<f)pVS' €t S' (X7TO OTTOvStJS KCLL (f)lXoOO(/)OVVTeS , TTOpd 

1063 ra? /cotvas* eaTtv ivvolas ifjeyetv piev ofiolcos /cat 
KOKit^iv irdvTas dvOpojirovs xpy a @ at &* T °fc A 6 ^ ^^ 


V7T€p£K'TT€iTXrjxQo:i /carayeAdV S' 'AAe^tVou fX7]8ev 8e 
jxaXXov o'Uadai jjuySe tJttov dXXrjXojv dcfrpaiveiv tovs 

1 6fiov Xiytiv -Pohlenz ; ofioXoyclv -E, B. 

^ C/. Castiglioni (Gnomon, xxvi [1954], p. 84). 

3 KadtLodcooav -Bernardakis (KaOeoOwaav -Wyttenbach) ; 
KaraOiodmoav -E, B ; cf. Amatorivs 753 b and S. V.F. i, 
frag. 246 (6<f>pi>s (.ltj /cafoi/xeVq). 

a For the emphasis which the Stoics placed upon the 
internal consistency of their system and Plutarch's conten- 
tion that their actions were inconsistent with their doctrines 
see De Stoic. Repug. 1033 a-f supra. 



between the evil things and the good is minute and 
imperceptible, for otherwise men would not have 
the latter instead of the former without noticing it. 

10. Well then, when the Stoics refuse to abandon 
any of the conflicting propositions but wish to assert 
and maintain all of them together — that men who 
are making progress are stupid and vicious, that 
when they have become prudent and virtuous they 
do not notice it, that there is a great difference 
between prudence and folly — , does it perhaps seem 
to you that they are in an amazing way confirming 
the consistency a in their doctrines ? And still more 
so in their deeds, when declaring b that those who 
are not sages are all in the same degree vicious and 
unjust and unreliable and foolish they then again, 
while avoiding and abominating some and to some 
not even speaking when they meet, to others entrust 
money, hand over offices, and give daughters in 
marriage ? If it is in jest that they say these things, 
let them unbend their solemn brows ; but, if it is in 
earnest and by way of philosophizing, it is at odds 
with the common conceptions to deal with some men 
as tolerable and with others as extremely vicious 
while subjecting all alike to blame and reproach 
and, while marvelling at Chrysippus and deriding 
Alexinus, c to think that the men are not a bit more 

b S.V.F. iii, frag. 668 (p. 167, 29-31) ; cf. 1076 c infra 
and De Stoic. Repug. 1048 e supra. 

c Doring, Megariker, frag. 79. See Plutarch, De Vitioso 
Pudore 536 a-b and S. V.F. iii, frag. 720 for anecdotes con- 
cerning this Alexinus of Elis, one of the Megarian School, 
nicknamed 'EXcyfrvos because of his contentiousness (cf. 
Doring, op. cit. y pp. 115-123). He made Zeno the Stoic a 
special object of attack (Diogenes Laertius, ii, 109 ; cf. 
Sextus, Adv. Math, ix, 108-109). The title of a rejoinder to 



(1063) avSpas. " vat," (f>aalv, il dXXa (Lorrep 6 nrrjxyv 
asniyoyv iv OaXdrrrj rrjs imc^aveias ovdev rjrrov ttvl- 
yerai rod KaraSeSvKoros opyvtds nevraKoaias ov- 
rcos ov8e ol rreXd^ovres dperfj rtov fiaKpdv ovrtov 
rjrrov eloiv iv /ca/cta* /cat Kaddrrep ol rv<f)Xol rv<j>Xoi 
eloi kov oXiyov varepov dvafiXerreiv pLeXXtooiv, ov- 
rajs ol rrpoKOTtrovres, &XP 1 °v l rr ) v dperrjv avaAa- 
B j8a>atv, dvorjroi /cat fjboxQypol Sta/xevouatv." on 
fiev ovv ovre rvtf)Xols ioiKaoiv ol TrpoKorrrovres 
dXXd rjrrov o^vSopKovatv ovre rrviyopLevois dXXa 
vrjxofjievois, /cat ravra TrX-qoiov Xifxevos, avrol S id 
rtov TTpayparojv fiaprvpovatv. ov yap dv ixp&vro 
ovpfSovXois /cat arparrjyois /cat vojxoderais tborrep 
rv<f>Xols 2 x €L P a y a> y°^y °v&* Q-v it,r)Xovv k'pya kcu 
rrpd^eis /cat Xoyovs /cat fiiovs evitvv el ndvras (hoav- 
rws Trviyofxevovs vtto rrjs dtfrpOGVvrjs /cat fioxd?]- 
pias ecopojv. d<f>els z 8e rovro davptaoov eKelvr] rovs 
dvopas, el (j,r)8e rots eavrtbv ScSdaKovrat rrapa- 
SelyiiaaL Trpoeodai (rovsY SiaXeXrjOoras €Kelvovs 

1 a-xpis ov -ft, B (but see Moralia vii [L.C.L.], p. vii) ; 
axpis dv ov -Rasmus {Proy. 1872, p. 14) but </. B. Weissen- 
berger, Die Sprache Plutarchs i, p. 37. 

2 tv(J>Aois -Meziriac ; rvSXol -E, B. 

3 <i<f)€L -B. 4 <tovs> -added by Reiske. 

his attacks is preserved in the list of the writings of Ariston 
of .Chios (S.V.F. i, p. 7.5, 23). Other writings by Alexinns 
are mentioned by Eusebius (Praep. Evang, xv, 2, 4) and 
Athenaeus (xv, 696 e-f and possibly x, 418 e) ; and a frag- 
ment of one is preserved in the De Rhetor ica of Philodemus 
(cols. XLIV-XLVI = i, pp. 79-81 and Supplementum, pp. 39- 
42 [Sudhaus]). 

° S. V.F. iii, frag. 539 (pp. 143, 39-144, 2). Cf. S. V.F. 
iii, frags. 527 and 530 ; the unnumbered fragment of a 
papyrus in Milan published by Anna Maria Colombo. 
Parol a del Passato, ix (1954), pp. 376-381 ; and St. Atigus- 



or less foolish one than the other. " Yes," they say, a 
" but just as in the sea the man a cubit from the 
surface is drowning no less than the one who has 
sunk 500 fathoms, so neither are they any the less 
in vice who are approaching virtue than they who 
are a long way from it ; and just as the blind are 
blind even if they are going to recover their sight b 
a little later, so those who are making progress con- 
tinue to be stupid and depraved until they have 
attained virtue." That those who are making pro- 
gress resemble neither blind nor drowning men, how- 
ever, but men whose sight is less than clear or men 
who are swimming and near to haven too, to this the 
Stoics by their deeds testify themselves. For they 
would not be using councillors and generals and 
legislators as blind leaders c and they would not be 
emulating the works and actions and words and lives 
of some men either if in their eyes all men were in the 
same way drowning in folly and depravity. But let 
this pass, and be amazed at the former point that 
the gentlemen are not taught even by their own 
examples to give up these men who are sages with- 

tine, Epistle 167, 12-13. The comparison of the puppy given 
by Cicero (S. V.F. iii, frag. 530) justifies neither the emenda- 
tion of Plutarch's text nor the assumption that Plutarch 
changed the comparison used by Chrysippus (Pohlenz, 
Hermes, lxxiv [1939], p. 20, n. 2), for Chrysippus probably 
used both comparisons : cf. S. V.F. ii, frag. 178 and, for the 
significance of this fragment and the comparisons with 
blindness, O. Luschnat, Philol or/us y cii (1958), p. 210. 

b For dva^XciTciv in this sense cf. S.V.F. ii, p. 52 , 21 and 
Plato, Phaedrus*24<3 b. 

c Cf. De Stoic. Repug. 1033 f supra, and for the pro- 
verbial phrase tv<j>\6s x^P^^Y^ D* For tuna 98 b with 
Wyttenbach's note ad loc. in his Animadrersiones in 
Plvtarehi Opera Moralia. 



* a ao(f>ovs kolL fiTj ovvUvras ft^S' aloOavopizvovs ore 
7rvvy6\ievoi Triiravvrai /cat <f>a>s dpcScrt /cat rrjs /cartas 
€Trdva) yeyovores avairenvevKacn. 

11. Ilapd 1 t^v k'vvoidv eartv av9pa>7Tov, <L Trdvra 
rdyaOa 7rdpeaTt /cat /u/nSev eVSet npos euSat/xovtav 
/cat to /xa/edptov, tovto> /ca^/cetv i£dyeiv eavrov, 
ert Se jjl&AXov, to fJLTjSev dyadov eon /xt?S' eoTat ra 
Setvd Se rrdvra kcu ra Sucr^ep^ /cat /ca/cd Trdpeori 
/cat 7rapearat Std riXovs, tovtcq jjltj KadrjKetv diro- 
AeyeoOou top fiiov, av pLTj rt v^ Ata 2 toji> doia<f>6pu>v 
avra) Trpoayevrjrac. tclvtcl toivvv eV rfi Z-roa vo- 

fJLo9€T€LTCLl, /Cat ffoAAoVS fJL€V i£dyOV(JL TO)V <JO<f>(A)V 

<bs dfieivov 3 €v8at,fJLOVovi'Tas ireiravodai, ttoAXovs 8k 

Kardxovcn rwv <j>avAcov (hs KadrjKovTos* avrols tfiv 

D KaKo8aipiovovvras . /catVot d /xei> oo<f)6s oA/Jto? )Lta- 

Kapios rravevSaifiajv aG(f>aArjs aKiv8vvos, 6 Se <£a£- 

Ao? Kat aVO^rO? OtO? et7Tetl> 

yefjLto 5 /ca/cd>v 017 /cat ou/c 6 eoO' onov 4 redfj- 

dAAd /cat tovtols fxovrjv* olovrai KadrjKovoav elvcu 
/cd/cetVots i^aycoyrjv. il et/coTOJS" Se," (f>r]al Xpva- 
17T7TOS, " ov yap dyadols /cat /ca/cots* Set 7rapa/ie- 

1 Kat 7rapa -Basil. ; "Ert 7rapa -Bernardakis ; but cf. the 
beginning of chap. 26 (1070 f) infra. 

2 rt v?) Aca -Turnebus ; tlvl Sta -E, B ; n Sta -Basil. ; rt 
[8ia] -Wyttenbach. 

3 dfi€Lvov <6V> -van Herwerden (Lectiones Rheno-Traiec- 
tinae [1882], p. 123), Hartman (De Plutarcho, p. 607). 

4 KaOrjKov -van Herwerden (ibid.). 

5 ye/x^ -Rasmus (Prog. 1872, p. 14) ; y€/ta»v -E, B (cf. De 
Stoic. Repug. 1048 f supra). 

6 E, B (8t) -omitted by B) ; St) KoiWr' -Diibner (<?/. X><? 
Stoic. Repug. 1048 f supra). 

7 ottou -E ; 077-77 -B (cf. De Stoic. Repug. 1048 f supra). 

8 /Ltov7)v -Basil. ; jjlovtjv -E, B, Aldine. 



out being aware of it and who do not understand or 
even perceive that they have stopped drowning and 
are seeing daylight and, risen above vice, have 
drawn breath again. 

11. It is at odds with the common conception to 
hold that, unless there befall a man to boot some 
one of the things that are — yes, by heaven — in- 
different, he who is attended by all the goods and 
lacks nothing that makes for happiness and bliss 
ought to commit suicide but — and this is still more 
at odds with it — he who has not and will not have 
anything good but is attended and will be perpetu- 
ally attended by all things dreadful and vexatious 
and evil ought not to renounce his life. These, then, 
are the laws enacted in the Stoa a ; and the Stoics 
speed many sages from life on the ground that it is 
better for them to have done being happy and 
restrain many base men from dying on the ground 
that they ought to live on in unhappiness. Although 
for them the sage is blessed, blissful, supremely 
happy, unliable to lapse or peril and the base and 
stupid man one fit to say 

I'm now replete with woes, and there's no room, 6 
nevertheless they think that it behooves the latter 
to abide and the former to take leave of life. " And 
this is reasonable," says Chrysippus, " for the 
standard by which life must be measured is not 

■ 8. V.F. iii, frag. 759 (p. 188, 11-20). See 1060 c-d and 
De Stoic. Repug. 1042 c-e supra ; and for the Stoic dogma 
of the complete happiness of the sage and the complete un- 
happiness of all others cf. Cicero, De Finibus iii, 26 and 
S.V.F. i, frag. 216. 

b Euripides, Nereides Furens 1245 (cf. De Stoic. Repug. 
1048 f supra). 



(1063) rpeloOai rov fiiov dXXd tols /card (f>vacv /cat Trapd 
<f)voiv" ovtojs avdpcoTTOLS 1 Gco^ovGL TTjV ovvrjdecav 
/cat Trpos ras Kowas evvoias <f)iXooo<j)ovoL. ri Xe- 
yeis ; ov Set OKOTrelv 

ottl 2 roc ev jjieydpoLGL kolkov (t') 3 dyadov re 

rov 7T€pl /3lov /cat Oavarov okottov\x€vov oitSe touTrep 

E em tpyov rd irpos euSat/xovtav /cat /ca/coSatjuovtav 

i^erd^etv eVta^jita fidXXov ai^eA(owTa) 4 dAA' e/c 


(jroTtpovY pcwreov r) fjurj 7roteta#at Xoy tayxovs" ; ov 
jite'AAet TTpos ras roiavras VTroOdaets /cat dp^a? 
KadrjKovrcos alpelodai re rov fiiov to rtov cf^evKrcov 
ovSev drreon /cat cfrevyetv to Trdvra rd aiperd Trap- 
eon; /catrot TrapdXoyov \xiv y c5 eVatpe, /cat to 
(frevyeiv rov /3tW eV firjSevt /ca/ca> yevopievovs rrapa- 
Xoya)T€pov Se et p,rj rvyxdvcov rts" tou dSiacfropov 
rdyadov d<f)lr)GLV, onep ovtol ttoiovgl, ttjv euoat- 
F fjLoviav 7Tpo'C€[A€voi /cat rrjv dperrjv rrapovGav dvd* 
vyteias /cat oAo/cA^ptas" cLv ov rvyxdvovGtv. 

1 E, B ; dvdpco7TOL -Basil. ; avOpconoi -Pohlenz, Bury. 

2 Reiske ; on -E, B. 

3 <r'> -supplied by Reiske ; omitted by E, B. 

4 H. C. ; cbfieX . . . vac. 5 -E, vac. 6 -B ; eWar^/xa /xaAAov 
a)<j>€XovvTa)V /cat fiXa-TTTOvrcov -Turnebus, Vulcobius ; €t Tt €ttl- 
£,riLLiov /LiaAAov r) <l)<j>£Xip,ov -Pteiske ; eVt^^ta /^taAAov r) <lxf>eXip.a 
-Bernardakis (cf. contra Kolfhaus, Piutarchi De Co mm. 
Not., p. 54) ; inlarffia fiaXXov axfreiXev -Pohlenz. 

5 Pohlenz ; rovs . . . vac. 8 -E, B. 

° On avvrfOcLa see 1059 b and De Stoic. Repug. 1036 c — 
1037 a supra ; ooj^ovol is used as in the phrases ra <f>atv6(j,€va 
ow^eiv (De Facie 923 a) and otpaai Kat 8ta<f>vXd£at ras av£rjO€is 
(1084 a infra, cf. De Primo Frigido 947 e-f). 

b irpos here as in De Stoic. Repug. 1042 d-e supra (. . .fit) 



goods and evils but the things in conformity with 
nature and contrary to it." This is the way in which 
they save common experience a for men and philo- 
sophize with a view to b the common conceptions. 
What do you say ? The man who deliberates about 
life and death must not consider 

Whatsoe'er hath been wrought both evil and good in the 
palace c 

and must not as it were test in the balance the 
minted coins (l that are of greater use in respect to 
happiness and unhappiness but must take the things 
that are neither beneficial nor injurious as the basis 
of his calculations about the necessity of living or not 
living ? On such premises and principles will one not 
properly choose the life from which is absent none of 
the objects of avoidance and avoid that in which are 
present all the objects of choice ? Yet, irrational 
as it is, comrade, for men to flee life when nothing 
evil has befallen them, it is more irrational if one 
resigns the good because he misses that which is 
indifferent ; and that is precisely what these men 
do in giving up the happiness and the virtue which 
they have for the sake of physical health and sound- 
ness which they miss. 

rrpo? ra atpera . . . rid^odat Aoytoy.AOus', dAA' . . . irpos raura 
Kai £rjv Kal aTTodvrjo kzlv) . 

r Odyssey iv, 892, quoted also in be Tttenda Sanitate 122 o 
and [Plutarch], Stromal. 9 (VII, p. 4-1, 5 [Bernardakis] = 
JJo.v. Graeci, p. 582, 3) ; cf. the purpose for which Diogenes 
the Cynic is said to have quoted the line (Diogenes Laertius, 
vi, 103). 

d Cf. Pollux, iii, 86 sub fine m and Philo, Quis Rerum Div. 
Heres 180 (iii, p. 41, 13-17 [Wendland]) ; for comparing 
minted coins by weight and the simile based on this cf. 
S.V.F. i, frag. 81. 



(1063) ev#' aure TXavKO) Kpovlorjs (frpevas e^e'Aero Z*€vs, 

on 1 y^pvaeia ^aA/ceta)^ eKarofx^ota ivveafioicov e- 
/xeAAe SiajjLelifjeaOaL. 2 Kairoi tol (lev ^aA/cea tojv 

OTtXoJV 01>X TJTTOV 7] TOL XP V0 ^ Tra P € ^X € XP e ^ aV P LOL X°'' 

fjiivots, €Virp€iT€ia Se acu/xaros' Kal vyUta tols 
UtojikoZs ovre xp e ^ av ovt ovtjolv rtva (f>epet rrpos 
1064 evSaijJLOvlav dAAd ofjiws ovtol rrjs <j)povf)o€ojs avn- 
KaraXXdrrovrai ttjv vyUiav. Kal yap 'HpaftvWra) 
<j>aol Kal QepeKvSrj Ka9rjK€iv dv, ziirep rjovvavTO, 
ttjv aperrjv a<j>€ivai Kal tt)v (f>p6vrjaiv ware Travoa- 
odai (f)9eipta)VTas Kal vSpajmcovras Kal ttjs KipKrjs 
€yX€ovar)s 8vo (ftdppLaKa, to pcev rroiovv a<f>povas 
€K (f>povijjLOjp to S' o(yovs i£ avOpamojv <f)p6vr)oiv 
8' exovTas, 6pda)s dv) 3 top 'OSvcraea melv to tt)s 
a(j>pocruvrjs fxaXXov rj pLeTafiaXelv els Orjpiov fxop(f>rjv 
to elSos, k'xovTa ttjv cfrpovrjoiv — Kal juera ttjs <f>po- 
vrjoews SrjXovoTt ttjv ev8aip,oviav — , Kal ratrrd (j>a- 
oiv* avTrjv v(j>rjyeiodai Kal irapaKeXeveodai ttjv 
B (frpovrjGLv " d(f)es jjl€ Kal KaTaq^povrjoov aTroXXvpLe- 

1 ore -Reiske. 2 B ; hiapbei^aoOai -E. 

3 H. C. ; to Se o . . . vac. 22 -f 19 (in two lines) -E, vac. 
32 (at bottom of page) -B . . . tov; to §' 5<vovs <f>povifiovs 4$ 
a<f>povujv av9pa>7Tcov, ovk av> tov -Bernardakis after Wytten- 
bach (cf. contra Kolfhaus, Phttarchi De Co mm. Not., 
pp. 54-55) ; ro 8' o<,vous €<; avOpdjiron', opOcos au iXeoOai^ tov 
-Pohlenz. 4 E ; cj>r]olu -B. 

a Iliad vi, 234. 

b S. V.F. ni, frag. 762. 

c In Non Posse Suaviter Vivi 1089 f Plutarch speaks of 
Heraclitus and Pherecydes as victims of severe diseases 
which he does not specify, but in Sulla xxxvi, 5 (474 f) he 
names Pherecydes " the theologian " (cf. Diels-Kranz, Frag. 
Forsok. 6 i, pp. 43-51) among those who succumbed to 
pediculosis (cf. Aristotle, Hist. Animal. 557 a 1-3 and 



Then was Glaucus bereft by Cronian Zeus of his reason, 
in that he was about to exchange golden arms worth 
a hundred oxen for brazen arms worth nine. Yet 
for men in combat brazen arms were no less useful 
than golden ones, whereas the Stoics find bodily 
comeliness and health neither useful nor advantage- 
ous for happiness at all ; but nevertheless these 
Stoics accept health in exchange for prudence. That 
is clear from their statements b that it would have 
behooved Heraclitus and Pherecydes, if they could 
have done so, to resign their virtue and prudence 
so as to be quit of their pediculosis and dropsy c and 
that, if the philtres poured by Circe were two, one 
making fools of prudent men and the other passes 
of human beings d but asses with prudence, it would 
be right) for Odysseus to have drunk the philtre of 
folly rather than to have changed his form to the 
shape of a beast though thereby keeping his prud- 
ence — and with his prudence obviously his happi- 
ness e — ; and this, they say, is the precept and 
prescription of prudence herself : " Let me go and 

W. Nestle, Grieehische Studien [Stuttgart, 1948], pp. 577- 
578). For the fatal dropsy of Heraclitus and its embellish- 
ments (Diogenes Laertius, ix, 3-5) c/. H. Frankel, A.J.P., 
lix (1938), pp. 309-314 and p. 325 and R. Muth, Anzeiger 
fur die Altertumswissenschaft, vii (1954), cols. 250-253 and 
viii (1955), cols. 251-252. 

d Although in Odyssey x, 210-243 only wolves, lions, and 
swine are mentioned, in Bruta Animalia Ratione Uti 986 b 
Plutarch expressly includes asses among the beasts into 
which Circe has transformed men (cf. also Apollodorus, 
Epitome vii, 15 [L.C.L. ii, pp. 286-287] ; Bethe, R.-E. xi 
[19211, col. 502, 21-29). 

e The interjection is Plutarch's ironical reminder that for 
the Stoics (f>p6vr]OLs and eOSat/xona are identical (S. V.F. iii, 
frag. 53= De Stoic. Repug. 1046 e supra). 



(1064) V7}$ ijjiov Kal hia^deipopLev-qs els ovov TrpoatOTTOv" 
aXX ovov ye, <f>r\G€i tls, rj roiavra rrapayyeXXovaa 
<f>p6vrjais eo+iv, cl to putv (f>pov€lv Kal evoaifjuovetv 
dyadov iari to Se ^Stjoyxop^ov) 1 ir€pi<f>4p€iv rrpou- 
ojttov d8id(/)opov. edvos eivai <j>aoiv AWlottojv, 
ottov kvujv fiaaiXevec Kal fiaaiXevs Trpooayopeverai 
Kai yepa 2 Kal Tifids e^et fiaaiAtajs, avopes Se 
TTpaTTOVOiv aircp rjyefjLOG-i TToXecov 7Tpocrr}K€i Kal 
apxovow. dp ovv rrapd tols TtTOJiKOLS ojjlolojs to 
pb€V bvofxa Kac to oyfuio. Tayadov irapeoTi tjj dpe- 
ttj Kal fiovrjv TavTTjv alpeTov Kal ojc^iXtpLov Kal 
C avfi<f>€pov KaXovaiy TTpaTTovoc Se ndvTa 3 Kal (f)iXo- 
oo<f)ovoi Kal i^coGi Kal diroBv^aKovoiv wcnrep arro 
irpooTaypLaTOS tcov d8ta(f)6pa>v ; KatToi tov Kvva [xev 
€K€lvov ovSels AWiorrcov drroKTivvvoiv , 4 aAAd oe- 
jjivtos 5 KaOrjTac TrpoaKWovpLZvos • ovtoi Se tt^v dpeT'nv 
air oXXvov a iv iavTtov Kal SiafiQeLpovcn, ttjs vyteias 

7T€pi€)(6fJL€VOL Kal TTJS aTTOViaS . 

12. "Eot/ce Se rj/juas drraXXaTTeiv tov rrepl tovtcdv 
€tl TrXeiova Xeyeiv 6 KoXo<f>tbv avTos ov 6 XpvoiTT- 
rros tols boypiaoiv €7TiTedeiK€v. ovtqjv yap eV Trj 
<f>va€i tcov jjLev dyada>v tcov Se KaKcov tcov Se /cat 6 

1 <&vofiop<f>ov> -H. C. ; Se . . . vac. 9 -E, vac. 3-f- 1 (in two 
lines) -B . . . Trtpifyiptiv; <6vov> -Turnebus. 

2 yipa -Heiske ; Upa -E, B. 

3 Travra -Hartman (Be Plutarcho, p. 607), implied by 
A myot's version ; ravra -E, B. 

4 Stephanus ; clttoktIvvvolv -E, B. 

5 dAAct (j€fjiva)s (sic) -Basil. ; dAAd da€fivajs -E ; dAA' acrefivajs 

6 Kal -deleted by Wyttenbach ; Papabasileios excised as 
a gloss on fxera^v the following Kal KaAou/xeVcov dSta^opcav 
(Athena, x [1898], p. 227). 



regard me not, for I am being undone and perverted 
into an ass's head." a But the prudence that gives 
such orders, one would say, is the prudence of an 
ass, if in fact to be prudent and happy is good and 
.to wear a (misshapen) face indifferent. There is 
said b to be a tribe of Ethiopians among whom a 
dog reigns and is addressed as king and lias the 
perquisites and honours of a king, but the functions 
of political leadership and government are per- 
formed by men. Do not the Stoics in like manner 
give the title and rank of the good to virtue and call 
virtue alone an object of choice and beneficial and 
useful but perform all their actions and do their 
philosophizing and live and die as it were at the 
command of the things that are indifferent ? While 
that dog, however, is slain by none of the Ethiopians 
but sits in majesty receiving their obeisance, these 
Stoics undo their own virtue and destroy it by their 
attachment to health and painlessness. 

12. It seems that the finishing touch which 
Chrysippus has put to his doctrines itself c absolves 
us from saying still more on this subject. For, there 
being in nature some things that are good and some 
that are evil and some also that are intermediate 

a Cronert (Symbolae Oslomses, xiv [1935], pp. 126-133) 
argued that these words are verses taken by Chrysippus from 
the Elpenor of Timotheus and put into the mouth of his 
personified <f>p6vrjois. 

b Cf. Pliny, N.H. vi, 192 and Aelian, De Natura Anl- 
■malium vii, 40 = Hermippus, frag. 76 (C. M tiller, Frag. Hist. 
Graec. iii, p. 53 with Heibges, R.-E. viii [1912], col. 852, 

c Pohlenz (Moralia vi/2) punctuates so as to construe 
avTos not with koXo<J)(x>v but with Xpvonnros, as is implied by 
Amyot's version, " que Chrysippus mesme adjouste, . . ." 



(1064) fjL€Ta£v /cat KaXovfJLevojv ahta^opcov, ovhels eoriv 
D avdpcoTTtov os ov jSouAerat rayadov e;\;eiv fxdXXov 7) 
to aSid(f>opov {/cat to aota^ooov) 1 t) to /ca/coV. 
aAAa /cat tovs Oeovs Stjttov 2 irotovfieda fjidpTvpas, 
acTovfxevoL rat? evxcus Trap olvtcov txaAiara uei> 
kttjglv ayadajv, el 8e jult], /ca/ccoi> dno^>vyr]v y to 
[Se] 3 fjLTjT dyaQov \xr\Te /ca/cov olvtc piev Tayadov fir) 
OeAovTes k'yeiv olvtl 8e tov /ca/cou OeAovTes. 6 8e 
ttjv <f>vciv €vaAAarra)v /cat ttjv tol^lv dvaoTpecfyojv 
e/c T7Js fjL€G7]s ^topa? to pAaov els tt)v cor^aT^i/ 
jjL€TaTtdr]cn to 0' eax aT0V €t V ttjv \xear]v eiravdyei 
/cat tterot/ct£et, Kaddnep ol Tvpavvoi tols kolkoZs 
npoeSptav SiSovgl, [/cat] 4 vofjiodeTWv TTp&Tov Staj- 
/cetv rayadov SevTepov 8e to kolkov eoya TOV 8e /cat 
E ^etptarov ^yeta^ai to /xt^t' ctyaflov ju/^Te /ca/cov, 
ajorrep et Tt? /x€Ta Ta ovpdvia to, eV "AiSof TiOeir] 
Trp> 8e yrjv /cat Ta uepi yrjv et? tov TapTapov a7r- 
oj crete 

T^Ae /xaA\ fjx 1 fidOiOTov vrro xdovos k'oTi /3epe- 

etVojv ouv eV toj TpiTto rrepl Qvoeous oti AuaiTeAei 
£r}v dcf>pova 7) (/X07) 5 fiiovv /caV fjL7j8erroTe /xe'AA^ </>po- 
VTyaetv einfyepei /caTa Aetjiv H toiclvtcl yap Tayadd 

1 <. . .> -added by Stephanus. 

2 S7777-01; -E, 77817 -B. 

3 [Sc] -deleted by Hartman (De Plutarcho, p. 607). 

4 [kcuJ -deleted by Pohlenz ; BlBovs kcu -Basil, and Madvig 
(Adversaria Crltica^ p. 669) but 0/. contra Rasmus (Prog, 
187:2, p. 15). 

5 <|U/>7> -added by Stephanus (c/. fiaXXov t) <^17> in V> 
Stole. Re pug. 1042 a siqira). 

This distinction, as Sextus says, was common to the 



and are called indifferent, there is no human being 
who does not wish to have the good rather than the 
indifferent (and the indifferent) rather than the evil. 
Nay, of this we make the very gods our witnesses, I 
take it, as in our prayers we beg them first of all for 
the possession of good things and, if this may not 
be, for deliverance from evils, being unwilling to 
have what is neither good nor evil instead of what is 
good but willing to have it instead of what is evil. 
This man, however, by a transposition of nature and 
an inversion of order transfers the middle from the 
midmost space to the last and, just as tyrants give 
evil men precedence, removes what is last and 
elevates it to the midmost space, making it the 
law to seek first the good and second the evil and to 
regard as last and worst what is neither good nor 
evil, as if one would place after celestial things the 
infernal realm and expel the earth and earthly 
things to the nether w r orld 

Far and afar, where lies under earth the profoundest of 
chasms. 6 

So in the third book concerning Nature c after he 
has said that to live a fool is better than (not) to be 
alive even if one is never going to be sensible he 
continues in so many words : " for to human beings 

Old Academy, the Peripatus, and the Stoa (Adv. Math, xi, 
3-6 = £. V.F. hi, frag. 71 [p. 17, 22-25] and Xenocrates, frag. 
76 [Heinze]) : cf. Plato, Gorgias 467 i: 6—468 b 1, hy*u 216 
d 5-7, Symposium 202 u 1-5; Aristotle, Categories 12 a 13- 
20 ; Divisiones Aristoteleae §§54 and 68 (pp. 31, 16 ff. and 
65, 26 ff. [Mutschmann]) ; O. Luschnat, Philoloous, cii 
(1958), pp. 211-214. 

b Iliad viii, 14 (cf Plato, Phaedo 112 a). 

c For the remainder of this chapter see De Stoic. Repug. 
1042 a-c supra (S. V.F. iii, frag". 760) and the notes there. 



(1064) eari tois dvdpomois, coorc rpouov rivd /cat rd /ca/ca, 
Ttov [aXXcov] 1 dvd /xeaov Trporepelv' eon S' ov 
ravra rrporepovvra dXX 6 Xoyos ^£0' ov /Stow 2 em- 
fidAXei [xdXXov el /cat 3 d(f)poves eGopbcda " — orjXov 


F kou et 4 KaKoSatpLoves' ovbev yap drreori rovrcov rots* 
d<f)povcos fiiovatv. imftdXXci roivvv /ca/coSat/xoveti> 


rj firj fiXdirrtodai /cat dStKetv rj pirj dot/cetv /cat 
Trapavofielv 7] (jltj rrapavoixelv rovreoriv eVt/3aAAet 
rd (fx^) 5 eTTifidXAovra ttoicZv /cat KadrjKf-i £,fjv /cat 
TTdpd to [pirj] 6 Ka6rji<ov; " vav ^elpov ydp iarc ro 
aAoyov /cat to dvaLadrjrov eu>at tou a</>oatWtv." 
€tTa (riy Tradovres oi>x opLoXoyovoiv elvai /ca/cov 

O TOL> KOLKOV ^CtpoV €OTt ,' StO, (t/) 8 cf)€VKTOV 0,770- 

1065 (jxiivovoi jjlovov r r qv d(f>poovvr)v, el oi>x rjrrov dXXd 
/cat fiaXXov imfidXXov earl (fyevyeiv tt]v [irj Se^o- 
fi€V7]v to d<f>paiv€iv SidOecriv; 

13. AAAa TL dv TIS €7TL TOVTOLS SfO^CpatVot, fJL€~ 

p,vr]pL€Vos dv iv rw Sevrepco rrepl Qvaeous yeypa- 
(f>ev, a7TO(f)aivojv ovk dxprjoroos ttjv /ca/ctav rrpos rd 
oXa yeyevrjfjLevqv; d^iov §' dvaXafielv to Soyua Tat? 
€K€tvov Xe^ecriv, tva /cat jidOrjs ncos ol rod 9 Hevo- 

1 [aAAcov] -deleted by Reiske (cf. Oai> tcl KaKO. ra>v dvd 
fxcGov in De Stoic. Repug. 1042 b supra). 

2 fiiovv -E ; Piovvras (?) -B. 

3 /cat ci in De Stoic. Repug. 1042 c supra. 

4 et -deleted by Reiske but defended by Pohlenz (" con- 
sulto Plutarchus KaKohaifioves extollit "), 

5 <fir}> -added by Reiske (implied by Xy lander's version). 

6 [^17] -deleted by Wyttenbach (as by implication from 
Xylander's version). 7 <rt> -added by Stephanus. 

8 Sid <ti> -Meziriac (implied by versions of Xylander and 
Amyot) ; St' a -E, B. 


goods are of such a nature that in a way even evils 
have the advantage over intermediates ; but it is 
not these that have the advantage but reason, and it 
is incumbent upon us rather to be alive with reason 
although we are to be fools " — obviously, then, 
although unjust and lawless and hateful to the gods 
and although wretched, for those who are foolishly 
alive are without none of these characteristics. It is 
incumbent upon us, then, to be wretched rather than 
not to be wretched and to suffer injuries rather than 
not to suffer injuries and to do wrong rather than not 
to do wrong and to transgress the law rather than 
not to transgress it ; that is it is incumbent upon 
us to do things incumbent upon us <(not)> to do, and 
it is a duty to live even in violation of duty ? " Yes, 
for to be without rationality and sensibility is worse 
than to be a fool." Then <(what) makes them refuse 
to admit that there is evil which is worse than evil ? 
For <%vhat) reason do they declare that only folly 
is an object of avoidance if it is not less incumbent 
upon us but even more to avoid the state which does 
not admit of folly ? 

13. But why would this annoy anyone who re- 
members what he has written in the second book 
concerning Nature, where he declares that the 
genesis of vice has not been useless in relation to 
the universe as a whole ? It's worth repeating the 
doctrine in his own words, in order that you may 
in a way understand what position is given to vice 

a Cf. De Stoic. Repug. 1050 p (S. V.F. ii, frag. 1 181 [p. 339, 
14-19]) supra with the notes there. 

9 Wyttenbach after Leonicus (77-0)9 ol rov) ; ttlos S-nov -E 
B ; 04 tov (without 7rd»?) -Basil. 



(1065) Kpdrovs Kal ^TTevoLTmov Karyyopovvres inl rto purj 
rrjv vyieiav d8id<f>opov rjyeiaOai firjSe rov ttXovtov 
dvaxfreXes iv rlvi rornp rrjv kclkiclv avrol riOevrai 
Kal rivas Xoyovs rrepl avrfjs 8ief;iamv " r) 8e KaKta 
Trpos to. Sewa avfJL7Trd)fjLara (I8i6v to*') 1 eyei opov 
B yiyverai yap avrrf ttcds Kara rov rrjs (f>vaea>s X6- 
yov Ken, tv ovtods elrroj , ovk dypriarojs yiyverai 
rrpos rd oAa* ovSe ydp av rdyadov rjv. n ovkovv ev 
Oeols dyaOov ovSev eoriv, ejrel fjLrjSe KaKov ovoe, 
brav o "Levs els eavrov dvaXvaas* rrjv vXrjv drraoav 
els yevrjrai Kal ras dXXas dveXrj 8iacf)opds, ovSev 
eoriv dyadov rrjviKavra, prjSevos ye kokov irap- 
ovros. dXXa ^opov piev eoriv epifieXeia fjLrjSevos 
aTrdhovros ev avrco, Kal aajfiaros vyieia jxrjSevog 
fioptov vooovvros, dperrj S' dvev KaKias ovk e\ei 
yeveoiv, dXXa tooirep eviais ra>v larpiKcov hwapbecov 
log o<f>eu>s Kal yoXr) vaivrjs dvayKalov eoriv ovrajs* 
C e7Tirr)8ei6rr)s erepa rfj MeXrjrov 5 fxoxOrjpta TTpos 
rrjv TiOjKparovs SiKaioovvrjv Kal rfj l&Aeojvos dva- 

1 Setva ovtiTTTaifiaTa KJlSiov tlv> -Pohlenz (Hermes, lxxiv 
[1939], p. 12, n. 2), cf. De Stoic. Repug. 1050 f supra ; 
Xonrd ovixirrai^iara -E, B. 

2 ydp <kcu> avTT) -Kasmus (Prog. 1872, p. 15), cf. De Stoic. 
Repug. 1050 p supra (p,kv yap /cat avrrj). 

3 avaXuxjas -Meziriac ; but cf. Kolfhaus (Plutarchi De 
Coram. Not., p. 55). 

4 Wyttenbach ; ovrws dvayKalov iarlv -E, B. 

5 Bernardakis ; /zeAtrou -E, B. 

a Xenocrates, frag. 92 (Heinze) and Speusippus, frag. 59 
(Lang). Cf. Cicero, De Finibus iv, 49 ; De Legibus i, 55 ; 
Ti'sc. Disp. v, 29-30 ; and for the Platonic doctrine that 
health and wealth may be either goods or evils cf. especially 
Plato, Laws 661 a 5-d 4 and 728 d 6—729 u 1. The lists of 
works by Speusippus and by Xenocrates both contain a title 
llepl ttXovtov (Diogenes Laertius, iv, 4 and 11). 


and what theories concerning it are developed by 
the very men who denounce Xenocrates and Speusip- 
pus for holding that health is not indifferent and that 
wealth is not useless. " Vice is ^peculiarly) dis- 
tinguished from dreadful accidents, for in itself it 
does in a sense come about in accordance with the 
reason of nature and, if I may put it so, its genesis is 
not useless in relation to the universe as a whole, 
since otherwise the good would not exist either." 
So then, among the gods there is nothing good, 
since there is nothing evil either ; and, whenever 
Zeus, having reduced all matter to himself, becomes 
one and abolishes all difference else, 5 then, there 
being nothing evil present, there is nothing good 
either. While in a chorus c there is harmony if no 
member of it is out of tune and in a body health if 
no part of it is ill, for virtue, how r ever, there is no 
coming to be without vice ; but just as snake's 
venom or hyena's bile is a requisite for some medical 
prescriptions d so the depravity of Meletus is in its 
way suited to the justice of Socrates e and the 

b That is in the " ecpyrosis," for which see 1067 a, 1075 
b-c, and 1077 d infra and De Stole. Repug. 1053 c and 1053 
b-c supra. 

c dAAa x°P°v M v • • • T l v o.BiKtav=S.V.F. ii, frag. 1181 (p. 
339, 20-30). 

d For hyena's bile cf. in a similar context Plutarch, De 
Sera Numinis Vindicta 552 f and Steier, R.-E. Supplement 
iv (1924), col. 766, 20-25 ; for the use of snake's venom cf. 
Gossen-Steier, R.E., Zweite Reihe ii/ 1 (1921), col. 506, 

e See De Stoic. Repug. 1051 c supra. For Meletus, who 
brought the action against wSocrates (cf Plato, Euthi/phro 
2 b) and who is mentioned by Plutarch several times in the 
Moralia (76 a, 475 e, 499 f, 580 b-c), cf. P. Mazon, Rev. 
Etudes Anciennes, xliv (1942), pp. 177-190. 



(1065) ycoyia npos rrjv TLepiKAeovs KaAoKayaQiav. tto)s 
S' av evpev 6 Zei)? rov 'Hpa/cAea (j>vaai /cat rov 
AvKovpyov €6 firj /cat HapSavdrraAov tj^uv e(f>vae 
/cat QdAapiv; topa Aeyeiv avrols on /cat (f)6Lais 
yeyovev avOpcorrco 1 7rpos eve^iav /cat rroSdypa TTpos 
WKvrrjra, /cat ovk av rjv 'A^tAAeu? KOjjLrjrrjs el firj 
cfcaAcLKpos Qepalrrjg. ri ydp Sccufiepovai rtov ravra 
Arjpovvrajv /cat (f)Avapovvra)v ol Azyovres firj dxp^- 
otcds yeyovevai rrpos rrjv iyKpdretav ttjv d/coAa- 
atav /cat 7rpos ttjv oiKaioovvrjv 7TjV dSt/ctav; ottojs 
D evyjii)\ieBa rot? ^eot? det \ioydr\plav elvat 

ipevSed y alfivAiovs re Aoyovc /cat €ttlkAo7tov 

1 Wyttenbach ; dvOpcuTrajv -E, 1>. 

a Cf. Plutarch, Nicias ii, 2 -iii, 2 (524 c-d) and viii, 5 
(528 b-c) ; Pericles xxxiii, 8 (170 d-e) ; and for Plutarch's 
estimates of Cleon and of Pericles respectively see further 
Praecepta Gerendae Reipublicae 806 f — 807 a and Pericles 
xxxix (173 c-e). 

b Heracles was a hero of the wStoics (cf. 8.V.F. i, frag. 
514 [and IleraclUi Qvaestiones Homer icae 33] ; ii, p. 300, 
31-37 ; iii, p. 84, 5-7 ; Epictetus, Diss, i, vi, 32-36 and 
in, xxiv, 13-17). Lycurgus, the legendary author of the 
vSpartan constitution {cf. Plutarch's Lycurgus and especially 
xxxi [59 a-b]), was with Socrates the subject of a treatise 
by Sphaerus, the pupil of Zeno and Cleanthes (S.V.F. i, 
p. 140, 2 and p. 142, 3-7) ; and he must have been held in 
high regard by some Stoics (cf. Seneca, Epistle xc, 6 ; 
Epictetus, Diss, u, xx, 26 and frag, v) despite the denial that 
he was a sage and that his enactments were truly law (see T)e 
Stoic. Repug. 1033 f and S. V.F. iii, frag. 599, and cf. 
Dougan and Henry on Cicero, Tusc. Disp. v, 7). 

c Sardanapalus, king of Assyria, typified for the Greeks 
the life of luxury and sensuality (cf, Plutarch, De Alexandri 
Fortuna aut Virtute 330 v and 336 d ; Aristophanes, Birds 



vulgarity of Cleon to the nobility of Pericles. How 
would Zeus have found the way of creating Heracles 
and Lycurgus b if he had not also created Sardana- 
palus c for us and Phalaris ? d Here it is time for 
them to assert that mankind has been given con- 
sumption with a view to his vigour and gout with 
a view to his fleetness of foot and that Achilles would 
not have had long hair if Thersites had not been 
bald/ For what is the difference betw r een those 
who talk this silly nonsense and the Stoics, who say 
that the genesis of licentiousness has not been with- 
out use for continence or that of injustice without 
use for justice ? Let us take care, then, to pray 
the gods that there may always be depravity 

Falsehoods and blandishing speeches and character tricky 
and thievish ' 

1021 ; Aristotle, frag. 90 [Rose] and Eth. Nic. 1095 b 10-22 ; 
Athenaeus, xii, 528 e — 530 c) and was used for this purpose 
by Chrysippus in his polemic against the Epicureans 
(Athenaeus, viii, 335 b — 337 a [cf. E. Bignoiie, V Arhtotele 
Perduto ii, pp. 244-247]). Sardanapalus and Heracles are 
contrasted by Juvenal (x, 360-362), Cleomedes (De Motu 
Circular! ir, i, 92 = pp. 166, 19-168, 7 [Ziegler]), and 
Clement of Alexandria (Stromata t, xxiv, 158, 3-159, 1). 

d Cf. Plutarch, De Sera Numinta Vindicta 553 a : tolovto 
teal <$d\apis fjv ' Ak pay avr [vols (jyapfxaKov. The ferocious cruelty 
of this tyrant of A era gas (ca. 570-544) was notorious as 
early as Pindar (Pythian i, 95-98) ; cf. Aristotle, Eth. Xic. 
1148 b .24 and 1149 b 13-15 and '[Plutarch], Parallela 
Graeca et Romano. 315 on = Stobaeiis, Anth. iv, 8, 33 (iv, 
pp. 318, 14-319, 4 [Hense]) with Callimachus, frags. 45-47 
(Pfeiffer). For the sage in the bull of Phalaris cf. S. V.F. 
iii, frag. 586 with Epicurus, frag. 601 (Usener, Epicurea, 
pp. 338-339). 

e Iliad ii, 219 ; cf. Plutarch, Quomodo Adolescens Poetas 
Audi re Debeat 28 f — 29 a and De Invidia et Odio 537 d-e. 

1 Hesiod, Works and Days 78. 



(1065) el tovtqjv avcupedevrajv ot^erat fipovSos rj dperr} 
Kal uvvarroXcoXev . 

14. *H fiovAei to tJSlgtov olvtov tt)s yXacfrvplas 
Kal TTidavoTrjTOs luToprjoai ; M worrrep yap at ku>- 
[AtoSiai" (f>r}GLv t u eVtypaju^ara yeAota <f)€povcriv, 
a Kad* avra /xeV iart (f>avXa rep Se SXcp TroirjjxaTi 
yapiv nva TTpoaridrjatv, ovtojs ifje^etas dv avrrjv 
e</>' eavrrjs rrjv KaKiav, rots' Se oAots* 1 ovk axprioros 
eoTt." Trpcorov [lev ovv ttjv KaKiav yeyovevai Kara 
rrjv rod deov 7rp6voiav, (Larrep to (fravXov iiriypapL- 
[xa yiyove Kara rrjv tov noirjTOV fiovXrjoiv, iraaav 
E eTTivoiav aroirias virepfiaXXei. rl yap jjl&XXov aya- 
8a>v rj KaKtbv Sorrjpes eoovrai; ttcjs S' en deois 
€)(dp6v rj Ka/a'a Kal #eo/xtaeV; t) tl irpos rd roi- 
avra Svcjcfrr) fir} p,aTa Ae'yetv e£o/xev, ojs 

Oeos jjl€v alrlav cf)V€i fiporols, 
orav KaKCJoai otojia 7Ta{i7rr)8rjv deX-rf 


rig t dp o<f>a>€ 0€a>v eptSt £vvdr)K€ [idyeoOai ; 

€7T€iTa Se to [lev (fyavXov e77typajLt/xa ttjv KojfjicpSiav 

1 oXols -Meziriac (cf infra chap. 15 init.) ; aAAoi? -E, B. 
2 OeXr) -Reiske (mss. in Moralia 17 b) ; iBiX-Q -E, B. 

a SJ r .F. ii, frag. 1181 (p. 339, 31-36). Cf. Marcus 
Aurelius, vi, 42 (S.V.F. ii, p. 340, 7-8) ; and for the use of 
the word eViypa/z/xa Dyroff, Die Ethik der alien Stoa, pp. 375- 
376 and Pohlenz, Hermes, lxxiv (1939), p. 91, n. 2. Plutarch's 
treatment of the argument in this chapter was criticized by 
Leibniz in his Theodicee : Essais stir la Bonte de Dieu etc., 
Partie iii, § 334 ; cf. also Babut, Plutarque et le Sto'icisme, 
pp. 288-289. 

b Cf. 1075 e infra and Maxims cum Principibus P/iilo- 
sopho Esse Disseretxdum 778 f. Scorrjpes idwv was a tradi- 
tional epithet of the gods (Odyssey viii, 325 and 335 ; Hesiod, 



if the abolition of these involves the disappearance 
and destruction of virtue. 

14. Or would you like to examine the most de- 
lightful specimen of his smoothness and plausibility ? 

For just as comedies," he says, a " contain funny 
lines which, while vulgar in themselves, add a certain 
charm to the piece as a whole, so vice all by itself 
you could censure, but for the universe as a whole 
it is not useless." Now in the first place, for the 
origin of vice to have been due to the providence of 
god as that of the vulgar line was to the purpose of 
the poet is a notion that exceeds all imaginable 
absurdity. For then why would the gods be dis- 
pensers of good rather than of evil, & and how is vice 
still hateful to the gods and god-detested, c or what 
shall we have to say to such blasphemies as 

In men god makes a fault to grow 
Whene'er he wills a house's overthrow d 


Which of the gods brought together the twain in conten- 
tion to quarrel ? e 

In the second place, the vulgar line embellishes the 

Theogony 46, 111, 633, and 664), who according to the Stoics 
themselves can be the cause only of good (S. V.F. ii, frag. 
1117 [with Seneca, De Ira ii, 27], frag. 1125 [ = De Stoic. 
Repug. 1049 e supra], frag. 1184; but contrast what is 
reported of Zeno in S. V.F. i, frag. 159 [cf. Pearson, Frag- 
ments, p. 95] and of Chrysippus himself in S. V.F. ii, frag. 
997 [~De Stoic. Repvg. 1056 b-c supra)). 

c As the Stoics assert (cf. S. V.F. hi, frag. 661). 

d Aeschylus, frag. 156 (Nauck 2 ) = frag. 273, 15-16 
(Mette). The lines are quoted by Plutarch, Quomodo Ado- 
lescens Poetas Audire Debeat 17 b in a context similar to that 
in which Plato quoted them {Republic 380 a). 

• Jliad i, 8. 



(1065) Koafxel /cat avvepyel irpos to reXos avrrjs, i(f)i€- 
fjievrjs rod yeXolov rj K^apiopiivov rols dearalg- 6 
Se irarp&os /cat vttcltos /cat depLiorios Zeus' /cat 
dpiorore^yas , /card TUvSapov, ov Spa/xa hrjirov 
jjieya /cat ttoikLAov /cat TroAvnades 1 hrjpaovpycbv rov 
F Koopiov aAAa Oewv /cat dvdpcoTrcov darv koivov ovv- 
vopL7]oojjL€vcov 2 pi€Ta Slktjs /cat dperfjs o/xoAoyofjLt€- 


aepLvoTOLTov TeAos eSetro Arjordov /cat dvhpo(f>6vwv 

KCLL TTCLTpOKTOVODV Kol TVpdvVOJV ; 01) ydp rj8l) Tib 

Beta) /cat Kopa/jov rj /ca/aa yeyovev €tt€lo68iov , ov8e 
1066 St' 3 evrpoLTTeAiav rj dSt/cta 4 /cat yeAcora /cat /?a>/xo- 
Ao^tav TTpouTZTpiTTrai toZs npdypiaoiv, l)<j? <Lv Ol>8* 
6Va/> tSetv eoTi rfjs vpvovpLevrjs o/zoAoy t'as. eVt to 
/x€v (fjavAov erriypajjipLa rod irocrjpLaTos ttoAAoott)- 
pLOpiOV €OTl /Cat pLLKpOV €TT€X£l> rravTarraaLV €V rfj 
KcopiwSia -^ixjpioVy /cat ovre uA^ovdi^eL rd toiolvtcl 
ovre rwv ev tt err otrj a 6 ai 5 8okovvtcl>v drroAXvoi /cat 
AvpLOLLverou ttjv %dpiv ttjs 8e /ca/ctas dva7T€7rAr)GTcu 

1 TToXwnaQks -Reiske (cf. Kolfhaus, Plutarch I De Comm. 
Not.) pp. 55-56) ; 7ro\vfxa8es -E, B ; 7roAu^cpe? -Fahse (cf. 
Rasmus, Prog. 1872, p. 16). 

2 E, B ; Gvvv€fxr]aofi€vojv -Madvig (Adversaria Critica, 
p. 669) ; evvofju-qoo^vajv -Haupt (Hermes, vi [1872], p. 5) ; 
but See $. V.F. i, p. 61, 5 (ajonep ayeXrjs avvvofiov vo/xto [vofMcu 
-Pearson] kolvw ovvTpefofievrjs) ; ii, p. 192, 24 (rov kog/xov . . . 
ovfiTroXLTevofjievov Ocols Kal avdpa)irois) ; iii, p. 83, 7 ('* lege 
quoque consociati homines cum diis ") with ii, p. 169, 28-29. 

3 oi)8e hi" -B ; ovbi* E 1 (8e superscript -E 2 ). 

4 rj ahiKia -Reiske ; rj aoiKtav -E, B. 

5 ev 7T€7Tot7Jodai -Meziriac ; ev ti noielaOcu -E, B. 

As an epithet of Zeus BepLorios seems to occur only here : 
but vttcltos is frequent even in the Iliad (v, 756 ; viii, 22 
and 31 ; xix, 258 ; xxiii, 43), and for irarpcoos cf. Aeschylus, 



comedy and contributes to its goal, the aim of 
comedy being what is funny or pleasing to the 
spectators ; but Zeus the paternal and supreme and 
righteous a and, as Pindar calls him, 6 master- 
craftsman fashioned the universe not, I take it, as 
a grand and intricate and sensational drama but as 
a town common to gods and men who should live 
lawful partners in right and virtue concordantly and 
blissfully, and for the attainment of this most fair 
and most majestic goal what need had he of pirates 
and murderers and parricides and tyrants ? For it 
is not as a clever interlude pleasant to the divinity 
that vice has come to be, nor is it by way of drollery d 
and jest and ribaldry that human affairs have been 
sullied e by injustice, vice and injustice having made 
it impossible to see even a phantom of the concord 
they harp upon. Moreover, while the vulgar line is 
a small fraction of the piece and occupies very little 
room in the comedy and while such lines neither 
outnumber the rest nor undo and spoil the charm of 
the passages that are thought to have been well 
written, human affairs are all defiled by vice, and all 

frag. 162 (Nauck 2 ) = frag. 278 a (Mette) ; Cornutus, Theo- 
logia Graeca 9 (p. 9, 15 [Lang]) ; and Maximus of Tyre, 
Philos. xli, ii d (p. 474, 11 [Hobein]). 

b Pindar, frag. 57 (Bergk, Schroeder, Snell)- 66 (Turyn) 
= 48 (Bowra) ; see Plutarch, De Facie 937 w (L.C.L. xii, 
p. 87, n. a). 

c Cf. S.V.F. ii, frags. 528, 636, and 1131 ; S.V.F. iii, 
frags. 333, 338, and 339 ; Epictetus, Diss, it, v, 26. 

d See the note on tvrpaTreXov in 1062 b supra. 

e For the use cf the verb cf. De Pytkiae Oraculis 395 e 
and Wyttenbach, Animadversiones ad 89 f ; and for stain, 
rust, or incrustation used as an example in connexion with 
the problem of evil cf. Corpus Ilernieticum xiv, 7 (ii, pp. 224, 
17-225, 4 [Nock-Festugiere]). 



(1066) TTOLvra rrpdypLara, /cat rras 6 fiios evOvs ir< rrap68ov 
/cat apxys ^XP l KoptovLhos ao^piovcjv /cat €Kttl- 
rrrwv koll raparrofievos /cat fjLrjoev kyojv pLepos Kada- 
pov ynqS* aveTTiArjTTTov, ojs ovtol Aeyovatv, ala^ioTOV 


15. "OOev rj8ews av rtvdolprqv rrpos ri yeyovev 
tvXprjoros rj /ca/cta rot? 6'Aot?. ov yap 8t) Trpos rd 
ovpdvia /cat 9eca (f)rjoet. yeAotov ydp el, fxr) ye- 
vofJievrjs iv dvdpwrroLS pirjS ovorjs kolkiols /cat 
drrArjorlas /cat i/jevSoAoytas [atjo* dAXrjAovs r)pLU)v 
dyovrojv /cat <f>€p6vrojv /cat ovKo<j>avrovvra>v koI 
<})OV€v6vtojv , ovk aV e/3aSt£ev 6 tJAlos rr)v reray- 
jjLevrjv TTOpetav ouS' dv topais ixprjro /cat Trepiooois 

KOUpCOV 6 KOOjJLOS Olf8 (aV) 1 T) yfj , T7]V jJL€G7]V ^OJ- 

pav e^ouaa rod rravros, dpxds rrvevpLarajv iveoloov 
/cat opL/3pa)i>. drroAeLTreraL roivvv rrpos TjfJLas /cat ra 
C rjfjLZTepa rrjv kolklolv tvxprjOTOJS yeyovevat • /cat rovr 
lotos ol av8p€s Aeyovoiv. dp* ovv vyialvopLtv /xaA- 
Aov kolkol ovres rj tl 8r) 2 pL&AAov evrropovpLev rtov 
dvayKaioJV ; rrpos 8e /caAAos* rjuiv r] rrpos io^vv ev- 
Xprjoros rj /ca/cta yeyovev ; ov cfyaoiv. rj8rf rrov 
yrjs ioriv (rj /ca/cta s* evxprjorca ; rj eoriv) A " ovofia 

1 <a^> -added by Papabasileios (Athena, x [1898 J, p. 227). 

2 rj rt 3t) -Pohlenz ; ctl 8e -E, B. 

3 rj8 V -H. C. ; rj Sc -E, B. 

4 <. . .> -added by H. C. (c/. 17 Sijwou XP1 G ^ itrriv -Madvig 
[u td versa ria Crttlca, p. 669 J ; contra Hasmus [Pmg. 1872, 
P. 17]). 

a ('/. I)e Alexandri . . . Virtute 334 c. 

b This is probably meant to indicate not any particular 
Stoic assertion but the implication of the doctrine that save 
for the sage, who exists rarely if ever (S. V.F. iii, p. 165, 1-3 
and 23-25 ; iii. p. 167, 34-36 ; iii, p. 216, 39), all men are 
utterly wretched and depraved (ste 1076 B-c infra and supra 



of life, being from the very entrance or beginning to 
the final flourish a indecent and degenerate and dis- 
ordered and without any part undefiled and irrepre- 
hensible, as these Stoics say, 6 is of all dramas what- 
ever most ugly and most unpleasant. 

15. Wherefore I should like to inquire what it is 
for which vice has proved to be useful to the universe 
as a whole. Surely he would not say that it is for 
the things that are celestial and divine, for it is a 
ridiculous notion that, if in human beings there had 
not been or were not vice and greed and falsehood 
or we did not ravage and blackmail and murder one 
another, the sun would not be following his appointed 
course or the universe keeping its times and seasonal 
periods or the earth occupying the midmost space of 
the sum of things c and giving rise to winds and rains. d 
What remains, then, is that for us and our affairs the 
existence of vice has proved to be useful ; and this 
perhaps is what the gentlemen mean. Are we more 
healthy, then, for being vicious or any the better 
provided with the necessities of life ? Has vice 
proved to be useful to us for beauty or for strength ? 
They deny it. So finally where in the world is <the 
utility of vice ? Or is it) " only a name of nothing 

1062 e— 1063 a and Be Stoic. Repug. 1048 e— 1049 a 
[S. V.F. iii, frags. 662 and 668]). With the words Kadapov 
fj,7]b* av€TTi\r)7TTov in the present passage cf. S. V.F. iii, p. 165, 
43 and p. 168, 1-2. 

c This is Stoic terminology : cf. De Stoic. Repug. 1054 b — 
1055 c supra and Plutarch, De Facie 924 d-f and 925 F (with 
my notes ad loc, L.C.L. xii, pp. 68, note c; 71, note b; 
and 76, note a). 

d Cf. S. V.F. ii, frags. 699 and 702 ; Seneca, Nat. Quaest. 
v, 4 ; Pliny, N.H. ii, 111 and 1 14 (with Aristotle, Meteorology 
359 b 27—360 a 13). 




ovx (ovrcos ivapyes Kavrols ovap toetv) 1 coairep 
rj KaKia tt&giv vuap €KK€iTai 2 /cat tt&giv ivapyrjs 3 
ovbevos cos evxprjCFTOs* pLeraAafielv rJKiora S' dpe- 
rrjs, co 6eoi, Sta tjv y eyovapuev ; evr ov Sttvov, el 
yecopyco {lev /cat Kv^epvrjrrj /cat rjvt6)(cp ra evxprj- 
ara <f>opa /cat ovvepya rrpos to ot/cetdv iart reAos, 
to 06 V7to rod deov TTpos dperrjv yeyovos drroAcoAeKe 
D rrjv aperrjv /cat SiecfrOapKtv ; dAX tocos rjorj Katpos 
en* aAAo 4 Tplireodai tovto 8' dcfrelvai. 

16. ETAIP02. OvSapbcos, co <f>lAos, ipLrjv ;^a/w 
emOvjJLco yap rrvBeodat rtva Sf] rpo'nov oi dvSpcs rd 
/ca/ca tlov dyadcov kolI ttjv Kcuciav rrjs dperrjs 'rrpo- 

AIAAOTM. 'AfJLeAeiKald^LOVyCoiTtupe. 7toAvs /xev 5 
6 ipeAAcopLOS avrcoVy reAos Se rrjv jxev cfypovt)- 
utv €7TiOTrjfJbr]v dyadcov /cat KaKcov ovoav (dvaipe- 
devrcov rcov /ca/cojv} 6 /cat 7 rravrdixaoiv dvacpeloOai 
Aeyovoiv cos S' 8 dAr)8cov ovrcov dSvvarov pirj 9 /cat 

1 <. . .> w -added by H. C. 

2 vrrap eKKeiTdL -Wyttenbach ; v7T€p€KK€iTai -E, B. 

3 evxprjcrros -H. C. ; axptfoTov -E, B ; evxprfarov -Reiske. 

4 dXXo -E ; dXXa> -B. 

5 fiev <ydp> -Bernardakis. 

6 <. . .> -supplied by Reiske (cf. 1067 a infra) ; ovoav . . . 
vac. 15 -E, 24 -B . . . koi ; </ca/co>v fir) ovrcov 6'Aco?> -Wytten- 
bach ; (avcupedevTQjv rcov kolkwv o\los> -Diibner. 

7 kcu <avTr)v> -Reiske ; [/cat] -deleted by Castiglioni 
(Gnomon, xxvi [1954], p. 84), but cf. . . . vTrapxovrcov xai 
kolkcl virdpxew infra. 

8 cbs ydp -Reiske. 

9 fir) <ov> -Rasmus (Prog. 1872, p. 17) ; but cf. Weissen- 
berger, Die Sprache Plutarchs i, p. 33. 

a Euripides, Hercules Fur ens 111-112 (enea fiovov . . . eV- 
vvxcov oveipcav). 


and a darkling spectre of benighted " ° sophists not 
<^so clear even for them to see in a dream them- 
selves) as vice stands forth for all awake to see and 
clear to all as useful for getting a share in nothing 
and least of all, by heaven, in virtue, to which we owe 
our origin ? b And then is it not awful that, while 
the things useful to a farmer and a pilot and a 
charioteer are favourable to the proper goal of each 
and contribute to it, what god has produced for virtue 
has undone virtue and ruined it ? But perhaps it is 
already time to let this subject go and turn to 

16. comrade. By no means, friend, on my account, 
for I am eager to learn how in the world the gentle- 
men give evil things precedence of good and vice 
precedence of virtue. 

diadumenus. And worth hearing, comrade, too, no 
doubt. They stammer at great length, but in the 
end what they say c is that prudence, since it is 
knowledge of things good and evil, 4 is utterly 
abolished too {if evils are abolished) c ; and they 
think that as it is impossible for there to be truths 

b The text of this passage (rfir) nov yrjs . . . yeyova^ev) is 
hopelessly corrupt, and no emendation of it yet proposed 
including that printed here is likely to approximate what 
Plutarch wrote. For cvxp-qcrrla in the first supplement see 
T)e Stole. Repug. 1038 a with note d there and Epietetus, 
Diss. U vi, 2 (tt)V evxp-qoriav tcov yeyovorwv). 

c S. V.F. ii, frag. 1181 (pp. 339, 37-340, 6) ; cf. 1065 r 
supra and De Stoic. Repug. 1050 f with note a on page 555. 

d The Stoic definition is ordinarily given as cmoT-far) 
ayaOcov koli kolkcov ko.1 ov&ereptov (or <i$La<f>6pa>v) : cf. S. V.F. 
iii, p. 63, 23-25 ; p. 65, 8-9 and 22 ; p. 67, 30-31 ; p. 156, 

e Of. S. V.F. iii, frag. 190 and p. 47, 5-6 ; Plato, Laws 816 
n 9-r. 1. 



(1066) ipevSrj riva elvai TrapaTrXrjoioJS olovtoli 1 rrpoo- 
tjk€lv 2 ayadtov virap-^ovrajv Kal Aca/ca virdpytiv. 
E ETAIP02. 'AAAd touto /xev ov cfravAios AeAeKTat, 
to Se trepov ot/xcu /x^S* £/Lt€ Xavddveiv. 6pa> yap 
hia<f>opdv, fj to p,€v ovk dAr)6es evdvs ifttvSos iariv, 
ov jjltjv evOvs kolkov to jjltj dyaOov . 6#ey aArjOcbv 
fxev koll ifj€v8a)v ovSev ion fxeoov, dyaOwv Se Kal 

VTrdp\€lV €K€LVOlS m €^TjpK€l ydp T7)V (f)VOLV €%€IV 

rdyaOov, rod kolkov fJLT) Seo^ieVnv 3 dAAa to ixr^r 
dyaOov pajre kolkov e^ovoav. rrpos Se rov rrpo- 
repov Aoyov et ri Aeyerat, Trapd Vficov, aKovoreov . 

17. aiaaoym. 'AAAa 7roAAa jxev AeyeTou, 4 rd Se 
vvv rots dvayKaiois xP r ) ar ^ ov ' Trpoorov p,kv ovv 
evrjdes oteadai cftpovrjoeajs eveKa yeveoiv kclkojv 
F v7rooTr)vai /cat dyaOwv. ovtoov yap dyadwv Kal 
KaKcov €7Tiylyverai (frpovrjots, djorrep larpiKrj vooe- 
pcov viTOKeifjievcov Kal vyieivcov. ov yap rdyadov 

1 oXovrai -Madvig {Adversaria Critica, p. 070) ; ofov-E, B. 

2 TrpoorjKciv -Wyttenbach ; TrpoarJK€i -E, B. 

3 bconevTjv -Meziriac ; Seo/xevov -E, B. 

4 XeXtKTdL -Leonicus. 

a Cf S. V.F. ii, p. 336, 1-4 (Aulus Gellius, vn, i, 5). 

b Cf. S.V.F. ii, frags. 166, 193, 106, 108, 952; Mates 
Stoic Logic, pp. 28-29. (This applies only to propositions 
[dficij/iaTa] ; and so dialectic is defined as imarrrjiJLr] dXrjB&v 
Kal ipevoa>v Kal ovherepcov [S. V.F. ii, frags. 18, 122, and 123], 
where the last term refers to Xckto. that are not propositions.) 

'• Cf. S.V.F. iii, frag. 117 and 1064 c supra with note a 
on page 701. 

d From the fact that " good " entails its contradictory 
opposite, " not good," it does not follow that its contrary, 
tk evil," must exist (cf. Paul Barth, Die Stoa [Stuttgart, 
1908], pj), 71-73-= [Stuttgart, 1922], pp. 55-57); and for 



without there being also some things which are false 
similarly it is fitting, if goods exist, for evils to exist 
also. a 

comrade. Nay, the one part of this statement is 
not trivial ; but I think that even I am not eluded 
by the other, for I discern a distinction in that, 
whereas what is not true is eo ipso false, 6 the non- 
good is not, however, eo ipso evil. c Hence, while 
nothing is intermediate between things true and 
false, the indifferent is intermediate between things 
good and evil ; and it is not necessary that the 
latter coexist with the former, for it sufficed that 
nature have the good without needing the evil but 
comprising what is neither good nor evi\. d If to the 
former argument, however, you people do make any 
reply, it ought to be heard. 

17. diadumenus. Why, many replies are made ; 
but for the present we must do with the indispens- 
able minimum. Well then, in the first place, it is 
silly to think that the generation of evil things and 
good came about for the sake of prudence/ In fact, 
prudence follows upon the existence of goods and 
evils just as medicine does upon the prior existence 
of things unhealthy and salubrious, for the good and 

Chrysippus to argue as if it did is the more surprising in 
view of S. V.F. ii, frag. 175. 

e This is an inference not justified b3 r what the Stoics 
said (cf. Giesen, De Plutarchi . . . Disputationibus y p. 63), 
though defended by Babut (Plutarque et le Stoiieisme, 
p. 298, n. 1) ; but cf. Philo Jud., Leg. All. iii, 73 (i, p. 128, 
22-24 [Cohn]) : loa yap els rrjv rcov peXriovcov SrjXajoiv yeveacv 
virooTrjvai ko.1 rwv x^ipdvoov • . •♦ which suggests that Plutarch's 
phraseology here, ydveoiv kclk&v vnooTfjvai, is intentionally 
Stoic (for the verb v^iorarat see 1006 f and 1081 c and r 



(1066) v(f>LararaL /cat to kclkov tva yevryrai cf>p6vrjGts, aAAa 
fj rayaOov /cat to kolkov ovra /cat v^eortora Kpi- 
voLiev wvofidadr] cfrpovrjoLS' (jocnrep oifjis r) XevKtov 
/cat LieXdvojv cugOtjois ov yevofxevajv ottojs exoifiev 
1067 oifjiv rjLieis aAAa ll&XAov rjfitov rrpos to t<x roiavra 
Kpiveiv oxjjeojs SerjOevrwv. SevTepov, orav €K7tv- 

a77oA€677€Tat TO 06 SXoV (f>pOVLLLOV eOTl TTjVLKaVTa 
KCxl O0<f)0V. eGTl ToivVV (f)pOVTjGL9 OVK OVTOS KCLKOV, 

/cat ovk avdyicr) kclkov vudpyeiv el cf>p6vr]GLS €VL. 
el Se St) Trdvrojs Set rrjv cfrpovrjoiv dyadtov elvai kcli 


peOevTOJV ovk eorat cfrpovrjots irepav t' 1 dvr e/cet- 
vtjs dp€T7]v e^oLiev, ovk dyada>v kclI kclkc7)v dXX 
dyadojv llovojv 2 €7norr)Lir]v ovoav ; coairep el rtov 
XpojLLarojv to fieXav e^arroXoiTO TTavTairacsiv ctTa 
B Tis fitd^oLTo koll tt)v oifjiv drroXwXevaL, XevKwv yap 
ovk elvai /cat LieXdvcov alo6r)oiv y ri KUjXvei cf>dvai 
Trpos clvtov oti oeivov ovSev el TTjV Liev V7TO GOV 
XeyoLievrjv oi/jlv ovk eypiiev dXXr) he udpeoTtv 3 gvt 
eKeivj]s atordrjais rjfjuv /cat Svvclllis, fj XevKcov 
dvTiXcLLLfiavoLLeOa /cat Lirj XevKcov xpoj/zdrajv; iyd> 
Liev yap ovWe yevaiv ot/xat cf)povoov dv yeveodai 
rrcKpcov eTTtXiTTovTOJV ov9* d(f>7]v dXyrj86vog dvaipe- 

1 5' -Pohlenz ; but cf. Castiglioni {Gnomon, xxvi [1954], 
p. 83) and Westman (Acta Acad. Aboensis Hutnaniora, 
xxiv/2 [1959], p. 6). 

2 povcov -E ; i±6vov -B, Aldine, Basil. 

3 rrapeoTtv -E ; Tiapiorr^Giv -B, Basil. ; aAAo Se irapdoraoLv 

a Cf. Aristotle, De Anima 422 b 23-24 and 426 b 8-11 ; 

Sextus, Adv. Math, ix, 145 (el &e opa, kclI XevKa opa /ecu /xe'Aava). 

b S. V.F. ii, frag. 606 ; see 1065 b supra and note b there. 



the evil do not subsist in order that there may be 
prudence, but prudence is the name given to our 
means of distinguishing the good and evil which 
exist and are subsistent. Just so sight is the sense 
that perceives white and black objects,* 1 though 
these did not come to be in order that we might have 
sight but it was rather that we needed sight for dis- 
tinguishing such objects. In the second place, when- 
ever the universe has been turned to fire by these 
Stoics, no evil whatever remains, but the whole is 
at that time prudent and sage. b So, then, there is 
prudence though evil does not exist, and it is not 
necessary that there be evil for prudence to be 
possible. Even supposing, however, that prudence 
must be knowledge of things good and evil, what's 
to dread if because of the abolition of evils prudence 
would not exist and we should have instead of it 
another virtue, which is knowledge not of things 
good and evil but of things good alone ? Just so, 
if black should utterly vanish from among the 
colours and then someone should insist that the sense 
of sight had vanished too because sense-perception 
of things white and black does not exist, what is to 
prevent one from replying to him that there's no- 
thing dreadful about our not having what you call the 
sense of sight and having instead of it another sense 
or faculty with which we perceive white colours and 
those not white ? For my part, I think that the 
sense of taste would not have disappeared if bitter 
things had been lacking c or the sense of touch if 

c Cf. Aristotle, De Anima 422 b 23-25 (. . . olov oijus XevKov 
/cat fxeXavos . . . /cat yeuat? m/cpou /cat yAu/ceo?) and 426 b 8-11 ; 
see also Plutarch, Adv. Colotem 1110 d (. . . to XevKov . . . 
/cat to Kvavovv . . . /cat to yXvKV /cat to iriKpov). 



(1067) deiorjs ovre cppovrjaiv kclkov [irj rrapovTos aAA* 
€K6ivas re fievelv 1 aloOrjaeis yXvKeaiv kcu rjSecov 
Kal to)v jj/rj tolovtojv dvTiXaiLfiavoLievas ravrrjv re 2 
rrjv <f)p6v7)oiv ay ad tov Kal lit) ayaOtov emoTj\iir]v 
C ovoav. oh 8e fir] 8ok€c, Tovvoiia Aafiovres drroXi- 
7T€Ta>oav rjfjuv to Trpayiia. 


voTjocv elvat tov S' dyadov Kal vrrap^tu ; toorrep ol- 
iiai Kal toIs Oeols vyieias Likv eari Trapovoia rrvpe- 
tov 8e Kal TrXevpiTihos v6t)cns. irrel Kal rjLiels, 
KaKcov Liev d<f>66va)s tt&oc rrapovTOJV dyadov 8e firj- 
Sevds, ws ovtoi Xeyovoiv, dXXd tov ye voelv 3 ovk 
aTToXeXeiiiLieda ttjv (frpovrjoiv Tayadov ttjv evSaiLio- 
viav. o Kal daviiauTov ioTiv el ttjs iiev dpeTrjs lit] 
rrapovorjs elolv ol 8i8doKOVT€s orrolov £oti Kal 
KaTaXrjifjw €li7toiovvt€s ttjs KaKias 8e firj yevo- 
D Liev7]s ov SvvaTov rjv KTrjoaod ai v6k)oiv. 6 pa yap ola 
7T€L0ovoiv Tjiias ol Kara ras iwoias (f)tXooo(f)ovvTeg , 
oti ttj Liev d(f>poovvrj KaTaXaLL^dvoLiev ttjv cf>povrj- 

1 fteveiv -Bernardakis ; fUveiv -E, B. 

2 r€ -Basil. ; oe -E, B. 

3 Reiske (after the versions of Amyot and Xylander) ; 
tov yeveoiv -E, B. 

a As yXvKecov is to TTLKpcov SO rjSccov is to aXy-qoovos (f/. to 
tj8v Kal to aXyetvov [De An. Proc. in Timaeo 1026 n] and ttjs 
<f>voecos a-xpt tov Xvoai to aXyewov av£ovor)s to tj&v [jYon Posse 
Suavtter Vim 1088 c]) ; to. ffiia Kal tcl aXytiva had been closely 
connected with the tactile qualities by Plato (Timaeus 61 
a), but Aristotle had found no single cWvTtawris for the objec- 
tive correlative of touch such as he had for the other senses 
{De Anlma 122 b 23-31, De Part. Animal. 617 a 16-19). 



pain had been abolished or prudence if evil were not 
present but that they would remain, the former as 
senses perceiving sweet things and pleasant ° and 
those that are not so and this last as the prudence 
which is knowledge of things good and not good. As 
for those who think that this is not so, let them take 
the name and leave us the thing. 

18. Apart from this, what was to prevent there 
being a conception of evil while the good in addition 
has real existence ? Just so the gods, I think, 
though they have health as a reality, have yet a con- 
ception of fever and pleurisy, since even for us, 
though all have real ills aplenty and nothing good, 
as these men say, b yet at least to conceive of prud- 
ence, of the good, of happiness, is not beyond our 
capacity. This is amazing too that, whereas there 
are those who teach what sort of thing virtue is and 
who induce an apprehension of it although they do 
not really have it, c yet of vice, if it had not come 
to be, it would not be possible to get a conception. 
For see what sort of thing we are asked to believe 
by the men whose speculations are in accord with 
the common conceptions d : that, while by means of 

b Cf. 1076 u-c infra and he Stole. Repug. 1048 e— 1049 a 

c According to the Stoics virtue is teachable (cf. 8. V.F, 
i, frag. 567 = iii, frag. 223) and yet there is virtue only in 
the sage (see 1062 e— 1063 a supra ; S.V.F. iii, frags. 103 
and 557 [with p. 166, 10-11] and p. 152, 35-36), who has 
seldom, if ever, existed (see note 6 on page 712 supra). 

d For ewoias alone = koivcls cwoias see note c on 1059 b 
supra. Xylander and Naber " emended " Kara to napd, 
failing to see that Plutarch ironically refers to the Stoics in 
the terms that they used of their own philosophy (see 1060 b 
[chap. 4], note a), as in 1062 e supra he speaks of their con- 
firming ttjv ofioXoyiav in their doctrines. 



(1067) oiv r) Se (frpovrjens avev rfjs d<f)poovvrjs ov6* eavrrjv 
(pvre TTjvy 1 acfypoovvrjv KaraXapifidveiv rrecfrvKev. 

19. Et Se St) rravrajs eoelro /ca/cou yeveoeojs rj (fry- 
ens, ev r\v Stjttov rrapdoeiypia kclkicls Ikolvov rj Sevre- 
pov el Se fiovXei, Se'/ca cfravXovs rj ^tAt'ovs" r) pivpiovs 
eSet yeveuOai /cat pur) /ca/ctas p.ev <f>opdv roaavrrjv 
to 7rXrj9o$ — 

ov 2 ijjdpipLOS rj kovls 77 TTT€pd TTOtKiXorpLXOJV 3 oltovtov 
toogqv dv yZVCLlT apidfiov — 

E aperrjs Se /X77S' evvuviov. ol pJev yap ev HirdpTT] 
twv (f>ioLri(jov i empbeXovpievoi hvo fj rpels e7TiT7]8es 5 
ecXwras ipLTrecfroprjpLevovs aKpdrov /cat pbedvovras 
(elodyovresY etV koivov eVtSet/ci/iwrat rots veois 

OTTOIQV iGTi TO /LXe6MetV, 077 0>9 tfrvXdTTOJVTCLL Kdi 

Gcoc/ypovuxjiv, ev Se rep /3t'oj ? rd 77oAAd ravra rfjs 
/ca/ctW yeyov€ TrapaSetypLara' vrjcfrwv yap ovSe els 
eon rrpos dperrjv, dXXd pepL^opueda navres dax^p^o- 
vovvres /cat KaKoSatpbovovvres' ovroos 6 Xoyos rjpias 

1 ovff iavrr)v <ovre ttjv> -Meziriac ; ovre avrr)v -E, H. 

2 ov -Turnebus, Vulcobius ; ov -E, B, Aldine, Basil. 
(pace Wyttenbach et al.) ; omitted by mss. in l)e Amore 
Prolis 497 a. 

3 K, B ; TToiKiXodpocov -mss. in De Amore Prolis 497 a : 
TToiKtXorptx -Page. 

4 j> corr. (g superscript) : <f>iXiTLOiv -E, B. 

5 imTTjBes -E ; omitted by B. 

6 <€iW yovres> -added by Wyttenbach (cf. elafjyov [Deme- 
trius 889 a] and rrapeiorjyov [Lycurgus 57 a]). 

7 /?io> </xari7i>> -Pohlenz ; fiiio Krrpds rt> . . . TTa.pahtLyp.aTa; 
vrj<j>a>v . . . tart, rrpos dperrjv; dAAd . . . -Cobet, Kronenberg 
(Mnemosyne, 3 Ser. x [1942], p. 43). 

a Fragmenta Adespota 15 (Diehl, Anth. Lyr. Graec. ii, 
p. 162) = 79 (Edmonds, Lyra Graeca iii, pp. 452-454)= 1007 



folly we apprehend prudence, prudence without folly 
naturally apprehends neither itself (nor) folly. 

19. Even supposing, however, that generation of 
evil was required by nature, one example of vice was 
surely enough, or two ; or, if you will, there had to 
be brought forth ten base men or a thousand or ten 
thousand and not such a multitudinous crop of vice 

Not sand or dust or the plumage of birds with their down 

Could be heaped in such profusion ° 

with not even a phantom of virtue. The curators of 
the common messes in Sparta, for example, by pur- 
posely (bringing in) two or three helots gorged with 
neat wine and drunk give the young men a public 
demonstration of the nature of drunkenness, in order 
that they may beware and keep sober b ; but most 
of the things here in our life have turned out to be 
examples of vice, for in respect of virtue not a single 
man is sober but all of us are staggering about in an 
indecent and unhappy condition. Thus the rea- 

(Page, Poelae Melicl Graeci, p. 532), quoted by Plutarch 
also in De Amore Prolls 497 a. 

b Cf. Plutarch, Lycurgus xxviii, 8 (57 a) ; Demetrius i, 5 
(889 a) ; De Cohibenda Ira 4>55 e ; Instituta Laconica 239 a ; 
Clement of Alexandria, Paedagogus in, viii, 41, 5 ; Athe- 
naeus, xiv, 657 c ; Diogenes Laertius, i, 103 ; Plato, Laws 
816 e. 

c Cf. Philo Jud., J)e Ebrietate 95 and 151 (ii, p. 188, 
10-13 and p. 199, 21-24. [Wendland]) ; Corpus Hermeticum 
i, 27 and vii, 1 (i, p. 16, 21-23 and p. 81, 3-4. [Nock-Fes- 
tugierej) ; Porphyry, De Abstinentia iv, 20 (p. 266, 11-13 
[Xauck]). The figure goes back to Plato (Phaedo 79 c 6-8 ; 
cf. Macrobius, In Somnium Scipionis 1, xii, 7-8) and possibly 
to Heraclitus (frag. B 117 [D.-K.] ; cf H. Frankel, A.J. P., 
lix [19381, p. 318, n. 18= Wege und Formen fruhgriechischen 
Denkens [Miinchen, 1955], p. 262, n. 1). 



(1067) fiedvaKec /cat Tooavrrjs Karam/iTr/Yqcrt rapaxfjs /cat 
7rapa<f)poGvv7]s , ov8ev a7ToAeL7TovTas rcov kvvlov, a? 
<f)7]acv Algcottos Sepfxarcov tlvcov ijJL7rXe6vTa>v e</>te- 
F fJievas opfArjaou \xkv €KTriveiv ttjv OdXarrav payrjvai 
8e rrporepov rj tcjv Sepfidrajv Aaj8e'a0ar /cat yap 
rjfias 6 Xoyos iATrl^ovTas evSaifiovrjaecv 1 St' avrov 
/cat rfj apery tt pocrolaeaB 'at nplv €7i' iKecvrjv d(j)i- 
Keadai 8i€<f)9apK€ /cat dnoXcvXeKe, 2 ttoXXtjs aKpdrov 
/cat inKpas /ca/ctas* 7TpoaeiJL(f)opr]devra£ , 3 €i ye 8tj /cat 

TOtS" €7T y CLKpOV TTpOKOTTTOVOlVy d)C ovtol XeyovcFcv, 

dfieXrepias* /cat /ca/coSatjitovtas'. 
1068 20. f O Toivvv Xeytov ovk dxprjGTCos yeyovivai tt]v 
/ca/ctav 6 pa rrdXiv olov avrrjv dirooeiKvuGt XPVH" - 
/cat Krrjfjia toZs e'xovat, ypd<f)<jjv iv tols ire pi Kar- 
opOojfjLarojv ws 6 (fravXos ovoevos Selrat, ovoevos 
*X €i XP eiav ' ovoev ioTiv avrco xP 7 l (JL l JLOV > ovoev 
oIk€lov, ovSev dpfioTTOV. ntos ovv evxprjoros rj 
/ca/cta, jJL€0 y rjs ov8e vyUia xP'^ ol l xov ov8e rrXfjOos 
XprjfjLaTOJV ov8e TrpoKOirrj; ov oetrat 8e rts &v ra 
fikv 7rpor]yfi€va /cat XrjTrrd /cat vrj At' e\>xpy)oTa ra 

1 €vSaLjjLovrjo€Lv -Xylander ; tvSoKifjirjcrziv -E, B. 

2 diroXa)XeK€ -Rasmus {Prog. 1872, p. 17) ; a7rdAcuAe -E, 13. 

3 7Tpoo€fj.(l>opr]6ivTas -E (c/. 168 a, 54-7 c, 110i u) ; 7rpoe/z- 
<f>opr)6€VTas -B. 4 d^eXrepias -Diibner ; d^Xrr^pias -E, B. 

a As the last clause of the paragraph shows and as 
Wyitenbach seems to have understood (" ita ratio Stolen 
. . ."), 6 Xoyos here is " reason " according to the " doctrine " 
of the Stoics. 

6 Aesop, Fabula 138 (Hausrath) = 135 (Perry); cf. 
G. Williams, Class. Rev., N.S. ix (1059), p. 99. 

c See 1065 e — 1063 a supra and Quomodo Quis . . . Sentiat 
Profectus 75 B-C ; for rots eV dnpov TrpoKonrovcnv see rov in* 
aKpov TTpoKOTTTovra in 1061 F supra. 



son ° intoxicates us and fills us full of confusion and 
delirium no less than were the bitches which, Aesop 
says, 6 started to drink up the sea in their craving 
for some hides afloat upon it and burst before they 
had laid hold on the hides. For we too, expecting 
by means of reason to attain virtue and be happy, 
before we arrive at virtue are ruined and undone by 
reason, overloaded as we have been with much neat 
and bitter vice, if in fact, as these Stoics say, c even 
those at the summit of progress have no alleviation 
or abatement or respite in their stupidity and un- 

20. Well then again, the man who asserts that the 
genesis of vice has not been useless/* look what a 
useful possession e he shows vice to be for those who 
have it. He writes in his work concerning Right 
Actions / that the base man has need of nothing, 
has use for nothing, that to him nothing is service- 
able, nothing congenial, nothing appropriate. So 
how is it then that vice is useful, vice in conjunction 
with which not even health is serviceable or opulence 
or progress ? And does one not have need of the 
things which are, as the Stoics themselves call them, 
some " promoted " and " acceptable " and, yes by 
heaven, " useful " and others " in conformity with 

d See 1065 a-b supra and De Stoic. Repug. 1050 f. 

e For this meaning of xPW a KaL Kfyfia cf. [Isocrates], Ad 
Demonicum 28 ; Xenophon, Oeconomicus i, 16 ; O. Hense, 
Teletis Reliquiae 2 , p. 37, 6-9 (with Plato, Euthydemus 280 
c-e and Aristotle, Eth. Nic. 1120 a 8-9) ; Plutarch, Cimon 
x, 5 (484 e-f) and De Cupiditate Divitiarum 525 b. In 
legalizing bequests of property Solon ra xPW aTa KTTjfiara 
tcov ixovrcov €7rolrja€v (Solon xxi, 3 [90 a]). 

' & V.F. iii, frag. 674 (pp. 168, 37-169, 4). See De Stoic. 
Repug. 1038 a-b with the notes there and also 1061 f supra. 



(1068) 8e Kara (frvow, ojs avrol kclXovoiv; e?ra rovrojv 

ovSels e)(€i xP € ^ av y av I^V y^vrjTai ao(f)6s. ov8e rod 

B ao<f)ds ovv yeveoOai x? e ' iav eyti 6 cfyavXog. ov8e 

Siifjcoatv ov8e 7T€lvcoolv dvOpaJTToi rrplv aocfyol yevd- 

adac 8upa>vT€$ yovv 1 vSaros ovk exovcjL xp € ^ av oi5S' 

dpTOV 7T6lVO)VT€S. 

eore 2 £evoiot pieiXixots ioiKores 
oreyrjs T€ 3 jjlovvov kcu irvpos K€XP r }p'€vois. 

ovros ovk elx* x? €iav vrroSoxfis; ov8e yXaivqs €K€l- 
vos 6 Xeya>v 

80S X^ a ^ V<XV 'iTTTTtbvaKTl' KOLpTOL yap* piyO) ,* 

dAAd fiovXei rrapdSoijov elrreLV rt ko! rreptrrov /cat 
ISiov; Xeye rov oocf>6v pLTjhevos e^ety xP € ^ av /^8e 
SelcrOal rivos' eKtlvos oAjSio?, eKelvos d7Tpoo8eri$, 
€K€ivos avrdpKrjs pLCLKaptos reXetos. vvvl 8k rls 6 
C IXiyyos ovros rov fxev dvevSed 5 Selodat <Lv e'^et dya- 
Ocbv rov 8e cfravXov evSea* fxev elvau ttoXXcov 8eZ- 
adou 8e /x^SevoV; rovrl yap Xtyei XpvoiTnros , cu$ 
ov 8eovrat fiev iv8eovrai 8e ol <f>avXoi, rrerrcov 
8lkt)v 8cvpo kolk€l rag Koivos evvocas fxero.rcOetg . 
rrdvres ydp avOpooTroi ro 8eZcrdai rrporepov elvac rov 

1 yovv -Sandbach (Class. Quart., xxxiv [1940], p. 24, 
n. 3) ; odv -E, B. 

2 iore -Turnebus (pace Pohlenz [tore -DiibnerJ) ; eVrai 
-R, B, mss. of Hephaestion (e superscript over i -I), Eacheiri- 
dion v, c 2 (p. 16, 13 [Consbruch]). 

3 re -E ; omitted by B. 4 yap -E ; omitted by B. 

5 dvevbta -Bernardakis ; avevhtrj -E, B. 

6 ivhea -Bernardakis ; ivbefj -E, B. 

° Health, wealth, and progress, which have just been 
mentioned, all fall into these classes (cf. S. V.F. iii, frags. 
135, 136, and 149). See T)e Stoic. Repvg. 1038 a, note d for 



nature" ? a And then, no one has use for these 
things unless he has become a sage. Consequently 
the base man has no use for becoming a sage. And 
before having become sages men are not thirsty or 
hungry ; at any rate, if thirsty, they have no use for 
water or, if hungry, for bread. 

Like mild and modest guests you are whose wants 
Are shelter only and the warmth of fire. b 

Did this man have no use for hospitality ? Or for a 
cloak either that man who says 

Oh please, a cloak, for Hipponax is freezing cold ? c 
But you wish to say something paradoxical and extra- 
ordinary and original ? Say that the sage has use 
for nothing and has no need of anything : it is he who 
is blessed, he who is free from all other wants, he 
who is self-sufficient, blissful, perfect. d But now what 
is this state of vertigo in which he who is in want of 
nothing is in need of the goods which he has but the 
base man, while in want of many things, is in need 
of nothing ? For this is what Chrysippus says, 6 that 
the base are not in need but are in want, thus shifting 
the common conceptions about like pieces in a game 
of draughts/ All men, in fact, believe that being in 

€vxp r }° Ta i 1042 d, note b for Kara <f>vcrtv ; 1045 f, note c 
for X-qrrrd ; and 1047 e, note a for irpoiqyiiiva. 

b Anacreon, frag. 85 (Diehl, Anth. Lyr. Graec. i 2 , 4, 
p. 186) = 98 (Edmonds, Lyra Graeca ii, p. 188)= 425 (Page, 
Poetae Melici Graeci, p. 209). 

c See Stoicos Absurdiora Poetis Dicere 1058 d supra. 

d See supra 1060 u and 1063 c-n and Stoicos Absurdiora 
Poetis Dicere 1058 b-c. 

' 8. V.F. iii, frag. 674 (p. 169, 5-8) with Seneca, Epistle 
ix, 14-15. 

' For the figure cf. [Plato], Eryxias 395 b and Shorey's 
note on Republic 487 c 2-3 (L.C.L. ii, p. 14, note/). 



(1068) ivSeiodat 1 vo/jll^ovglv, rjyovfievoi rov ovx crot/xcov 
ov8* €VTTopLOTO)v 8e6jxevov ev8elaQai. K€pdrojv yovv 
Kal nrepwv ov8el$ ev8er)s avdpunros iariv, on fJLrj8e 
SeLTai tovtojv dAA' onXajv iv8eelg Xeyoptev /cat 


rvyyaviooi jjltjS' eywoiv. ol 8e ovtojs imOvpLovoLV 


coare rroXXaKis i^taraadac Kal rwv I8ia)v emdvp,ia 
KaivoXoyiaSy 2 cooirep ivravda. 

21. TtKOTrei 8e puKpov avajTepo dvayayojv 3 eav- 
tov. ev re twv irapa tols ewoias Xeyop,eva>v iarl 
to p,rj8eva cf>avXov d)(f>eXelcrdat. KaiToi 7rai8evo- 
fji€voi ye 7toXXoI TTpoKOTTTOvoi Kal 8ovXevovTes eXev- 
Oepovvrai Kal TroXiopKovfievoi acp^ovrai Kal irrjpov- 
pL€voi* xtipaywyovvrat, Kal depairevovTai voaovvres. 
" aAA' ovk d}(f>eXovvrai tovtcov Tvyx&vovTes ov8* ev 
Tracrxpvoiv ov8* evepyeras eypvoiv ov8* evepyertov 
apieXovcriv" ov toiwv ouS' d^a/noToucjiv ol </>av- 
E Aot* Kal pjr]V ov8 y ol vovv e^ovreg. avvirapKTOv 
ovv eon to d^aptoTTOV ol /xev yap ovk aTTOOTepovoi 

1 ivSeladat -Turnebus and Amyot's version ; ptrj SdoOat 
-E, B. 

2 KauvoXoyias -E (pace Pohlenz), Basil. ; KtvoXoylas -B, 

3 For the hiatus cf. avm c^ctv and kclto* avajdev in De Facie 
924 c. 

4 Xylander (cf. Reiske ad loc.) ; TrXrjpovfievot, -E, B. 

a Cf. Cicero, Tusc. Disp. i, 87-88. 

b Cf. the charge frequently repeated by Cicero in the 
De FinibiiSy e.g. iii, 5 ; iv, 7 and 56 ; v, 22. 

c Cf. Plato, Republic 528 a 6 (dvaye . . . «*s tovttlooj) with 
Shorey's note ad loc. (L.C.L. ii, p. 175, note e) ; and for 
dvcoTepoj cf. Plutarch, Adv. Colotem 1110 c (avcoTepcu . . . 



need is prior to being in want, holding that he who 
needs what is not at hand and not easily procurable 
is in want of it. At any rate, no man is in want of 
horns and wings, because no man is in need of these 
either ; but we speak of them as being in want of 
weapons and money and clothes whenever they have 
got a use for these things without having or obtaining 
them. a The Stoics, however, are always so eager to 
be openly saying something at odds with the common 
conceptions that they often abandon their own too 
in their desire for novel expression b ; and so it is 
in this case. 

21. Fall back to a point a little above c and con- 
sider. Among the assertions that are at odds with 
the common conceptions d one is that nobody who is 
base receives any benefit/ Yet there are many men 
who make progress by being educated and who are 
liberated from slavery and who are rescued from 
sieges and who in their blindness are led by the hand 
and who in illness get medical treatment. " Yes/ 
but by getting these things they do not get any 
benefit or have any good done to them and they 
don't have benefactors or disregard for bene- 
factors." The base, then, are not ungrateful either ; 
and neither are the men with intelligence. Con- 
sequently, ingratitude is non-existent, for the latter 

d ras ivvoLas=ras koivcls ivvoias (see page 66S, note c 

e See 1068 a supra (ovoev ionv avrco xp^oifiov k.t.X.) and De 
Stoic. Repug. 1042 b (page 483), note d ; and cf. especially 
S.V.F. iii, frag. 94 (p. 23, 18-20): . . . M b€va 8e <f>avXov 
t*>TjT€ ojcfreXciodai fjirjrc dxfrcAciv etvai yap to uxfreXeiv ioxclv kclt' 
ap€T7)v kol to a><f>€X€la9ai KLvtiodai kclt* ap€.rrjv. 

f aXX* ovk (h^eXovvrai . . . kol <j>avXoi Tvyxavovotv = S.V.F. 
iii, frag. 672 (p. 168, 15-23). 



(1068) \apiv XafifidvovTCs ol 8e Aafifidveiv ^apti/ 1 ov ttz- 
(f)VKOLGiv. Spa 8rj ri rrpos ravra Xlyovoiv ort rj 
X&pis €t? ra /xecra StaretWt, kcu to jiev dxfreXelv 
/cat a>(/>eAetcr#cu oo<j>a)v ion, ^aptros oe /cat <f>avXot 2 
TvyyavovGiv . eW* ols x^-p^os jjl€T€gti, tovtois ov 

fJL€T€GTL ^pCtaS",* OTTOV §€ Stare tW I xdplS y €K€L XPV~ 

Gifjiov ovSev ioriv ov8* olk€lov ; dXXo 8e ri ttokel tt]v 
virovpyiav \o\piv rj to irpos ti xprfviftov virdp^at to) 
8eo[JL€Vtp tov 7Tapaox oVTa > 

22. ETAIP02. Tolvtcl jxev ovv ac^e?. rj Se ttoXv- 
F tl[jl7]tos ax^e'Aeta tls €GTiv y rjv ws ue'ya Ti toIs 

GO(f)OtS i£atp€TOV (f)vAdTTOVT€S Ot)S' OVOflOL XeiTTOV- 

giv avTrjs* rocs (^) 4 oo(f>ols ; 

AIAAOTM. "Av CIS GO(/)6s 07TOv8rj7TOT€ 5 TTpOT€LV7) 

tov 8aKTvXov (fypovtfitos , ol Kara ttjv olKOVfxevqv 

GO(f)ol Trdvres wfeAovvrai . tovto ttjs (f>tXias 6 ep- 

yov avTtoVy els tovto tols kolvols oj^eA^/xaat twv 

1069 GO(f)a)v at dp€Tal TeXevTOjoiv. iXrjpec S' 7 'Apt- 

1 E ; x^P LV Aafxfiaveiv -B. 

2 E ; /cat ol <f>av\oi -B. 

3 avTols -E (with ol changed to r;), B. 

4 <^rj> -added by Meziriac. 

5 E ; OTTohrjiroTt -B. 

6 wfeXeias -Xylander. 

7 S' <ap'> -H. van Herwerden (Lett tones Rheno-T rated inae 
[1883], p. 133). 

° Cf. Plato, (Jorgias 520 c 5-(5 (tocos av dTToorep^oeie tijv 

b For this argument against the existence of ingratitude 
cf. Seneca, De Beneficiis v, 12, 3-4. 

c See De Stoic. Repug. 1038 a-h supra. 

d This is implied by the definition of dxjyeXelv and (o^tXelodai 
(S.V.F. iii, frag. 94 [see note e on 1068 d supra] and frag. 
117 [p. 38, 17-181) ; cf. S.V.F. iii, frag. 587 (rd 7rapaK€tfX€va 



do not withhold gratitude a when gratified and the 
former are naturally incapable of being gratified. b 
Now see what they say to this : that gratification 
extends to the intermediates c and that, while to 
confer and receive benefit is characteristic of sages , d 
even base men get gratification. 6 In that case, do 
those who partake of gratification have no use for it ? 
And does nothing serviceable or congenial come 
within the extension of gratification ? But what else 
makes the service rendered a gratification except the 
provider's having been in some respect serviceable 
to the one in need of it ? 

C 2 C 2. comrade. Well, let these questions go. But 
what is the highly prized benefit that they reserve 
as something grand exclusively for the sages, leaving 
not even its empty name to those who are {not) 
wise ? 

diadumenus. If a single sage anywhere at all 
extends his finger prudently, all the sages through- 
out the inhabited world are benefited/ This is their 
amity's work v ; this is the end in which for their 
common benefits the virtues of the sages issue. It 

rots' ayadols . . . (IxbeXr^ara ovra ^iovois rots oTrovhaiois crvfi- 
P<llv€iv) and frag. 673 for the same restriction of co^eXc^a. 

* On this and what follows cf. Seneca, Epistle lxxxi, 8-14 
and De Beneficiis v, IS, 2-14, 5. 

' S.V.F. iii, frag. 627 ; cf. S.V.F. iii, frag. 626 (p. 160, 
22-25) and frag. 93 (with Madvig's note on Cicero, De 
Finibus iii, 69) and Seneca, Epistle cix, 1-16. 

Q According to the Stoics amity can exist only among 
sages and does exist among all of them : cf. S. V.F. i, frag. 
223; S.V.F. iii, frags. 630 (p. 161, 7-9 [cf. p. 160, 15-17]), 
631, and 635 ; Epictetus, Diss, n, xxii ; Bonhoffer, Die 
Ethik . . ., pp. 106-109 ; Elorduy, Sozialphilosophie, pp. 160- 
174 ; A.- J. Voelke, Les rapports avec autrui dans la philo- 
sophie grecque (Paris, 1961), pp. 122-123 and pp. 176-177. 



(1069) OTOTeArjs, eXrjpet, 8e ZevoKpdrrjs, wfoXeladai fiev 
avdpd)7Tovs vtto detov (LfeXeladcu 8e vtto yoveojv 
(IxjyeX^lud at 8e vtto Ka07)yr)T(A)v a7TO<^atvo/x€vot rr\v 
8e OavjJiaaTrjv dyvoovvres oj<^e'Aetav, rjv oi ao(f>ol /ct- 

VOVJJL€VCOV KdT dp€TY]V (vtS} 1 dXXrjXoJV (bfeXoVVTCU 

kov prq ovvcoot, pL7)8e ytyvojGKovTCs Tvyxdvtovi. /cat 
firjv TTCLvres dvOpcoTroi ras* ii<Xoyds /cat rds rrjprj- 
(jets' /cat rag ot/covop,tW, orav xP 7 ]°^l xa)V & ai Kat 
OK^At^COJV, 2 TOT6 xp^atixous" Kai tofeXtjxovs viToXap,- 
fidvovai, /cat kX€l8ols aWtrat /cat aTTodrjKas <j>v- 
B Xdrrei xp^/zaTt/cd? dvrjp 

7tXovtov z 8ioiyojv ddXapiov tj8i<jtov x € P^' 
to S' ixXeyeaOai ret 77009 parj8ev dxfyeXifia /cat rrj- 
pelv €7np,€Xcbs /cat 7roAu7rora>9 ov aepbvov ov8e kolXov 
dAAd 4 KarayeXaarov iorcv. 6 yovv 5 'O8vooevs et 6 
rov Sea/xdv e/cetvov €/c/xa#ojv irapd rrjs Ktp/cr^ /car- 
eo^fiaivero St' avrov firj rd Trap* * AXkivoov 1 8a>pa, 
rpirro8as /cat XeftyjTas /cat et/xara /cat xpverov, dAAd 
avpefrerov riva /cat XiOovs /cat (rd Totaura} 8 ovv- 
ayaytbv rrjv nepi ravra Trpay/xaretav /cat kttjglv 
olvtcov /cat rrfpiqaiv evSoupLoviKOV epyov rjyeLro /cat 

1 <iV> -added by Rasmus {Prog. 1872, p. 18); kolvov^voi 
tt]v ap€T7]v <u7r'> -Reiske. 

2 xPV a ^ cov • • • <Jtx/>€Xifiu}v -Sandbach (Class. Quart., xxxv 
[1941], p. 116) ; xP 1 l aL f J ' 0i • * • <^<t>€XtfjLOL -E, B. 

3 E, B; oXfiov -Stobaeus (Anth. iv, 97, 16 = v, p. 802, 9 

4 dAAd -Leonicus, Basil. ; /cat -E, B, Aldine ; <dAAd> kolI 
-Diibner ; <dAA* aTreipoKakovy k<u -Pohlenz. 

5 yovv -Pohlenz ; ovv -E, B ; 8* ovv -Helnibold (Class. 
Phil. I [1955], p. 221). 

6 ci -E ; els -B. 

7 nap 9 ' Wklvoov -Basil. ; irapa XtjkvOov -E ; Trapa Xvk^8ov 
-B, Aldine. 



was silly of Aristotle and silly of Xenocrates a to 
declare that men are benefited by gods and benefited 
by parents and benefited by teachers and yet not to 
recognize the amazing benefit which sages receive 
{from) the virtuous motions of one another b even if 
they are not together and happen not even to be 
acquainted. Moreover, all men suppose that select- 
ing and safeguarding and managing are serviceable 
and beneficial actions when their objects are service- 
able and beneficial, and a moneyed man buys keys 
and guards his stores 

Wealth's lovely closet opening with his hand c ; 
but to select and safeguard with care and toil things 
that are of no benefit for anything is not grand or 
fair but ridiculous. At any rate, if Odysseus with 
that knot which he had learned from Circe had sealed 
up not the gifts given him by Alcinous, tripods and 
basins and garments and gold, d but litter and stones 
and, when he had got together {things of this kind), 
had regarded the trouble taken about them and 
their acquisition and safeguarding as a work of 

Xenocrates, frag. 94 (Heinze) ; but the reference is 
probably no more to any single statement of his than is the 
reference to Aristotle, for whose remarks on this matter see 
e.g. Eth. Nic. 1099 b 11-13, 1161 a 15-18, 1162 a 4-7, 1164 b 
2-6, 1179 a 24-30. 

b Cf. 1076 a infra (. . . tu^cAcio-flcu . . . Kivovfievov) and the 
definitions of thfaXeiv—aHfreXcladai {S. V.F. iii, p. 23, 19-20), 
quoted in note e on 1068 d supra. 

c Euripides, Bellerophon, frag. 285, 8 (Nauck, Trag. 
Graec. Frag. 2 , p. 444). 

d Cf. Odyssey viii, 438-448 ; and for the gifts themselves 
cf. also Odyssey xiii, 10-14, 120-124, 217-218, and 368-369. 

8 <tcl roiavra> -H. C. ; Kal . . . vac. 8 . . . avvayaycov -E, R ; 
<oKvf3a\a> -Xylander ; <axvpd> -Pohlenz. 



(1069) ixdKapioVy tls av i^rjAajoe rfjv dvorjTov ravrrjv rrpo- 
C vocav /cat k€voo7tov8ov eVtuVAetav; dAAa jjltjv tovto 


/cat [jLaKapiov, erepov §' ovSev aAA' e/cAoy^ /cat 
T7]prjois dvoj<f>eAa)v Trpaypbdrcov /cat doKufyopwv 1 - rot- 
aura yap rd /caret </>ucw /cat tcx €Ktos €tl 2 fx&AAov, 
et ye KpaoTrloois /cat dfilac xP vcra ^ KaL V V Ata 
ArjKvdois, 3 otolv Tvxtoot, TrapafidAAovoi top fjueyt- 

OTOV TrAoVTOV €l6 (l)G7T€p OL 0€tOV TLVOJV Tj Sat- 

fjiovcov Upd oo^avres V7T€prj<f>dva>s Kadvfiploou /cat 
AoioopfJGOu fj.6Tavor)GavT€s evOvs UTromWouat /cat 
Kadrjvrcu raTTetvol KarevAoyovvr^s /cat fxeyaAv- 
vovres to Oelov, ovtojs €K€ivol vefxeoet tivl ttjs 
D jLteyaAau^tas' TavTJ]s /cat /cevoAoyta? TrepnrzoovTes 
avOis iv tovtois Z^eTa^ovTai toIs dSiacftopots /cat 
fxrjScv Trpos clvtovs, fx4ya fSotovTes ojs €V ioTiv* 

1 aoia<j>6p<x)v -Leonicus, Basil. ; oiafaptov -E, B, Aldine. 

2 ert -Meziriac ; ion -E, B. 

3 E ; XvKrjdoLs -B. 

4 ev eanv -Meziriac (implied by Xylander's version); 


a i.e. that the reXos is to rfj fyvoti 6p.oXoy€iv (S.V.F. j, p. 
45, 28-29 : '* quod o/xoAoytW Stoici, nos appellemus con- 
venicntiam ") ; cf, page 673, note c and 1060 d-e supra. 

b i.e. 7] €K\oyr) twv Kara <f>voiv (S. V.F. iii, frags. 14 and 1.5 
[pp. 5, 40-6, 6], 64 [p. 16, 13-16], 191 [p. 46, 6-11 ; cf 
Epictetus, Diss, n, x, 6]). This explication of the reXos is 
supposed to have been introduced by Diogenes of Babylon 
(S.V.F. iii, p. 219, 11-18) and to have been adopted with 
modifications bv his followers, Antipater of Tarsus and 
Archedemus (S.V.F. iii, pp. 252, 37-253, 7 and p. 264, 22- 
24) ; and chapters 23-27 of the present essay have been 
taken to represent the polemic of Carneades against Anti- 
pater's formulation (M. Pohlenz, Hermes, lxxiv [1939], 
pp. 22-26 and Stoa i, pp. 186-189 with ii, pp. 95-96 ; cf. 


happiness and bliss, who would have coveted this 
stupid foresight and frivolous diligence ? Neverthe- 
less, in the Stoic doctrine of consistency a this is what 
is fair and grand and blissful : it is nothing but 
selection and safeguarding of things that are useless 
and indifferent, 6 for such is the character of the 
things that are in conformity with nature and still 
more of the externals, if the greatest riches are in 
fact placed by the Stoics on a level with tassels and 
golden chamber-pots and, yes by heaven, as they 
sometimes are, with oil-flasks. d Then, as those who 
have meant arrogantly to insult and revile shrines of 
certain gods or spirits straightway repent and then 
cower and abase themselves, extolling and exalting 
the divinity, just so these Stoics have met with a 
kind of retribution for this arrogance and vainglory 
of theirs and again in the case of these things that 
are indifferent and of no concern to them e show their 
metal f by shouting mightily that a single thing is 

Margaret lleesor, T.A.P.A., Ixxxii [1951], pp. 105-106 and 
with emphasis on the orthodoxy of Diogenes and his fol- 
lowers : W. Wiersma, Mnemosyne, 3 Ser. v [1037], pp. 219- 
228 ; M. van Straaten, Panetius [Amsterdam, 1946], 
pp. 152-153 ; Goldschmidt, Le systeme stoicien, p. 130, n. 2 
and pp. 136-140). 

c For to. Kara <f>voiv as dhid<f>opa Kal avaxfreXr} see 1060 b-e 
supra ; and for rd zktos cf. S. V.F. iii, frags. 122 (p. 29, 
25-29) and 764 (p. 190, 16-17) and Plutarch, Quomodo 
Adolescens Poetas Audire Debeat 23 e-f and 36 d. 

d S. V.F. iii, frag. 153 (pp. 36, 42-37, 3) ; see De Stole. 
Repug. 1048 b supra. Wealth is a conventional example of 
dSidfopa (S. V.F. iii, frags. 70 [p. 17, 20-21], 117 [p. 28, 5-16], 
and 119 [p. 28, 29-31]), and the Stoics denounced the 
Academy for holding that it is not useless (1065 a supra). 

e Cf. 1060 d-e supra and De Stoic. Repug. 1041 e-f 
(=--£. F.F. iii, frag. 139 [pp. 33, 36-34, 12]). 

f For ^erd^nrai cf. Plutarch, Quomodo Adulator ab 



(1069) dyadou /cat /caAov /cat oepivov, rj tovtcdv e/o\oyi7 
/cat nepL ravra OLKovopLta, /cat rovrcov pur) rvy- 
Xavovras 1 ovk a£i6v ion fiiovv dXX diroo^aTreiv 
iavTOvs fj diroKaprepelv, 77oAAa rfj apery yxiipeiv 
<f>pdoavras . 2 rov tolvvv Qeoyviv avrol TravreXcbs 
dyewrj /cat ficKpov rjyovvrai Xeyovra 

Xpr) Trevtrjv (jyevyovra /cat is fieyaKrjrea 3 ttovtov 

pi7TT€LV /Cat TtZTp&Vy KvpV€, KCLT ^AtjSdVoJV , 

E ovtcus* aVooetAtcoyra irpos rrjv nevlav docdcfropov 
ovoav dXX avrot ye ravrd b Tre^w Xoyco irapaKe- 
Xevovrac /cat Xeyovoiv on XPV voaov (f>evyovra fie- 
ydXrjv /cat aAy^Sova ovvrovov, idv p/r) 7rapfj £i<f>os 
r) Kcovetov, els ddXarrav dcfrelvaf /cat /cara nerpcjv 
pnrrelv eavrov, cLv ovoerepov fiXafiepov ovoe /ca/cov 
ouo' dov/jL<f>op6v ionv ovoe KaKoSaifiovas iroiel tovs 


23. " Uodev ovv " <f)7]olv " dp^copuai ; /cat rtVa 
Aaj8a> rod KadrjKovros apxyv f<al vXrjv rrjs dperrjs, 
d<f>els ttjv <f>voiv /cat to /cara 8 <f)voiv ; " noOev 5' 

1 E ; rvyxavovra -B. 2 E ; <f>aoKOvras -B. 

3 E, B ; padvKrjTca -De Stoic. Repug. 1039 f. 

4 ws -Pohlenz (but cf. Castiglioni, Gnomon, xxvi [1954], 
p. 83). 

5 Wyttenbach ; Tavra -E, B. 

6 a<f>L€vai -Bernardakis. 

7 Rasmus (Prog. 1872, p. 18) ; apfo/xcu -E, B. 

8 Kara -Meziriac (implied by Amyot's version) ; Trapa 
-E, B. 

Amico Internoscatur 74 b ; Philo in Eusebius, Praep. Evang. 
viii, 11, 7 (i, p. 455, 21 [Mras]) ; Iamblichus, Vita Pyth. 223. 

a See 1060 c-d and 1063 of supra and De Stoic. Repug. 
1042 c-e. 

b S.V.F. iii, frag. 167 (p. 39, 29-33) and Theognis, 175- 
176 ; see De Stoic. Repug. 1039 f supra. 



good and fair and grand, the selection of these 
things and their management, and that, if men don't 
obtain them, it's not worth being alive but they 
should bid a long farewell to virtue and cut their 
own throats or starve themselves to death. a So then, 
by these very people Theognis is held to be utterly 
mean and petty for saying b 

From want you must flee, oh my friend, though headlong 

you plunge in the motion 
Down cliffs sharp and sheer or below the yawning abyss 

of the ocean, 

thus playing the coward in the face of poverty, a 
thing which is indifferent ; but they give the same 
prescription themselves in prose and say that, if 
sword or hemlock be not at hand, one must cast 
oneself into the sea or hurl oneself down from rocks 
in flight from severe disease and intense pain, c 
neither of which (according to them) is injurious or 
evil or inconvenient or makes unhappy those who 
meet with it. d 

23. " What, then," says he, e " will be my point 
of departure and what shall I take as duty's principle 
and virtue's matter, once I have abandoned nature 
and what is in conformity with nature ? " Why, my 

c Cf. S. V.F. iii, frags. 757 (p. 187, 33-35) and 768 (p. 191, 

d See 1060 c supra ; cf. S. V.F. iii, frags. 1 17 (p. 28, 5-10), 
166 (p. 39, 15-17), 168 (p. 39, 34-38), and 256 (pp. 60, 31- 

e S. V.F. iii, frag. 491 (cf. De Stoic. Repug. 1035 c supra 
and S. V.F. iii, frag. 282), supposedly from the polemic of 
Chrysippus against Ariston (BonhofYer, Die Ethik . . ., p. 185 ; 
Dyroff, Die Ethik der alten Stoa, p. 43, n. 3). For rov 
KadrfKovTos apxf)v cf. S. V.F. i, p. 47, 14-16 and iii, frags. 186 
and 497 ; for vX-qv rrjs apcrfjs see 1071 b infra. 



(10G9) ApLGToreXrjg , to jxaKapie, /cat Qeocfrpaaros dpxov- 
rai; rivas Se Eero/cpa-ny? /cat HoXepiajv Xajifid- 
vovoiv apx^s ; °^X L KaL 'Lrpxtiv rovrois tjkoXovOt)- 
F Kev 1 VTTOTidejAevois aroi^ta rrjs €vSaijjLovias ty)v 
<f)voiv /cat to Kara cf>VGiv ; dXX €K€ivol fxev irri rov- 
ru)v €/jL€ivav d)s alpertov /cat ayaOwv /cat tbcfyeXipitDV , 
/cat rr]V dperrjv irpooXafiovrzs \^) 2 avrols ivep- 
yovaav oIk€lo)S xP co f l ^ V7 ] v e/caaraj reXeiov e/c rov- 

1 E ; 7jkoXov9t]0€v -B. 

2 <cV> -added by Pohlenz (cf. Stobaeus, Eel, ii, p. 130, 
20-21 and p. 132, 8-11 [Wachsmuth]). 

a This with what follows through 1069 f is printed as 
frag. 78 of Xenocrates by R. Heinze (Xenokrates, p. 189), 
who took it to be seriovis evidence for a Xenocratean doctrine 
elaborated in detail by Polemon (op. cit., p. 148). More 
recently K. von Fritz (R.-E. xxi/2 [1952], col. 2527, 51-63) 
has cited it with what follows in 1070 a as confirmation of 
the statement that Polemon Soy/xarifet x^pts ukv aptrfjs /x^Sc- 
7tot€ av cvSaifiovLCLV V7rdp\€iv &ix a &* ko.1 tujv owfJLaTiKtov /cat TWV 
€ktos t?)*> ap€TT)v avrdpKTj irpos ci)8at/xovtav ctvai (Clement of 
Alexandria, Stromata n, xxii, 133, 7). See the next note 

b S.V.F. i, frag. 183. Cf. Cicero, Acad. Post, i, 19: 
". . . partem illam bene vivendi a natura repetebant (sell. 
Peripatetici et vetus Academia [i, 18 supra]) . . . constitue- 
bantque extremum esse rerum expetendarum et finem 
bonorum adeptum esse omnia e natura et animo et corpore 
et vita." ... 22 : ". . . utrisque hie bonorum finis videbatur, 
adipisci quae essent prima natura.". . . 23 : "... Ex hac 
descriptione . . . officii ipsius initium reperiebatur. ..." The 
authority expressly cited for this account is Antiochus of 
Ascalon (i, 14, 35, and 43). Before him Carneades had 
maintained that the Stoic doctrine of good and evil was only 
verbally different from that of the Peripatetics (Cicero, 
De Finibus iii, 41 and Tvse. Disp. v, 120) ; but it was 
Antiochus who made it a basic tenet of his that the ethics 
of the Old Academy was a single doctrine professed alike 
by Aristotle, Theophrastus, Speusippus, Xenocrates, and 



good sir, what is the point of departure for Aristotle 
and for Theophrastus ; and what do Xenocrates and 
Polemon take as principles ? a And has not Zeno 
too followed them in their assumption that nature 
and what is in conformity with nature are basic 
elements of happiness ? b Those former men, how- 
ever, held by these things as beneficial and good and 
objects of choice c ; and, having taken virtue in 
addition as operating <(among)> them by making 
proper use of each, d they thought that with these 

Polemon and that Zeno, who had studied with Polemon 
(S.V.F. i, frags. 1, 10, 11, and 13; cf. Pohlenz, Stoa ii, 
p. 14 and C. O. Brink, Phronesis, i [1955/56], p. 143, n. 107), 
had taken over this doctrine in all its essentials and had dis- 
guised it in a novel terminology (Cicero, De Finibus v, 7 
and 14, 16 with 21-22, and 74-75 ; De Nat. Deorum i, 16 ; 
Acad. Prior, ii, 131 ; De Legibus i, 38 and 53-55 ; cf. 
Diogenes Laertius, vii, 25). Rejected as historically false 
by Pohlenz (Stoa i, pp. 250-253), this reconstruction in so 
far as it derives from Polemon the principle of <f>vois and 
to Kara <j>voiv in Zeno's ethics was later defended as sub- 
stantially correct by K. von Fritz (R.-E. xxi/2 [1952], cols. 
2526, 22-2529, 57) and has since been given a somewhat 
more plausible interpretation by C. O. Brink (Phronesis, i 
[1955/561, pp. 143-144). 

With Plutarch's phrase, aroix^a rrjs cvSai/jLovlas, cf. Philo 
Jud., Quod Bet. Potiori Insid. Soleat 8 (i, p. 260, 7-10 

c Cf. Stobaeus, Eel. ii, 7, 13 and 14 (p. 118, 16-17 and 
p. 125, 10-19 [Wachsmuth]) ; Cicero, De Finibus iii, 41 
(". . . cum Peripatetici omnia quae ipsi bona appellant 
pertinere dicant ad beate vivendum . . ."). 

d Cf. Stobaeus, Eel. ii, 7, 13 ; 7, 14 ; and 7, 18 (p. 119, 
11-19 ; pp. 126, 17-127, 2 ; pp. 127, 25-128, 9 ; p. 130, 18- 
21 ; and p. 132, 8-14 [Wachsmuth]); Cicero, De Finibus 
ii, 34 (". . . sententia veterum Academicorum et Peri- 
pateticorum . . . virtute adhibita frui primis a natura datis ") 
with Acad. Post, i, 21-23 ; St. Augustine, Civ. Dei xix, 3 
(". . . bona sunt tamen, et secundum istos [sell. Academicos 



(1069) tcov /cat oXoKXrjpov coovto ovfXTrXiqpovv fiiov /cat 
(jvfjLTrepaiveiv, ttjv dXrjOcos rfj <f>voei Trp6a<f>opov /cat 
avvcohov ofioXoyiav anoSiSovTes. ov yap cooTrep ol 
rfjs yfjs dcpaXXofievot /cat Karate pd/zevot 1 TrdXtv err* 
1070 avrrjv irapdrrovro, ravrd npayfiaTa Xrj7TTa /cat 
oi>x alperd /cat ot/ceta /cat ovk ayada /cat dvcofcXT] 
fiev evxpyvTa 8e /cat ovSev fiev TTpos rjfJLcls dpxds Se 
tcov KadrjKovTLov ovofid^ovreg' dXXd oto? 6 Xoyos 


oh eXeyov ot/ceta /cat avjxcpcova irapexovTcov . rj Se 
tovtcov aipeais, toorrep rj Trap 'Ap^tAd^oj yvvr) 

Tfj fJL€V vhcop (€<f)6p€l) 2 

SoXocppoveovaa x €t P L @*l T *py* &* KvPt 

1 B ; KaTCL(l>Op6fl€VOl -E. 

2 <,€<f)6p€L> -Amyot, Xylander, Stephanus ( Var. Led.), 
mss. of De Primo Frigido 950 e and Demetrius i, 5 (905 e) ; 
omitted by E and 13. 

3 Hiller (after Dtibner in 950 f) ; rfj -E, B (rfj tripy hk 
-mss. of De Primo Frigido 950 r ; ry 8* *t*P7) -mss. of 
Demetrius xxxv, 6 [905 e]) ; rr/rcpr) -Bernardakis (after 
Schneidewin ; but cf. Chatzidakis, Athena, xiii [1901], p. 

veteres] etiam ipsa propter se ipsa diligit virtus utiturque 
illis et fruitur sicut virtutem decet " [from Varro's account 
after Antiochus]). Cf. also the polemical " correction M 
which in order to emphasize to xpv gtlk ^ v T V S dpzrrjs would 
change the definition of Critolaus into to eV navrcov rwv dya- 
Oaiv ivepyovfjLcvov (Stobaeus, EcL ii, 7, 3*> = p. 46, 16-17 
[Wachsmuth] ; see the next note infra). 

Cf. Cicero, De Finibus iv, 58 (". . . natural ia . . ., quae 
coniuncta cum honestis vitam beatam perficiunt et ab- 
solvunt ") ; Clement of Alexandria, Stromata n, xxi, 128, 5 
(avfX7rXrjpovadai roivvv rr)v €i>BaL{xovLav €K rrjs rptyevelas rcov dya- 
0o)v) and Diogenes Laertius, v, 30 (rijv €vSaip.ovlav ovfiirX-qpcofjia 
€K rpitjjv dyadtov clvat. [cf. ovfinX^pcoaLS dyadcov in Alexander of 
Aphrodisias, De Anima cum Mantissa ed. I. Bruns, pp. 162, 



constituents they were filling out and finishing off a 
perfect and integrated life a by presenting the con- 
sistency that is truly in conformity and harmony with 
nature. b For they were not in the state of con- 
fusion of those who are leaping from the ground and 
tumbling down on it again, calling the same things 
acceptable and not objects of choice and congenial 
and not good and unbeneficial but yet useful and of 
no concern to us but yet principles of our duties c ; 
but as was the doctrine such was the way of life of 
those former men, who in their conduct exhibited 
actions congenial and consistent with the statements 
that they made. d The system of these Stoics, how- 
ever, like the woman of whom Archilochus says e 

In one of her hands there was water, 
A crafty lure, for fire the other <bore]>, 
26-27 and 167, 26]). This form of expression may reflect 
the definition of the tcXos ascribed to Critolaus the Peri- 
patetic, to €K iravTiov ra)V ayaQtov ovfX'iT€TTX7)po}yi4vov (StobaeiiS, 
Eel. ii, 7, 3b = p. 46, 10-13 [Wachsmuth]) ; cf. Clement, 
Stromata n, xxi, 129, 10 (. . . rrjv ck rdv rptcuv yevwv avfjL7rXr}- 
povfievrjv . . .) and for polemical k< correction " of the defini- 
tion Stobaeus, Eel., p. 46, 13-17 and p. 126, 12-18 (Wachs- 
muth) with Pohlenz, Grundfragen, p. 41 and F. Wehrli, Die 
Schule des Aristoteles, x, pp. 67-68 on Critolaus, frags. 19 
and 20. 

6 In contrast to rrjs Ztwiktjs o^ioXoylas (1069 c supra). 
With T-rj </>vo€i . . . awwhov cf. Stobaeus, Eel. ii, 7, 13 (p. 119, 
12-13 [Wachsmuth]). ' 

c S. V.F. iii, frag. 123 (p. 30, 1-4) ; cf. Cicero, De Finibus 
iv, 20 ; iv, 62-63 ; iv, 72 ; v, 90 and see 1060 e and 1068 a 

d Cf. the remark of Polemon (Diogenes Laertius, iv, 18) 
and the commentary on it by Margherita Isnardi, Parola 
del Passato, xi (1956), pp. 429-432. 

e Archilochus, frag. 93 (Bergk ; Edmonds) = 86 (Diehl) = 
184 (West), quoted by Plutarch in Demetrius xxxv, 6 (905 r.) 
and De Primo Frigido 950 e-f. 



(1070) rots fji€V Trpoodyerai ttjv (f>vaiv rot? S' dirojdelrai 
Soyixaav puaXXov Se tols puev epyois /cat toZs rrpdy- 
jjlolgw ojs aiperwv /cat dyaQcov k'xovrai rcov Kara 
<j)VGw, rots 8' ovo/jiaGL /cat rots' pr\piaoiv (oV) 1 dSid- 
B (f>opa /cat axprjora /cat dpperrrj Trpos evSaipioviav 
avaivovrai /cat TrpoTrrjAaKi^ovGLV . 

24. 'E77£t Se KadoXov rdyadov aTravres avdpoj- 


rrjv fxeyLGTrjv avrapKes dirpooSees, Spa ro tovtoiv 
TrapariOels dyadov. dpd ye x a P T0V ^oteV ro <f>povi- 

pUDS TOV SaKTvXoV 77 pOT elv at ,* TL o'; eVKTOlOV €OTl 

<f>povLpLrj arpefiXaJois ; eurt^et Se 6 /cara/cp^ p,vl£a)v 
eauroj/ €i)Aoya>s'; d£iav S' e^et rr)^ pLeytorrjv o ttoA- 
Aa/ct? atpet Adyos" aVrt ro£> /X17 aya0o£ rcpoeoQai; 
reXeiov Se /cat avrapKes eoriv ov [u^] 3 7rapdvTO£, 
aV /Ltoj rvyxdvojGi rtov dSia<f)6pojv , oi>x vrropLevovaiv 
ovSe fiovXovrai ^rjv; yeyove Se erepos Adyo? ifi ov 
C fiaXXov rj GVvrjOeia 7Tapavev6pLr)rai, ras ptev yvqoias 
v(f>aipovvTOS avrov /cat aTTooTrajvTOS evvoias ajcnrep 
reKva vodas Se vrrofidXAovros* irepas 5 dr}pubSeis 
/cat dAAo/cdrous' /cat ravras dvr eKelvwv eKTt,0rjvei- 
odai /cat orepyeiv dvayKa^ovros — /cat ravr ev rots 

1 <a>s> -added by Meziriac. 

2 oUt, -Reiske ; " praestaret voels " -Pohlenz. 

3 [firj] -omitted in versions of Amyot and Xylander, de- 
leted by Reiske. 

4 Kronenberg (Mnemosyne^ Hi [1924], p. 105) ; irpoofiaXkov- 
ros -E, B. 

5 irepas -B (at superscript over 4) ; eralpas -E. 

a C/. Cicero, De Finibus iv, 43 (". . . naturam videntur 
sequi . . . rursus naturam relinquunt") and 47-48. 

h Cf. Cicero, De Finibus v, 89 (" Bonum appello quidquid 
secundum naturam est, quod contra malum ; nee ego solus, 
sed tu etiam, Chrysippe, in foro, domi ; in schola desinis. 



calls in nature for some doctrines and for others 
thrusts it out, a or rather the Stoics in their works 
and acts cling to the things that are in conformity 
with nature as good things and objects of choice, but 
in word and speech they reject and spurn them {as^> 
indifferent and useless and insignificant for happi- 
ness. 6 

24. Now, since the good as universally conceived 
by all men is gratifying, desirable, fortunate, of the 
highest value, sufficient in itself, and wanting noth- 
ing else, look at the good of these Stoics in com- 
parison. Do you consider the prudent extension of 
a finger c gratifying ? What ? Is prudent torture 
desirable ? Is he being fortunate who with good 
reason plunges over a precipice ? Is that of the 
highest value which reason often requires them to 
give up for the sake of what is not good ? And is 
that perfect and sufficient in itself which they can 
have and still not endure or desire to live unless they 
get the things that are indifferent ? d Has there ever 
been another doctrine which did greater outrage to 
common experience, 6 itself snatching away and ab- 
ducting the genuine conceptions like babes from 
her breast while substituting other spurious ones, 
brutish and uncouth, and constraining her to nurse 
and to cherish these in place of those f — and this 

. . .") and iv, 22 (" Quae est igitur ista philosophia quae 
communi more in foro loquitur, in libellis suo ? "). 

c See 1068 r supra. 

d See 1063 E and 1069 r> supra, and De Stoic. Repug. 
1042 d. 

e Cf. 1084 b infra (virepfioXtf . . . napavopLias €ts . . . ttjv 

f Cf. 1084 a infra (ras kolvcls /cat ovvrjQeis i£oiKi£ovT€S £v- 
voias . . . irepas ertzioayovcnv aXkoKorovs /cat £ivas). 



(1070) rrepl dyadwv /cat kclkcov alpercov re /cat <f>evKTU)v 

OLK€lO)V T€ /Cat aAAoTpiCOV, <X fJL&AAoV €§66 deppiWV 

[re] 1 /cat i/jvxptov AevKtov re /cat fieAdvcuv aa</>€- 
arepav eyeiv rrjv evdpy eiav 2, eKeivoiv fiev yap e£a>- 
8ev eloiv at (fxxvraoiai rats aloQr\Geoiv eTreioootoi,, 
ravra 8' e/c tlqv d/?xa>v 3 rtov ev r^plv otujjl(J)Vtov e^ei 
ty]v yeveoiv ; oi he axjnep eh rov ifjevSofievov rj rov 
D KVpievovra fierd rrjs StaAe/CTt/c?}? epifidAAovres eh 
rov Trepl evhaipiovias roirov eAvoav p,ev ov8epbiav 
d/x</>t/3oAtW ev avrw puvpias 8' eTroLr)oav. 

25. Kat p,rjv on Svelv dyaOcov, rov pcev reAovs 
rod Se rrpos to reAos, fiel^ov eon ro reAos /cat 
TeAaoTepov, U7r' 4 ouSevos* dyyoetrat. yiyvcoaKei Se 

1 [re] -deleted by Sandbach (Class. Quart., xxiv [1930], 
p. 48, n. 3). 2 Stephanus ; eVepyciav -E, B. 

3 apx&v -Kronenberg (Mnemosyne ', lii [1924], pp. 105- 
106) ; dyadwv -E, B ; " cogitari potest etiam d<j>opp.cov " 
-Pohlenz (but cf. A. Grilli, Paideia, vii [1952], p. 208 and 
// problema della vita contemplativa, p. 116, n. 1). 

4 vrr' -Basil. ; o eV -E, B, Aldine. 

a For olkcuov tc koX ciAAot/hW see De Stoic. Repug. 1038 b. 

b See note c on Be Stoic. Repug. 1047 c with the refer- 
ences there to 1074 b and 1083 c infra ; and observe the 
combination, els ttjv ivdpyeiav /ecu rr^v avvrjdcLav, in 1084 b 

c Cf. Hierokles, Ethische Elementarlehre ed. H. von 
Arnim, col. 6, 1-24; O. Luschnat, Philologus, cii (1958), 
pp. 191-192 ; and note b on De Stoic. Repug. 1041 e (e/x<£i>Toi 
irpo\rnli€is)* For the terminology, oracrdStoi . . . ov{j.<f>vTov, cf. 
Plutarch, De Virtute Morali 451 c (avfi(f>vTov e^ei T171/ rod 
irddovs dpxqv, ovk eVctcrdSiov dXX* dvayKaiav ovaav) and Quaest. 
Naturales 914 b (the heat of the sea as gvjjl<j>vtos contrasted 
to that of other liquids as eireiooSios koI dXXorpia). 

d See 1059 d-e supra. 

e This argument, mentioned by Plutarch in De Tuenda 
Sanitate 133 b-c and Quaest. Conviv. 615 a, was formulated 
by Diodorus Cronus to support his definition of " possible " 



too in matters concerning good things and evil and 
objects of choice and avoidance and things congenial 
and repugnant," the clarity b of which ought to be 
more manifest than that of things hot and cold and 
white and black, since the mental images of these 
are incidental to the sense-perceptions entering from 
without whereas the former are generated intrinsi- 
cally c from the principles within us ? The Stoics, 
however, charging with their dialectic upon the topic 
of happiness as they did upon " the liar " d or " the 
dominator " e resolved none of the ambiguities in it 
but created myriads of them. 

25. Moreover, there is no one who does not re- 
cognize that, if one of two goods is the goal and the 
other subserves the goal, the goal is a greater and 
more perfect good/ Even Chrysippus recognizes the 

(see De Stoic. Repug. 1055 e [page 589, note c]) and was 
attacked in different ways by Cleanthes and Chrysippus 
(S.V.F. ii, frags. 283, 284, and 954). Diodorus contended 
that, since what has occurred is necessarily so and the im- 
possible does not follow from the possible, what is not or will 
not be is not possible (cf Doring, Megariker, frags. 130-139 
and pp. 132-135). For recent attempts to reconstruct and 
analyse the course of his argument see A. N. Prior, Time and 
Modality (Oxford, 1957), pp. 86-88 ; O. Becker, Erkenntnis 
und Verantwortung : Festschrift fur Theodor Litt (Diissel- 
dorf, 1960), pp. 250-263 ; P.-M. Schuhl, he Dominateur et 
les Possibles (Paris, 1960) with the review of Schuhl's book 
by K. von Fritz, Gnomon, xxxiv (1962), pp. 138-152 ; 
J. Hintikka, American Philosophical Quarterly, i (1964), 
pp. 101-114; G. Stahl, Rev. Philosophique, cliii (1963), 
pp. 239-243; R. Blanche, Rev. Philosophique, civ (1965), 
pp. 133-149; Dorothea Frede, Aristoteles und die M See- 
schlacht " (Gottingen, 1970), pp. 93-125 ; and R. L. Purtill, 
Apeiron, vii, 1 (May 1973), pp. 31-36. 

* Cf. Aristotle, Topics 116 b 22-26 and Eth. Nic. 1111 b 
26-29 and 1145 a 4-6 (with 1094 a 18-22 and 1097 a 25- 
b 6) ; Plato, Gorgias 499 e and Lysis 219 c— 220 b. 



(1070) /ecu Y^pvoiTTTTos rrjv hia^opdv, (Ls SrjXov Igtiv ev too 
TpiTco rrepl 1 AyaOwv toZs yap reXog rjyovfJLevots 
tt\v €7T larifj fjLrjv dvopuoXoyeZ kolI Tidrjoiv (avrrjv el- 
vac TTpos to reXos dyaOov avTcp ok tovtco fir) reAo? 
elvai rWrjGLV.y 2 ev 8e 3 rocs' rrepl kiKaioovvqs , el 

jieV TL? VTTodoiTO T7\V 7j8ovr)v TcAo?, OVK o'Urai Oip- 

^eudai (aV) 4 to SiKaiov el 8e fir) TeXos dXXd 
a77Xa>s dyadov, oterai. Tas 8e Xebecs ovk otofiat ae 
8eZa6ai 5 vvv aKoveiv ifiov KaTaXeyovTos ' to yap 
E TpiTOV nepl AiKaLoavvrjs fiifiXiov k'oTi rravTaypftev 
Xafielv. otov ovv avucs, co <f)lXe, fir)8ev dyadov 
XeycoGt fir]8evds dyadov fieZiov elvai fir)8' eXaTTov 
dXX Igov to) TeXei to fir] TeXos, ov Tats Koivals 
\16vov ivvoiais dXXd koX toZs avTcbv Xoyois (fxxtvov- 
Tat fiaxofievoi. Kal irdXiv el 8veZv KaKoZv ovtcov 6 
t5</>' ov \iev yiyvofieda ^etpoves" orav irapaycvqTai 
to 8e ftXaTTTei fiev ov rroteZ 8e xeipovos, rrapa ttjv 
evvoidv ioTL fir) Xeyeiv eKeZvo fieZ^ov elvai KaKov 
v(j> y ov yiyvofieda x € ^poveg oTav napayevrfTai tov 

1 E ; TW TpLTO) TO) 7T€pl -B. 

2 <avTr}v . . . rfflrjaiv} -H. C. ; /cat rtOtfatv ev -K, B ; /cat 
Tidvcnv <lacuna>- -Wyttenbach. 

3 Meziriac ; ev re -E ; ev ye -B. 

4 <av> -added by Sandbach (rf. De Stoic. Rcpvy. 1083 n 
and 1040 c : aajfot/iev ay). 

5 8aa0at -E ; omitted by B. 

6 KaKoiv 6vtu)v -Pohlenz (kolko'lv -Amyot, Xylander) ; /cot 
koivws -E, B. 

7 Trapa ttjv evvoidv eon . . . ov 7tol€l Se x e ''p° vas -omitted by B. 

a S. V.F. iii, frag. 25 (pp. 8, 38-9, 4). 
6 This refers to Herillus of Carthage, a pupil of Zeno's 
(<>f. S.V.F. i, pp. 91-93 and H. von Arnim, R.-E. viii [1919|, 



difference, as is clear in the third book concerning 
Goods, a for he disagrees with those who hold know- 
ledge to be the goal b and maintains (that it is a 
good subserving the goal and for this very reason 
maintains that it is not the goal.) c Also in the books 
concerning Justice d he thinks that, while justice 
could not be preserved if one should set up pleasure 
as the goal, it could be if one should take pleasure 
to be not a goal but simply a good. I don't think 
you need to hear me now recite the passage word for 
word, for the third book concerning Justice can be 
had everywhere. So, my friend, whenever the Stoics 
assert on the other hand that no good is more or less 
good than any other e but that which is not the goal 
is equal to the goal, they are obviously in conflict 
not only with the common conceptions but with their 
own doctrines as well. Again, if there are two evils, 
from one of which when it befalls us we become worse 
men while the other injures but does not make us 
worse, it is at odds with the common conception to 
deny that the one from which when it befalls us we 
become worse men is a greater evil than the one 

cols. 683, 20-681, 50), against whom Cleanthes wrote a 
monograph (S. V.F. i, p. 107, 3) and whose position was 
apparently demolished by Chrysippus (S. V.F. i, frag. 414). 
For d^o/xoAoy€t = ' 4 disagrees " cf. Pseudo-Galen (Porphyry), 
Ad Gaurum xiii, 7 (p. 53, 20-21 [Kalbfleisch]). 

c See page 681, note b supra and Be Stoic. Repug. 1036 a, 
where €7TLort]jjirjv . . . kolB' fjv o/LioAoyou/nevcos jSicoao/Liefla (cf. 
S. V.F. iii, p. 5, 6 and p. 6, 9) shows how Chrysippus re- 
garded the relation of l-nioTr\[iy] to the tcXos. 

d S.V.F. iii, frag. 23 (p. 8, 17-21) ; see Be Stoic. Repug. 
1038 d and 1040 c. 

* For the doctrine that all goods are equally good and all 
evils equally evil see supra 1060 e-f and 1064 f, Be Stoic. 
Repug. 1038 c, and S. V.F. iii, frags. 92 and 93. 



(1070) o 1 j9A(X7TT€t fX€V OV 7T<H€l 0€ X € lp ova $ jArjSe KaKlOVa 

ftXdfi-qv rrjv kolkiovcls rjfJLas drroreXovaav . dAAd 
ojicoAoyet yc Xpucrt7T7ro9 eivat Tivas <f)6fiovs /cat Xv- 
rras /cat dndras a? fiXdiTTOVcn jxkv rjfJLas xtipovas 
8' ou Troiovatv. evrv)(€ 8e rco irpwrto ra>v npos 
F UXcltcjovcl yeypapLfievcuv Trepl AiKatoavvqs' /cat yap 

dXXcDV €V€KCL T7]V €/C€t TOV OLvSpOS €Vp7)OlXoyLaV 

a£iov loTopfjoai, 7rdvrcov olttXcos Trpaypbdrcov /cat 
Soyfidrcov olk€llov ojjlov kcli dXXorplwv dcfretSovaav. 2 
26. Hapa rqv kvvoiav iarc 8vo reXrj koll okottovs 
npoKeladac rod JZlov /cat firj iravrcov oaa Trpdrrofjiev 
1071 e<j>* €V rt yiyveoOai rrjv dvacfropdv, en Se piaXXov 
iarc TTapd rrp> evvoiav dXXo jjl€v elvat reXos €tt* 
d'AAo 3 8e rtov 7TpaTTOjjLeva>v eKaarov dvacfiepeoOai. 
tovtodv S' avTovs V7TO(JL€V€iv dvdyKrj Odrepov. €i 
yap avrd fiev (ra) 4 TTpcora Kara cf>votv (dy)a#a 5 

1 tov 8 -Wyttenbach ; to Se -E (missing from B). 

2 Meziriac (implied by Amyot's version) : a-nihovoav 
-E, B. 

3 aAAoj -B (with o superscript over to). 

4 <ra> -added by Wyttenbach. 

5 Wyttenbach ; <j>voiv . . . vac. 3 . . . a0a -E, B. 

a [i-qbe is here used with consecutive force as the negative 
of the consecutive /cat (cf. W. J. Verdenius, Mnemosyne, 
4 Ser. ix [19561, p. 249, lines 5-9 and p. 250, lines 1-11)* 

b S. V.F. iii, frag. 455. 

c See note 6 on Be Stoic. Repug. 1040 a. 

d okottos is here a synonym of riXos {cf. S. V.F. iii, frags. 
3 and 10) and was so used by Chrysippus (De Stoic. Repug. 
1040 e-f supra [S.V.F. iii, p. 8, 30-34]) and even by Anti- 
pater (S. V.F. iii, p. 255, 22), despite the distinction between 
the two ascribed to Cleanthes, Chrysippus, and all their 
followers (S. V.F. iii, frag. 16 : ... rty ph cvSaifxoviav okottov 



which injures but does not make us worse and so a 
to deny that the injury which renders us more evil 
is more evil. Yet Chrysippus does admit b that there 
are certain fears and griefs and deceptions which 
injure us but do not make us worse. Read the first 
of his books concerning Justice written against 
Plato, c for it is worth while for other reasons also to 
observe the man's verbal ingenuity there sparing 
absolutely no fact or doctrine at all, either his own 
or another's. 

26. It is at odds with the common conception that 
life have two goals or aims d set up for it and that 
the point of reference for all our actions be not some 
single thing, but it is still further at odds with the 
common conception that one thing be the goal and 
each particular action be referred to another. Yet 
in one of these alternatives they (the Stoics) must 
acquiesce. 6 For, if t it is not <(the) primary things 
conforming with nature that are themselves good 9 

€KKcl(jOai riXos o° etvat to rv\iiv rrjs cuScufiovias, 6rr€p ravrov 
etvou Tip €v8atfjLovelv). The Stoics had expressly repudiated 
the charge that their doctrine implied two different reXrj (cf. 
Cicero, Be Finibus iii, 22 [S. V.F. iii, p. 6, 34-35]). On this 
and what follows in chaps. 26-27 cf. M. Soreth, Archiv fiir 
Geschichte der Philosophie, 1 (1968), pp. 48-72 and especially 
pp. 58 ff. 

e Cf. Cicero, Be Finibus iv, 39-41. 

* €i yap . . . ivheiKwpiivovs ttju hta<j>opdv (1071 b infra) — 
S. V.F. iii, frag. 195 (p. 46, 28-38). 

9 For rd TTpatra Kara cfrvaiv cf. S.V.F. iii, frags. 140, 141, 
and 181 ; Cicero, Be Finibus iii, 20-23 (S.V.F. iii, frags. 
188, 497, and 186) ; Schafer, Ein fruhmittelstoisches System , 
pp. 294-311, who holds that the term was coined in the 
debates between Carneades and his Stoic opponents ; 
Pohlenz, Grundfragen, pp. 13-14 and 17-21, who ascribes 
it to Zeno himself. 



(1071) fxrj ioriv rj S' tvXoyioros eVAoyr) /cat Xrjifjis avrojv 
/cat ro ndvra rd rrapa zavrov 7tol€lv Zkolotov eW/ca 
rod rvyxdvtiv ra)v rrpajrojv Kara (frvoiv, eV e/cetvo 
Set 1 vdvra e^etv ra irparrd^va rrjv avacf>opdv, ro 
rvyx^vetv rcov TTpojrwv Kara <f>voiv. eiirep S' dp* 2 
ocovrai fxr) oroxa^opiivovs p>r]8 y €(f)L€pL€vovs rod tv- 
yciv eKcivcov ro reXos e^et^, (eV^) 3 aAAo ov eVe/ca 
Set 4 ava<f)€p€odat rrjv rovrcov iKXoyrjv /cat ptrj rav- 
B to 5 - riXos pi€V yap ro e/cAe'yea#at /cat Xap,fidv<Eiv 
e/cetva cfypovLpuos , e/cetva 8' avrd /cat ro rvyxdveiv 
avrtov ov re'Aos' 6 dAAd coorrep vXr) ti$ vrroKtirai rrpr 
eKXeKTiKTjV d^iav e^oi/cra* rovro yap ofyzat /cat toi»- 

i 8a -E ; 5e -B. 

2 8' ap' -Wyttenbach (reading ol 8* dp' ) ; yap -E, B. 

3 <eV> -added by Rasmus {Prog. 1872, p. J 8 : eV aAAo 
Set . . .); 

4 oft €V€kcl Set -H. C. ; eve/ca ou Set -E ; ov Set eVe/cci -B ; 
€X €LV > <*AAo <efrat ro riXos tov'tou> eVe/ca ou Set -Babut (Piu- 
tarque et le Sto'icisme, p. 338, n. 5 [on p. 339J). 

5 tclvto -H. C. ; Tavra -E, B. 

6 ov re'Aoy -Xy lander ; cureAe? -E, B. 

a This appears to be a conflation of the definitions formu- 
lated by Diogenes and Antipater (S.V.F. iii, p. 219, 11-18 
and p. 252, 37-38) ; see note h on 1069 c supra and 1073 c 
infra : ovoiav rdyadov Tidevrai rr)v evXoyiarov iKXoyrjv rtov Kara 
<f>vaiv. Here and in what follows Xtji/jls and Aa/xjSdVety are used 
in the technical Stoic sense (see note c on 10'JO t supra and 
note c on 1)4 Stole. Repug. 1045 f). 

b Cf. S. V.F. iii, pp. 252, 39-253, 2 (Antipater) and p. 5, 7, 
in the critique by Posidonius (frag. 187, 26- c 27 [Edelstein- 

c With this conclusion, which is the position assumed by 
Carneades against the Stoics (cf. Cicero, Be Finibus v, 19-90 
and ii, 42; Tusc. Disp. v, 84; Acad. Prior, ii, 131), all 
actions would be performed in view of something other than 
the re'Aoj, as Cato in fact asserts in De Finibus iii, 22 (S. V.F. 
iii, p. 135, 17-21). 


but the rational selection and acceptance of them, a 
that is each man's doing all that in him lies for the 
purpose of obtaining the primary things conforming 
with nature,* it is to this that all actions performed 
must have their reference, to the obtaining of the 
primary things conforming with nature c ; and, if 
then they think that men achieve the goal not by 
desiring or aiming at the possession of those things,** 
the selection of these must be referred <(to) another 
purpose and not to the same one, 6 for the prudent 
selection and acceptance of those things is the goal, 
whereas the things themselves and the obtaining of 
them are not the goal but are given as a kind of 
matter -^ having "selective value " * — for this, I 

d The emphasis is on rod rvx^lv ejcctwuv, as is shown by 
1071 C infra, fiia^oyizvoi fir) to rvyxdvav . . . rov crro^a^a^ai 
. . . eirai reXos. . . . Cf. Cicero, De Finibus v, 20 (S. V.F. iii, 
frag. 44). 

e i.e. the Stoics must in fact set up two distinct reX-q if 
obtaining rd rrpayra Kara </>uglv is not the purpose of selecting 
them, for then the selecting itself must have a purpose 
different from the reXos of all particular actions, since the 
latter according to the Stoics themselves is to tKXeyeoOat . . . 
(j>povlfjnos but (cf. 1071 e and 1072 c infra) selection can be 
(fypovLfios Kal €vX6yi<jTos only if it is 77-00? re rdXos. Cf. Cicero, 
De Finibus iv, 46 : " non enim in selectione virtus ponenda 
erat, ut id ipsum quod erat bonorum ultimum aliud aliquid 

f Cf. . . . vXrjv rrjs aperrjs ... to Kara, <f>vaiv (Chrysippus 
in 1069 £ supra); Cicero, De Finibus iii, 61 (S.V.F. iii, 
p. 189, 36-38) : " prima autem ilia naturae . . . sub iudicium 
sapientis et dilectum cadunt, estque ilia subiecta quasi 
materia sapientiae" ; S. V.F. iii, frag. 114 ; Epictetus, Diss. 
r, xxix, 2-3 and it, v, 1-8. 

« Cf. S.V.F. iii, p. 28, 27-28 and p. 30, 9-11 (=p. 251, 
35-38 [Antipater, frag. 52]) y where the coinage is ascribed 
to Antipater {cf. R. Philippson, Philol. Wochenschrift, lvi 
[19361, cols. 598-599); Cicero, De Finibus iii, 20 (S.V.F. 



(1071) vofMCL Xeyetv /cat ypdcf)€LV avrovs, ivSeiKvyfievovs rrjv 

ETAIP02. 'AvSpiKCOS jJL€V aTTOjl€jJiVrilJi6v€VKaS KCLL 

o Xeyovoi /cat cog Xeyovoi. 

AIAAOTM. S/coVet Se ore ravrd Trdaxovai TOLS 
rrjv OKidv vrrepdXXeadai rrjv eavrcov ecpcepLevois' ov 
yap arroXeiTTovaiv aAAa avfjLpLera(f>epovoc rrjv dro- 
7Tiav too Xoyop, TToppcordroo rcov evvoicov d(f)iara- 
fievrjv. cog yap el ro^evovra (j>airj res ovxl rrdvra 
C ttol€lv rd Trapa avrov 1 eW/ca rod fiaXelv rov gkottov 
aAAa eVe/ca rod rrdvra rroirjoai rd rrapd avrov, 2 al- 
viypbaaLV opboca /cat repdana ho^eiev dv nepaiveiv 
ovrcos oi r pine pur eXoi fiia^opievoi fir) to Tvyydvziv 
rcov Kara <f>vcriv rod aroxd^eaOai rcov Kara <j>voiv 
etvai reXos aAAa rd Xapifidveiv /cat 3 eKXeyeaOai 
pirjoe rrjv e<f>eaiv rrjs vyieias /cat hico^iv els rd vyi- 
aiveiv eKaorco reXevrav aAAa rovvavriov rd vyiai- 
veiv errl rrjv etfieaiv avrov /cat hico^iv dva(f>epeo9ai, 

1 Trap' avrov -Reiske (cf. 1071 a supra : -rrdvra rd -rrapd 
cavrov) ; nepl avrov -E, B. 

2 trap avrov -Reiske ; n€pl avrov -E, B. 

3 Kal -Pohlenz (cf. 1071 b supra : reXos . . . ro eVAcyea^at *ai 
Xafipdvecv) ; ro -E, B. 

iii, frag. 143). This paraphrase of Cicero's and hiSovrujv 
rcov 7rpayp,dra)v (S.V.F. iii, p. 251, 36) seem to support the 
interpretation of the ambiguous eVAexm/o; as " objective M 
(e.g. Rieth, Grundbegriffe, p. 98 and pp. 100-101) ; but 
according to Pohlenz (Stoa i, p. 187 sub finem) Antipater 
coined the term in order to emphasize the " subjective " 
character of the value given to rd Kara <f>voiv by selection, 
and there is support for this interpretation in such a text 
as Seneca, Epistle xcii, 11-13 ( k '. . . quid erit tunc in illis 
bonum ? hoc unum, bene eligi. . . . non in re bonum est sed 



think, is the very expression by which in their talk 
and their writing they indicate the distinction. 

comrade. You have done nobly in recalling both 
what they say and their way of saying it. 

diadumenus. Observe, however, that the same 
thing happens to them as to those who long to out- 
leap their own shadow : the absurdity which is 
furthest removed from the common conceptions is not 
outdistanced by their reasoning but is carried along 
with it. For, if someone should say that an archer 
in shooting does all that in him lies not for the pur- 
pose of hitting the mark but for the purpose of doing 
all that in him lies, a it would be thought that he was 
spinning some monstrous and enigmatic yarns ; and 
just so the babbling dotards who insist that in aiming 
at the things conforming with nature the goal is not 
the obtaining of the things conforming with nature 
but the accepting and selecting and that being 
healthy is not the end in which issue for each indi- 
vidual his desire and pursuit of health but on the 
contrary being healthy has reference to the desire 
and pursuit of it, who consider walks of a certain 

in electione quali. actiones nostrae honestae sunt, non ipsa 
quae aguntur. . . ."). For an attempt to reconcile the two 
interpretations cf. Goldschmidt, Le systeme stoicien, pp. 136- 
140, especially p. 140, n. 3 sub finem. 

a Cf. Cicero, De Finibus iii, 22 (S. V.F. iii, frag. 18) with 
M. Pohlenz, Hermes, lxxiv (1939), p. 24, n. 4. To Carneades, 
who had apparently used the example of the archer to prove 
that obtaining ra Kara <f>voLv must be the reXos, Antipater 
replied that even the archer achieves his t4\os when he 
shoots skilfully at his target (okottos), whether or not his 
arrow happens then to hit it. Cf. O. Rieth, Hermes, Ixix 
(1934), pp. 26-29 and pp. 32-37 ; W. Wiersma, lUpi reXovs 
(Groningen, 1937), pp. 71-75 ; Goldschmidt, Le systeme 
stoi'cien, pp. 145-146. 



(1071) irepnrdrovs rivds /cat dva(f>ojvrjtJ€is /cat rofias vrj 
Ata /cat <f>ap/JLaK€Las evXoyiorovs reXt] jroiovfievoi 
rrjs vytetag, ov^l rovrcov €K€ivr)v, opLoca Xrjpovot 
rco Xeyovrt 

SeiTrvtojAtv tva dvojjJLev, tVa Xovcofxeda. 

D fjL&XXov o' eKetvos 1 eltvOos Tt /cat vevopnopLevov dX- 
Xdrret /cat rapdrret 2 T7jv rd^tv, a (Se) 3 ovrot Xe- 
yovat rrjv iraoav e^ct rcov rrpayptarajv dvarpOTrrjv 
/cat ovyyyotv li ov 07Tov8d£,optev evKaipa>s Treptrra- 

T€LV €V€KOL TOV TT€TT€lP T7JV rpO(f)rjV dXXd (jT€TT€LV 

rrjv rpocf>'rjvy A eveKa rod neptirarelv evKatptos." 
tjttov /cat rrjv vytetav r) <f>vots rod eXXeftopov ydptv 
7T€7tol7]K€v, ov rrjs vytetas rdv eXXefiopov. ri yap 
dXXo KaraXetnerat avrois els vTrepfioXrjv rrapaSo^o- 
Xoyias rj rotavra Xrjpetv; ri yap otatf)epet rod Xe- 
yovros yeyovevat rr\v vytetav rcov cf>appLaKcov eveKa, 
pirj rd cj)dppLaKa rrjs vytetas, 6 rrjv eKXoyrjV rrjv 
E 7T€pl rd cf)dpjxaKa /cat ovvOeatv /cat ^prjotv avrcov 
aipera>repav irotcov rrjs vytetas, p,dXXov oe rrjv ptev 

1 eKetvos -Meziriac ; eKtivo -E, B. 

2 rapdrret -Reiske ; Trapd -E, B. 

3 <8c> -added by Meziriac. 

4 <. . .> -added by Wyttenbach (implied by the versions 
of Amyot and Xylander) ; dXXd IW/ca (without lacuna) -E, B. 

a See Plutarch, De Tuenda Sanitate 133 f and Aristotle, 
Physics 194 b 32-33 {cf. Anal. Post. 94 b 8-9 and Meta- 
physics 1013 a 32-35). 

6 Plutarch, De Tuenda Sanitate 130 a-f ; Galen, De 
Sanitate Tuenda v, 10, 41-44 (p. 158, 22-34 [Koch]) ; Caelius 
Aurelianus, Tard. Pass, i, 37 and 164 and ii, 93. 

c The relation of medicine to health had been used as an 



kind" and vocal exercises 6 and, yes by heaven, 
surgical operations and rational uses of drugs to be 
the goals of health, not this the goal of those, they 
are talking foolishness like that of the character who 

Let's feast that we may sacrifice, that we may bathe. d 
Or rather that character alters something customary 
and conventional in that he upsets its order, (where- 
as) what these people say involves the utter over- 
throw and ruin of the facts : " Our concern is not to 
take a walk at the right time for the purpose of 
digesting our food but <(to digest our food) for the 
purpose of taking a walk at the right time." Nature 
also, no doubt, has created health for the sake of 
hellebore, not hellebore for the sake of health. In 
fact, to achieve the ultimate paradoxically what else 
remains for them except to make such silly state- 
ments ? For what is the difference between one 
who asserts that health has come to be for the sake 
of drugs, not drugs for the sake of health and one 
who more than health makes the selection of the 
drugs and their composition and use an object of 
choice or rather holds that health is not an object of 

example by Carneades in attacking the Stoic doctrine of 
the rcXos (Cicero, De Finibus v, 16) ; and the analogy had 
been rejected by the Stoics, who insisted that the relation 
to the reAo? is quite different for prudence, the art of living, 
from what it is for such an art as medicine (De Finibus iii, 
24-25 and 39). Aristotle had already stated that, since an 
incurable patient can receive excellent medical treatment, 
the function of the medical art cannot be identical with 
making the patient healthy (Rhetoric 1355 b 12-14 and 
Topics 101 b 5-10; cf. Cicero, De Invent tone i, 6 and 
Quintilian, Instit. Oral, ii, 17, 28-26). 
d Vomica Adespota y frag. 461 (Koek). 



(1071) ov8e oXws 1 alperov r)yovfJL€vos iv Se rfj rrepl e/ceiva 
7rpayfJLar€La to reXos Tidefievos /cat ttjv efacnv oltto- 
(f>aivo)v (reXosY rrjs reviews, ov ttjs ifieaetos ttjv 
t€v£lv; u rfj yap €(j>€oei vrj Ata to evXoyioTcos /cat 

TO (jypOVipLOJS TTpooeOTl." TTOLVV jJL€V OVV , <f)rjGOfl€V, 

av a>9 rrpos TtXos opa* ttjv Tev^iv cbv 8icok€l /cat 


tolc, TravTa 7tolovo7]s eve/ca tov Tvyelv ov Tvyelv ov 


F 27. (JlLi7T€i8rj §') 4 ivTCLvOa <Vou) 5 Xoyov yeyova- 
jjl€v, tl aV 6 <f>aLif)s fA&XXov elvat 7rapa ttjv evvoiav Tj 
to fir} XafiovTas evvocav dyadov [xr^Se 7 a^ovTa? €<^t€- 
adat TayaOov /cat SiwKecv; opqs* yap otl /cat Xpw- 


ttjv dnopiav, oj$ t&v Trpay/xaTajv (ov oiSoVtojv) 10 

1 ov86\a>s -E, B. 

2 <T«r'Aos> -added by Meziriac (implied by Xylander's ver- 
sion) ; rrjs reviews <t4Xos> -Reiske. 

3 Meziriac (implied by the versions of Amyot and 
Xylander) ; opdv -E, B. 

*<...> -supplied by Wyttenbach (implied by Amyot's 
version) ; ianv . . . vac. 9 -E, 10 -B (at the end of line) . . . 

6 <to£> -added by Kronenberg (Mnemosyne, N.S. lii 
[1924], p. 106). 

6 ti av -Madvig (Adversaria Critica, p. 18) ; -ndv -E, B. 

7 fATjSc -Stephanus ; Se firj -E, B. 

8 6 pa -Meziriac. 

9 [fi&XXov] -deleted by Wyttenbach ; but cf. Kolfhaus, 
Plutarchi De Comm. Not., pp. 56-57 and De Stoic. Repug. 
1054 c supra. 

10 <. . .> -added by Bernardakis (cf. 1072 a Infra [. . . 
€7TivoLav aitTTJs ov olbtooi]) ; Ttov 7Tpayixaro)v rrjv -E, B. 

a Health is among to. npwTa Kara <f>voiv and is X-qirrov, not 
alperov : see 1060 n-c supra and S. V.F. iii, frags. 141 and 


choice at all a but supposes the goal to reside in 
occupation with the drugs and declares desire to 
be <^the goal) of attainment, not attainment that 
of desire ? " Yes, by heaven," (they say) " for de- 
sire has as its attribute ' rationally/ that is ' pru- 
dently.' " h By all means, we shall say, if it regards 
the attainment and possession of what it pursues as 
related to the goal c ; but otherwise its rationality is 
annulled, for it does anything and everything for the 
purpose of obtaining what it is neither grand nor 
blissful to obtain. 

27. <(And since) we have come to this point in the 
argument, what would you say is more at odds with 
the common conception than the proposition that 
men, without having grasped or got a conception of 
good, desire the good and pursue it ? Because you 
see that this is rather the perplexity to which 
Chrysippus also reduces Ariston/* on the ground that 
the objects e (do not provide) for getting the notion 

b This means not only that what the Stoics regard as 
re'Aos is rational €<f>ccn$ rather than any or all fycais but 
primarily that " rationally " characterizes " to desire " and 
not " to attain," so that, since this " rationally," which is to 
say " prudently," distinguishes the re'Aos, they are right in 
regarding the Te'Ao? as escorts, i.e. as to cuAoyioTctv iv rats . . . 
cVAoycus (1072 c infra) and to cKXeytadai . . . <f>povipLQ)s (1071 
B supra) and not as to Tvyyavziv tojv Kara <f>vaiv (1071 c 
supra). For l^eois cf. Simplicius, Phys., p. 303, 30-31 (t6 ou 
rj €<f>€ats t 07T€p okottov oi v€U)Ttpoi koXovoiv . . .) and [Alex- 
ander], Quaest. Moral., p. 142, 26-30 (Bruns). 

c See 1072 c infra : IkXojt] 6" ovk eoriv cuAoyioTos rj <^t]> 
npos Tt yevofievT) tcAo?. 

d S. V.F. iii, frag. 26 (p. 9, 5-1 1). See for Ariston and the 
attacks on him by Chrysippus De Stoic. Repug. 1031 d (with 
note d there) and & V.F. iii, frag. 27 (p. 9, 12-17). 

' See not© d on De Stoic. Repug. 104-8 a and 8. V.F. ii, 
p. 48, 19-20. 



(1071) rrjv TTpos to [irvr dyadov fja/jre kolkov aSta<f)opiav 

€7nvorjaai rdyadov Kal rod kolkov purj upoernvor]- 

devrajv ovtojs yap avrrjs 1 <$>av€lodai rrjv dota<£o- 

piav Trpov<f>LCTTap,€V7]v , el vorjow jjlzv avrrjs ovk ecrrc 

1072 Xa^elv fir) rrporepov rdyadov vorjdevros dXXo S' ov- 

Sev dAA' avrr) {jlovov rdyadov io~rw. Wl Se /cat 

GKortei rr]v €/c rrjs Uroas ravrrjv dpvovpLevrjv dSta- 

(f)opiav KaXovjxevrjv 8e ofioXoylav, ottojs 8r) /cat otto- 

dev rrapia^ev avrrjv 2 dyadov vorjdrjvai. el yap 

rdyadov x oj P^ °^ K £° rrl vorjoai rrjv rrpos to fxr) 

dyadov doia^opiav, en fxaXXov r) rcov dyadcov <f>p6- 

vtjois errivoiav avrrjs 3 ov BlScocn rots dyadov fxr) 

Trpoevvorjaaaiv . dAAd toarrep vytetvcov /cat vooeptov 

ri)(yr]s ov yiyverai vorjcns ols f.irj rrporepov avrtov 

£k€lvojv yiyovzV) ovtojs dyadcov Kal /ca/ca>v em- 

orrjLtrjs ovk k'oriv k'vvoiav Xafielv jxr) rdyo£d Kal 

B rd /ca/cd rrpoevvorjaavras . 

1 Wyttenbach ; avrrjs -E, B. 

2 Wyttenbach ; avrr)v -E, B ; avrov -Aldine ; avro -Basil. 

3 Wyttenbach ; avrrjs -E ; avrols -B. 

a Cf. Marcus Aurelius, xi, 16 : ... ovhsv avrtov (sciL ratv 
dhia<j>6pcov) imo\r)ipiv 7T€pl avrov r)puv ifATroiei . . . r)fi€ts Se iopi€v 
oi rds tr€p\ avrtov Kplaeis yevvcovrcs .... 

6 i.e. if the preceding statement, rcov -npay^drcov . . . rrpo^vi- 
vo-qdcvrcov, be granted, as Ariston is presumed to have 
granted it (cf. S. V.F. i, frag. 374 for Ariston on imarr]p.ri 
dyaQcov koX KaKtov). 

As Ariston did assert that d8ia<£opta is the t&os and the 
only good (S. V.F. i, frags. 351, 360, and 362). 

d If dpvovfidvrjv is thus taken as passive, then just as ro 
yivos rcov dpvovfidvcov e-nalvtov (Quomodo Adulator ab Amino 
Internoscatur 58 a) is adulation though denied to be such 



of indifference to what is neither good nor evil if 
there has not been a prior notion of the good and 
the evil, a for thus b the state of indifference would 
obviously have subsistence prior to itself, if a con- 
ception of it cannot be had without prior conception 
of the good but only itself and nothing else is the 
good. c Come now and consider this that the Stoa 
denies is indifference d and calls consistency. How 
and whence did it ever come to provide the con- 
ception that it is itself good ? For, if apart from the 
good it is not possible to conceive indifference to 
what is not good, a fortiori prudence about things 
good e does not provide a notion of itself for those 
who have not had a prior conception of good ; but 
just as a conception of skill about things salubrious 
and unhealthy does not occur to men to whom there 
has not previously occurred a conception of these 
things themselves f so it is not possible for men to 
get a conception of knowledge about things good 
and evil without having had a prior conception of the 
things that are good and the things that are evil. 

so it is here implied that the reAos of the Stoa, though 
called ofioXoyla (see 1069 c supra with note a there), is 
despite all protestations really dSia<£opi'a, an insinuation 
which might have been speciously supported by occasional 
obiter dicta (cf. Epictetus, Diss, n, v, 20 ; Marcus Aurelius, 
vii, 31 and xi, 16). It is possible, however, that dpvovfievrjv 
is not passive and that Plutarch means ". . . this Stoic 
principle which disowns indifference and is called con- 

* For the objective genitive with foovycris cf. Aristotle, 
De Sensu 437 a 2-3 (17 tc tcov vo^tcov . . . <f>p6vr}ois ko.1 j) tojv 


f See 1066 e-f supra and Sextus, Adv. Math, xi, 186-187, 
where the same argument is used against the existence of 
Stoic <f>p6vr]ms. 


(1072) ETAIP02. 1 Ti ovv dyadov euriv; 

AIAAOYM. Ovhkv dXX Tj (f) pOVTjO LS . 

ETAIP02. Tt 8e rj <f>p6vrjacs ; 

aiaaotm. OvSev aAA' r) dyadtov imcm/jiiT/. 

ETA1P02. rioAug O0V O AtOS KoptV#09 €771 TOV 

Xoyov avrwv dcfnKrai. 

aiaaotm. 2 Trjv yap virepov 7repirpo7Tr)v, Iva firj 


ofjLOiov €K€lvco ndOos KareiXrj(f)€. <f>aiverai yap els 
ttjv rdyadov vorjaiv avrrjv vofjaai 8e6/xevos (f>po- 
vr\oiv (rrjv 8' av <f>p6vr)Givy 3 ev rfj Trepl rdyadov 
tpqr&v votj(J€l Kal irpo rrjs irepas dvayKa^o/Jtevos 
del ttjv erepav ScwKeiv <X77 oXenj 6 jxevos 8e eKarepas 
rep irpo avrrjs voovfievov* SeiaOai rod X^P^ vorj- 
dijvai firj Svvafievov . Kal Kar dXXov Se rporrov 
C eon rrjv ovKeri 8iaarpo<j>r)v dAA' €Karpo(f>r)v avrwv 
rod Xoyov Kal aTraya)yr)v reXecos els ro paqhev Kara- 
fiadetv. ovoiav rdyadov ridevrai rrjv evXoyiorov 

1 The distribution of questions and answers here was 
made by Wyttenbach. Madvig objected {Adversaria 
Critica, p. 670), and Pohlenz gave both questions and 
answers to Diadumenus, who thus speaks without interrup- 
tion down to IIoAus o$v . . . 

2 Pohlenz has Diadumenus recommence here ; but Sand- 
bach (Class. Quart., xxxv [1941], p. 116) has the comrade 
continue through Zaoov and makes Diadumenus begin with 
Katrot . . . 

3 <. . .> -added by Bernardakis ; <at>Tr)v 8e r-qv <f>p6i>r]aiv> 
-Meziriac after Amyot's version. 

4 voou/xcvou -H. C. ; vooif/icvoj -E, B ; toj <to> irpo auTTjs 
voovfievov -Wyttenbach ; rep <np6s to> 7rpo avrrjs voovp.zvov 

a For 4>p6vqais is identical with cvoaifiovia (De Stoic. Repug. 
1046 e) and with apery (De Stoic. Repug. 1034 c-d), whicli 



comrade. What, then, is good ? 

diadumenus. Nothing but prudence. 

comrade. And what is prudence ? 

diadumenus. Nothing but knowledge of goods. 6 

comrade. So " Corinthus, Zeus's son," c has come 
with a rush upon their doctrine. 

diadumenus. Yes, for, lest you seem to scoff, leave 
out " the pestle's endless roundabout," d although 
it is a condition like that in which their doctrine is 
involved, since it is obvious that for the conception 
of the good it needs to conceive prudence itself <(but) 
seeks (prudence again) in the conception of the good 
and that it is compelled always to pursue the one 
before the other and falls short of either by needing 
that conceived before it which cannot be conceived 
apart from it/ There is another way also of dis- 
cerning in their doctrine that which goes beyond dis- 
tortion and is dislocation and complete reduction of 
it to nullity. They suppose f the rational selection 

alone is good (see 1064 b supra and S.V.F. iii, pp. 154, 6 
and 165, c 2l). 

b See 1066 d supra with note d there. Cf. Plato, Republic 
505 b 6-c 5 : there are those who say that the good is 
<f>povr]ois but who, when asked to say what (frpovrjois, can say 
only <f>povr)OLS dyadov. 

c Proverbial for '* the eternal refrain," " the same old 
story over and over again/' Cf. Pindar, Semean vii, 105 ; 
Plato, Eathydemus 292 e ; Leutseh, Corpus Paroem, Graec, 
i, p. 63 (no. 21). 

d Cf. Plato, Theaetetus 209 d 8~i: 4; Leutseh, Corpus 
Paroem. Graec. i, p. 168 (no. 25). 

* For the construction, voou/xevou Seiaflai tou . . . fir) bwa- 
jicvou, cf. De Stoic. Repug. 1057 a-b (01) ovyKaTarid€fi€vcov . . . 
8co/x€voi;s rjfiayv dXXd TrparrovTcov . . .), Conjugalia Praecepta 
143 b (. . . a»? heofievas avraiv fiorjdovvTcuv), and 1085 D-E infra 
(. . . dipos SeiTai avviaravTOS avrr)v . . .). 

' S.V.F. iii, p. 253, 8-11 (Antipater, frag. 59). 



(1072) eKXoyrjv tcov Kara (/>vglv eKXoyrj S' ovk €gtlv ev- 
Xoyioros r) (ju^) 1 rrpos tl yevofxevrj TeXos, cos rrpo- 
eiprjTcu. tl ovv tovt Igtlv ; ovSev dXXo, (/hmjlv, fj 

TTptoTov fjLev ovv ot^eTaL koX OLa7T€.<f)evyeV Tj eVVOLCL 
Tayadov* to yap evXoyioTclv ev tolls eKXoyats ov\i- 


TeXos S* ovk dvev tolvttjs avayKa^opLevoL voexv, 
D oLTToXeLTropLeda ttjs apL(f)OLv vorjoecos. eWtra, o peel- 


eKXoyrjv dyadcov e8eL koll co<f>eXipLCov Kal Gvvepycov 
rrpos to TeXos eKXoyrjv etvar to yap CKXeyeadaL tol 
pnyre ovpL(/)€povTa p,rjTe TLpLLa pjrjff oXcos aipeTa ttcos 
evXoyLOTOV ioTtv ; eGTCo yap, cbs aurot XeyovGLV, 
evXoyLOTos eKXoyrj tcov a^iav eypvTcov upos to ev- 
SaLpLovelv Spa to'lvvv cos els rrdyKaXov tl Kal Gepi- 
vov avTols 6 Xoyos e^rjKeL K€(f>dXaLOV. €gtl yap, cos 


Xoyfj tcov dgiav eypvTcov rrpos to evXoyLGTelv. 
ETAIP02. AAAa ovtcogl 2 pcev olkovovtl tcov ovo- 


E (jypa^opbevov in 8e Seo/xat pLaOelv ttcos tovto ovp- 


aiaaotm. YlpooeKTeov ovv gol pbdXXov. ov yap 

1 <fif)> -added by Meziriac ; rj 'rrpos -E, B. 
2 ovrcoal -Wyttenbacb ; ovtoj ooi -E, 1». 

° 1071 e supra. 

h Cf. S. V.F. iii, frag. 512 (. . . rov oocj>6v . . . zvXoyioTov . . . 
oltto e^eco? Kal SiaOeocos evXoyiorov). For the relation of e£t? 
and ivdpyeta cf. S. V.F. ii, p. 130, 7-8 and iii, p. 57, 35- 
37 (with Epictetus, Diss, it, xviii, 1-7 and in, xxv, 8) : 
and for avfX7TTOjfia cf. S. V.F. iii, p. 49, 12-14. 



of the things that are in conformity with nature to be 
the essence of the good ; but, as was said before, a a 
selection is not rational which has (not) been made 
relative to some goal. What, then, is this ? Nothing 
else, they say, but rational behaviour in the acts of 
selecting the things that are in conformity with 
nature. Well then, in the first place the conception 
of the good has gone and fled, for rational behaviour 
in the acts of selecting is, I presume, an occurrence 
proceeding from a habitude, rationality. 6 Con- 
sequently, since in conceiving this we are compelled 
to start from the goal and in conceiving the goal not 
to leave this out, we fall short of the conception of 
both. Then, what is more, in strict reason the 
rational selection ought to be a selection of things 
good and beneficial and conducive to the goal, for 
w r hat is rational about selecting things that are not 
useful or valuable or objects of choice at all ? For 
grant that it is, as they say themselves, 6 rational 
selection of the things that have value for being 
happy ; then observe that the sum total reached by 
their calculation is something exceedingly fair and 
grand, for what is the goal according to them, it 
seems, is rational behaviour in the selection of the 
things that have value for rational behaviour. 

comrade. Nay, at first hearing of the words, com- 
rade, the formulation does strike one as something 
terribly strange ; but I still need to learn how this 
result comes about. 

diadumenus. You must attend more closely, then, 

c S. V.F. iii, p. 253, 12-18 (Antipater, frag. 59), only lines 
14-16 of which should be printed as a " fragment M of Anti- 
pater's. Of. W. Wiersma, ITepi tc'Aous- (Groningen, 1937), 
p. 71. 



(1072) rod tvxovtos iarlv alviypa 1 avvUvai. aVoue Sij 
/cat arroKpivov. ap* ovv t£Xos earl k<zt' olvtovs 2 

TO* €l)\oyL(TT€LV €V TOLLS €AcAoyatS TO)V KCLTO, (f)VOLV; 

ETAIP02. Aeyovotv* ovtcjds. 

aiaaoym. Ta. 8e Kara <f>vocv norepov 5 ojs ay add 
eKXeyovrac fj co? a^ias tlvols eyovra fj npoayojyds 

<(K<It) 6 TOVTO 7Tp6? TO TcAo9 T) ITpOS £T€p6v Tl TOJV 


ETAIP02. Ov vopi^oj, dXXa rrpos reXos- 
aiaaotm. "HS77 roivvv aTTOKaXvi/jas opa to ovjx- 
fSalvov avrois, ore reXos iarl to €vXoyioT€iv ev rats 
etcXoyals rcov d£Lav €x6vtojv rrpos to evXoyiareiv' 
dXXrjv yap ovalav Tayadov /<rat ttjs ^v^aipiovias 
ovt ex eiv <f>acrlv ovt€ voelv oi dvopes rj tt]v ttoXv- 
F TijLt/rjTov tvXoyiOTiav TavTrjv irepl ras CKAoya? tojv 
d£iav eypvTuyv. dXXa tovto pu4v eloiv ol rrpos 
5 AvTcnarpov olopbevoc Xeyeadai pur) rrpos ttjv aipe- 
glv €K€lvov yap vrro KapvedSov me^ofievov els 
TavTas KaTa8v€o6ai 7 tcls evpTjoiXoylas* 

1 tort <to> alvcy^a -R. G. Bury (Pohlenz, Moral la vi/3, 
p. c 224). 2 kolt* avrovs -Basil. ; Kara rovs -E, B. 

3 to -E ; omitted by B, Basil. 

4 E, B (vras superscript over vow -B 1 ) ; Xiyovras -Aldine, 
Basil. 5 7TpoT€pov -E, B (tto superscript over npo -B 1 ). 

6 <Kal> -supplied by Xylander ; irpoayojyds . . . vac. 3 
-E, 4- -B . . . tovto', <; ct 8c> -Kronenberg (Mnemottyttf, 
3 Ser. x [1042], p. 43) ; <; KTAIPOS. 'tis e'xorra npoaytoyds. 
Aiaaoym. Kat> -Wyttenbach. 

7 Wyttenbach (Index Graec. Plutarch /, KaTabvw and 
KaTaXvoj) ; KaraXvecdai -E, B. 

8 €vpT)GiXoyias -cf. 1070 f supra, De Stoic, llepug. 1038 b, 
and L. Dindorf in Stephanus, Thes. Ling. Graec. s.v. evpeai- 
Xoyeto ; evpcoiXoyias -E ; cvpeoioXoylas -B. 

a Cf. 1072 c supra. 

6 Wyttenbach's longer supplement, adopted by Pohlenz, 



for it is a riddle not to be read by just anybody. 
Listen now, and answer. Isn't the goal according to 
them rational behaviour in the acts of selecting the 
things that are in conformity with nature ? a 

comrade. So they say. 

uiadumenus. And the things that are in conformity 
with nature, do they select them on the ground that 
they are good or on the ground that they have certain 
values or advantages (and) b that relative to the goal 
or to some entity other than the goal ? 

comrade. Not to anything else, I believe, but to 
the goal. 

diadumenus. Well then, look at their predicament, 
for you have already revealed it : the goal is rational 
behaviour in the acts of selecting the things that 
have value for rational behaviour, for the gentlemen 
deny c having or conceiving any essence of the good 
or happiness other than this highly prized rationality 
about the acts of selecting the things that have value. 
But there are those who think that this argument is 
directed against Antipater and not against the Stoic 
system, for, they say, it is he who under pressure from 
Carneades takes cover in these verbal ingenuities. d 

is wrong, as is proved by the fact that Diadumenus on the 
basis of the reply to his question says . . . twv df lav ixovrojv 
npos ... In other words, f) npoaycoyds here is not an alter- 
native to a£Las but an explication of it ; cf. S. V.F. iii, p. 
35, 15-19 : rd otVeta <kcu> npo-qyfieva teal cvxprjora teal d£iav 
^ovra . . . npos rt nporJKTai koli . . . 8ia rovro Aeyerou kcu irpo- 
rjxOat npos ro tc'Aos ko1 t} npoaycoyr) avrthv 8t)Aov ms ovvepyel 
npos €u8aifi,oviav (which the Stoics denied, of course, as they 
denied that the objects of selection are dyadd [rf. S. V.F. iii, 
p. 31, 10-22]). 

c S. V.F. iii, p. 253, 19-23 (Antipater, frag. 59). 

d See note 6 on 1069 c supra. The expression, elmv . . . 
oi npos ' ' AvTinarpov olofxevot, . . ., which according to von 



(1072) 28. Ttov 8e 7T€pl epojros (f)tXoao(f)OVfX€vcov iv rfj 
TtToa rrapd ras kowols ivvoias rrjs aroma? ttolgiv 
1073 aureus- fxerearcv. aloxpovs fiev yap eki tovs 
vlovs, <f>avXovs y ovrag koli clvotjtovs, kolXovs Se 
tovs oo<f)ovs' €K€lvu)v Se tcov koXcov pnqheva [iryr 
ipaoOat, jjLTjT a^tepaorov elvai. koX ov tovto ttco 
Seivov, dXXd koll tovs epaodevTas aloxpa>v nave- 
g6 ai Xeyovoi koXlov yevopievcov. kolI tis epcora 
yiyvtooKei tolovtov, os a/xa aoj/xaro? uo^^pi'a 
^pLoxOrjpiasy 1 i/wxfjs ftXe7ropLevr}s 2 ovvex CTaL /cat 
avoLTTTeTdi 3 kolXXovs Se a/xa cppovrjoei /xera St- 
kcuoovv7]s koli oa)cf>poovvr]s iyyiyvopievov Kara- 
ofSevvvTai koX aVo/xapaiWrai ; ovs pL7]8ev oiopiai tcov 

KOJVW7TO)V 8ia(j)€p€LV' X a ^P oV(Jl Y a p XdjXTTrj KOLL 6'£ft, 
TOV 8e TTOTlflOV KOLI XP^VTOV OLVOV (X7707T€T0jLteV0t (j)ev- 

B yovGiv. rjv 8e XeyovTes koX ovofid^ovTes epicf>aoiv 
kolXXovs enaycoyov elvai tov epcoTos Xeyovai, 7rpa>- 
tov pL€v ovk k'x^i to Tridavov iv yap ata^iarots koL 

1 <fioxOr)plas> -added by Pohlenz. 

2 pXcnofjLcvrfs -Pohlenz ; pXcrrofievrj -E, B. 

3 ava.7TT€Tai -Pohlenz ; dycrai -E ; ytWrat -B. 

Arnim (S.V.F. i, p. xn) proves that Plutarch " argumenta 
ab aliis tradita et accepta prodit," is a concession which 
suggests that Plutarch himself thought or wished to think 
the argument relevant against the whole Stoic system. 
Bonhoffer contended (Die Ethik . . ., p. 181, n. 1) that in 
any case the restriction was meant to apply only to the 
polemic against the last formulation ascribed to the Stoics, 
cvXoytGTos eKXoyr) . . . tt/oos" to evhaLfioveiv (107:2 d). Schafer's 
contention (Ein fruhmittehtoisches System, p. 998) that 
WvTLTraTpov is a mistake made in ignorance by Plutarch's 
source and that it should have been AioyeVvj is merely an 
attempt to make the evidence fit his own historical hyoothesis. 
a S.V.F. iii, frag. 719 (p. 181, 3-9). See Sto'icos Ab- 



28. All members of the school, however, are in- 
volved in the absurdity of the philosophical tenets of 
the Stoa that are at odds with the common concep- 
tions on the subject of love. For their position is a 
that, while the young are ugly, since they are base 
and stupid, and the sages are fair, none of these who 
are fair is either loved or worth loving. And this is 
not yet the awful part. They say further that, when 
the ugly have become fair, those who have been in 
love with them stop. Now, who recognizes love like 
this, which at the sight of {depravity) of soul to- 
gether with depravity of body is kindled and sus- 
tained and at the birth in them of beauty together 
with prudence accompanied by justice and sobriety 
wastes away and is extinguished ? Lovers like that, 
I think, do not differ at all from gnats, for they delight 
in scum and vinegar but palatable and fine wine they 
fly from and avoid. 5 And in the first place there is 
no plausibility in their assertion c that love is incited 
by what in their terminology they call a semblance 
of beauty/ for in the very ugly and very vicious a 

surdiora Poetis Dicer e 1057 f — 1058 a supra with the notes 
there ; Zeller, Phil. Griech., III/l, p. 291, n. 2 \ Bonhoffer, 
Epictet und die Stoa, pp. 288-290 ; Pohlenz, Stoa ii, p. 76 
(lines 3-16); D. Babut, Rev. Et. Grecques, lxxvi (1963), 
pp. 55-63 and especially pp. 61-63. 

b Qf, Quaest. Conviv. 663 d and Aristotle, Hist. Animal. 
535 a 14; in Stoicos Absurdiora Poetis Dicer e 1058 a it 
is with KavOapot that the Stoic love is compared. 

c S.V.F. iii, frag. 719 (p. 181, 9-13). 

d Cf. in the Stoic definition of love Sia kolXXous €fi(f>a(Hv= 
olo. KaXXos 4fjL(f)aLv6fM€vov (S. V.F. iii, p. 180, 18 and 34-35 with 
p. 164, 10-11 [ex pulchritudinis specie]). For €fx<j>aais cf. 
S. V.F. ii, p. 24, 20-21 (etol Se tcov (fxivracncov kcli efufxicreis, at 
u)S av a-no virapxovTOjv yiyo/zevai) with Bonhoffer, Epictet und 
die Stoa, pp. 159 and 164 and Epictetus, Diss, ir, xi, 15. 



(1073) kolklotois ovk dv €jjL<f)a(ns yevoiro KaXXovs, eL7Tep y 
d)9 Xeyovaiv, rj (jLoxOrjpia rod rjdovs dvan ifiTTXrjcrt 

TO elSoS. €7T€LTa KOfJLtSfj TTapd TTjV eWOldv 1 €OTlV 

a^tepaorov elvai rov aloxpov on /xeAAet ttot€ Kal 
Trpoaho Karat 2 kolXXos €^€iv KTrjcrafxevov Se rovro 
Kal yevopbevov koX6v KayaOov vtto iir\o€v6s ipa- 

ETAIPOS. Q-qpa yap ri?, <f>aaiv, eorlv 6 eptos 
dreXovs fiev €v<j>vovs 8e [xeipaKtov rrpos dperrjv. 

aiaaotm. Efra, c5 PeXriare, nparropiev dXXo vvv 
C rj rrjv alpeatv avrtov iXeyxofxev out€ iriOavols rrpdy- 
\iaoiv ovf? djpuXripLevois ovo/iaac rag Koivas e/c- 
arpi<f>ovoav tj/jlwv Kal Trapa^La^ofjievrjv evvoias ; 
ovSelg yap rjv 6 kojXvojv rrjv irepl rovs vdov? tojv 
ao(f>(x)v GTTOvorjv, el 7rddos avrfj p,rj Trpooeori, Or/pav 
rj (f)iXo7Touav z 7TpoaayopevofjL€vrjv . 4 €pa>ra 8' (e'Set) 5 
KaXtiv ov 7rdvT€s dvdpa)7Toi Kal uaoai voovoi Kal 
ovo/jLaCovat 6 ' 

(jTavres S' rjprjaavro napaiy Xexeeaac KXiOrjva^ 

1 Wyttenbach ; inel Kop,ibrj irapa tivojv olov -E, B. 

2 E ; /xc'AAet koX npoaSoKdrat, irore -B. 

3 <t>i\o7roilav -Rasmus (Prog. 1872, p. 19) ; faXonaibtiav -E, 

4 rrpooayopeveiv -Hartman (De Plutarcho, p. (50S) but cf. 
Praecepta Oerendae Reipublicae 818 a (/ccuAuW e^afiaprdvov- 

* 8' <€$«> -Wyttenbach ; U -E, B. 

6 di>o/xa£oucri <, olov to> -Wyttenbach ; ovo/ia£ouai <, cos 
"Qfir)pos> -Pohlenz. 

7 <. . .> -supplied by Wyttenbach from Odyssey i, 366 ; 
ovoixd^ovat . . . vac. 20 -E, 24 -B . . . Ac^c'ecron. 

8 KXrjdijvaL -E, B ; corrected by Stephanus. 

a S.V.F. hi, frag. 719 (p. 181, 14-15); cf. S.V.F. iii, 
p. 180, 30-31. See also Plutarch, Amatorius 751 a (cfr 


semblance of beauty could not appear if in fact, as 
they say, depravity of character defiles the outward 
form. In the second place, it is utterly at odds with 
the common conception for the ugly person to be 
worth loving because he is going to have beauty some 
day and is expected to get it but to be loved by no 
one once he has got it and has become handsome 
and virtuous. 

comrade. Yes, for love, they say, a is a kind of 
chase after a stripling who is undeveloped but natur- 
ally apt for virtue. b 

diadumenus. Why then, my dear sir, are we now 
trying to do anything else but convict their system 
of doing violence to our common conceptions and 
turning them inside out with implausible facts and 
unfamiliar terms ? For there was nobody trying to 
keep the zeal of sages about young men from being 
called a " chase " or " making friends " c if passion 
is not part of it ; but one (ought) to call " love " 
what all men and women understand and call by the 
name : 

<(A11 of them hotly desired) to be couched <by her side) 
in the bride-bed d 

"Rpcog yvqoios 6 rraihtKos lariv . . . avrov oif/€i . . . ncpl drjpav 
vimv . . . €yK€\ev6fjL€VOV irpos dperrjv rots d£iois tTrt/xcAcias") ; and 
for the earlier use of the figure cf. C. J. Classen, JJnter- 
suchungen zu Platons Jagdbildern (Berlin, 1960), especially 
pp. 5-6, 11-13, 24, and 29. 

b Cf. S. V.F. i, frag. 248 (. . . -rdv vecov rcov iin^aivovruiv 
hid rov cihovs rr)v irpos dperrjv cvcfrvtav) and with this the words 
of Plutarch (Amatorius 767 b), ttoisiv e^aatv eu^tuas rrpos 


c €7nf}o\r) ^iXoTTouas {cf. S.V.F. iii, p. 96, 18 and 29, 
p. 97, 2-3 and 33-34, p. 164, 3-4 and 10 [" conatum amicitiae 
faciendae "], p. 180, 18). 

d Odyssey i, 366 and xviii, 213. 



(1073) </cat 

ov yap TnoTTore u a>oe ueas) epos ovoe yvvat- 

(BvyLovY ^ VL vrrjOecroi Trepnrpoxvdels eSdpLaaaev. 

29. EtV rocavra fxevroL rrpdypbara rov tj6lkov 
Xoyov 6/cj8dAAovT€9 4 

IXiKrd KovSev 5 vytes dXXd ttclv Trepit; 
evreXi^ovoi (rovs d'AAous) 6 /cat hiaovpovaw, ojs 8r] 
fiovoi ttjv cj)voLV /cat ovvrjdeiav opOovvres fj XPV Ka ^ 
D KaQioravres 1 rov Xoyov d'AA' diroorpefeiv /cat in- 
dyeiv* rats icfyeaeac /cat Stoj^ecrt /cat opfxats 7Tpos to 
oIk€iov eKCLorov. rj Se ovvqdeia rfjs SiaXeKTiKrjs 
Siepa/xa 9 yiyvojievrj xprjorov fiev ovSev ov8e vyies 
a7ToXeXavK€v, dXXd ajonep aKorj voocoSrjs vtto /ce- 
vlqv tjx ojv SvcrqKotas /cat doacjieias euTreVA^crrar 
7T€pl rjs avdis irepav dpxyv Xafiovres, el fiovXet, 
StaAe£d/ze0a. 10 vvvl Se rov <f>voiKov olvtojv Xoyov, 
ox>x tjttov rod ire pi reXcov Siarapdrrovra rag /cot- 

1 <. . .> -supplied by Wyttenbach from Iliad xiv, 315; 
KXrjdrjvai . . . vac. 15 -E, 16 -B . . . Zpws. 

2 €pws -E, B ; corrected by Stephanus. 

3 <. . .> -supplied by Stephanus from Iliad xiv, 316 ; 
yvvaiKos . . . vac. 5 -E, 9 -B . . . evl. 

4 E ; cKfidXAov -B ; i^dXXovres (?) -Pohlenz, but cf. Eu- 
ripides, Cyclops 20 and Plato, Politicus 298 b 5-6. 

6 Diibner ; /cat ovBcv -E, B. 

6 <tovs dXXovs> -added by Wyttenbach after Xylander's 
version ; <eu /iaAa rovs aAAous> cvrcAijJouai -Pohlenz. 

7 Wyttenbach ; /cafltWavTat -E, B. 

8 Apelt (Philologus, lxii [1903], p. 288); dXXd d-noorptyti 
/cat eVayet -E, B ; 09 djxa (a/xa -Wyttenbach) dirooTpifai /cat 
cVayet -Madvig {Adversaria Critica, p. 670). 

9 Wyttenbach ; 8t€pd fxev -E, B. 

10 Aldine, Basil. ; hiaX^w^da -E, B. 




Come, for never before) hath desire <of a goddess) or 

Thus overwhelmed the <(heart) in my breast and reduced 

it to bondage. 

29. Yet, while casting the theory of morals off 
upon troubles like this 

Twisted, unsound, arid all circuitous, 6 
they belittle and disparage <the rest of us) as if they 
alone uphold nature and common experience c as it 
must be done and alone put reason in a position to 
avert all else d and to bring each man by his desires 
and pursuits and impulses to that which is naturally 
congenial/ Common experience, however, in be- 
coming a funnel for their dialectic has made no sound 
or useful gain but like a sickly ear has been filled by 
senseless noises with uncertainty and hardness of 
hearing. Later on, if you wish, w r e shall make a fresh 
start and discuss that subject f ; but now let us run 
through the fundamental principles of their physical 

Iliad xiv, 315-316. 

b Euripides, Andromache 448, quoted also in De Herodoti 
Malignitate 863 k and Non Posse Suaviter Vivi 1102 c. 

c See owfoucri ri)v crwrjdtiav at 1063 d supra and cf. Epi- 
ctetus, Diss, i, xxvii, 20-21. 

d See Be Stoic. Repug. 1048 a-b supra (. . . a-noo-nav rov 
\6yov Tjuas koll a7Tocrrp€<f>€iv airavrcov rwv tolovtcov) with the note 
there. • Cf. S. V.F. iii, p. 43, 16-20. 

1 Supposedly a promise of the essay, Hepl avvrjOeias npos 
tovs ?lt(x)lkovs (no. 78 in the Catalogue of Lamprias), cf. 
Pohlenz, Hermes, Ixxiv (1939), p. 1 and Ziegler, R.-E. xxi/i 
(1951), col. 761, 5-17, and the consequences drawn from 
this by Babut (Plutarque et le Stoicisme, pp. 35-39) ; but 
avdts . . . el fiovXei is sometimes a way of dismissing further 
discussion of a subject (cf. Plato, Protagoras 361 e 5-6 and 
Republic 430 c 4-5 with Adam's note ad loc). 


(1073) vd$ 7rpoXrjipetg y ev toIs Kvpicorarois Kal Trpuyrois 


30. KadoXov (lev arrortov koll irapd ttjv evvoidv 
iartv elvcu ll4v tl fxrj ov 8' elvai, (tovtojv 8e noXXd 
E tlv efvcu) 1 fiev ovk ovtcl §' elvai Xeyovrtov aro- 
Trcorarov iart to €itl rov iravros Xeyofievov. Kevov 
yap aireipov e^codev tco koollco Trepcdevres ovre 
awfia to tt&v ovr acroj/xarov elvat Xeyovoiv. €7T€- 
tcu 8e tovtco to litj ov elvai to irav ovtcl yap Liova 
Ta owpLaTa koXovolv eTrcthrf ovtos to 7tol€lv tl Kal 
TrdoyjE.iv. to 8k nav ovk ov €Otlv, ojotc ovtc tl 

7TOLV]0€l OVT€ 3 TL 7T€LO€TaL TO TTOV . dAA' OuS' €V 

tottco carat' oajfia yap 8t]7tov to ineyov tottov, 

1 <. . .> -added by H. C. (cf. Adv. Colotem 1116 b) ; <i«u 
clvaO \iiv <rtva> fxrj ovra 5* elvat <■ noXka be roiavra avra>v> 
AeyovroDv -Wyttenbach ; <aAAd 7roAA' avriov etvau> -Pohlenz. 

2 KaXovoiv. €iT€ira -Madvig {Adversaria Critica, p. 670) ; 
eiretra S' -Pohlenz ; iireibfj <8c> . . . [Jjctt*] -Rasmus (Prog. 
1872, p. 19). 

3 ovt€ -Rasmus (Prog. 1872, p. 19) ; ovoe -E, B. 

Plutarch presumably thought that this objection would 
not be valid against Plato's fxrj ov, which Colotes misinter- 
preted (Adv. Colotem 1115 d [cf. Sophist 258 u— 259 b]). 

* S. V.F. ii, frag. 525 (p. 167, 19-26). 

c Cf. Adv. Colotem 1116 B (rroXXa yap Kal pcyaXa . . . ovra 
fi€v fir) elvat riva S' elvai Xiyovai). For rl as the most general 
class or highest category of the Stoics, comprising both 
bodies (ovra) and incorporeals (ilj\ ovra), cf. S. V.F. ii, frags. 
329, 332-334, and 371; Sextus, Adv. Math, x, 234-236; 
Rieth, Grundbegriffe, pp. 90-91 ; Goldschmidt, Le systeme 
sto'icien, pp. 13-19. 

d For the Stoic terms to irdv, ro oAov, and 6 koo^xos and 
their distinctions see the references in note c on 1066 b 

e See De Stoic. Repug. 1054 b-c (chap. 44) supra with 



theory, which confounds the common preconceptions 
no less than does their theory of goals. 

30. While in general it is absurd and at odds with 
the common conception to say that something is but 
is non-existent, a {these men), asserting b {that many 
things are something) but are not existent, reach 
the height of absurdity in what they say about the 
sum of things. rf For, after enveloping the universe 
on the outside in infinite void, e they assert that the 
sum of things is neither body nor incorporeal. The 
consequence of this is that the sum of things is non- 
existent, for they call bodies alone existent * since 
it is the property of an existent to be subject and 
object of action ; but the sum of things is not ex- 
istent, so that the sum of things would be neither sub- 
ject nor object of any action. But it would not be in 
place either, for it is body surely that occupies place h ; 

note a and for the Stoic distinction of tottos, xtopa, and kzvov 
the references in note d there. 

' Cf S.V.F. ii, frags. 319, 320, 329, and 361 ; Anon. 
Proleg. to Platonic Philosophy ix, 2-4 and 14 (p. 19 Wester- 
ink = p. 204 Hermann [Platonis Dialogi vol. vi]) ; S.V.F. 
ii, frags. 316 (with iii, p. 249, 8-9), 328, and 469. 

9 For this formula cf. Plato, Sophist 247 d 8-e 3 ; Aris- 
totle, Topics 139 a 4-8 and 146 a 22-23 ; Lucretius, i, 440- 
441. The attempts to emend eirct&if are misconceived, for 
the clause gives the reason why the Stoics call bodies alone 
existent, the second premise, here unexpressed, being that 
what is incorporeal ovtc ttoizI ti ovt€ 7rdax €c ( r /* 1080 f 
infra ; S. V.F. i, frag. 90 and ii, frag. 363 ; Alexander, 
Be Sensu y p. 73, 19-20 [Wendland]) ; compare the Stoic 
proof that <f>ajvrf is body (S. V.F. ii, frags. 140 and 387) and 
the similar Epicurean proof that the soul is corporeal 
(Epicurus, Epistle i, 67 and Lucretius, i, 440-448). 

h M Place " being denned as that which is occupied by 
body (S. V.F. i, p. 26, 23 ; ii, p. 163, 20-22 [cf. p. 163, 6-7] 
and p. 164, 1-2 and 10-12). 



(1073) ov ocoLia 8e to ttcxv, war ovocxliov 1 to ttcxv. /cat 

pLTJV ((/>) 2 TOV CXVTOV €TT€)(€LV TOTTOV GVLl^€^7]K€, 

tovto to 3 fxevov loot ov Lievei to ttSv ov yap 

iiriyti tottov. dAA' ovSe kiv€ltcu, TrpcoTOV otl /cat 

toj klvovllzvco tottov Set /cat ^ai/oas V7TOK€lU€Vr)S } 

F eVetTa otl to [fir)]* KLVOVfievov rj clvto klv€lv r) vfi 

€T€pOV TTaoyjclV TT€(/)VK€. to Liev ovv v<f>* iaVTOV 
KCLTO, fidpOS fj KOV<f)OTrjTa, KOVtfioTTjS 8e Kol fidpOS* 
TjTOL G%€G€LS TLV€S rj 8wdfJL€LS eloiV Tj Ota(f>Opal 

1074 TrdvTO)s 6 Gxo/xaTOS" to Se ttcxv 1 ov GWLid Iotlv, coot 
dvdyKT] urJTe fiapv iiryre Kov<f)ov elvai to ttcxv lltjcV 
e^eLV e£ eavTod Kivrjaetos dpx^jv. dAAd litjv ovSe 

V(j)' €T€pOV KLVTjO€Tai TO TT&V €T€pOV ydp OvSdv CGTL 

tov ttclvtos. cooT dvdyKrj XeyeLV avTots OTT€p Xe- 
yovoi p,r]Te Lievov 8 etvai to ttcxv urjTe Kivovuevov. 
b'Xcos 8e, eirel to Xeyeiv otoLia to ttcxv Lirj8* cvcotl* 
/car' cxvtovs ocoucx S ovpavos Kcxl yrj /cat £a)a /cat 
<f>vra /cat dvOpcoTTOL /cat Xidoi, to lit] ov gcvlicx gco- 
\lojtcx fiepr) €§€t /cat rou lit) ovtos l^epT) ovtcx €arat 

1 ov&afiov -Dubner ; oi)S' dXXov -E, B. 

2 <a>> -added by Wyttenbach. 

3 tovto Ioti -Wyttenbach ; tovto [to] -Kronenberg (Mne- 
mosyne, Hi [19241, p. 106). 

4 [fxrj] -deleted by Hutten (omitted by versions of Xylander 
and Amyot) ; j.Uv -Wyttenbach. 

5 Wyttenbach (implied by versions of Xylander and 
Amyot) ; kov^ottjtos Be kcu fidpovs -E, B. 

6 Meziriac (" omnino " -Xylander) ; navTos -E, B. 

7 Bernardakis; toS* a7rav-E, B. 8 Leonicus ; /aoVov-E, B. 
9 /u.7yS' evcoTL -Pohlenz ; /xt) Bdov eWi -E, B. 

10 carat 6Vra (but with order corrected superscript) -B. 

~°~C/. S. V.F. ii, frag. 500. 

6 Motion is " change of place " or " change from place 
to place " (S. V.F. ii, frags. 492 and 496) ; and space is to 



and the sum of tilings is not body, so that the 
sum of things is nowhere. Moreover, <\vhat) has 
happened to occupy the same place, this is what is 
at rest a ; consequently the sum of things is not at 
rest, for it does not occupy place. Yet it is not in 
motion either, first because what is in motion also 
must have a place and space underlying it 6 and then 
because what is [not] in motion is naturally either 
moving itself or being acted upon by another. Now, 
what is moved by itself has of itself certain tendencies 
and inclinations according to its weight or lightness, 
and lightness and weight are either some kind of 
relative states or forces or at all events differentiae 
of body ; but the sum of things is not body, so that 
of necessity the sum of things is neither heavy nor 
light and does not have of itself a principle of motion. 
But furthermore the sum of things would not be in 
motion by the agency of another either, for there is 
nothing other than the sum of things. Consequently 
it is necessary for them to say, as in fact they do, d 
that the sum of things is neither at rest nor in motion. 
Quite generally, since according to them there is 
not even a possibility of saying that the sum of 
things is body but heaven and earth and animals 
and plants and men and stones are body, what is 
not body will have bodies as its parts and of the non- 
existent there will be parts that are existent and 

the place of any body as the partially occupied to the fully 
occupied (S. V.F. i, p. 26, 24 ; ii, p. 162, 42 f. and p. 163, 
22-24), so that space might be called the sum or the place 
of all places (cf. 8. V.F. ii, frag. 1141). 

c Cf. S. V.F. ii, frags. 499 and 989 (p. 289, 1-9), and De 
Stoic. Repug. 1054 f — 1055 c with note d on 1053 e supra. 

d S.V.F. ii, frag. 525 (p. 167, 26-27); cf ii, frag. 500 
(p. 161, 39-40). 



(1074) /cat to jxrj /3aou xPV G€rai fi a p£&t, fioptots 1 /cat /COU- 
GHS' TO fJL7j KOV(f>OV 0)V 0?5S' OVeLpCLTCL XdfStlv fl&XAoV 

B eon rrapd rag kolvols evvoias. /cat pjr)v ovtoos ov- 
Sev evapyes eWt /cat tojv kolvcov ixofievov €vvollov 
cbs to, et rt fjurj ejjojjvxov icrTLV, €K€lvo oj\svypv elvai 
/cat ttglXiv, et tl jjltj aifwxov, e/cetvo epafjvxov elvar 
/cat TavTrjv ovv avaTperrovoi tt)v ivdpye iav 2 ovtol, 3 

TO 7ToV 6fJLoAoyOVVT€S JJL7JT €fJo/jVXOV €LVCLl p/f\T dlpV" 

Xov. avev §e tovtoov, dreXes /xev ovSels voel to 
rrav, ov ye S77 ju/^Sev fxepos aireoriv, ovtol oe Te'Aet- 
or ou <f>aotv etvat to 7rdv obpiofievov yap ti to ri- 
Aetov, to oe ttoLv vtt* aTreipias aopiOTov. ovkovv eort 
Tt KaT avTois o ixtjt aTeAes psryre Te'AetoV eWtv. 
dAAa /x^v ot>Ve fiepos eaTt to 77av — ouSev yap avrov 
C jjl€l£,ov — ov6* b'Xov, cos avTOt XeyovGC TeraypLevov 
yap to oXov KaTrjyopelod at, to oe irav St aireiplav 
/cat dootorov 4 etvat /cat aVa/CTov. atVtoi> to'lvvv 
ovt€ rod TravTos eTepov Ioti too fjLTjSev etvat Trapa 


ttolclv ydp ov 7T€<f)VK€, too 8e 7Toielv to alnov voet- 

1 Leonicus ; fiapeaiv oplois -E, B. 

2 Leonicus, Basil. ; ivipytiav -E, B, Aldine. 

3 Madvig (Adversaria Critica, p. 670) ; ovtco -E, B. 

4 aopioriav -Kronenberg (Mnemosyne, lii [1924], p. 106). 

a See note c on Be Stoic, Repug. 1047 c supra. 

b S.V.F. ii, frag. 525 (p. 167, 27-28). They maintained, 
of course, that the cosmos itself is animate (S.V.F. i. frags. 
110-112 and ii, frags. 633-635). 

c S.V.F. ii, frag. 525 (pp. 167, 28-168, 3). 

d It is the Koop.os by itself without the surrounding void 
that is oAov (cf. S. V.F. ii, frags. 522-524). 

e aireipla is called draKros (Adv. Colotem 1114 b) and 
element or principle of drafi'a (De Defectu Orac. 428 f). It 
has already been said above that to irdv of the Stoics is 



what is not heavy will possess heavy members and 
what is not light light ones. One could not find even 
dreams that are more at odds with the common con- 
ceptions than this. Moreover, nothing is so clear 
and so coherent with the common conceptions as the 
notion that, if something is not animate, it is in- 
animate and contrariwise, if something is not in- 
animate, it is animate. Well, this clear apprehension a 
too these men subvert when they acknowledge b 
that the sum of things is neither animate nor in- 
animate. All this apart, while no one thinks incom- 
plete the sum total, which of course lacks none of its 
parts, these men deny c that the sum of things is 
complete because what is complete is something 
determinate and the sum of things is made indefinite 
by its infinitude. Well then, according to them there 
is something that is neither incomplete nor complete. 
But furthermore the sum of things is neither a part 
— for nothing is larger than it — nor a whole, as they 
say themselves,^ for it is of orderly arrangement that 
wholeness is predicated and the sum of things by 
reason of its infinitude is both indefinite and without 
arrangements As to cause, furthermore, neither 
does the sum of things have another as cause, since 
there is nothing other besides the sum of tilings, nor 
is the sum of things cause of anything else or of itself 
either, for to produce is not in its nature and produc- 
ing is implied in the conception of cause. Well then, 

in aTretpias aopiorov^ but that is no reason to object to the 
repetition here in the combination Kal aopiorov ko.1 araKTov 
(cf. Qvomodo Quis . . . Sentiat Profectus 76 n, De An. Proc. 
in Timaeo 1014. d). Being reray^eVov, a whole must also 
be coptCT/xevov ; and to vdv of the Stoics is by its a-Trcipia pre- 
vented from being either. 



(1074) rat. (fiepe roivvv rravras dvdpamovs ipojT&odai ri 
voovoi to ixTjhev koI tivcl tov ju/^Scvos" irrivoiav Aajii- 
fiavovoiv. dp* ovk aV elnotev (1)S to \-ir\T oXtiov 
VTTapxpv p/f\T aiTiov ^X ov M 7 ?^' °Xov \ir\re \iepos 
fir]T€ TeXecov /X7]r' arcAc? pJyr e/x?/a>^ov \xr\T dipv- 


D \ir\Te acjfjia jirjT dowpaTov, tovto koX ovk aXXo rt 
to ovSev eoTiv ; otclv ovv oaa 7tolvt€S ol Xolttol tov 

TOV Ojg €CHK€ (fraiVOVTQLl T<p pLTjOevl TO 7TaV 7TOtOUVT€9 . 

ovSev ovv €tl Set Xeyetv tov xpovov, to KaT7]y6pr]p,a, 
to d^tajfia, to avvrjfifjievov, to avpLTTeTrXzypLevov, 


ov Xeyovotv zlvai. kolitoi to y dXrjOeg ov purj 
ctvai nrjoz 2 VTrapx^w, dXXd KaTaXapLJUdveoOai kolI 
KaTaXrjTrTov elvcu kolI ttigtov a> ttjs ovGias tov 
6vtos firj JjL€T€gti, i7d)$ [ow] 3 ov rrdoav aTorrtav 4 
vir€pf3ej3Xr]K€v ; 

31. 'AAAa, jjurj Soktj TavTa XoyiKtoTepav e^etv 
E ttjv aTToplav, dipcofJieOa to)v (f)voiKtOT€pujv. end 


1 Kolfhaus (Plutarchl J)e Comm. Not., p. 57) ; /x^rc -E, B. 

2 Bernardakis ; tirjre -E, B. 

3 [ovv] -deleted by Meziriac. 

4 Meziriac ; aru^i'av -E, B. 5 Xoyicorcpav -B. 

a S. V.F. ii, frag. 335. The last four items here belong to 
the class of ra XeKrd listed with the void, time, and place in 
Adv. Colotem 1116 b-c as things that the Stoics say ovra 
fiev firj chat nva d* elvai. They are all incorporeals (S. V.F. 
ii, frags. 331, 166 [p. 48, 22-24], 170, and 521) and therefore 
not existent. For KaT-qyoprjfia (predicate) cf. S.] r .F. ii, 
frags. 183-184 and Plutarch, Plat. Quaest. 1009 e-o ; for 
dftco/jta (proposition) and cru/Li7Te7rAey/LLfe-vov (conjunction) see. 
note c on Be Stoic. Repug. 1047 d supra ; for ow^^ixevov 



suppose all men are asked what they conceive nothing 
to be, that is what notion they get of nothing. 
Would they not say that what neither is a cause nor 
has a cause, is neither whole nor part, neither com- 
plete nor incomplete, neither animate nor inanimate, 
neither in motion nor at rest anywhere, and is not 
either body or incorporeal, this and not anything 
else is nothing ? So, since all that for the rest of 
mankind are predicates of nothing are by these 
Stoics alone predicated of the sum of things, it seems 
that they are clearly making the sum of things 
identical with nothing. Nothing must, then, be 
meant moreover by time, predicate, proposition, con- 
ditional, conjunction, of which they among philo- 
sophers make most use but which they say are not 
existent/ 1 Yet to hold that what is true is not 
existent and does not subsist but that that is appre- 
hended and apprehensible and credible which has 
no part in the reality of what exists, 6 how can there 
be any absurdity unsurpassed by this ? 

31. Lest the difficulty involved in these matters 
seem to be too much of a logical one, however, let 
us take up those of a more physical character. Since, 
then, as they say themselves, 

(conditional) cf. Mates, Stoic Logic, p. 43 and Plutarch, 
De E 386 f— 387 a. 

b Cf. Adv. Colotem 1116 b (to tcov X^ktcov yzvos, iv <L kcll 
rdX-qOrj travr eVeort) and Plat. Quaest. 1009 c (a£i'co/!Aa, . . . , 
o npajTov Xeyovres dXrjOevovcnv rj ipevBovrau) with S. V.F. ii, p. 
48, 22-26 and p. 61, 34-42. Plutarch disregards the Stoic 
distinction between to aXrjQes and dXrjOeta, according to 
which the former, being a proposition and so incorporeal, is 
not existent whereas dXrjQtia, being knowledge, i.e. the mind 
in a certain condition, is corporeal and therefore existent (rf. 
S. V.F. ii, frag. 132 and Mates, Stoic Logic, pp. 33-36). 


(1074) Zeus* apxv Zeus' p.eooa 1 Aids 8 e/c irdvra re- 


cos avrol Xeyovot, (jlclAlgtcl [xev eoet ras* irepl Oecov 
evvotas, et (rt) 2 Tapa^coSe? rj wXav^rov eyyeyovev 
avrals, Icopievovs aTrevOvvetv /cat Karopdovv eirl to 
fieXriorov' el oe firj, (jreioyOevras* y u edv cos k'xov- 


to Oelov — 

ov yap tl vvv ye /cages' 5 aAA' aet rrore 
tfl ravra, Kovoels oloev e£ orov '^avry 6 - 

ol he cocnrep d(f>* eorias dp^afxevoi rd KaOeorcora 
Kiveiv /cat irdrpia ttjs 7repl Oecov oo£r)s ovSejjLiav, 
cbs dnXcos elneXv, evvoiav vyiif /cat a/cepatov oVo- 
F AeAotVacrt. ris ydp eoriv aAAo? dvOpconcov rj yeyo- 
vev b\ ovk d(f>6aprov voel /cat atStor to Oelov; 
{ot)S)ev 8 Tat? Kotvats irpoXrjipeaL ire pi Oecov ofioXo- 
yovfievcos dva7re<f)covrjrai fidXXov rj rd rotavra' 
rep evi repTTovTcu fiaKapes Oeol rjpbara ndvra 

1 Stephanus (so De Defectu Orac. V36 d) ; fxeoa -E, B. 

2 <n> -added by Lconicus. 

3 Pohlenz ; fleVras -E, B ; /xcfle'vTas -Wyltenbach. 

4 y -Bernardakis ; re -E, B. 

5 ov ydp tolvvv Kal xQ*s -E, B ; corrected by Diibner. 

6 /<cu oi'Sets oJScv i^orov (cf otou -B) (ftavrj -E, B ; corrected 
by Wyttenbacli. 

7 vyia -Bernardakis. 

8 <ovh>kv -H. C. ; iv -E, B ; a iv -Basil. ; <rj ti> iv -Leo- 
nicus ; rt \iv] -Pohlenz. 

a Quoted in this form by Plutarch in De Defectu Orac. 
436 d and by the Scholiast on Plato's Laws 715 e. The line 
appears with K€(f)aXrj instead of dpxrj in [Aristotle], De 
Mundo 401 a 29 and Porphyry, Tlepl dyaXfiaTODv, frag. 3 
(J. Bidez, Vie de Porphyre, p. 3*, 13). See Orpheus, frag. 


Zeus is beginning and middle and Zeus the fulfilment of 
all things, 

they ought above all to have straightened out and 
set to rights the conceptions about the gods by re- 
pairing (anything) in them that may have become 
confused or have gone astray but otherwise ought to 
have let people persuaded by the law and common 
experience be each as he is in his relation to the 
divinity — 

For these things live not now and yesterday 

But always, and none knows when they appeared b ; 

but instead they began to upset from the very 
hearth and foundation, as it were, the established 
traditions in the belief about the gods c and, gener- 
ally speaking, have left no conception intact and un- 
scathed. For what other human being is there or 
has there been in whose conception the divinity is 
not indestructible and everlasting ? d <(No)thing has 
ever been uttered that is more consistent with the 
common preconceptions about the gods than words 
like these : 

There in delight dwell days without end the divinities 
blessed e 

B 6 (D.-K.) and Orphicorum Fragmenta coll. O. Kern, 
pp. 90-93 (frags. 21 and 21a). For Stoic use of verses 
ascribed to Orpheus and Musaeus cf. S. V.F. ii, frag. 1078 
and Cicero, De Nat. Deorum i, 41. 

6 Sophocles, Antigone 456-457 ; quoted by Plutarch in 
Quaest. Conviv. 731 c. 

c With the language and sentiment cf. Amatorius 756 b : 
and for the proverbial expression d<j> y iarias ap^d^ievoi see De 
Sera Numinis Vindicta 549 e with the note by De Lacy and 
Einarson (L.C.L., vol. vii, p. 189, note d). 

d See De Stoic. Repug. 1051 e-f supra. 

6 Odyssey vi, 46 ; quoted by Plutarch in Quomodo Ado- 
lesce ns Poetas Audi re Debeat 20 e. 



(1074) (/cat) 1 

dOavdrcov re dewv ^a/Ltat ipxofjbevcov r dvdpcoTrcov 

1075 /cat to 

k€lvoi 2 yap r dvoaot /cat dyrjpaoi 
ttovojv r drrecpoc, fiapvfioav 

7TOpQ\l6v 7T€<f)€VyOT€S 'Ax^pOVTOS. 

/cat lows ivrvxoi Tt9 av Zdveai jSapjSapotS" /cat dy pl- 
ots Oeov pirj voovoiy deov 8e vocov fjurj voojv S' a- 
<f)dapTov firjS diStov dvOptoTros ov8e et9 yeyovev. ol 
yovv d6eoi 7Tpoaayop€v0evr€s ovtol, QeoScupoi /cat 
Atayopat /cat "I^ntoves , ovk eroXpL-qoav eiTreiv to 
Oetov oti <j>6apTov ioTiv aAA' ovk irrioTevaav ais 
eart rt d</>6apTov, tov /xev d</)6dpTov ttjv vTraptjiv 

JJL7) d7To\€lTTOVT€S TOV 8k dtOV* T7)V 7Tp6Xlf]lfjlV (/)v\aT- 
TOVT€S. dAAa XpVOt7T7TOS /Cat K\edv6r]S , €fl7T€7TXrj- 

1 Added by Dubner ( 4 * item " -Xylander\s version). 

2 Basil. ; Vclvot -E, B, Aldine. 

3 E ; tov 0€ov Se -B. 

a Iliad v, 142. 

b Pindar, frag. 143 (Bergk, Schroeder, Snell)=147 
(Turyn)=131 (Bowra) ; quoted by Plutarch in De Super- 
stitione 167 e and Amatorius 763 c. 

c Cf. Cicero, De Nat. Deorum i, 62 ; Simplicius, In 
Epicteti Ench. 222 c— 223 a (pp. 356-357 [SchweighaeuserJ = 
p. 95 [Dubner]). 

d Besides De Stoic. Repug. 1051 e-f and the statement of 
Antipater which Plutarch there quotes cf. Epicurus, Epistle 
iii, 123 with Cicero, De Nat. Deorum i, 45 and Sextus, Adv. 
Math, ix, 33 and 44. 

e Hippo, frag. A 8 (D.-K) ; G. Giannantoni, / Cirenaici 
VIII: Teodoro, A 27 (p. 473) = E. Mannebach, Aristippi 
et Cyrenaicorum Fragmenta, p. 100 (Adnot. 269). Theodorus 
of Cyrene is mentioned as an atheist by Plutarch in De 
Tranquil I ttate Animi 467 b and Phocion xxxviii, 3 (759 c) ; 



Gods, who are proof against death, and the treaders of 
earth, who are mortal, 

and the verse 

These are ageless and proof against all disease, 
Immune from labours, having been spared 
Woe's Acherontical flood of wailing. b 

One might perhaps chance upon barbaric and savage 
tribes that have no conception of god, c but not a 
single man has there been who having a conception 
of god did not conceive him to be indestructible and 
everlasting.^ At any rate, those who have been 
called atheists, Theodorus and Diagoras and Hippo 
and their like/ did not venture to say of divinity that 
it is subject to destruction but did not believe that 
there is anything indestructible, preserving the pre- 
conception of god while not admitting the existence 
of what is indestructible/ Chrysippus and Cleanthes, 

and Diagoras of Mclos (concerning whom cf. F. Jacoby, 
Diagoras f O "Adcos [Abhand. Deutscheri Akad. Wins, zu 
Berlin, Kl. fur Sprachen, Lit. and Kimst, 1959, Nr. 3]) is 
coupled with Critias in De Super stitione 171 c. Diagoras 
and Theodorus together are Cicero's examples of absolute 
atheists (De Nat. Deorum i, 2 ; i, 63 ; and i, 117) ; cf. also 
[Plutarch], De Placitis 880 d and Sextus, Pyrrh. Hyp. iii, 
218 and Adv. Math, ix, 51-59. The charge that Hippo was 
daePrjs is early (frag. A 2 [D.-K.]\ but the testimony for 
his atheism is later and weaker (cf. frags. A 4, 6, 9 and B 2-3 

f Their very atheism testifies to the universality of the 
conception of divinity as necessarily indestructible, for it was 
because they could not admit the existence of anything in- 
destructible that they denied the existence of gods. There 
is no other evidence that any of the atheists named by 
Plutarch here did so argue ; but cf. the arguments, formu- 
lated apparently by Carneades, to prove that god, if there 
were a god, would be <f>dapr6s, that this is absurd and at 



(1075) kot^s, ws €ttos eiTTtlv, T(5 Aoyco Btujv tov ovpavuv 

B rr]v yrjv tov dtpa rrjv daXarrav, ovStva tcov tooov- 

tcov a<f>6apTOV ouS' aibiov dnoXeXo faraai ttXtjv jjlovov 

XoVS> <X)GT€ /Cat TOVTCp TO <f>d€lp€LV TTpOOtlVCLl TOV 

cfcdtipeoQai firj imeiKeaTepov daOeveia yap tivl /cat 
to (JLeTafidXXov els eTepov (f)deip€Tai /cat to rot? 
dXXois et? iavTO (frOeipofjitvois TpetfiopLzvov cra)£€Tat. 
raura 8 ox>x o>s aAAa 7roAAd tcov dro7rtov ovXXoyi- 
^ofieda e^eiv 1 rds" viroOeaeis olvtojv /cat tols 86y- 
pLaacv €7T€odai, dXX olvtol fieya fiowvTes iv rot? 
7T€pl Qetbv /cat TlpovoLas JLlfxappLevrjs re /cat Ou- 
crecus ypapLfxaat StapprjSrjv Xeyovai tovs dXXovs 
C deovs CLTTavTas zlvai yeyovoTas /cat (f)9apiqoopi€vovs 


ojs to avdptoTTov aOdvaTov etvai /cat to deov dvrjTOv 
etvar jjl&XXov S' oi>x dpto tls carat 0€oi3 irpos ctv- 
dpoJTTOv 8ia<f>opd, el /cat d 06O9 £cpov Aoyt/cov /cat 
(f)6apTov ioTiv. dv yap av to ao(f)6v tovto /cat 
/caAov dvTiOtoai, Bvtyrov elvai tov dvdpojTrov ov Qvrj- 
tov oe tov Oeov dXXd <f>6apTov, 2 opa to ovpiflaZvov 

1 <TT€pc>€x €lv -Pohlenz (but cf. Be Stoic. Repntf. 1054 a : 
-no\Xr]v droTTiav . . . tovtcov ixovrayv). 

2 Basil. ; aXX a<j>6aprov -E, B, Aldine. 

odds with the common conception, and that therefore god 
does not exist (Sextus, Adv. Math, ix, 140-181 [cf. Cicero, 
])e Nat. Deorum iii, 99-34], n.b. ix, 143 and 147). * 

a Cf. S.V.F. ii, p. 315, 19-93 and ii, frag. 1077. 

b S. V.F. i, frag. 536 and ii, frag. 1049 (p. 309, 26-36). 



however, who in theory have, so to speak, filled full 
of gods heaven, earth, air, and sea, a have held b that 
none of all these many is indestructible or ever- 
lasting except Zeus alone, in whom they consume 
all the rest. c The result is that he too has the at- 
tribute of destruction, which is not more fitting than 
that of being destroyed, for some weakness is the 
reason both why what changes into a different thing 
is destroyed and why that is preserved which is 
nourished on the destruction of others that it absorbs. 
These absurdities unlike many of the others we do 
not infer as involved in their premises and as con- 
sequences of their doctrines d ; but they shout aloud 
themselves in the writings on the Gods and Provi- 
dence, on Destiny and Nature and state expressly 
that all the other gods have come into being and will 
be destroyed by fire/ being in their opinion capable 
of melting as if made of wax or of tin/ Now, as the 
notion that man is immortal is at odds with the 
common conception so also is the notion that god is 
mortal, or rather I do not see what difference there 
would be between god and man if god too is an 
animal rational and subject to destruction. For, if 
they retort with this fine subtlety that man is mortal 
whereas god is not mortal but is subject to destruc- 

c See De Stoic. Repug. 1051 f — 1052 a and 1052 c supra ; 
cf De Defectu Orac. 420 a (S. V.F. ii, p. 310, 1-4) : . . . 

#cojv ovtojv tooovtwv to irXrjdos €Vl Xp(x)fJL€VOVS dtSico KCU d- 
(f>ddpTCO. , . . 

d See De Stoic. Repug. 1052 c : kcll tout * ou Set ouAAoyi- 

e See De Stoic. Repug. 1052 a supra ; cf. De Defectu 
Orac. 425 k-f and 426 b. 

/ Cf. S.V.F. h\ frag. 602 (n.b. p. 185, 31-32) ; Pohlenz, 
Stoa ii, pp. 45-47. 



(1075) avTols' rj yap addvarov elvai 1 ^r\oovoiv d\ia tov 

0€OV Kol <f)6apTOV Tj /JLTjT€ dvTJTOV €LVCU fir)T* d9dva~ 

tov. &v ovk €gtw ovSe rrXaTTovTas e^TTLTrjSes 

D erepa irapd ttjv kolvtjv evvoiav vnepfiaXXtiv rrjv 

aroTriav' Xeya) 8c tovs dXXovs, irrel tovtols ye 

rcov droTrcordrajv ovSev dpprjTov ovo dvemx^ipy]- 


KXedvdr]^ rfj €K7TVpojG€L Xeyec ttjv aeXijvrjv koll to, 
Xoirrd darpa tov rjXiov (co? rjyefxovtKovy 2 i^o/jLOLtb- 
oai navTa iavTw /cat pLeTafiaXelv ec$ iavTov. aAA' 
ovtl \y , ei) ol avTepes ueoc ovtcs rrpos T'qv eav- 
tcov (f)6opdv owe py ova i, to) tjXlo) GvvepyovvTts Tt 4 
Trpos ttjv eKTTvpajcnv, ttoXvs dv €lt] yeXcus rjjJLas 7T€pl 
atDT7]pias avTols n pooevxeo Qai koX owTrjpas dv- 


E €ttI T7jv avTwv <f)6opdv koll dvaipeaiv ; 

32. Kat pLrjv avToi ye b Trpos tov EtTTiKovpov ov- 
Sev aTToXtinovoi twv 7Tpay/xara>^ 6 " lov, lov, <f>ev, 

1 ehai -E ; omitted by B. 

2 <ojs rjyefjLovtKov^ -supplied by H. C. ; rjXiov . . . vac. 4 + 
7 -E ; vac. 1 1 -B . . . e^opLOLcooai ; <o)(j>e\eiv iv ra»> -Kalb- 
fleisch (cf. Kolfhaus, Plutarchi T)e Comm. Not., p. 58) ; 

<OVV€KTTVpOVLl€V> OY <aUTCt OVV€pyOVVT> -Pohlenz (JlermCS, lxxiv 

[1939], p. 28, n. 2) ; <rore Gvoirevhovr) -Sandbach (Class. 
Quart, xxxv [1941], p. 116). 

3 dAA' ovtl <y\ ct> -H. C. ; dAA* on . . . vac. 3 -E ; vac. 
5 -B . . . ol ; aAA* el n ol -Xylander ; aAAo n <ovv, et> ol . . . 
avalptoiv ; -Kalbfleisch (cf. Kolfhaus, loc. cit.) ; dAA' el 
7r<dvT€s> oi -Sandbach (loc. cit.) ; dAA' ore <or) koi> ol -Pohlenz. 

4 ovvepyovvTts tl -Basil. ; avvepyovvros ion -E, B ; ovv- 
€pyovvT€s ye -Wyttenbach ; avvepyovvris <ye> n -Pohlenz ; 
[to> "qXloj, aw€pyovvT€$ n Trpos tqv eKTrvptooLv] -deleted by 
Sandbach (loc. cit). 

6 ye -Wyttenbach ; re -E, B. 

6 <eV> oi)Sevl . . . ypa\ji[xanx}v -Wyttenbach ; <kclt> ovhh 
. . . ypafifidrcov -Pohlenz. 



tion, ft look at their predicament : they would be say- 
ing either that god is at once immortal and subject 
to destruction or that he is neither mortal nor im- 
mortal. Not even by purposely inventing fictions at 
odds with the common conception is it possible to 
surpass the absurdity of this. I mean it is not 
possible for others, since there is nothing, however 
absurd, that these Stoics have left unsaid or untried. 
Cleanthes, furthermore, in his championship of the 
conflagration asserts b that the sun (as ruling 
faculty) c assimilates to itself and transforms into 
itself the moon and all the rest of the stars. (If) the 
stars,** however, while being gods, contribute to their 
own destruction by giving the sun some co-operation 
towards the conflagration/ would it not be highly 
ridiculous for us to address prayers for our safety to 
them and to believe them to be saviours of men, 
when what is natural to them is eagerness for their 
own destruction and abolition ? 

32. Moreover, the Stoics themselves f make no 
end of fuss crying woe and shame upon Epicurus for 

• S. V.F. ii, frag. 1049 (p. 309, 37-38) and see De Stoic. 
Repug. 1052 c with note a on page 566 supra. 

b S. V.F. i, frag. 510 (cf. Festa, Stoichi Antichi ii, p. 149) ; 
cf. S. V.F. i, frags. 511, 512, and 497. 

c De Stoic. Repug. 1053 b supra and S. V.F. ii, frag. 1052 
suggest that in this context Cleanthes may have emphasized 
the sun's role as ^yc/xoviKoy, which was peculiar to his 
doctrine (cf. S. V..F. i, frag. 499). 

d Plutarch apparently makes no distinction between doryp 
here and aarpov, used just above. 

e Cf. S.V.F. ii, p. 189, 24-25 (Pohlenz, Hermes, lxxiv 
[1939], p. 29, n. 2 and Stoa ii, p. 47). 

/ S.V.F. ii, frag. 1126 and Epicurus, frag, 368 (Usener, 
Epicurea, p. 248, 11-14); see De Stoic. Repug. 1051 d-e 
and 1052 u supra. 



(1075) <f)€v " fioajvres, (bs avyyeovra rrpf tlov decov npo- 
Xrnjjtv dvcupovfJLevrjs rrjg irpovoias' ov yap dOdva- 


KTjSe/jLOViKov kclI dxfreXtfjLov TrpoXanfidveaOai Kat vo- 
elvdai rov Oeov orrep dXrjdes eoriv. el S' dvcu- 
povoi rrjv 7T€pl Oeov TrpoX^iv ol fir) aTToXeliTovres 


Oeovs 1 Xeyovres firj axfyeXetv 8e rjfias /x^S' dyaOwv 
elvai Sorfjpas aAA' d8ia<j)6pwv , dperrjv /xcv firj 8c- 
hovras rrXovrov 8e /cat vyUiav /cat reKvtov yeveoeis 
F /cat ra rotavra 8i86vra$, cLv ov8ev axfceXijJiov oif8e 
XvoireXes ov8e alperov ov8e crvfufyepov eoriv; tj 
CKelvoi fxev ovk 2 dvaipovot ras Trepl dea>v ivvotag, 
ovroi 8e /cat vrepivflpit^ovoi /cat ■xXevdt > ovow t 'ETrt- 
Kapmov riva Oeov Xeyovres etvat 3 /cat TeveO^iov /cat 
1076 IlatdVa Kat MavTetov, 4 ovk ovros dyaOov tt)s vyi- 
€ta? Kat rijs yeveaeojs ov8e rijs TroXvKapTTias aAA' 
d8ia<f>6pcov Kat avax^eAcSv rot? XapifSdvovoi ; 

33. To rpirov roiwv rvjs rrepl 8ea>v evvoias earl 


cfrepeiv ooov evSaifMovLa kcu dperfj 8 cat/ye povoiv . aA- 
Aa Kara \pvai7T7rov ov8e rovro ixepieoriv avroig- 
dperfj re yap oi>x vrrepexeiv rov Ata rod Atajvo? 

1 E ; rovs deoiis rjfxiov -B. 

2 [ovk] -deleted by Hartman (De Plutarcho, p. 608) ; rj 
ovk €K€ivol fitv -Madvig (Adversaria Critica, p. 671). 

3 E ; chat, Xeyovres -B. 

4 jiavreiov -E ; fiavriKOv -B. 

° See page 709, note b supra. 

b Cf. De Stoic. Repug. 1048 d supra. 

c For this use of tj cf Bonitz, Index AristoteUcus 312 b 
57 — 313 a 18. The negative, the force of which despite its 
position goes through the whole sentence, should not be 



violating the preconception of the gods because he 
does away with providence, for they say that god is 
preconceived and conceived to be not only immortal 
and blessed but also humane and protective and 
beneficent. This is true. If, however, the precon- 
ception about god is annulled by those who do not 
admit providence, what are they doing who assert 
that the gods do provide for us, to be sure, but do 
not benefit us and are dispensers of things not good 
but indifferent," since they do not give virtue but 
give wealth and health and the birth of offspring 
and the like, none of which is beneficial or advantage- 
ous or useful or an object of choice ? b Or c do the 
former not annul the conceptions about the gods, to 
be sure, while the latter in addition insult and make 
a mock of them by asserting that there is a god 
Guardian of Harvests and Guardian of Births and 
Healer and Oracular d though health or birth is not 
a good nor is abundant harvest either but they are 
indifferent and of no benefit to those who get them ? 
33. The third feature of the conception about gods 
is the notion that the gods differ from men in nothing 
so much as they do in happiness and virtue. Accord- 
ing to Chrysippus, e however, they have not even 
this advantage, for Zeus does not excel Tom / in 

tampered with (cf. P. Shorey, T.A.P.A., xlvii [1916], pp. 220- 
222 in his article, " Illogical Idiom "). 

d See De Stoic. Re pug. 1048 c supra. For TeveOXios cf. 
Adv. Colotem 1119 e and Plato, Laws 729 c 5-8 ; for Uaidv 
cf. Qaaest. Conviv. 745 a and Cornutus, xxxii (pp. 69, 17- 
70, 2 [Lang]) ; for Mavrctos cf. De Tranquillitate Animi 472 
a-b and Aristophanes, Birds 722 and Euripides, Troiades 

« S. V.F. iii, frag. 246 ; cf. De Stoic. Repug. 1038 c-d 
supra. f See page 681, note a supra. 



(1076) axfieXe to dal 9* opioids \m dXXrjXwv rov Ata /cat rov 
Atawa, oo(f)ovs ovras, orav drepos 1 Oarepov rvy- 
X av TI Kivov[iivov '. rovro yap ioriv o /cat irapd 
detov avdpamois ayadov 2 vndpxei kcu 6eol$ Trap" 
dv6pd)7TO)v, oo(j)tbv yevopievajv* dXXo 8* ov. dpe- 
B rfjs* 8e pLTj aTToXenrofxevov avdpamov ovhev drroSelv 
evSat/jLovlas Xeyovoiv aAA' eniorjs etvat p,aKapiov 
rep Ait 5 rtp acorrjpi rov drvx'r}, oid voaovs" /cat Trrjpto- 
oeis oojpLOLTos etjdyovra tou ^v eaurdv, eiirep 
eir) ao(f)6s. eon oe outos* ouSa/xou yij? oi5Se y€- 
yovev, a7rA€Tot 8e pivpidoes dvOpwrrojv KaKooaipLO- 
vovvreg eir* a/cpov iv rfj rov Atos" TroXireia /cat 
dpxfj ttjv dpLGrrjv exovorj Siolktjgiv. kclitoi ri 
fidXXov dv yevoiro 7rapd rrjv evvoiav tj 6 rov A 109 
cos €Vi dptora hioiKovvros rjpids ojs eve ^etptara 
rrpdrreiv; el yovv, o pL7)8e Befits iarlv eliretv, 
eBeXrjoeie firj Hojrrjp firjSe MetAt^ios- etvat pLrjo* 
C 'AAe^t/ca/cos' aAAd 7 rdvavria rcov KaXtov rovrcov 
TTpoGTjyopitoVy ovSev ear i TrpooBelvai rots' ovgl 
KaKov* oiir els rrXrfdos ovr* els fieyeOos, ojs ovroi 

1 drepos -van Herwerden (Lectiones Rheno-Traiectinae 
[1882], p. 123) ; cTcpos -E, B. 

2 E ; ayadov avOpajnoLS -B. 

3 Ktvovfi€vojv -Pohlenz. 

4 dpcT^s -Rasmus (Prog. 1872, p. 20 [cf. Stobaeus, Eel. ii, 
p. 98, 15, Wachsmuth]) ; apcrf -E, B. 

6 B ; St . . . vac. 1 . . . rd> -E. 

6 V -Wyttenbach (implied by versions of Amyot and 
Xylander) ; r-qv -E, B. 

7 aAAd -Meziriac ; fxrj be -E, B. 

8 KaKov -Xylander ; koXov -E, B. 

a See 1068 f— 1069 a supra. 

b This phrase is a proper and necessary limitation of 
avOpojircov, and Pohlenz's emendation is therefore at best 



virtue and Zeus and Tom, being sages, are benefited 
alike by each other whenever the one encounters a 
movement of the other. a For this, not anything 
else, is the good that men get of the gods and the 
gods also of men, once these have become sages. b 
They assert that not being deficient in virtue man 
has no lack of happiness c but the unfortunate who 
commits suicide because of bodily disease and mutila- 
tion a is blissful, if he be a sage, in the same degree 
as Zeus the Saviour. This sage does not exist, how- 
ever, and has not existed anywhere on earth e ; but 
there are countless myriads of human beings at the 
extremity of unhappiness in Zeus's commonwealth 
or realm which has the very best administration. 
Yet what could be more at odds with the common 
conception than the notion that with Zeus administer- 
ing affairs in the best possible fashion we are in the 
worst possible plight ? At any rate, if — what is 
illicit even to mention — he should wish not to be 
Saviour or Gracious or Averter of Evil f but the 
contrary of these fair appellations, any evil in addi- 
tion to the number or magnitude of the evils there 
are is impossible, according to the assertion of these 

c Cf. S. V.F. iii, frags. 248 and 764, and Stobaeus, Eel. 
ii, 7, 11* (pp. 98, 14-99, 2 [Wachsmuth], partially printed 
in S. V.F. iii, p. 14, 8-13). 

d See 1069 e supra. 

e With this and the remainder of the chapter cf. Cicero, 
De Nat. Beorum iii, 79 and see 1066 a-b supra with the 
references in note 6 on pages 712 f. 

1 In Non Posse Suaviter Vivi 1102 e MeiAt'xio? and *AAe£t- 
k(lkos are distinguished from Zeus ; for the latter as an 
epithet of Zeus cf. H. Usener, Gdtternamen z , p. 313, n. 33 
and for the former cf. M. P. Nilsson, Geschichte der yrie- 
chischen Religion i (1955), pp. 411-414. 



(1076) Xeyovot, iravrojv dvQptoTTtov en* dfcpov ddXlajs (/cat) 1 

jJLOxOrjpd)^ filOVVTGOV KCU [JL7]§€ TTJS KOLKiaS €7Tl8o(JLV 

[xr]8e VTrepfloXrjv rfjs /ca/coSat/xov/a? 8exopev7]$. 
34. Ov fjLrjv ivravOa to Secvorarop iartv, dXXd 


dpX 7 ) /xeyicrrq tcov iv dvOpcorrois kolkcov 
rd Xiav dyadd 

8vuKoXaivovai — tovto yap elvai rrapd ttjv evvotav — 
avrol 8e tcov kolkcov apx^v dyadov* ovra tov Oeov 
TToiovaiv. ov yap rj ye vXrj to KaKov e£ eavTrjg 
7rap€ax^f<€V' arrows yap eoTi Kal rrdoas ocras 
D Se^erat Stacfiopds vrro tov kwovvtos avTrjv Kal 
ax^piCLTL^ovTog e'crx 6 * Kivel 3 S' avTrjv 6 Xoyos ev- 
vrrdpxojv Kal ox^jJiaTi^ei, jjLrjTe Kivelv eavTrjv psfyre 
cr^/xaTi^eiv rrecpvKvlav . loot dvdyKTj to KaKov, el 
puev oY ov8ev, Ik tov pcrj ovtos, €t 8e 8id ttjv klvov- 
aav dpXT)V> &< tov 6eov yeyovds vrrapx^iv. Kal yap 
el piev otovTai tov Ata jjltj KpaTelv tcov eavTov piepcov 
pL7]8e xPV or ^ ac Kar d tov avTOv Xoyov eKaoTco, rrapd 
ttjv evvotav* Xeyovac Kal rrXaTTovot £coov, ov rroXXd 
tcov pLoplaJV eKtfrevyec ttjv fiovXrjcnv ISlats evepyelais 
Xpcopueva Kal rrpdtjeaiv, ah to oXov opfirjv ov 8l- 
Sojoiv ovSe KaTap^et Kcvrjaecos. ovtcos yap KaKtos 

1 <kol\> -added by Wyttenbach. 

2 B ; dyadu>v -E. 

3 tax*- Klv *i -Meziriac (implied by /Vmyot's version) ; 
2oxr)K€v €1 -E, B. 

4 Meziriac ; cmvoiav -E, B. 

a S. V.F. ii, frag. 1168. 

h Menander, frag. 786 (Koerte-Thierfelder) = frag. 724 

c See 1085 k-c and 108.5 i: -1086 a infra (K. \\F. ii, frags. 



Stoics, since all human beings are living in the 
extremity of wretchedness and depravity, and vice 
does not admit of increment or unhappiness of 

34. The most dreadful part about it is ° not this, 
however, but that, while they are cross with Men- 
ander for his theatrical pronouncement 

Of human ills the chiefest origin 
Is things exceeding good b 

— for this, they say, is at odds with the common con- 
ception — , yet they do themselves make god, though 
good, the origin of things evil. For matter has not 
of itself brought forth what is evil, for matter is 
without quality and all the variations that it takes on 
it has got from that which moves and fashions it. c 
That which moves and fashions it, however, is the 
reason existing in it, since its nature is not to move or 
fashion itself. The necessary result is that what is 
evil, if it has no cause, is a product of what is non- 
existent but, if its cause is the moving principle, is a 
product of god. d For, if they think that Zeus does 
not have control of his own parts and does not use 
each of them in conformity with his own reason, 
their assertion is also at odds with the common con- 
ception and they are imagining a living being many 
of whose parts elude its will in performing their own 
private operations and actions without impulse given 
or motion initiated by the whole organism. For, in 

313 and 380), De Stoic. Repug. 1054 a-b supra (S. V.F ii, 
pp 147, 44-148, 2), De hide 369 a (S. V.F. ii, frag. 1108) ; 
cf. Diogenes Laertius, vii, 134; S.V.F. ii, frags. 303, 309- 
311, 31*, and 336; and Plotinns, Fnn. i, viii, 10 on the 
question, how matter can be evil though a?rotos. 
d Cf De An. Proc. in Timaeo 1015 b. 



(1076) . ,., , , , , 

-g \ovoev/ ovvreraKrai rcov ywx*} v £X ovr(j0V C0OT 

dftovXovvros avrov npolevai rr68as r\ <j>dlyyeodai 

yXcorrav 7) Kepas 2 KVpirreiv fj SaKvecv oSovras' cov 

avdyKTj rd irXelora iraoyeiv rov 9e6v, el rrapd rr}V 

fiov\y)Giv avrov fJLeprj ovres ol cfiavXoi ifjevoovrai 

/cat paoiovpyovoi /cat roLxcopvxovoc Kai drroKriv- 

vvovcrcv aAA^AofS*. el 8e, cos <f>rjoc Xpvoi777Tos y ovSe 

rovXdxicrrov eart rcov pbepcov ex € lv dXXcos dAA' r\ 

Kara rrjv rov Atos f$ovXr)oiv dXXa nav jiev ep.- 

ifjvxov ovrcos lox^crSai koX ovtco KtveloOat ire(f)VKev 

COS €K€LVOS Ciy€L KaK€lVOS €7riGTp€(f>€L KCLl tCT^et /Cat 


00 avr €K€tvov cpuoyyos egcoAeorepos. 
F pvpiaKis 2 ydp rjv emeiKeorepov doOevela Kal dSv- 
vap,iq rov Aios e/cj8ta£o/xeva to, pieprj rroXXd 8pdv 
drona rrapd rrjv eKelvov <f)vaiv Kal fiovXiqcnv 7} pi-qr 
aKpaoiav etvai prqre KaKovpylav rjs ovk eoriv 6 
TLevs curios, dAAd urjv to rov Kocrpov* etvai ttoXiv 
/cat rroXir as rovs dare pas, el Se rovro, Kal cpvXeras 
Kal dpxovras orjXovori Kal fiovXevrrjv rov rjXiov /cat 
1077 rov eorrepov rrpvraviv 77 aorvvopiov, ovk olo \ei) 

1 <ovbev> -Bernardakis (ovbev yap ovtco kliklos ovvTzraKrai 
-Basil.) ; <ti> -Dubner. 

2 E, B ; Kcpa -Dubner. 

3 Meziriac ; p.vpla -E, B. 

4 to rov Koofjuov -Pohlenz ; to tovzIkos pAv -E (et apparently 
a later insertion) ; to to velKos p.kv -B ; tov p.h Koopiov -Xy- 
lan der ; rov ye Koop,ov -Meziriac. 

5 01S' <a> -Giesen(D<? Plutarchi . . . Dispitfationlbus^ p. 45, 
n. 2) ; olSa -E, B. 



fact, {nothing) that has life has been so badly or- 
ganized that against its will its feet move forward or 
its tongue gives utterance or its horns butt or its 
teeth bite ; but most of this must be what happens 
to god if, contrary to his will, the base, while being 
parts of him, deceive and cheat and rob and kill one 
another. If, however, as Chrysippus says, a it is not 
possible for even the slightest of his parts to be 
otherwise than in conformity with the will of Zeus 
but it is the nature of every animate thing to stay 
and to move as Zeus guides it and as he turns and 
stops and arranges it, 

This has a more pernicious sound than that. 6 
For it was ten thousand times more fitting to think 
that owing to the weakness and impotence of Zeus 
his parts break out and do many monstrous deeds 
contrary to his nature and his will than to say that 
there is neither incontinence nor villainy for which 
Zeus is not responsible. But furthermore the thesis 
that the universe is a city and the stars citizens — 
and, if so, obviously fellow-tribesmen too and officers 
of state and the sun a senator and the evening-star 
presiding magistrate or chief of police c — I know not 
<( whether) notions like this do not show those who 

° S. V.F. ii, frag. 937 (p. 269, 34-38) ; see Be Stoic. Repug. 
1050 a-d and 1056 c supra. 

b Nauck, Trag. Graee. Frag. 2 , p. 417 (frag. 417) and 
Kock, Comic. Attic. Frag, iii, p. 614 (frag. 1240). 

c S. V.F. ii, frag. 645 ; cf. especially Manilius, Astro- 
nomicon v, 734-745 and Philo Jud., Be Specialibus Legibus 
i, 13-14 = v, p. 4, 1-7 (Cohn). Plutarch's Be Exilio 601 a 
is not a parallel despite the similar terminology ; nor despite 
Pohlenz is Dio Chrysostom's Oratio xix ( = xxxvi [von 
Arnim]), 29-38, which is rather closer to the more general 
thesis that the universe is a city common to gods and men 
(see 1065 f supra with note c there). 



(1077) fxr] rovs iXeyxovras ra rotavra rd)v Aeyovrcov kcu 
d7TO(j)aivojJi€vo)v aTTohziKvvoiv aToncorepovs. 

35. 'AAAa T&v <j)voiK(A)T€pov x XeyojJiivcov dp* ov 
napa ttjv evvoidv eari OTTtppLa nXeov elvai /ecu ^u€t- 
£ov rj to yewd)fjL€vov e£ avrov ; rr)v yovv <f)voiv 
6pa>fX€v 2 nam kcu t>CL>ois kcu (/>vtois (/cat rjfjLepotsy 
Kal dypiois dpxds rd uiKpa kcu yXlaxpa Kal /xdAtc 
oparct rrjs t<a)v ixeylarajv yeveaetos Xaufidvovoav . 
ov yap €K TTvpov ordxvv ovcV dfirreXov €K yiydprov 
uovov dAA' €K nvprjvos r) fiaXdvov twos opveov 
Siacfrvyovarjs warrep £k uiKpov* amvOfjpos e£dipaaa 
B Kal pLTviaacra ttjv yivecnv epvos rj fidrov r] Spvog r) 
<I>oivikos fj TTtvKrjs TxtpiprqKicnov dvaStScocnv , fj kcu 
(j>aoiv (avroiy to jjuev airepfxa (jrapdy rr)v inl 

fllKpOV SyKOV €K TToXXoV OireLpaOlV (hvopidod ai TTjV 

Se <f>vcnv i/jLcfyvarjcnv 1 ovoav Kal oidxvcnv tojv vtt* 
avrijs dvotyojjLevcvv Kal Xvo/xevcov X6ya>v rj* dpid- 

1 Rasmus (Prog. 1872, p. 20) ; <f)vaiKa)T€pojv -E, B. 

2 6pa>ii€v <eV> -Pohlenz. 

3 <Kal r)p,<=pois> -added by Wyttenbach. 

4 flLKpOV twos -B. 

5 <aurot> -supplied by Wyttenbach ; <f>aaiv ... vac. 5 -E ; 
vac. 7 -B ... to ; <ewoi> -Kronenberg (Mnemosyue, Hi 
[1924], p. 106); <6p0a>s> -Pohlenz. 

6 <-napa> -added by Kronenberg (Mnemosyne, lii [1924], 
p. 106), cf. De Stoic. Repvg. 1052 f (ttjv ifrvxyv (hvop,aoBa.L -napa 

TTjV xjiV^lv). 

7 ifx<l>v(Tr}atv -Leonicus ; €fX(f>VG€GLV -E ; ev^vozoiv -B ; eK<j)v- 
crqmv -Xylander. 8 rj -E ; Kal -B. 

° With the whole of this chapter cf. Philo Jud., De Aeter- 
nitate Mnndi 100-103- vi, pp. 103, 11-104, 13 (Cohn-Reiter), 
of which 101-103 = 5. V.F. ii, frag. 619. 

6 S. V.F. ii, frag. 744. For this kind of Stoic etymologiz- 
ing cf. De Stoic. Repug. 1052 f supra ; S. V.F. ii, frags. 896 
and 911; and K. Barwick, " Probleme der stoischen 



try to refute them to be more absurd than the people 
who assert and maintain them. 

35. Of their more strictly physical assertions, how- 
ever, isn't it at odds with the common conception to 
say that a seed is ampler and bigger than what is 
produced from it ? a At any rate, we see that nature 
for all things, both animals and plants^, both culti- 
vated) and wild, takes as origins for the generation 
of the biggest what are little and petty and scarcely 
visible. For it is not only that she sends up an ear 
of wheat from a grain or a vine from a grape-seed ; 
but from the pip of a fruit or some acorn missed by 
a bird, from a tiny spark, as it were, she kindles 
generation and fans it into flame and sends up a 
lofty shoot of bramble or of oak or of palm or of pine, 
wherefore they say b (themselves) that the seed has 
been named sperm (after) the spiralmg of a large 
mass into a little one c and nature has been named 
physis because it is diffusion or expansion of the 
formulae or factors which it explicates or resolves.** 

Spraehlehre und Rhetorik " (Abhand. der Sachsischen Akad. 
der Wiss. zu Leipzig, Phil.-Hist. Kl., xlix, 3 [1957]), pp. 29- 
33 and 58-79. 

c Cf. Seneca, Nat. Quaest. iii, 29, 2-3 and Epistle xxxviii, 2. 

d Cf. S.V.F. i, p. 36, 5-9 and p. Ill, 25-28 ; S.V.F. ii, 
p. 161, 28-30 and p. 212, 21-34. The Aoyot are the Stoic 
07T€pixaTLKoi Xoyot (cf. S.V.F. ii, frags. 713, 717, 739, and 
1074), which as constitutive factors are here called alter- 
natively dpidfioi (cf. Plutarch, De Recta Ratione Audiendi 
45 c; S.V.F. iii, p. 20, 20-22 and p. 136, 14-15; A.-J. 
Festugiere, Class. Phil., xlviii [1953], pp. 239-240). The 
latter term used in this sense is no indication of " Platonic- 
Pythagorean influence," even though the Neo-Pythagoreans 
did give their dpidfiot the characteristics of the Stoic anepfian^ 
koi Xoyoi (M. Heinze, Die Lehre vom Logos in der grip- 
chischen Philosophic p. 116 and pp. 179-180). 



(1077) ju,<oi>. dAAd rod ye 1 Koapov irdXw 2 to irvp olov 3 
G7T€pfjia Xlyovaiv etvai Kal Kara 4, rrjv eKTrvpuioiv 
€6S* 5 arreppa perafidXAew* rov Koopov, €K fipaxv- 
repov atopLCtTos Kal oyKov x^® 1 ^ ^X 0VTa KoXXrjv 
/cat rod kcvov TrpoaemXap^dvovra \odpav arrXtTov 
emvepopdvrjv rfj av^rjcrei, yevvwpevov S' avOis vrro- 
C x^pzw TO pL€ye6o9 Kal avvoXicrdaivew, ovopLevrjs 
Kal ovvayopivr\s rrepl rrjv yiveoiv etV eavTrjv rrjg 

36. 'AKOvaat roivvv eartv avrcnv Kal ypdppaatv 
ivTvxew itoXXols rrpos tovs * AKaSrjpaiKovs Sta- 
<f)€popL€va)v Kal fiowvrajv ws Travra TTpdypiara ovy- 

1 rod ye -Wyttenbach ; rovre -E, B ; rod [re] -von Arnim. 

2 TrXiov -Pohlenz. 

3 olov -Kolfhaus (Plutarchi De Comm. Not., p. 59) ; o 
-E, B ; [o] -deleted by Wyttenbach ; [irvp o] -von Arnim, 

4 Kara -Rasmus {Prog. 1872, p. 20) ; fxerd -E, B ; etvai 
<ftctJov> Kal fiera -von Arnim ; cIvollK., to irvp o> [/cat] fxera 

5 els -Wyttenbach from the version of Xy lander ; el -E, 
B ; <ore> el$ -von Arnim. 

6 iierapdAXeiv -Rasmus (Prog. 1872, p. 20) ; fiere^aXe -E, 
B ; nerafiaXeZv -Wyttenbach. 

7 x^W-Madvig (Adversaria Critica, p. 23) ; <£uW -E, B. 

fl S. V.F. ii, frag. 618 (pp. 187, 41-188, 4). For the Stoic 
doctrine of the periodic conflagration and restoration of the 
universe see 1065 B, 1067 a, 1075 b-d and De Stoic. Repiftf. 
1052 c and 1053 b-c supra. 

6 Cf. Aquane an Ignis Utilior 955 e (to irvp . . . olov 
crnep\ia tout' e£ eavTov t€ trdvTa Troielv Kal els iavro eKXa^dveiv 
Kard rr t v €K7Tvpu>(jiv) and S.V.F. ii, p. 183, 42-43 and p. 184, 
12-14 ; S.V.F. ii, p. 188, 6-9 and 28-29. 

c Cf. S.V.F. ii, p. 188, 19-26 and p. 189, 8-10. 

< l Cf S. V.F. ii, p. 171, 28-29 ; p. 185, 34-35 ; p. 186, 27- 
31 ; and p. 188, 24-28. 

e Of S.V.F. ii, p. 188, 20-21 and 29-32 and De Stoic. 



On the other hand, however, they assert a that fire 
is as the seed of the universe and that in the course 
of the conflagration the universe changes into seed, 6 
having its lesser corporeal mass greatly diffused c 
and taking over from the void an immense additional 
space upon which it encroaches by its growth,** but 
that when the universe is being generated again the 
magnitude shrinks and dwindles, the matter sub- 
siding and contracting into itself in the process of 
generation. 6 

36. Furthermore, they can be heard and in many 
writings can be seen quarrelling with the Academics 
and crying out * that the latter confuse all things 
Repug. 1053 b supra (a^cvvvfievov 8' avdis Kai naxwo^vov etV 
... to acjfxarocihks rpcrreadai). 

f S.V.F. ii, frag. 112. This controversy between the 
Stoics and the Academics (for which cf. Cicero, Acad. 
Prior, ii, 49-59 and 84-86 ; Sextus, Adv. Math, vii, 252 and 
403-41 1) was part of their debate about the possibility of dis- 
tinguishing true mental images or impressions from false 
ones. The Stoics maintained that every existing thing is 
qualitative individuation {Ihiws noios) of substance or matter 
(Stobaeus, Eel. i, 20, 7 = pp. 178, 13-179, 5 [Wachsmuth] = 
Box. Graeci, pp. 462, 22-463, 4 [cf. Rieth, Griindbegriffe, 
p. 15, n. 8] ; Marcus Aurelius, xii, 30 and ix, 25 ; S.V.F. 
ii, frags. 395 and 378), matter itself being without quality 
(see 1076 c-d supra and note c there), so that a single 
qualification of any quantity of substance must be a single 
individual and there cannot ever be two or more discrete 
things that are exactly alike (S. V.F. ii, frags. 113 and 114 ; 
Seneca, Epistle cxiii, 15-16). To this the Academic reply 
was not a proof that discrete substances otherwise identical 
really exist but the contention that there are existing things 
which, though admittedly many, are yet in fact indistinguish- 
able from one another (Cicero, Acad. Prior, ii, 85-86 and 
Sextus, Adv. Math, vii, 408-411 ; cf. S.V.F. i, frags. 3i7 
and 625). The notion that no two things in nature are 
exactly alike was not exclusively Stoic : cf. Lucretius, ii, 
342-376 ; Quintilian, Instil, Drat, x, 2, 10. 



(1077) xeovot rats dirapaAAa£iais, em ovetv ovotibv eva 
ttolov elvai fiia^opLevoi. koltol rovro p,ev ovk 
eoriv Sons dvOpcorra)^ ov Stavoecrat /cat rovvavrlov 
oterai Oavpuaorov elvai /cat 7rapd8o£ov el pxyre 
(f>drra (f>drrrj pirjre pLeAtrrr] fxeXcrra pLrjTe rrvpcp 
rrvpos ri ovKco to rov Aoyov ovkov ev rep navrl 
Xpovcp yeyovev drrapdAAaKTOV . eKelva 8* ovtojs 
D rrapa rrjv evvoidv eoriv, a Aeyovoiv ovtol /cat nAdr- 
rovoiv, em puds ovoias 8v* tSta>9 yeveodai ttolovs 
/cat rr/v avrfjv ovolav eva ttolov ISiojs e\ovoav em- 
ovros erepov he^oOai /cat ^la^vAdrreiv 6p,oia>s 
dpL<f)OT€povs. el yap 8vo, /cat rpets /cat rerrapes 
eoovrai /cat nevre /cat ooovs ovk dv ns eirroi rrepl 
pLtav ovoiav* Aeya> S* ovk ev piipeoi hia(f>6pois 
dAAa Trdvras 6p,ola>s rrepl oArjv rovs drrecpovs. Ae- 
yei yovv Xpvoirnros eoiKevai rep pbev avdpwrrtp rov 
Ata /cat rov Koopiov rfj oe foxf) T V V rrpovoiav orav 
ovv rj 1 €K7TVpa>OLS yevrjrat, piovov d^daprov ovra 

1 rj -E ; omitted by B. 

° Cf. Cicero, Acad. Prior, ii, 53 (" eorum qui omnia 
cupiunt confundere M ) and 54. 

b Cf. Comica Adespota, frag. 189 (Kock) ; Herodas, vi, 
60 ; Leutsch, Corpus Paroem. Graec. i, p. 293 (no. 37). 

c S.V.F. ii, frag. 396. This is not, as J. R. Mattingly 
contends it is (Philos. Rev., xlviii [1939], pp. 278-279), what 
the Stoics said or meant but is an inference drawn from the 
statement about the ecpyrosis that Plutarch proceeds to cite 
(Ae'yet yovv XpvanrTTOs). For the Stoics any amount of 
matter is as many and only as many discrete and different 
substances as it has i8ta*s irotot, and Chrysippus expressly 
stated (S. V.F. ii, frag. 397) that hvo IBlws noiol nepl to avro 
vTTOKziixzvov ov hwavrai €lvcll (cf. A. C. Pearson, Journ. of 
Philology, xxx"[1907], pp. 212-214 ; E. Brehier, Rev. d'Hist. 
de la Philos., i [1927], pp. 219-220). The contradiction 



with their indistinguishable likenesses a by insisting 
upon the existence of a single qualification in the case 
of two substances. Yet there is no human being who 
does not make this supposition and think that on the 
contrary it is amazing and paradoxical if in all of 
time there have not been two doves or two bees or 
two grains of wheat or the proverbial two figs b in- 
distinguishably like each other. What's really at 
odds with the common conception are those asser- 
tions made by these Stoics and their fictions about a 
single substance's having got two individual qualifica- 
tions, which is to say that one and the same sub- 
stance with a single individual qualification takes on 
a second when it supervenes and continues to keep 
both of them alike. For, if two, there could also be 
three and four and five and more than could be told 
in a single substance — I mean not in different parts 
of it but all the countless qualifications alike in the 
whole of it. At any rate, Chrysippus asserts d that 
Zeus, that is the universe, is like the human being e 
and his providence is like its soul/ that consequently, 
when the conflagration has taken place, Zeus, who 

cannot be explained away as Miss Reesor has tried to do 
(A. J. P., lxxv [1954], pp. 46-47) or accounted for in the way 
attempted by C. Petersen (Philosophiae Chrysippeae Funda- 
mental pp. 90-91). 

d S. V.F. ii, frag. 1064. 

• Cf. S.V.F. Hi, p. 217, 10-12 (Diogenes of Babylon rov 
Koofiov ypd<t>€L toj Ait rov avrov vnapx^cv 7} ir€pt€x €iv r ^v Ata ko.9- 
aiT€p avOpojTTov </rux^v). The universe, identified with Zeus 
(De Stoic. Repug. 1052 c-d supra and Be Facie 926 d ; cf. 
S.V.F. ii, p. 168, 5-8 and p. 169, 32), has body and soul in 
the " diacosmesis " but becomes all soul in the " ecpy- 
rosis " (Be Stoic. Repug. 1053 b-c supra). 

f Cf. Cicero, Acad. Post, i, 29 and Be Nat. Beorum ii, 58 
(S.V.F. i, p. 44, 19-21) ; S.V.F. ii, p. 187, 13. 



(1077) rov Ata tojv #ca>v dvaxojp€iv irrl rr)v rrpovoiav, €i#' 
E o/jtou yevo/LtcVotis 1 irrl pads rrjs rod aldipos ovoias 
ScareXeiv dpi<f)orepovs . 

37. 'A(f)€VT€s ovv rjSrj rovs Oeovs Kal rrpooev- 
£dpL€vot Koivas (f>pevas SiSovaL /cat kolvov vovv, rd 
rrept oroiyeiow rrtos e^et avrols ISojpLtv. rrapa rr)v 
evvoidv ion ocofia aojptaros tlvai rorrov Kal acofxa 
XoopeZv Sta atofxaros, Kevov paqherepov rreptexovros 
dAAa rod TrArjpovs els ro rrXrjpes ivSvopievov Kal 
Se)(0[JL€Vov ro impuyvvpLevov rod Scdoraoiv ovk 
exovros 1 ovSe x^P av *v avrco Sid rrjv ovvexttav. 

1 exovros dAAa rov rrX'qpovs -E, B ; [dAAa rov rrXrjpovs] -de- 
leted by Hutten. 

° See 1075 b supra and note c there. 

6 Implying that a single substance has two qualitative 
individuations, Zeus = kooixos {cf S.V.F. ii, p. 186, 35-38) 
and irpovota = soul alone. The opponents of Chrysippus then 
argued that in conformity with his paradigm for avoiding 
such a conclusion (S. V.F, ii, frag. 397) rrpovota should be 
destroyed in the " ecpyrosis " (Philo Jud., De Aeternitate 
Mundi 47-51 =vi, pp. 87, 14-88, 25 [Cohn-Reiter]). 

c For the Stoic " ether M see note e on Be Stoic. Repug. 
1053 a supra, and for the " ecpyrosis " as " etherialization " 
of the body of the universe cf. S. V.F. ii, p. 188, 22-23. 

d Explicitly as such this subject is not attacked until 
chapter 48 (1085 b infra) ; but the doctrine of thorough 
blending, with which Plutarch here begins and on which all 
Stoic physical theory was held to depend (cf. S. V.F. ii, frag. 
475, especially p. 156, 16-18), and the related questions of 
continuity and discreteness and of the corporeality of all 
existents are fundamental to his criticism of the Stoic treat- 
ment of (TTotxetov, so that despite a few digressions suggested 
by the context the intervening chapters are not irrelevant 



alone of the gods is indestructible, withdraws to his 
providence, and then both, having come together, 
persist in the single substance b of the ether. c 

37. So, leaving the gods at last with a prayer for 
the gift of common sense and common intelligence, 
let us see how the Stoics treat the subject of the ele- 
ments. d It is at odds with the common conception e 
for one body to be place for another f and for one to 
pass through another if void is contained in neither 
but plenum enters into plenum and the admixture 
is received by that which because of its continuity 
has not interval or space within itself. g These men, 
to the subject here announced (cf. Pohlenz, Hermes, lxxiv 
[1939], pp. 29-30). 

e irapa ttjv evvoiav . . . toj /Lteyi'crTOj = S.V.F. ii, frag. 465 
(p. 151, 16-23) ; cf. Alexander, Be 'Mixtione, p. 218, 10-24 
and p. 220, 23-34 (Bruns) with p. 227, 10-12 ( = S.V.F. ii, 
p. 156, 16-19) and for the Stoic doctrine of thorough blend- 
ing, the compenetration of one another by two or more 
bodies, each itself a plenum, cf. S.V.F. ii, frags. 463-481 
and W. J. Den Dulk, KPASIS (Leiden, 1934), pp. 41-48. 
Our most extensive sources for the doctrine are the present 
chapter, the essay De Mixtione (ITept Kpdoews koX av\rjO€<x>s) 
by Alexander of Aphrodisias (cf. De An. Libri Mantissa, 
pp. 139, 30-141, 28 [Bruns] and Quaestiones, p. 57, 7-30 
[Bruns]), a discussion by Plotinus (Erin, n, vii ; cf. iv, vii, 
8 2 ), and the attack on blending by Sextus Empiricus (Pyrrh. 
Hyp. iii, 56-62). Sympathetic interpretations of the doctrine 
have been attempted by Br Shier (Thdorie des Incorporels, 
pp. 39-44), A. Schmekel (Die Positive Philosophie . . . i 
[Berlin, 1938], pp. 250-255), and Sambursky (Physics of 
the Stoics, pp. 13-17). 

/ Cf. S.V.F. ii, frag. 468 (. . . to oa>fia earai iv loco ire pep 
o-ojfxo.Tt . . .) and Alexander, De An. Libri Mantissa, p. 140, 
10-20 (Bruns). 

9 Cf. Alexander, De Anima, p. 20, 8-10 (Bruns) ; De An. 
Libri Mantissa, p. 139, 33-36 ( = S.V.F. ii, p. 156, 36-39) ; 
De Mixtione, p. 218, 21-24 (Bruns) and, for hta rrjv avvix^a-v, 
ibid., p. 218, 5-6 ( = S. V.F. ii, p. 155, 35-36). 



(1077) oi S' ov)( €v €i$ eV ov8e 8vo ov8e rota /cat 1 Se'/ca 

cruvcodovvres aAAd rrdvTa fiepr) rod KocrfMov /cara- 

F KepiLarioQevTOS iiifidAXovTes els cV 6 tl dv rvywoi 

/cat TovXdyioTov aladrjTov a7To<f>doKovT€s 2 imXeiipecv 3 


jjLevoi tov eXeyxov 5 ojs ev aAAot? ttoXAols, are §r) 
/xa^o/xeVas- v7to0€O€ls rats evvoiais XapifidvovTes . 
aurt/ca yovv (d/coAou#ov) 6 rat Xoyco tovtco iroXXa 
reparwSrj 7 /cat dXXoKora 7Tpoo8ex^cFdai tovs ra aai- 
1078 /xara rots' acofiacnv 6'Aots" oAa Kepavvvvras. wv eon 
/cat to " rd rpia reooapa efvat ,,# rovrl yap ol 
fiev dXXot XeyovcrLV iv vnepfioXfj 7rapaSety/xa tojv 
aSiavorjTOJV, tovtois 8k ovfif3alv€i tov eva KvaOov 
tov olvov TTpos 8vo K€ pawv )jL€vov voWo?, el fxeXXec 

(JLTj aTroX€L7T€W ClAA' i^lOOVodai, TTOLpayOVTCLS €77t 8 

rrav /cat 8iaovyx<£ovTas eV 6Vra 8vo 7roielv tyj ttoo? 
tovs 9 8vo TTJs Kpdoetos c^tcraWer to yap fievetv eva 


1 kox -E, B ; <rj> Kat-von Arnim ; r) -Pohlenz (but cf. Ad 
Principem Ineruditum 780 e : ov <£ei67ou . . . ovbc Ho\vkX€ltou 
kq\ Mvpcovos). 

2 <x7To<l>doKovT€s -Bernardakis ; zTTifydoKovTts -E, B ; in 
4>d<JKOVT€s <ovk> -Wyttenbach ; <ouSc> rovXdxt>urov alodrjrov 
[€7n]<f>doKovT€s -Kronenberg (Mnemosyne, 3 Ser. x [194-5], p. 

8 Stephanus ; i-nikq^iv -E, B. 
4 Zmov -von Arnim. 

6 to dveXeyKTov -Pohlenz (but cf. Sandbach, Class. Rev., 
N.S. iv [1954], pp. 249-250). 

6 <aKoXovdov> -added by Pohlenz. 

7 T€paTo>8r} <8ct> -Giesen (De Plutarchi . . . Disputationi- 
bus, Theses # 5). 

8 inl -Wyttenbach ; « n -E, B. 

9 rovs -E ; omitted by B ; [rfj . . . egioiooei] -deleted by 
Sandbach (Class, Quart., xxxv [1941], p. 116). 



however, compressing into one tiling not one other 
and not even two or even three or ten but stuffing 
all parts of the finely shredded universe into any- 
single thing they find and denying that the slightest 
perceptible thing would be inadequate for the largest 
that encounters it,° recklessly make themselves a 
doctrine of the objection advanced to refute them 
just as they do in many other cases, inasmuch as they 
make assumptions that are in conflict with the com- 
mon conceptions. It is <(a consequence) of this 
reasoning, for example, that many prodigiously 
strange things are admitted by those who blend 
bodies with bodies in their entirety. Among them is 
even the proposition, " three are four," for, while 
others use this expression by way of hyperbole as an 
example of things that are inconceivable, b for these 
men it does turn out that, if the single ladleful of 
wine being blended with two of water is not to fall 
short of the water but is to match it, in dispersing 
the ladleful over all the water and dissolving c it 
throughout they make it two, though it is one, by the 
equalization of blending it with two. For to remain 
one ladleful and to make <(itself)> coextensive with 

° Cf. Alexander, De Anima, p. 20, 10-15 (Bruns) ; 
Simplicius, Phys., p. 530, 19-24 ; Philoponus, De Aeternitate 
Mundi vii, 17 (p. 281, 12-22 [Rabe]). 

b Cf. De Stoic. Repug. 1038 f supra. 

6 Not to be taken in the technical Stoic sense of ovyxvois, 
which is distinguished from Kp&ois (cf. Alexander, De 
Mixtione, p. 220, 29-35 [Bruns] ; S. V.F. ii, p. 153, 23-26 
and 39 ff. and p. 154, 15-28). 

10 [koX 7tol€lp] -deleted by Rasmus (Prog. 1872, p. 21) ; 
teal novel -Giesen (De Plutarchi . . . Disputationibus, p. 31, 
n. 2). 



(1078) eorai to yjfjLLGV Troielv taov) 1 to> harXaoicp' el he, 2 
ottcos e^t/c^rat 3 rfj Kpdoei irpos rovs hvo, hvelv 
Aa/ij8aVet 4 jjLerpov ev rij 8ta;\wet, tovto 5 fierpov 
dp,a kclI Tpttov eari Kal reoodpcov, rpiwv p.ev on 

TOLS hvo €L? jJidflLKTai TeOOapOJV he OTt hvol jLl€/Xty- 

B fievos igov ea^iqKe ttXtjOos ols [Aiyvvrai. tovto q hr) 
avpfiacvei to kolAov avTois epifidXAovoLv els oxoua 
ocbfjiaTa, /cat 7 to Trjs Trepioxrjs ahiav6y]Tov . dvdyKTj 
yap, els dXXrjXa ^ojpovvTOJV tu> Kepdvvvodai, pLr\ 
OaTepov jxev Ttepieyeiv irepieyeodai he daTepov /cat 
to [lev he)(eo9ai to S' evwndpyeiv ovtco yap ov 
Kpaats d<f>7) he /cat i/javois carat tcjv erncfyaveiijov, 
ttjs {lev evTOS VTTohvopLevrjs ttjs S' £ktos Tiepieypv- 
gt]s tcov h* d'XAojv fiepajv dfJLiKTOJv Kal Ka9apa>v 
{/cat /ca#') 8 ev he h ia(j>e po piev cov . aAA' dvdyKrj* 
yiyvopievrjs woirep d£iovoi ttjs dvaKpdoeajs, ev aA- 
A^Aots" tol puyvvpieva ylyveoBai 10 /cat tovtov optov 

C Tip evvirdp^eiv irepieyeoQai Kal to> Se^eaflat rrepi- 
e^eiv daTepov Kal jjLTjheTepov 11 aurcov av irdAiv hv- 

1 <iavrov . . . loov> -added by H. C. (cf. Alexander, De An. 
Libri Mantissa, p. 141, 13-14 [Brims]) ; -rroitlv loov rw St7rAa- 
olw <ro jjfjLiov napaXoyov ioriv> -Sandbach (Class. Quart., 
xxxv [1941], p. 116) ; ttoicZv loov <Joov> rep onrXaoico -Pohlenz. 

2 en Se'-Madvig (Adversaria Critica, p. 671 [with Xap.fidv€iv 

3 ei 5e ovrios iiioovrai -Rasmus (Prog. 1873, p. 21). 

4 Sandbach (Class. Quart., xxxv [1941], p. 116), and im- 
plied by Amyot's version ; Xafi^dvecv -E, B ; XafMpdvcov -Giesen 
(De Plutarchi . . . Disputation lb us, p. 31, n. 2). 

5 to avro -Sandbach (loc. cit.). 

6 tovto <t€> -Sandbach (loc. cit.). 

7 /caret -Wyttenbach. 

8 </«h KaQ'> -added by H. C; Kadapwv £voia<f)€popi€vcA)v 



two and equal to them (would be to make what is 
half equal) to its double ; but, if in order to suffice 
for blending with the two it does acquire in the 
diffusion a measurement of two ladles, this is at the 
same time a measurement both of three and of four 
— of three because one ladleful has been mixed with 
the two and of four because, once having been mixed 
with two, it is equal in amount to those with which 
it is mixed. a This pretty pass they come to, then, 
by stuffing bodies into body — and to the inconceiv- 
ability of encompassment. For it is necessarily not 
the case b that of bodies permeating each other in 
being blended one encompass and the other be en- 
compassed or one be the receptacle and the other be 
in it, since in that case there would be not blending 
but contact, that is contiguity of the surfaces, the 
one within subjacent and the one without encom- 
passing it and the rest of the parts unmixed and pure 
and severally distinct too. If blending occurs in the 
way they require, however, it is necessary that the 
things being mixed get into each other and the same 
thing be at once encompassed by being in the other 
and encompass it by being its receptacle ; and on 

Cf Alexander, De An. Libri Mantissa, p. 141, 9-22 and 
Sextus, Pyrrh. Hyp. iii, 60-61 and 96. 

6 o\vdytcc\ yap . . . ava7Tifi7r\ao9ai ^iat ) op,4vy]S= S. V.F. ii, 
frag. 465 (p. 151, 24-33) ; cf. Alexander, De Mixtione, 
pp. 220, 37-221, 6 (Bruns). 

c Cf 1080 E infra : to (lev yap oi>x d^rjy dXXa Kpaoiv rroieiv. 

-Wyttenbach ; KaOapwv ov8k Siafapofjidvajv -Rasmus (Proy. 
1872, p. 21). 

9 Wyttenbach ; dvay/eqs -E, B. 

10 E ; ficyvvaO at -B. 

11 von Arnim ; p,r) S' erepov -E, B ; pLr/d* erepov . . . au/i.j3cuWi 
IaiJt dp<f>oT€pa -Madvig (Adversaria Critica, p. 671). 



(1078) varov elvai ovpifSaivei, dpLcfrorepa 1 rfjs Kpdoeojs hi 
aXhrqXcxyv Suevou /cat p/qhev eiriXeiiTead ai 2 firjbtvds 
[Jiopiov dAAa (7rav) 3 iravrog dvaTTipLTrXaoOai j8ta- 
t^opLevrjs. ivravOa StJttov* /cat to OpvXovpiesov 5 ev 
rat? Starpt/Jat? ' ApKeoiXdov OKeXos rjKei rals dro- 
Triais errepifiaZvov* avrwv jierd yeXa>ros- el yap 
eloiv at Kpdaeis St' oAojv, ri KcoXvec, 7 rod gk£Xovs 


rrjv ddXarrav /cat 8iaxv9evros , ov rov 'Avriyovov 
[jlovov oroXov Ste/c7rAetv, d>s eXeyev 'Ap/ceatAaos, 
D aAAa ra? E*ep£ov ^tAta? /cat Sta/coatas" /cat ra? 'EA- 
XrjVLKas opLOV rpiaKooias rpirjpeis ev rep a/ce'Aet 
vavpLCLXovoas ; ov yap eTTiXeiifjei hrjTrovdev 7rpoidv* 
ovSe iravaerai ev rep pbel^ovt rovXarrov rj rrepas rj 
Kpaois e^ei /cat to reXevralov avrrjs dfrqv oirov 
Xrjyei 7TOirjadpLevov els oXov ov Sietoiv dXX* aTrayo- 
pevaei pnyvvp^evov. el 8e pLepbl^erai St' 6Xa>v y ov pid 
Ata 10 to OKeXos evvavpLaxfjoac rrape^ei rots* " EA- 
Xrjoiv dAAa rovro puev Setrat or\ifjea)s /cat /xera- 

1 avfifiaiv€LV S* d^i<j>6r€pa -Wyttenbach ; crvfLpaivti S' d/x^o- 
T€pa -von Arnim ; ovfifiaiveiv , d^orepa -Pohlenz. 

2 crt ActTTccr^at -von Arnim (but cjf. Epinomis 978 b 1). 

3 <7rdv> -added by Madvig (Adversaria Critica, p. 611). 

4 5^77-oi> -Bernardakis ; Set tov -E ; 617 -B. 

5 Dilbner ; dpv AAou/xci/o v -E, B (c/. D^ Stfcnc. Re pug. 1050 b 

6 B ; €7T€jJL^alvWV -E. 

7 B ; kojAvciv -E. 

8 E ; iTpoitov (but with a> changed to o) -B. 

9 Sandbach (Class. Quart., xxxiv [1940], p. 24, n. 3); 
(XTrayopevti -E, B. 

10 ou fia (fxd -E) 81a -E, B ; €v fj,d\a -Pohlenz. 

a Cf. Alexander, Be Mixtione, p. 215, 10-12 (Brims) and 
p. 217, 9-12 ( = S.V.F. ii, pp. 154, 36-155, 3); Ilierokles, 
Ethische El ( merit arlehre ed. II. von Arnim, col. 4, 6-10. 



the other hand again it follows that neither condition 
is possible, since the blending constrains both things 
to penetrate each other and no part to lack any part 
but (every part) to be filled full of all. a Here, I 
presume, is where the leg too that Arcesilaus made 
a commonplace in his discourses enters trampling in 
mockery upon their absurdities. In fact, if blends 
are thorough, what is to prevent not only the fleet 
of Antigonus, as Arcesilaus said, from sailing through 
the leg that has been amputated, decayed, flung into 
the sea, and dissolved but the 1200 triremes of 
Xerxes together with the 300 of the Greeks b from 
fighting a naval battle within the leg ? For surely 
the lesser spreading in what is greater would not run 
short and would not stop either ; otherwise the 
blend would have a limit, and its extremity, having 
made contact at the point where it terminates, would 
not penetrate the whole but would leave off being 
mixed. If it should be, however, that the mixture 
has been thorough, it is not the leg, by heaven, that 
would be affording the Greeks room for a naval 
battle ; but, while this does require decay, that is a 

5 Approximately the number of ships engaged at Salamis 
in 480 b.c. according to Aeschylus, Persae 337-343, the 
passage to which Plutarch himself refers in his Themistocles 
xiv, 1 (119 b). 

c Pohlenz's emendation (ev fidXa) is superficially attrac- 
tive but spoils the sense. Plutarch recognizes that the jest 
of Arcesilaus is beside the point because, since it implies 
alteration of the leg before blending occurs, the leg is not 
an element in the blend. The elements that enter into the 
blend must retain their own characters (cf. Alexander, De 
Mixtione, pp. 216, 28-217, 2 [ = 8. V.F. ii, p. 154, 23-28] and 
p. 220, 26-35 [Bruns]) ; and this according to the Stoic 
theory a single drop of the putrefaction fallen into the ocean 
should do. 



(1078) fioXrjs, cfs* 1 Se ris Kvados rj fiia araycbv avrodev 
els to Alyalov e/x77€crouaa TTtXayos rj to KprjriKov 2 
€(f)i^€rai 3 rod 'Q/ceavou /cat rrjg ' ArXavrcKrjs da- 
E Xdrrrjg, ovk imTroXrjs ifjavovaa rrjs emcfxiveias aAAd 
7Tavrrj Std jiddovs els rrXdros 6[xov /cat jjltjkos dva- 
XeofjLevq. /cat ravra irpoooexerai Xpvonnros €i>9vs 
ev to) rrpcorcp rtbv Owt/ccov ZrjTrjiJLaTCOV ovSev drr- 
€^£tv <f)dfA€Vos oi'vou GTaXayfjiov eva 4 Kcpdaac ryv 

ddXarrav /cat, tVa §7} flTj TOVTO daVfJLd^COfJLeV, €tV 
oAov <f)-qol tov KoafMov hiarevelv rfj Kpdcrei TOV otcl- 
XaypLov. (Lv ovk otSa rl dv droTTcxyrepov <f>aveirj. 
38. Kat /jltjv TTdpd rrjv k'vvoiav yurir aKpov €V 

T7J <f>VG€L TWV CTOJ/XaTOJV fJbrjT€ TTpa>TOV pjTfT k'oyjXTOV 

(fxepos etvat) 5 firjSev ctV o Xrjyec to fieyedos rod 
1 els -Diibner ; €t -E, B. 2 E ; KpiriKov -B. 

3 Wyttenbach ; afigerai -E, B. 

4 araXayfjLO) ivl -Giesen (De Plutarchi . . . Disputation* bus, 
p. 32). 

5 <fiepos €ip(u> -added by von Arnim (S. V.F. ii, p. 159, 9) ; 
<€trat> -Pohlenz. 

a S.V.F. ii, frag. 480. Cf. Alexander, Be An. Libri 
Mantissa, p. 140, 22 {S.V.F. ii, p. 157, 1-2) and p. 141, 
19-21 ; Diogenes Laertius, vii, 151 (S.V.F. ii, frag. 479). 
In this passage of Diogenes ovfi<f>daprjo€Tai conflicts with the 
other accounts of the Stoic theory, for ovfifiuapuis character- 
izes avyxvcris as distinguished from kp&ols (cf. S. V.F. ii, 
p. 154, 15-19 and 32-34) ; and so the preceding ivl ttogov 
avTL7rap€KTa9r}G€Tcu, which has been used to discredit Plu- 
tarch's assertion (H. A. Wolfson, The Philosophy of the 
Church Fathers i [Harvard University Press, 1956], p. 383, 
n. 81), is also suspect as a misinterpretation if it is not simply 
an error for em rooovrov avrnrap^KradrjoeraL (cf. S. V.F. ii, 
p. 155, 24 : ei? rrjv inl roaovrov eVraortv). Chrysippus made 
his assertion in direct contradiction of Aristotle's (De 
Generatione 328 a 26-28). 

b S.V.F. ii, frag. 485 (p. 159, 7-11). Sandbach (Class. 
Quart., xxxiv [1940], p. 25) suggests that Plutarch included 


transformation, a single ladleful or just a single drop 
once fallen into the Aegean or the Cretan sea would 
reach the Ocean and the Atlantic, not in superficial 
contact with the surface but everyway diffused from 
top to bottom throughout both breadth and length 
at once. And this Chrysippus straightway admits in 
the first book of the Physical Questions, where he 
says that nothing keeps a single drop of wine from 
tempering the sea ; and, no doubt in order that this 
may not amaze us, he says that the drop in the blend- 
ing will extend to the whole universe. What could 
be manifestly more absurd than this I do not know. 
38. Moreover, it is at odds with the common con- 
ception that b < there be) in the nature of bodies 
neither extremity nor any first or last {part) c in 

chaps. 38-89 because, " having turned to (frvoiKa ^rrj/iara a' 
for his quotation at the end of 37, [he] could not resist pick- 
ing out a couple of points from the same book " ; but that 
the subject of chaps. 38-40 was regarded as essential to the 
question of Kpdms St' oXcov may be seen from the way Alex- 
ander treats the former when attacking the latter in De 
Mixtione, p. 221, 25 ff. (Bruns). 

c Cf. ol oa)fia /jLTjStv €is 'io^arov fiepos TTtpaivovres in 1079 A 
and fJLrjbtv /xepo? €<JX aT0V f^Se Kpajrov anoXeLTrovTes in 1080 E 
infra, where it appears that the Stoics did not deny " ex- 
tremities " to body but insisted that these extremities are in- 
corporeal limits and not parts of the bodies which they 
limit. Plutarch in his attack here, however, disregards the 
distinction which they drew between nepas and toxarov tM€pos; 
and, perhaps misled by this and by Brehier (Theorie des In- 
corporels, pp. 39-40), Sambursky (Physics of the Stoics, p. 
96) misinterprets the passage as evidence for the notion that 
the Stoics " discarded the conception of the distinct surface 
of a body. ..." Sextus in Adv. Math, x, 28 assumes that 
ra eaxara rod oGj\iaros nepara are parts of the body ; but in 
Adv. Math, iii, 24-25 he tries to prove that every iripas is a 
part of that of which it is the extremity and as such has 



(1078) acLfiaros dXX* del (ri} 1 tov Xr\<f)devTos erreKetva 
cf>aw6p,evov els drreipov /cat dopiarov ejifidXXeiv to 


voelv erepov irepov fieyedos, el to rrpo'ievai tols 
fjbepeoiv err* drreipov dpL^orepois ojo{avra>sY ox»/x- 
f$ef$ir)Kev } dXX dvioorrjTOS aXperai* (f>voLS' dviaojv 
ydp voovfievcov, to jiev TTpoaTToXeirrerai rots eoyd- 
tols fiepeat to 8e TrapaXXdrrei /cat rrepieori. fir) 
ovat)s 8' dvcooTTjTos, errerai [AT] dvcofiaXcav elvat, 
jj/r)8e TpaxvrrjTa ocojxaros' dvajfiaXia piev ydp eon 
1079 puds em(f>avelas dviaorrjs Trpos eavrrjv, Tpaxvrrjs 
8' dvojfJLaXta pierd crKXrjpoTrjros, <Lv ovSev dno- 
Xelrrovaiv ol aa)/xa pLrjSev els eox arov [xepos 
rrepalvovres dAAd rrdvra rrXrjOei fxepcov err* drreipov 
e^dyovres. kolitoi ttcos ovk evapyes eon t6v dv- 
dpomov €K rrXeiovojv avvearrjKevai ptopicov r) rov 
SaKTvXov rov dvdpojTTov /cat ndXiv rov Kocrpiov rj 
rov dvOpcorrov; raura 4 ydp iirioravTou koll Stavoouv- 

1 <n> -added by Dtibner. 

2 Pohlenz ; <Ls -E, B ; [cos] -deleted by VVyttenbach. 

3 avaiptlrai -van Herwerden, Westman ; but see De Stoic. 
Repug. 1051 b supra. 

4 Wyttenbach ; avra -E, B. 

a Any part taken as ultimate must as a part be corporeal 
and so have " beyond it " an extremity, which, if a part, 
will also be corporeal and have " beyond it " an extremity, 
and so on without limit. See 1080 d-e infra (rots . . . ad n 
tou ookovvtos aiTT^odai TrpoVcpov Aa/i,j3dVot;cri Kai ivqh4i70T€ rov 
iTpoayctv €7T€K€tva 7rauo/x€vots), and cf. Sextus, Adv. Math, iii, 
81 (ct yap acjfxd ioriv [scil. to 7rcpa?|, eVct irav oat^ia Trdpas ^\ €l > 
KOLKtivo to 7Tepa? owfta ov efet -rrcpas, KaKttvo 6fiolu)s, Kal tovt' 
cts dncipov) and for the pattern of the argument Zeno of Elea, 
frag. B 1 (i, p. 255, 15-21 [D.-Kl = Simplicius, Phys., p. 141, 
2-6 with the remark of Simplicius [ibid., p. 180, 17-18 1 : 
. . . 7rpo tov Aafifiavofievov au ri clvai 5ta rr^v eV* dneipov rofxrjv). 



which the magnitude of the body terminates but 
that, whatever be taken, the invariable appearance 
{of something]) beyond it reduce the object to 
infinity and indefinitude.® For it would not be pos- 
sible to conceive one magnitude as greater or less 
than another if for the parts of both alike it is char- 
acteristic to proceed to infinity ; but the nature of 
inequality is abolished, for, when things are con- 
ceived as unequal, it is by the ultimate parts that the 
one leaves off before the other and the other passes 
it by and is in excess of it. & And, if inequality does 
not exist, it follows that unevenness does not exist 
or roughness of body either, for unevenness is in- 
equality of a single surface with itself c and rough- 
ness is unevenness along with hardness,** none of 
which is left by those who e bring no body to an end 
in an ultimate part but in number of parts extend 
all bodies to infinity. Yet is it not completely clear 
that a man consists of more parts than the man's 
finger does and the universe again of more parts 
than does the man ? This all men know and have in 

6 The reason given here is simply that the extent of 
magnitudes not determined by ultimate parts could not be 
distinguished. It is not, as it has been said to be (S. Luria, 
Quellen und Studien zur Gesckichte der Mathematik, B ii 
[19331, p. 169), the objection that any two magnitudes 
would be equal because both would contain infinitely many 
parts ; nor is it the objection raised by Epicurus in Epistle 
i, 56-57 (p. 16, 6-12 [Usener]). 

c Cf. Anonymi Logica et Quadrivium ed. J. L. Heiberg, 
p. 73, 16-17, and Hero, Definitiones 10 (p. 22, 10-13 [Heiberg]) 
with Sextus, Adv. Math, iii, 95 (to €\ov «f laov ra fxeprj k€l- 
fAtva, TouT€Vrt to ofiaXov) ; for heterogeneity or lack of uni- 
formity in general of, Plato, T'nnaeus 58 a I. 

(l Cf Plato, Timaeits 63 e 8-10. 

• S. V.F. ii, frag. 485 (p. 159, 1 1-12). 



(1079) rat rrdvres dv fir} J^tojikoI yevcovrac yevofxevot 8e 
Yjtojikol ravavTia Xeyovai kolL So^d^ovacv u>s ovk 
eoriv €K nXetovoJv fioptcov 6 avOpamos 7) 6 SolktvAos 
ovSe 6 Kocrfios rj 6 dvOpcoTros' e7r' aireipov yap rj 
B rofirj fipaTTGt, 1 ra acojiara, rtov §' arr^lpajv ovSev 
ion rrXeov ouS' eXarrov ovSe oXcos vTrepfidXXei 2 
TrXrjdos 3 7) rravoerai ra p<€pr] tov vrroXeiTrouevov 
fMepL^ofJieva Kal irapiyovra irXrjOos i£ avrcov. 

ETAIP05. Tt ovv; ovk dfJLVvovrai* ravras rds 
diropias ; 

AIAAOTM. EvfJLrjxdvOJS KOfllSfj Kdl dv8p€LOJS . 

Xeyei yap 6 XpvoiTTTTos ipojrcopb€vovs rjfJias e? riva 
exofiev fi€prj Kal rroaa Kal c/c tlvojv avyKeifieva fie- 
pcov Kal ttogojv StaaroXfj xPV cr€(J Q cu > T0 ^ v 0A0- 
ax^p^S riOevras cos €K K€<f>aXfjs Kal dcopaKos Kal 
OKtXojv avyK€cpL€0a' rovro yap rjv rrav to ^7]tov- 
[jl€vov Kac aTTopovfjuevov " iav 8' errl ra ea^ara 

1 H. C. ; 77-parret -E, B ; rrpodyei -Wyttenbach. 

2 Stephanus ; vnepfidWeiv -E, B ; virepfiaXKov -Pohlenz ; 
vTT€pf3d\A€i <rt Kara to twv fi€ptov> -von Arnim (S.V.F. ii, 
p. 159, 5 [with l-n drreipov yap . . . eXarrov in parentheses}). 

3 [nXfjOos] -deleted by Wyttenbach. 

4 Tt ovv ; ovk dfivvovrai -Pohlenz (Tt ovv ovk dfivvovrai 
-Oiibner ; Tt' ovv ; dfivvovrai -van Herwerden) ; onovv ovk 
dfivvovrai -E, B (dfi€ivovrai -B) ; ncus ovv dfivvovrai -Basil. ; 
riaiv ovv dfivvovrai -Rasmus (Prog, 1872, p. 21) ; ... onovv. 
aamup. Ilcos ovv dfivvovrai -Bernardakis. 

a yevdfievoi hk YiTcolkol . . . napdxovra 7rAf}dos e£ avrojv^ 
S. V.F. ii, frag. 484. This is not Stoic doctrine, however, 
but an argument against the Stoics based upon the supposed 
implication of their doctrine, an argument used by Lucretius 
also (i, 615-627) to prove that there must be minima. The 
Stoics themselves refused to say that any body or any 
continuum consists of an infinite number of parts (S.V.F, 
ii, frag. 482 [p. 158, 17-19 and 24-26] and the remark of 



mind if they have not become Stoics ; but, once they 
have become Stoics, their statements and opinions 
are to the contrary effect a that the man is not made 
up of more parts than the finger is or the universe 
of more parts than the man, for by division bodies 
are triturated b to infinity and among infinites none 
is more or less and none exceeds another in multi- 
tude at all c or else the parts of the one exceeded 
would stop being divided and making multitudes of 

comrade. What then ? Don't they grapple with 
these difficulties ? 

diadumenus. Oh, quite ingeniously and manfully. 
For Chrysippus says d that, when asked whether we 
have any parts and how many and of what parts 
they are composed and how many, we shall make a 
distinction, in the large sense affirming that we are 
composed of head and trunk and limbs — for this was 
all there is to the difficulty in question — ; " but," 

Chrysippus infra — S. V.F. ii, frag. 483), so that this passage, 
if it anticipates the notion of an infinite set containing an 
equivalent sub-set, indicates not that this was formulated 
by the Stoics (Sambursky, Physics of the Stoics, p. 97) but 
rather that their opponents formulated it as a u gibe at the 
Stoics " (D. A. Steele in Paradoxes of the Infinite by Dr. 
Bernard Bolzano translated from the German [London, 
1950], p. 38, note 5). 

6 For the word ^parrei in this sense cf. Aristophanes, frag. 
271 and Plato, Sophist 226 b6; for the figure cf. the scholia 
to Iamblichus, In Nicomachi Arithmeticam Introductionem, 
p. 126, 4-8 (Pistelli). 

c Against such arguments based upon the position that 
all infinites are equal cf. Newton's letter to Bentley, 17 
January 1692/93 (Correspondence edited by H. W. Turnbull 
[Cambridge, 1961], iii, p. 239), quoted by H. A. J. Munro 
in his note (ii, p. 82) on Lucretius, i, 622. 

d S, V.F. ii, frag. 483. 



(1079) yizpv) to 1 ipojT&v Trpodyojotv, ov8ev " <f>7)(Jl " TU)V 


C tlvojv avvearavai kol ojjlolqjs* ovt* i£ ottogojv,* 

OUT \£f/ a7T€ipO)V OVT €K 7T€7T€pacrpL€Va>V . ACat 

jLtot Sokoj ra69 eKeivov Kexprjodai Xe^eow avrais, 
ottois avvihrjs ov rponov 8i€<f>vXaTT€ tols koivcls ev- 
volas, KeXevcov rjjids voelv ra>v acofidrajv €kclotov 


aireipojv ovr €K 77€7T€paoyzeVa>v crvyKetfievov. ct 
jxev yap, <Ls dyadov /cat kolkov to aStdcfiopov, ov- 

TO)? 7T€TT€paCFpL€VOV TL KCU d7T€ipOV lieOOV €OTLV, €L- 
OJ9 TO pUT) IGOV €vQ\)S OVIGOV Kdl TO pLT] (f)6apTOV 

d(f>dapTOv y ovtojs to pjr) TTeuepaapiivov drreipov vo- 

OVpL€V, OflOLOV €OTLV, otpLOLl, [tO>] 7 TO GtbflOL elvOLl 

D pfr\T Ik 7T€7T€paopi€va)v pjr\T i£ aTTzipcDv to> b Xoyov 

1 to -E ; rod -B ; rep -Wyttenbach (?). 

2 E, B ; €k tlvwv -Rasmus {Prog. 1872, p. 21), hut see 
eV tlvojv . . . /cat ttogcov (1079 b supra). 

3 [kclI ofjLoltas] -deleted by Giesen (De Plutarch* . . . /Jis- 
putationibus, p. 33). 

4 E, B ; ottogcovovv -Giesen (loc. cit.) ; [/cat o/jlolcos] out* 
€k ttogcov <kclL 6fj,ola)9> -Rasmus (loc. cit.). 

5 ovt <<rf> -Rasmus (loc. cit.) ; avre -E, B ; ovt€ -Basil. ; 
€?t' aneipcov cltc TTCTTcpaGfievcov -von Arnim (S.V.F. ii, p. 158, 

6 Bernardakis ; e/c nVco^ -E, B. 

7 [to>] -omitted by Basil., deleted by Rasmus (Prog. 1872, 
p. 21).' 

8 to) -H. C. ; /cat -E, B ; to -Pohlenz (retaining too to crtu/ia 

n This injunction must fit the question in 1070 u puprn to 
which it was addressed, €K rivtov . . . /cat ttogcov now pressed 
<:Vi to. eoxoiTa fjiepr), and not necessarily Plutarch's tenden- 



he says, " if they press their questioning on to the 
ultimate parts, nothing like these is to be taken up 
in response but one must say neither of what ultimate 
parts one consists nor — in like manner too — of how 
many, neither infinitely nor finitely many. ,,<z 1 
think it well to have made use of his very words, in 
order that you may behold the way in which he kept 
watch and ward over the common conceptions, bid- 
ding us conceive each several body as composed 
neither of any particular parts b nor of any number 
of them whatever, neither an infinite nor a finite 
number. For, if there is something intermediate 
between finite and infinite as the indifferent is 
between good and evil, he ought to have resolved the 
difficulty by saying what this is c ; but, if we con- 
ceive what is not-finite to be infinite in the way we 
do what is not-equal to be eo ipso unequal d and what 
is not subject to destruction to be indestructible, e 
then to say that a body is made up of parts neither 
finite nor infinite is, I think, like saying that an 

tious interpretation of it infra, ovt <ek tivcov out* e£ oirocrajv- 

OVV fl€pO)V . . . OVyK€lfl€VOV. 

b Plutarch forgets or quietly suppresses for the sake of his 
polemic the fact that the injunction of Chrysippus had to do 
with ultimate parts. 

c This does not mean, as Luria supposed (Quellen und 
Studien zur Geschichte der Mathematik, B ii [1933], p. 139), 
that Chrysippus assumed any fieaov between finite and in- 
finite ; Plutarch's statement here is not even parallel to his 
ascription of ^r loas €?vcu /lojt' dvlaovs to Chrysippus in 1079 
e-f infra. For the indifferent as intermediate between good 
and evil see supra 1064 c (page 701, note a) and 1066 E. 

d Cf. Aristotle, Topics 147 b 4-6 and Plato, Parmenides 
161 c 7-8. 

e Cf. De Soli erf ia Animal him 960 n-c and see 1075 c 



(1079) elvai p.rrr c£ dXrjdojv Xrjfiixdrcov \ir\T e/c ifjevSojv 
lirjT i£ (airXtov firjT i£ 01)% aTrXwv.y 1 

39. Em 8e tovtois emveavievopLevos (f>r]cn rrjs 
7TvpafjLi8os €K rpiycjovojv ovvioTapLevrjs ras rrXevpds 
/caret rrjv ovvacj>r)v eyKeKXipcevas 2 dvloovs {lev elvat 
ptrj vnepe^eiv 3, 8e fj fie troves elocv. ovrcos irrjpei ras 
evvoias. el yap eon ri {lel^ov /cat pur] vnepexov, 
eorai ri pLiKporepov /cat p,rj eXXecnov, ware /cat 
dvioov psqff virepeypv paqr eXXet7Tov, rovreoriv loop 
to dvioov /cat ov {lel^ov to {xel^ov ov8e pLiKporepov 
E to puKpoTepov. eVt Toivvv Spa Tiva Tpoirov aTrrjv- 
TTjoe ArjpLOKpLTCp, htairopovvTi <J)Voiko)s /cat epupv- 
^a>9 4 el kojvos TepuvoiTO rrapd ttjv ftdoiv emTreScp, tL 
Xprj SiavoeioOai tgls tojv Tp,rjpidTOJV em^aveLas , 

1 <. . .> -supplied by H. C. (cf. S. V.F. ii, p. 66, 28-30) ; 
€% . . . vac. 10+8 -E ; vac. 16 -B ; ^ahwarcmv p.i]T Ik hvvarwv} 

2 Bernardakis ; Ikk^kKi^Ivos -E, B. 

3 Leonicus, Basil. ; virdpx^v -E, B. 

4 £ttitvx<a>s or €v(j>ua>s -Wyttenbach (cuAdya>? in Index Oraer. 

Both of which the Stoics would declare to be impossible, 
for they insisted that every proposition is either true or false 
(S. V.F. ii, frags. 166, 186, 187, 192, 193, 196 ; see note b 
on 1066 e supra) and either atomic or molecular (S. V.F. ii, 
frags. 182, 203, 205 ; Mates, Stoic Logic, pp. 28-33). 

b S. V.F. ii, frag. 489 (p. 159, 31-34). 

c Chrysippus meant that they do not protrude (cf Aris- 
totle, Categories 10 a 23 with Porphyry, Caieg., p. 134, 11- 
12) beyond the straight edge in which any two of the tri- 
angular faces meet and which is their common -nipas, 
although down that edge the faces become continuously 
larger. By Kara rrjv avva<f>r)v €yK€K\ipi€vas he could not have 
meant k< inclined towards the apex," and as reported here he 
did not say that adjacent sides or faces are unequal to each 
other or refer to laminae into which the pyramid is divided 
by parallel sections or to any process of convergence to a 


argument is made up of premises that are neither 
true nor false, neither <( atomic nor molecular.) ° 

39. In addition he has the audacity to say b that 
the pyramid, being composed of triangles, has its 
faces unequal, to be sure, as they are inclined along 
the juncture but without exceeding where they are 
larger. This was his way of preserving the common 
conceptions. For, if there is something larger with- 
out exceeding/* there will be something smaller 
without falling short, so that there will also be some- 
thing unequal without either exceeding or falling 
short, that is what is unequal will be equal and what 
is larger will not be larger or what is smaller smaller. 
Furthermore, look at the way in which he met e the 
difficulty raised by Democritus f scientifically and 
vividly with the question, if a cone should be cut by 
a plane parallel to its base,^ what one must suppose 

imit, — all of which is read into the passage by Sambursky 
(Physics of the Stoics, pp. 94 and 140-141), as some of it 
was by Luria before him (Quellen und Studien zur Gesvhichie 
der Mathematik, B ii [1933], pp. 171-172). Luria con- 
jectured that Chrysippus had borrowed this example of the 
pyramid from the Atomists, whereas it is more probable 
that he put it forward as counter-evidence in his polemic 
against Democritus about the cone (1079 e-f infra). 

d The word which Chrysippus had used in its meaning 
M to protrude " is now taken in its common mathematical 
sense, for which cf Plato, Phaedo 96 e 3-4 and Parmenides 
150 d 5-e 5 ; Aristotle, Topics 125 a 20-22 ; Nicomachus, 
Arithmetics, Introductio i, xvii, 3 (p. 44, 13-20 [Hoche]). 

« S. V.F. ii, frag. 489 (pp. 159, 34-160, 8). 

/ Democritus, frag. B 155 (D.-K.). 

9 Contrary to what Heiberg, Heath, and many others 
have asserted this does not imply " indefinitely near to the 
base " ; for the expression cf. Aristotle, Topics 158 b 31 with 
[Alexander], Topics, p. 545, 7-12 and Archimedes, De 
Sphaera i, xvi, lemma 2 (I, p. 74, 1 [Heiberg]). 



(lu79) ioas rj dvtoovs yiyvo^vas' aviaoi /xev yap ovoai 
rov kqjvov dva>[ia\ov Trape^ovoi, rroXXds drro^apd' 
geis Xa/jb^dvovra jSafytoetSetS' /cat rpaxvTrjras' loojv 
S' overtop, loa TfirfpLaTa earai /cat (fravelrai to rov 

KvXlvhpOV 7T€7TOvdd)S 6 KWVOS , €*£ IGOJV OVyK€LfJ,evOS 

ivravOa ot] rov ArjuoKpcrov drro^aivajv dyvoovvra 
F rds fiev ein^aveias <f>rjoi \ir\r loas etvai ixtjt dvt- 
oovs dvioa he ra ow/xara rco pJyr loas elvat pLTjr 
dvtoovs rds em<j)aveias . to fiev hrj vofioOeretv tojv 

a How Democritus resolved the dilemma, if he tried to do 
so, is not indicated here or elsewhere. Some have thought 
that by it he meant to prove the inapplicability of atomism 
to mathematics (O. A pelt, Beitrage zur Geschichte der 
griechischen Philosophie [Leipzig, 1891], pp. 265-266 ; 
A. Wasserstein, J.H.S., lxxxiii [1963], p. 189). It is usually 
assumed, however, that the dilemma is somehow connected 
with the theorem concerning the volume of a pyramid (and 
of a cone ?), the undemonstrated enunciation of which is 
ascribed to Democritus (Archimedes, Opera Omnia iterum 
ed. J. L. Heiberg, II, p. 430, 2-9) ; and on this tenuous 
basis some scholars have maintained that he believed the 
cone to consist of an infinite number of infinitely thin 
laminae (e.g. Sir Thomas Heath, A History of Greek Mathe- 
matics i, pp. 179-181) and others that he believed it to con- 
sist of a large but finite number of atom-thin laminae 
(J. Mau, Zum Problem des Infinitesimalen hex den antiken 
Afomisten [Berlin, 1954], pp. 22-25) or of sub-atomic and 
mathematically indivisible magnitudes (S. Luria, Quellen 
unci Studien zur Geschichte der Mathematik, B ii [1933], 
pp. 138-148). The way in which he came to the theorem 
being unknown, however, it is possible that theorem and 
dilemma had entirely different contexts, for he may have 
posed the latter as a stumbling-block for Protagoras in his 
polemic against him (cf. Democritus, frags. A 114 and B 156 
with Protagoras, frag. B 7 [D.-K.] and K. Philippson, 
Tfermes, ixiv [1929|, pp. 180-182). 

b This does not imply, as Plutarch contends (1080 b infra), 



the surfaces of the segments prove to be, equal or 
unequal : — for, if unequal, they will make the cone 
uneven by giving it many step-like notches and 
asperities ; and, if they are equal, the segments will 
be equal, and the cone, being composed of circles 
that are equal and not unequal, will manifestly have 
got the properties of the cylinder — which is the 
height of absurdity. Here is just where Chrysippus 
declares Democritus to be in ignorance and says that 
the surfaces are neither equal nor unequal but the 
bodies are unequal in that the surfaces are neither 
equal nor unequal. 6 Now really, to ordain that, the 

that Chrysippus posited " an intermediate between equal 
and unequal which is neither one nor the other." Such a 
[iloov or rpirov ylvos (S. Luria, op. cit., p. 139 [see note c 
on 1079 c supra]) is ruled out by Plutarch's own unwitting 
testimony to the Stoic assertion that the predicates " equal " 
and " not-unequal " are equivalent (1080 c [page 826, note 6] 
infra). Nor has the passage anything to do with the " limit- 
ing process " read into it by Sambursky (Physics of the 
Stoics, pp. 93-95). Chrysippus meant simply that neither 
of the predicates, M equal " and " unequal," is applicable to 
what Democritus called the " surfaces," because these are in 
fact just the single geometrical plane which cuts the cone into 
segments and is the incorporeal iripas of their division and 
contact (see 1080 e infra). The " equality " or " inequality " 
of the surfaces in the dilemma of Democritus implies a 
" cut " that is not geometrical but physical and so is the 
removal of an intervening segment, however fine ; and this is 
why Chrysippus went on to say (1080 a infra) that the nicks 
envisaged in the first horn of the dilemma are produced by 
the inequality of the bodies {i.e. the segments remaining 
after the removal of the physical " cut ") and not by any 
inequality of the supposedly contiguous surfaces, which in 
geometrical division are the one common iripas. When this 
is taken twice in thought, as Aristotle would say (e.g. Physics 
263 a 23-26 and b 12-14), to be the upper surface of one 
segment and the lower of the next, it is because " they," 



(1079) em<f)aveicov \xr\r tocov (^t' dviocovY ovocov ra oto- 
fiara ovfifiaiveiv aviaa elvai OavjJLaarrjv e^ovolav 
avTco 2 rod ypdcf>ew 6 ri dv euirj 8lS6vtos iori. 
rovvavTtov yap 6 Xoyos juerd rrjs ivapyelas 3 voelv 
StScoot tcov dviaojv ocopuaTcov dvioovs elvai tgls €ttl- 
1080 <j>aveias Kal yuei^ova rrjv tov /x€t£ovo9, e? ye /jltj 
fieXXei T7jv vnepoxtfv, u [JL€t£ov iortv, eaTeprjfxevrjv 
ernc^aveias e£etv. el ydp oi>x virepfidXXovoi rds 
tcov eXaTTOVcov eirufxiveias at tcov {leil^ovtov dXXd 
7Tpoa7ToXet7TovaLV , carat 4 awjJLaros wepas e^ovros 
fiepos dvev Treparos /cat dire par lotov. ei yap Xeyei 
ore fiia^oixevos ovrco (ravras voelodac oco^ei tov 
kcovov, eXeyxerac cj)doKcov'Y u a? yap xxfroparai 
rrepl tov kcovov dvaxapd^ets rj tcov ocojiaTcov dv- 
ioottjs 8rj7TOvdev ovx f] tcov eiricfaaveicov direpyd^e- 
rat." yeXolov ovv to rds: eTncpavelas vrce^aipov- 
fievov* iv toZs otofjiaoiv eXeyxopbeviqv 1 aTroXiTrelv 
dvtofiaXlav. dAA' av jxevcopiev inl tt\s V7ro8eaecos, 
B tl fxaXXov eoTi Trapa ttjv . evvoiav rj Ta TocavTa 
TrXaTTeiv ; el ydp eiricjidveiav emcj>avela Orjoopiev 
/xt^t' tarjv etvat puryr avioov, Kal to jieyeQos carat 
fxeyeOet <f>dvai 8 Kal dpiOpiov dpiOjxcp \xjt\t taov etvat 

1 fLTjT taojv <ixrjT y dvtaojv> -Bernardakis after Wyttenbach 
(/jltj lgcov </xtJt' aviocov} or [XT) <dv>to-o>v) ; ll r) lgojv ovgojv -E, B. 

2 avrco -Stephanus (avrat -Basil.) ; avra -E, B. 

3 Leonicus, Basil. ; ivzpyeias -E, B. 

4 €GT at -E ; €GTOJ -B. 

& <. . .> -supplied by H. C. ; ovtoj . . . vac. 14+ 16 ... as 
-E ; ovrco . . . vac. 32 . . . as -B ; ovrco <,ri]v ivdpyeiav i\4y\€- 
rat (A-qfxoKpiros), avrov eAey^et <f>dGKtov> "as -Pohlenz. 

6 E ; itjaipovfievov -B. 7 B ; iXeXeyxofxevrjv -E. 

8 Stephanus ; cfravai -E, B. 

being really one, are neither equal nor unequal that the con- 
tinuous segments so delimited can be unequal. 



surfaces being neither equal {nor unequal^, the bodies 
are consequently unequal is the mark of a man who 
gives himself amazing licence to write whatever 
comes into his head, for what reason together with 
clear apprehension a provides is the contrary con- 
ception that of unequal bodies the surfaces are un- 
equal and the surface of the larger body is larger, 
unless, of course, this body is to have the excess by 
which it is larger deprived of a surface. For, if the 
surfaces of the larger bodies do not exceed those of 
the lesser but leave off before doing so, there will be 
of body that has a limit a part that is without limit 
and so limitless. For, if he says that by insisting 
upon such <(a conception of these surfaces he saves 
the cone, he is confuted by his own remark :^> " for 
the nicks in the cone about which he has misgivings 
are produced by the inequality of the bodies, surely, 
and not by that of the surfaces. " b It is ridiculous, 
then, to exclude the surfaces and in the bodies leave 
unevenness confirmed. If, however, we adhere to 
the assumption, what is more at odds with the com- 
mon conception than to imagine things like this ? 
For, if we do affirm that surface is neither equal nor 
unequal to surface, it will be possible also to say of 
magnitude in relation to magnitude and of number 
in relation to number that it is neither equal nor un- 

a See 1074 b and 1070 c (page 745, note b) supra. 

b as yap . . . d77<fpya£eTcu, as Pohlenz saw, are certainly 
the words of Chrysippus (the subject of vfoparaL being 
Democritus) ; and the sentence should have been included 
in S. V.F. ii, 489. For its meaning in the reply of Chrysippus 
to Democritus see note b on 1079 f supra. 



(1080) prqr avccrov, /cat tclvt laov /cat dvioov 1 jxeaov, o 
fjLTjSerepov 2 iartv, ovk exovras elrreLV ov8e vofjaai 
Swafievovs. ere o' ovowv imcjxiveicbv {irJT* Igcov 
pjyr aviaojv, ri KcoXvet /cat kvkXovs voeladai jjltjt* 
loovs yLiqT avloovs; aural 3 yap SrJTrovOev at ra>v* 
kojvlkcov Tfjarffjidrayv €7TL<f>dv€iai kvkXol elaiv el 8e 
kvkAovs, /cat Scafierpovs kvkXcov Oereov psfyr lgovs 
\irpr avioovs' el 8e tovto, /cat ycjvias /cat rpi- 
C ycova /cat TrapaXX^XoypafjLiJLa /cat 7rapaXXrjXe7TL7TeSa 
/cat awfiara. /cat yap el pjqtcr) earl \iryr tea \xtcyt 
dviaa dAA^Aots, /cat jSa^o? 5 carat /cat TrXdrrf /cat 
ocofxaTa. etra 770)? toXjjlcooiv imrLpLav rols rds 
KOLVorrjTas 7 elaayovai /cat dfieprj tlvcl Ktvrjpiara 
pLaxopLevcog 8 pJvre KLvetaOai prfyre \iiveiv vrroride- 
fjLevois, avrol rd roiavra a£ta>/zara ifjevSij Xeyovres 

1 ravra taov /cat avioov -Basil. ; ravrats ovk dviaov -K, B. 

2 fjLrj&€T€p6v -Wyttenbach ; o /x^ oeure/jo^ -K, B ; to fi-qbe- 
T€pov -Aldine. 3 aural -Basil. ; aura -E, B. 

4 al tcov -Wyttenbach ; ovrwv -E, B. 

5 fiddos -Bernardakis (0a0ij -Wyttenbach) ; pdpos -E, B. 

6 nXdrrj -Wyttenbach ; 7rXrjyrj -E, B. 

7 K€v6rr]Tas -Leonicus. 

8 KLvrjfjLCLTa fjLaxofJL€vcos -H. C. ; koX fiax6fji€vov -E, B ; /cat 
fiaxofxeva -Basil. ; /cat 'AxiAAea -Wyttenbach (" nisi forte 
complura exciderunt ") ; /cat ivh^xdjxevov -Rasmus [Prog. 
J 872, p. 22) ; /cat fiaxdiicvov <to> -Pohlenz. 

a Body being traditionally denned by the three dimen- 
sions (ef. Aristotle, Topics 142 b 24-25), though later with 
the addition of avrirvrrta to distinguish physical body from 
geometrical solid : cf. Box. Graeci, p. 310 a 9-12 and p. 449, 
6-11 ; S.V.F. ii, frag. 357 (with p. 127, 5-7 and p. 162, 29- 
31) and iii, p. 259, 24-26; Sextus, Adv. Math, i, 21 and 
ix, 367. 

6 roAfJLcooiv . . . vnoTideixevois is one Stoic " fragment " and 
the rest of the sentence (auTot . . . cot! tclvt' dXXrjXois) another, 
neither of which is to be found in S.V.F. 



equal, and that too though we are unable to mention 
and cannot even conceive an intermediate between 
equal and unequal which is neither one nor the other. 
Moreover, given surfaces neither equal nor unequal, 
what's to prevent the conception of circles also 
neither equal nor unequal ? For the surfaces of the 
conic segments are themselves, I presume, circles. 
And, if circles, one must affirm that diameters of 
circles too are neither equal nor unequal ; and, if so, 
angles also and triangles and parallelograms and 
parallelepipeds and bodies, for, if lengths are neither 
equal nor unequal to one another, so will it also be in 
the case of depth and breadths and so of bodies. 
Then how do the Stoics dare to censure b those who 
adduce the common characteristics c and who sup- 
pose certain indivisible movements to be self- 
contradictorily neither in motion nor at rest, d when 
they say themselves that propositions like the fol- 

c On these the Epicureans based their analogical infer- 
ences against which the Stoics polemized (cf P. H. and E. A. 
De Lacy, Philodemus : On Methods of Inference [Phil- 
adelphia, 1941], p. 23, n. 1 and pp. 162-171), the kind of 
argument used by Epicurus (Epistle i, 58-59) to establish 
the existence of the minimal and partless parts that con- 
stitute the atom and measure it (cf. -q yap Koivor-qs . . . tKavq 
to n^xpi rovrov avvrcXiaat [pp. 17, 20-18, 1, Usener]). The 
11 emendation " of Leonicus adopted by subsequent editors 
is therefore unnecessary and wrong. 

d The text is corrupt, and the exact restoration is un- 
certain ; but dficprj should be governed by vTroTtdc^vots 
(not by eladyovai), and in view of dfi€prj . . . fi-qrc Kivtlodai 
p.rjT€ (jl€V€lv what the Stoics are here said to censure is most 
probably the doctrine ascribed to Epicurus in frag. 278 
(Usener), on which cf. J. Mau, Philologus, xcix (1955), 
pp. 99-111. According to Plutarch (1073 e — 1074 a supra) 
the Stoics themselves had said that " neither at rest nor in 
motion " is true of to nav. 



(1080) elvai' " el riva pLrj eonv laa dXXrjXois, eKelva aviod 

eonv aWrjXois " /cat li ovk eon fxev laa ravr aX- 

XrjXois, ovk dvioa o' eon ravr' aAA^Aois" '[ ; enel 

Se <f)r)oiv elvai n fxel^ov ov firjv vuepeypv y at;iov 

aTToprjoai Trorepov raur' icfyapjjLOoei dAATjAots". el 

D [lev yap ecfyapfiooet, ttlos /xet£oV eon Odrepov; el 8' 

ovk ecfrappiooei, ttojs ovk dvdyKrj to ptev vrrepe^ew 

to o eXXelrreiv; (rf) 1 rep parjSerepov vrrepeyeiv 2 /cat 

ovk €<f>appLooet, rep piel^ovi [77 ] 3 /cat e<f)appLooei ra> 4 

piel^ov elvai ddrepov; dvdyKT) yap ev roiavrais 

drropiais yiyveoOai rovs ras koivcls evvoias pir) <f>v- 


40. Kat pur)v to fi7]8ev6s dnreoftai pLrjSev rrapd 

1 <rj> -added by Madvig (Adversaria Critica, p. 671). 

2 Leonicus ; virdpxetv -E, B. 

3 [rj] -deleted by H. C. ; ra> fiel^op dvai -Madvig (loc. cit.). 

4 rep -H. C. (tw <fir)> -Madvig, loc. cit.) ; to -E, B. 

a The Stoics are right in calling this proposition false, for 
fir) elvai "era, " not to be equal," is not the same as etvai 
firj tcra, " to be not-equal " (c/. Aristotle, Anal. Prior. 51b 

b This is the regular form of a Stoic negation of a con- 
junction (cf. 1084 d infra and Mates, Stoic. Logic, p. 31). 
It was inattention to this that led to the excision or " emenda- 
tion " of the ovk before dwaa. Literally translated the pro- 
position is " not (i.e. not both) : these are equal to each 
other and these are not-unequal to each other." Since ac- 
cording to the Stoics this negation is false, they held to be 
true the corresponding unnegated proposition, " both these 
are equal to each other and these are not-unequal to each 
other," i.e. equal and not-unequal are equivalent. Plutarch, 
however, must have taken the negated proposition to mean 
" these aren't equal and not unequal " in the sense that they 
aren't equal without being not-unequal and the Stoics to 



lowing are false : "if certain things aren't equal to 
each other, those things are unequal to each other " a 
and " it is not so that these things are equal to each 
other and are not-unequal to each other " ? b And, 
when Chrysippus says that there is something larger 
without, however, exceeding, it is proper to raise the 
question whether these things c will coincide with 
each other. For, if they will coincide, how is one 
larger d ; and, if they won't, how can it fail to be 
necessary for one to exceed and the other to fall 
short ? <^Or) will it both not coincide and coincide 
with the larger, the former in that neither exceeds 
and the latter in that the other is larger ? c For 
such are the difficulties into which those who do not 
observe the common conceptions necessarily get 

40. Moreover/ the proposition that nothing 

have declared this to be false. In short, he misinterprets 
the first example to mean that they denied the equivalence 
of ovk laa and avioa and the second to mean that they denied 
the equivalence of laa and ovk avioa. So the initial ovk 
before lo-n should not be excised either, as it was by 
D. Konstan (Class. Rev., N.S. xxii [1972], pp. 6-7), who 
has generously informed me by letter that he has had second 
thoughts about this proposal. 

i.e. the fxel^ov ov fir)v vrrepexov and the iiiKporepov Kat fir) 
e'AAet7rov, which Plutarch thinks is implied by the former 
(see 1079 d supra). 

d Cf. Euclid, Elements i, Koivai evvoiai 7. 

* This is a sarcastic question formulated upon the pattern 
of avioa ... to) /xtJt' toas ilt)t avioovs . . . (1079 f supra) and 
on the basis of fir) v-nepix^v ok fj fiel^oves eiorv (1079 d supra) 
as Plutarch understands it. Will Chrysippus in accordance 
with this, he asks, say that just because neither surface ex- 
ceeds the other the two do not coincide and because one 
is larger than the other they do ? 

/ Kal iii)v . . . 7TavofjL€vois = S.V.F. ii, frag. 486. 



(1080) rrjv k'vvoidv ioriv, ovx tjttov ok tovto, 1 aTrreodai 
jikv dXXrjXojv ra acofAara pirjSevl 8k aTrreodai. tov- 
to 8* avayKT) Trpoohex^odai toZs firj aTToXetTrovoiv 
eAdxtCTTa pLtprj oa)pt,aT0S dXX i del tc 2 tov Sokovvtos 

a7TT€O0a(, 7TpOT€pOV XapbfidvOVOt KOI jXr]0€7T0T€ TOV 

E irpodyeiv irreKewa ijavo\i4vois . 3 o yovv avrol pcd- 

XlOTO 7TpO(f)€pOVOC TOls TOJV dfJL€pa>V 7Tpo'£OTajJL€VOlS , 

tovt ioTL to p>rjd* oXots oXwv d(f)r)v etvat pbr]T€ pue- 
peoi fxepibv to pbkv yap ovx d<f>r)v dXXd Kpaocv 
7toi€lv, to o ovk etvat SvvaTov, p>€pr) Tcbv dfieptov 


7rTovoi, pLTjoev piepos eoxctTOP purjSk 7Tpa>Tov aTToXel- 
TTOvTes? ore vrj Ata ipavew* koto, irepas ra oojp,aT 
aXXrjXojVy ov* kotol p,£pos Xeyovot ■ to 8k irtpas ocopia 
ovk eoTiv. dipeTat tolvvv otopca oajpuaTOs docopLaTcp 
Kal ovx difjerac ttoXlv, docopidTOV pL€Ta£v ovtos. el 

1 tovtov <to> -Pohlenz. 

2 dAA' act rt -Wyttenbach ; dXXa cl rt -E, B. 

3 rod . . . TTavo^iivois -Wyttenbach ; tovs . . . 7ravoy.ivovs 
-E, B. 

4 Bernardakis ; dTroXiirovrts -E, B. 

5 vr) Ata i/rauctv -Wyttenbach ; /lit) Sia0au€iv -E, B. 

6 dXXrjXcov, ov -H. C. ; oXa oXcov ov -E, B ; Kovx^ oXa oXojv 
ov<B€> -Wyttenbach ; <dAA' ov\> oXa oXwv oi)<£e> -Pohlenz. 

a Of. Sextus, Adv. Math, ix, 258-366. This is presented 
here as one of the alternative absurdities implied by the 
Stoic theory of iripas (difieTou rolvvv . . . Kal ovx diperat ndXtv 
. . . [1080 e infra]) ; it does not refer, as Luria supposes, 
to a denial of d^tj by atomists (Quellen und Studien zur Ge- 
schichte der Mathematik, B ii [1933], pp. 154-155 and n. 129). 

b i.e. of whatever part is taken to be in contact they take 
a part nearer than the whole of the former to that with 
which it is supposed to be in contact, and they continue 
this process indefinitely. See page 812, note a supra ; and 


touches anything a is at odds with the common 
conception ; and not less so is this, that bodies do 
touch one another but touch one another with noth- 
ing. Yet this must be accepted by those who do not 
admit minimal parts of body but are always taking 
some part before that which seems to be touching 
and never cease from going on beyond it. b At any 
rate, their own chief objection to the advocates of 
indivisibles is this, c that there is contact neither of 
wholes with wholes nor of parts with parts, for the 
result of the former is not contact but blending d 
and the latter is not possible, since indivisibles do not 
have parts. 6 How is it, then, that they do not fall 
into this trap themselves, since they admit no last 
part and no first either ? Because they say, by 
heaven, that bodies are in contact with one another 
at a limit, not at a part ; and the limit is not body/ 
Well then, body will touch body with an incorporeal (J 
and, again, will not touch it, since an incorporeal is 
between them. ft And, if it does touch, it will be by 

cf. Sextus, Adv. Math, ix, 26l=Pyrrh. Hyp. iii, 45-46 (p. 130, 
10-16 [Bekker]). 

c o yovv aiiTol . . . oa)fia ovk €otlv = S. V.F. ii, frag. 487. 

d Cf Sextus, Adv. Math, ix, £60 and Pyrrh. Hyp. iii, 
42 and 45 (p. 130, 8-10 [Bekker]) ; [Aristotle], De Lin. 
Insec. 971 a £8-30. For the contrary see 1078 b supra: 
ovtoj yap ov Kpaois acf>rj 8e /cat iftavois. . . . 

* Cf Sextus, Adv. Math, iii, 35 and ix, 387 ; Aristotle, 
Physics £31 b 2-6 with Simplicius, Phys., p. 927, 1-9. 

/ Cf. S. V.F. ii, frair. 488 ; Cleomedes, De Motu Circnlari 
i, i, 7 (p. 14, 1-2 [Ziegler]) ; and see note c on 1078 e supra. 

9 Cf. the similar inference drawn by Philoponus (De 
Ueneratione, pp. 158, 27-159, 3 and p. 160, 7-1 1) concerning 
the atoms of Leucippus and Democritus : . . . oca. tov k€vov- 
tovto) yap aTTTOVTai dAXrjXajv. 

h Cf. Sextus, Ado. Math, ix, 265 and iii, 82 = ix, 435. 



(1080) 8e di/jerai, /cat Tronjoei rt /cat Tretocrat 1 raj daaj- 
F /xaroj to awpta- TrotetV yap Tt /cat irdox civ utt' aA- 

A^Aa>V TO) 2 a7TT<EoQ0U TO. GCVfACLTa 7T€(f)VK€V. €l §€ 

a</>^v ta^a to) docoptdrq) to axo/xa, /cat avvacf)i)v 
e£ei /cat Kpdotv /cat ovptc^viav. eortv dp' 3 ev rats* 
ovva<f>als /cat Kpdoeotv 7} ptevetv avayhcalov rj ptrj 
pteveiv dAA' i(f)6dp9ai rd ire para tow oajptdrajv. 
€/cdrepov §€ 7rapd rqv evvotdv ion- cj)6opds piev yap 
dacofidrajv /cat yeveoets oi5S' aurot /caraActVouat, 
1081 Kpaais 8e /cat ovva<f)r) oojjxdTOJV Idiots xP OJ f Ji ^ va)V 
rrepaotv ovk dv yevoiro. to yap irepas dpt'^et /cat 
larrjot ti)v rod oajptaros (frvotv at Se Kpdoets el ptrj 
/x€pcoi/ 7rapd /xep^ TrapaOeoets elolv {dAA') dAAi]- 
Aots* 4 oAa rd Kipvapteva ovyx^ovotv, coorrep ovrot 
Xeyovat, (f)6opds dTToXetrrreov^ mepdrcov iv rats* pti- 
^eotv etVa yeveoeis iv rats Staardoeot' ravra S* 

1 E ; TTTj(J€TaL -B. 

2 rep -Giesen {De Plutarchi . . . Disputationibus* Theses 
ad loc), implied by Xylander's version ; Kai -E, 15. 

3 toTiv dp* -Pohlenz ; ert yap -E, B. 

4 <aAA'> aWrjXois -H. C. (aAA^Aot? <dAA'> -Wyttenbach) ; 
dAA' oAot? -Bernardakis. 

5 aTTo\r)7TT€ov -E, B (but with a superscript over 77 -B 1 ). 

The change of Kai dVrea#cu to tw aVrecrflai is required 
by the argument, of which Pohlenz makes nonsense by 
changing -noizlv yap to -noi^iv hi. According to the Stoics 
only bodies iroul Kai irdax^ v-rr* dAXtjAtov (see note g on 1073 e 
supra) ; but, if it is by an incorporeal limit thai bodies touch 
one another, it must be by an incorporeal that they act upon 
one another, for this they do only by touching one another 
even according to the Stoics themselves (S. V.F. ii, frags. 
342 and 343). With this cf. the sceptical arguments (Sextus, 
Adv. Math, ix, 255 and 258) that, surface being incorporeal, 
a material effect cannot be produced by superficial contact 
and that, contact being impossible, there can be neither agent 
nor patient. 


what is incorporeal that the body produces an effect 
and is affected, for it is by touching that bodies 
naturally produce an effect and are affected by one 
another/ 1 And, if body gets contact by what is in- 
corporeal, so will it also have conjunction and blend- 
ing and coalescence. b Then it is necessary that in 
the conjunctions and blendings the limits of the 
bodies either remain or not remain but have been 
destroyed ; but either alternative is at odds with 
the common conception, for not even the Stoics them- 
selves allow destruction and generation of incor- 
poreals and there could not be blending and conjunc- 
tion of bodies possessed of their own limits. For 
the limit bounds and fixes d the nature of the body ; 
and, if blendings are not the juxtapositions of parts 
to parts (but)>, as these men say, fuse with one 
another in their entirety the things being blended/ 
one must admit destruction of the limits in the ming- 
lings and then their generation in the segregations, 

6 All three of these Stoic degrees of unification are used 
by Plutarch in Conjugalia Praecepta 142 e — 143 a. Cf. 
also S.V.F. ii, p. 302, 18-21 and Hi, p. 38, 7-9 ; for owa^-q 
S.V.F. ii, p. 124, 20-22 and p. 129, 13; and for av^vta 
Plutarch, Adv. Colotem 1112 a and Philo Jud., In Flaccum 
71 (vi, p. 133, 6 [Cohn-Reiter]). 

c Cf. S. V.F. ii, p. 158, 13 ; Simplicius, Categ., p. 125, 
5-6 (on Aristotle, Categories 5 a 1-6). 

d The text is sound (pace Sandbach, Class. Rev., N.S. iv 
[1954], p. 249 and Class. Quart., N.S. vi [1956], pp. 87-88) ; 
cf. De Defectu Orac. 428 f (. . . 6pit,ovoa /ecu KaraXafipdvovoa 
. . .), De An. Proc. in Timaeo 1023 c (. . . opl^cov koX nzpi- 
AafifidvtDV . . .) and 1015 e (. . . ovk dvcarrjae rr]v vXrjv . . . 
dAA' ecrriqotv . . .). 

e See 1077 e-f and 1078 b-c supra ; here too ovyxeovoiv 
is used without regard to the Stoic distinction between 
ovyxvais and Kpaais (see note con 1078 a supra). 



(1081) ovSels av paSlcos vorjcreiev. dXXa jmtjv 1 kcl9' 6 ye 
anrerai ra aaJ/xara dXXtfXajv Kara rovro /cat Trie- 
t^erai kcll QXLfierai Kal avvrpifitTai vrr' dXXrjXojv 
dacofxarov 8e ravra Trda^eiv rj rroielv ov Svvarov, 
dXX ov8e StavorjTov 2 eon. rovro 8e fiid^ovrai 
B voelv rjfias. el yap rj ocfralpa rod imTreSov Kara 
orjfjLeiov drrrerac, 8r}Xov on teal avper at Kara arj- 
fielov Sta, rov eiriiri&ov Kav rj jxiXrco 3 rrjv em- 
(fydvetav dXrjXi/JLfievrj , 4 pnXriv^v evofiop^erai ray 
erwrehoj ypa[xpff]V* (kSv fjy Trerrvpo)[ievi]^ nvpcooec 
ro e7Ti7re8ov' dcrajfjidrcp 7 8e xpw^eodai Kal doojp.d- 
ra) trvpovaOai acofxa rrapd rf)v ewoidv eartv. dv 8e 
8rj Kepajxedv 8 r) KpvoraXXtvrjv 9 o<f>aipav els entire- 
8ov (f>epofievrjv Xldivov™ d<j>' vifjovs vorjoajpLev, dXoyov 
el firj ovvrpifiijoerai, TrXrjyrjs rrpos avrirvrrov yevo- 
yLevrjs, droiTOjrepov 8e ro avvrpij3fjvai Kara irepas 
Kal O7]fxeiov daajfjuarov TTpoorreoovaav . coare Trav- 
TTy 11 ra? Trepl ra>v daojjxdrojv Kal aa>fjidrojv avrols 
rapdrreoOat rrpoXrjifjeLs fiaXAov S' dvaipelodai y ttoX- 
Xd roiv d8vvdro)v irapandeyievois . 

1 ^v -Basil. ; firj rt -E ; /U/7T01 -B (rot superscript). 

2 van Herwerden ; Siavo^Tcov -E, B. 

3 $ fit^Ta) -Leonicus (17 [xI\to> -Basil.) ; 17 ra> -E, B. 

4 Basil. ; dXrjXifip,€vr}v -E, B. 

5 <Acav t5> -supplied by Bernardakis ; ypa\xyii)v . . . vac. 5 
-E ? vac. 7 -B . . . ; <axjavTO)s> -Westman. 

6 Basil. ; TT^TTvpO)piivT]v -E, B ; 7r€7rvppL0fj,€VY] , -rruppwaet . . . 
nvppovoOat -Bernardakis (". . . estant jaulne, elle jaulnira 
..." -Amyot). 

7 Madvig (Adversaria Critica, p. 671) ; daca/xaTov -E, B. 

8 Diibner ; K€pafi4av -E, B. 

9 E ; KpvaraXtvrjv -B. 

10 Leonicus, Basil. ; nidivov -E, B. 

11 avdyKT} -Castiglioni (Gnomon, xxvi [1954], p. 84). 



and these processes no one could easily conceive. 
But, furthermore, it is where bodies touch each other 
that they are also pressed and squeezed and crushed by 
each other ; and for an incorporeal to do these things 
or have them done to it is not possible, — nay, it is 
not even thinkable. Yet this is the conception that 
they force upon us. For, if the sphere touches the 
plane at a point, it is also obviously drawn over the 
plane on a point ; and, if its surface has been smeared 
with ruddle, it will tinge the plane with a red line b 
<^and, if) it has been heated, it will make the plane 
hot. But for body to be tinged by an incorporeal 
and to be made hot by an incorporeal is at odds with 
the common conception. And, finally, if we imagine 
a sphere of earthenware or of crystal falling from a 
height on a plane of stone, it is unreasonable that it 
will not be crushed at its impact upon a resistant 
object but more absurd for it to be crushed by im- 
pinging on a limit, that is an incorporeal point. The 
result is that the preconceptions about incorporeals 
and bodies are everyway upset or rather are an- 
nihilated by the Stoics' associating with them c many 
of their impossible notions. 

Cf. the Aristotelian position that the nipara like 
" forms " supervene and disappear instantaneously without 
being subject to the processes of becoming and perishing : 
Aristotle, Metaphysics 1002 a 28-b 11, 1044 b 21-29 (cf. 
Cherniss, Aristotle's Criticism of Plato . . ., notes 279 and 
424) ; and De Caelo 280 b 6-9 with Simplicius, Phys., 
p. 998, 16-19. 

b Cf. Sextus, Adv. Math, iii, 27. It has been suggested 
that the argument derives ultimately from Protagoras 
(O. Apelt, Beitrage zur Geschichte der griechischen Philo- 
sophies p. 263 ; S. Luria, Quellen und Studien zur Geschichte 
der Mathematik, B ii [1933], p. 119). 

c For TraparidefievoLs in this sense cf. Plato, Phaedo 65 e 8. 



(1081) 41. Hapa 7rjv evvotd.v can xpovov elvai /xe'A- 
Xovra koll 7tap(x}yy)\iivov ivearajra 8k fir) elvai XP°~ 

VOV dXXd TO [Jikv dpTL Kal TO TTpCOiqV V<f)€OT(XVaL TO 

8e vvv oXojs fJirjoev elvai. /cat firjv tovto avpifiaivei 


pi7]8e to vvv dfiepes elvat fiovXofievois dXXd 6 tl 
dv tls ojs eveoTobs otrjTai Xaj3d>v Siavoetodai tov- 
tov to [lev pieXXov to 8e irapcpx^^evov elvai <f)d- 


X€L7T€adai jjiopiov xpovov irapovTos dv os 1 XeyeTai 
D rrapetvai tovtov ra fJiev el$ ra pueXXovTa ra 8' els 
to, 7Tapq)x r Jl Ji ^ va oiav€jjL7]Tai. 8velv ovv GVfifiaivei 
9aT€pov, r) to " rjv XP° V °S KaL eoTai XP° V °S " Tt ~ 
OevTas dvaipelv to " koTi XP^ V °^ " V (rtdevTas 

T6y 2 " eOTl XP VOS €V€GT7)KOJS ," OV TO fX€V €V€L- 
GTTjKei TO S' €V GTTJG €T ai y KCU XeyeiV OTL TOV V7T- 

dpxovTos to [lev [JLeXXov €GtI to 8e Trapcpx^l^evov 


1 os -Leonicus ; <Ls -E, B. 

3 <Ti^cWas ro> -added by H. C. ; <oco£ovtcls to> -Pohlenz ; 
<et> -Bernardakis. 

3 [Kal] -deleted by Bernardakis and Pohlenz. 

° Hapa. rrjv evvotav . . . elvai (j>doKovaLv= S.V.F. ii, frag. 
519. For the Stoic theory of time criticized in this chapter 
and the next see Goldschmidt, Le systeme staicien, pp. 30-45 ; 
the treatment of the subject by Sambursky (Physics of the 
Stoics, pp. 101-106) is not to be trusted. 

6 See 1081 F infra (to fxev irapqjx' r ]^ vov • • • Kal to fieXXov 
oi>x vTrdpx CLV <*AAd vj>eaTt]K4vai <f>r]ol . . .) with note a there. 

c Cf. S.V.F. ii, p. 158, 15-17 ; p. 160, 19-21 ; and p. 164, 


41. It is at odds with the common conception to 
hold a that there is future and past time and not 
present time but that, while recently and the other 
day subsist, 6 now is nothing at all. And yet this is 
what it comes to for the Stoics who do not admit a 
minimal time or wish the now to be indivisible c but 
say that whatever one may think one has grasped 
and has in mind as present is in part future and in 
part past, d so that there is left and remains co- 
incident with now no part of actual time if the time 
said to be actual be divided into parts that are future 
and parts that are past. e What happens, then, is 
one of two things : either in making the affirmation 
" time was and time will be " they deny the pro- 
position " time is " or <(in making the affirmation^ 
" there is time present," which in part was and in 
part will be present, they also assert that what exists 
is in part future and in part past and what is now is 
in part before and in part after/ so that now is what 

d See 1081 f infra (tlOtjol tov ivear-qKoros xP ovov T ° H>* v 
fieXXov €ivoll to Se TrapeXrjXvdos), and cf. the statement that no 
time kolt dTraprtafjLOv iveordvat dXXd Kara rrXdros Xiyeodai 
(S. V.F. ii, p. 164, 25-26) with that ascribed to Posidonius 
(Box. Graeci, p. 461, 19-20 = frag. 98, 9-10 [Edelstein-Kidd]), 
to Se vvv kcu to. op-oia e'v 7rAaT€i xpovov Kal ou^l kcit* a.7TapTia/xov 
voeiaOai. In Be E 392 f Plutarch makes Ammonius, his own 
teacher, say . . . to iveoT7)K€ " Kal to " 7rapeori " Kal to " vvv " 
. . . 6 Xoyos a77-dAAuatv. cVcdAt/fercu ydp els to fieXXov Kal to 
TTap<j>xr]\i.£vov . . . SuoTafievov. 

^ Cf. Sextus, Adv. Math, x, 119-120 (p. 500, 25-27 

1 Cf. Posidonius in Box. Graeci, p. 461, 17-22 =frag. 98, 
7-12 (Edelstein-Kidd) : . . . tov Se napovTa, os £k tlvos fiepovs 
tov TrapeXrjXvOoTos Kal tov (jlcXXovtos rrepl tov biopiopiov avTOv 
crvv<EGTr)K€' tov Se oLopiopidv Grj(jL€ta)hr) tlvai. . . . Ae'yeoflai Se to 
vvv Kal [koto] tov iXdxicTov rrpos atodrjOLV XP 0V0V Kepi tov Sl- 





ydp vvv to 7rapojx r ]f Ji ^ vov /cat ov8e7TOj vvv to fieXXov. 
(avdyKT) 8e ovtojY hiaipovoi Xeyew olvtols otl /cat 
to(v TTj fxepov to fiev e^Ses to S* avpiovY /cat tov 

TtJtCS* TO jLt€V TT€pVOl b TO S' €tS" V€0>Ta /Cat TOV (XjLta 
E TO fJL€V 7TpOT€pOV TO 8k VOTCpOV . OX)8kv yap €77L€IK€- 
tto> /cat to t)ot) /cat TO fJLTJKeTl Kat TO VVV 
/cat to jx?) vuv. ot o aAAot names avupamoi 
/cat to apTt Kat to /xera \wcpov ojs €T€pa 
tov " vvv " pbopia /cat to /xev /xeTa to vw to Se 
7ipo tou vuv TidevTac /cat voovoi /cat vojit^ovaL. 
tovtojv {S') 8 ^Apx^rjfjios fiev appLrjv* Tiva /cat oi;/x- 
j3oAt)v elvat Xeya>v tov 7rapojx r )l x ^ vov K0Ll T °^ €77 1 - 
(f>€poji€vov to " vw " XeXrjdev avTov ws eot/ce t6v 
TrdvTa X9® vov dvaipcbv. el yap to vvv ov 10 xpovos 
ioTiv dXXd Trepas xP ovov 7T ^ LV °^ p-opiov xpovov tol- 
ovtov olov 11 to vvv €otiv, ov8ev (f)aiv€Tai jxepos k\ojv 
F 6 ov\xnxas xP° vos ^^ €LS irepara StdAou /cat crvfx- 
fioXds /cat apfjLas 12 dvaXvofievos. Xpvoi7T7ros oe /Sot>- 

1 ovk€tl -Wyttenbach ; ovk lort -E, B. 

2 <avayo? <*' ovtco> -supplied by Bernardakis (Cch-ay/o? ow> 
outco> -Wyttenbach after Amyot's version) ; /xc'AAo^ . . . vac. 
7 -E ; vac. 6 -B . . . hiaipovoi ; <e7r€rai o' ovtw> -Pohlenz. 

3 <v . . . avpiov> -supplied by Wyttenbach ; on Kat to (to 
-B) . . . vac. 26 + 3 -E ; vac. 10+ 12 -B . . . *ai tou -E, B. 

4 t^t£s -Wyttenbach ; (Jhotos -E, B. 

5 B ; 7T€plOV -E. 

6 Wyttenbach ; Tcun-a -E, B. 

7 B ; 7roioui/Tos, o -E ; voovurcs ro -Kaltwasser. 

8 <S*> -added by Sandbach (Class. Quart., xxxiv [1940], 
p. 24, n. 3). 

9 apfxrjv -von Arnini (S. V.F. iii, p. 263, 32 ; cf. Alexander, 



is not yet now and what is no longer now, a for what 
is past is no longer now and what is future is not yet 
now. In dividing {this way, however, they must) 
assert that even {today is in part yesterday and in 
part tomorrow) and this year is in part last year and 
in part next year and what is simultaneous is in part 
before and in part after. For they make muddles no 
more reasonable than these when they identify " not 
yet " and " already " and " no longer " and " now " 
and " not now." All other men suppose and con- 
ceive and believe both " recently " and " soon " to be 
parts of time different from " now " and the latter to 
be after now but the former before now. Of these 
Stoics, however, Archedemus for one asserts b that 
" now " is a kind of juncture and connexion of what is 
past and of what is coming on ; and by this assertion 
he has unwittingly, as it seems, annihilated the 
whole of time, for, if now is not time but a limit of 
time and if every part of time is such as now is, c all 
time in its entirety obviously has no constituent part 
at all but is wholly resolved into limits and con- 
nexions and junctures. Chrysippus, on the other 

° Cf. Aristotle, Physics 234 a 11-14 on the consequences 
of taking vvv to be divisible. 

b Archedemus, frag. 14 (S.V.F. iii, p. 263, 31-37); cf. 
Aristotle, Physics 222 a 10-20. 

c But Archedemus probably denied that vvv is a " part " 
of time just as Aristotle did (Physics 218 a 6-8 and 220 a 

Be Mixtion*, p. 216, 19, p. 217, 5-9, and p. 219, 3 [Bruns]) ; 
apxrjv -E, B. 

10 ov -Leonicus, Basil. ; o -E, B. 

» olov-E; ^-B. 

12 apfias -von Arnirn (S. V.F. iii, p. 263, 36) ; op/jitis -E, B. 


(1081) Xoptevos (f>t\oT€)(y€Zv rrepl rr]v hiaipeoiv ev jxev rep 
7T€pl tov Kevov kcll dAAots- real to ptev TrapcpxV 
[Atvov rod XP° V0V Kai TO fJ&XXov ovx vrrdpxeiv dAAd 
v(f)€GT7]KevaL (f>j]ol piovov Se vnapx^v to eveorrjKos' 
ev 8e rco rpircp /cat reraprcp /cat TTepLrrrcp rrepl tcov 
Mepcov Tidrjoi rov eveuTr)Koros XP ovov T ° ^ v fteX- 
1082 Xov elvai to Se 7TapeXrjXv86s. tooTe avpL^atvei to 
VTrdpxov avTtp tov xp® vov oiaipew els tcl fir/ vrrdp- 
Xovtol to #' vnapxov 1 uaAAov Se oXojs rod xP ovov 
pLTjSev aTToXecTrecv 2 VTrdpxov, el to eveoTrjKos ovSev 
k\ei piepos o pLTj pieXXov cgtIv t] TraptpxVP'tvov. 

42. f H piev ovv tov xp ovov vorjois avTols olov 
vScltos TrepLopa^is, oaco pdXXov me'^erat hiappeov- 


dvdyKrj ydp, el tov vvv to p,ev els to rrapcpx^l^evov 
to 8* €is to pieXXov hiaipelTCLi, /cat tov Kivovp*evov 

1 to 6* virapxov -R. G. Bury (in Pohlenz, Moral-la vi/2, p. 
224) ; rov vrrdpxovros -E, B ; [rod VTrapxovros] -deleted by 
Rasmus (Prog. 1872, p. 23) ; rod VTrapxovros </ccu rd v-ndpxovra 
rov vTrdpxovros> -Sandbach (Class. Quart., xxxiv [1940], p. 24, 
n. 3). 

2 Bernardakis ; d-noXnT^iv -E, B. 

8 B (cf. 966 e) ; oioXioddvovros -E. 
4 Leonicus ; ivepyeias -E, B. 

a S.V.F. ii, frag. 518; cf. S.V.F. ii, p. 164, 26-30 and 
for the distinction made here between vfeonqKtvai and 
virdpx^v see A. A. Long, Problems in Stoicism, pp. 89-93; 
A. Graeser, Archiv fur Begriffsgeschichte, xv (1971), pp. 
303-305 ; and V. Goldschmidt, Rev. Etudes Grecques, lxxxv 
(1972), pp. 336-344 ; but cf. also the observation made by 
Apollodorus of Seleuceia (S. V.F. iii, p. 260, 22-23) : /cat 
VTrdpx^tv 6 rrds XP^ vo ^ Ae'yerai, ovStvos avrov rcov fxepcov VTrapxov- 
ros dTrapri^ovrcos. 

6 S.V.F. ii, frag. 517. 



hand, wishing to treat the division with finesse says a 
in his treatise on the Void and in some others that 
the part of time that is past and the part that is 
future subsist but do not exist and only what is 
present exists ; but in the third and fourth and fifth 
books on Parts he affirms b that of present time part 
is future and part has gone by. Consequently it 
turns out that he divides the existing part of time 
into parts that are non-existent and what does exist, c 
or rather that he leaves absolutely nothing of time 
existing if what is present has no part that is not 
future or past. d 

42. The conception of time for them, then, is like 
clutching water, which falls away and slips through 
one's grasp the tighter one squeezes it/ while as to 
actions and motions it involves the utter ruin of clear 
apprehension/ For, if now is divided partly into 
what is past and partly into what is future, it is 

c Cf. Sextus, Adv. Math, vi, 67 (p. 761, 19-21 [Bekker]) 
and x, 199 (p. 517, 14-18 [Bekker]). 

d Cf. Sextus, Pyrrh. Hyp. iii, 145 (pp. 154, 33-155, 2 
[Bekker]) and Adv. Math, vi, 63 = x, 192; Aristotle, 
Physics 217 b 32 — 218 a 6 (in the initial airopLai). 

e In De E 392 a-b Ammonius, Plutarch's teacher, uses 
the same simile for the impossibility of apprehending the 
dvrjTT) </)vols, all of which is Iv tiiaco yzviaecos /cat (f>9opds (cf. 
H. von Arnim, Quellenstudien zu Philo von Alexandria 
[Berlin, 1888], pp. 97-98 on Philo Jud., De Josepho 140- 
143 = iv, p. 90, 2-17 [Cohn]). Pohlenz thought that only 
the zeal of polemic could have caused Plutarch in later life 
to turn against the Stoics this argument of his own (Hermes, 
lxxiv [1939], p. 33), whereas the polemic itself is char- 
acterized as " shadow-boxing " by C. Andresen (Logos und 
Nomos [Berlin, 1955], p. 289), who holds that Plutarch's 
attitude towards time and that of the Stoics come to the 
same thing. 

f See 1074 b and 1079 f supra and 1083 c infra. 



(1082) Kara to vvv to p,ev KeKivrjodai to 8e KtvrjoeoOai 
rrepas 8e Ktvrjaeojs avflprjaOcu /cat d>PXV v ywfie- 
B vos (S') 1 epyov TTpcbrov yeyovevai firj8^ eayarov 
eaeadat /jLrj&ev, rta XP° VC P ™ v 7Tpd£ea>v ovv8iave- 
jjlo pievojv. to? yap rod eveoTWTOs XP° V0V TO P-^v 
7Tapipx^i ^ aL T ° ^ pueXAeiv Xeyovoiv ovtojs rod 
TTparrofievov to piev rreTTpax^ai to 8e TrpaxOtfoeoOai. 
tt6t€ tolvuv eoxev ^PXV V 7T ^ r€ &* ^ €t TeXevrrjv to 
apioTav to ypdcf)€LV to j8aSt£eti/, el rrds puev 6 dpi- 
OTtov r)pi(iT7](j€ /cat dpioTrjoec was 8e 6 j5a8Lt,ojv e/3d- 
8io€ 2 /cat jSaSietTat; to 8e 8eiva>v, cf>aoL, 8eivoTaTov, 
el to) t,a>VTL to etprjKevai /cat tfioeodai ovpLfiefirjKeVy 
ovt apx^v £OX € T0 Vj v ov " € £ £t 7T€ P a ^> aAAa e/ca- 
otos r)p,ibv d>s eoiKe yeyove jjurj dp^dpbevos tov l,fjv 
/cat Tedvrj^€Tai fir] TravoopLevos* el ydp ov8ev ea- 
C tiv eoxaTOV jxepos dAA' dei Tt 4 tw £a>vrt tou 
TrapovTos els to pueXXov TrepieoTiv, ov8<=TTOTe yiy- 
v€Tat ifjev8os to " tpf]oeodai HojKpaTrj (^aWa." 
/cat) 5 ooaKis dXr]6es (eoTai) % to t,fj H*ojKpdT7]s " 
eTTL tooovto 1 ifrev8o$ to " Tedvr\Ke Hoj/coaT^s'." 
coot y el to " ^TjoeTai HcoKpaTrjs n dXrjdes eortv 
ev a7T€Lpois XP° vov f^epeocv, ev ov8evl xpovov fiepet 

1 <8'> -added by Bernardakis. 

2 E, B (pace Pohlenz) ; t^dSi?* -Stephanus. 

3 E, B ; Travadfievos -Bernardakis. 

4 dAA' del tl -Wyttenbach (after Xylander's version) ; dAA' 
€t Tt -E, B ; dAA' en -Stephanus. 

5 <£a>vra." kcli> -supplied by H. C. ; owKpdrr] . . . vac. 5 
-E ; vac. 2 -B . . . dcrd/as 1 ; ^coKpar-q," <dAA'> -Bernardakis ; 
this lacuna suppressed by Aldine, Basil. 

6 <l(7Tat> -supplied by Pohlenz ; dXrjdes . . . vac. 4, -E ; 
vac. 5 -B . . . to ; <e'(7Tt> -Bernardakis ; <ro £§ tlcoKpdrrjs, kclI 
e<£' oaov dXrjdky -Rasmus (Prog. 1872, p. 23). 

7 E, B ; e'ori tooovtov -Aldine, Basil. 



necessary also that of what at the moment now is in 
motion part have moved and the rest be about to 
move and that terminus and initiation of motion have 
been abolished <and^ that there be no part of any 
deed that has been first or will be last, since actions 
are divided in correspondence with time. For, as 
the Stoics say that of the present time part has gone 
by and the rest is to come, 8 so it must be that part of 
what is being done has been done and the rest will 
be done. When, then, did lunching, writing, walking 
commence and when will they have an end if every- 
one lunching lunched and will be lunching and every- 
one walking walked and will be walking ? And, 
what is, as people say, most outrageous of outrages, b 
if it is characteristic of one who is living that he has 
been living and will be living, his living neither had 
initiation nor will have a terminus ; but each of us, 
as it seems, has come to be, though he did not begin 
living, and will die, though he will not stop living. 
For, if no part is last but some of the living being's 
actuality always extends into the future, it never 
becomes false that " Socrates will be living (if he is 
living/' And) as often as <it will be) true to say 
" Socrates is living " so far will it be false to say 
" Socrates is dead." Consequently, if in infinitely 
many parts of time it is true to say " Socrates will 
be living," c in no part of time will it be true to say 

See 1081 c supra and note d there. 

b Cf. to Travrwv Setvdrarov (Sextus, Adv. Math, viii, 178), 
irdvrcov yap ovtojv . . . Seivtov rovro bcivorarov (Demosthenes, 
xxiv, 194), and similar turns of phrase common in the 

c It will be true to say it " infinitely many times " because 
that part of the specious present which is really future is 
itself infinitely divisible. 



(1082) to " redvr]K€ TiOjKpdrrjs n dXrjOeg earou. Kalroi 
tl irepas av epyov yevoiTO, itov Se 1 Xrj^ete to Trpar- 
rofjievov, av ogolkis dX-qQes ion to " TTpaTTCTai " 
TOoavTaKis dXr)9es fj koX to " Trpa^^crerat "; ifjev- 
o€tcli yap 6 Xeyojv irepl 2 tov ypac^ovro? Kal 8ia- 
Xeyopievov YlXaTcovos otl uavoeTai rroTe TlXaTOJV 

D (ypdcJHjov KaV) z 8iaXeyop,evos, el p,r)8eiTOTe ipev86s 
eoTi to " SiaXexOrjoeTat " rrepl tov 8iaXeyopievov 
Kal to (l ypdipei" rrepl tov ypdcfiovTos. eri tolvvv 
(ziy tou yiyvopLtvov* p,epos ouSev eoTiv onep ovk 
tjtoi yeyovos eoTiv t) yevqaopbevov Kal TrapeXrjXvOos 
rj piiXXoVy yeyovoTos 8e Kal yevrjoopbevov* Kal Traptp- 
Xyp-evov Kal p,eX\ovTos a'lodrjcns ovk cgtlv, ovSevos 
airXcos^ a"o9r)ois eoTiv. ovtc yap optopev to Trapto- 
XV)p<evov tj to pceXXov ovt aKovopitv ovt aXXrjv riva 
XapL/3dvop,ev a'ioOrjoiv tG)v yeyovoTOJV rj yevr\aop,e- 
vojv ov8ev (o?v,) 8 ovo av rrapfj tl, aladrjrov eoTiv, 
el tov TrapovTos dec to pev pceXXei to Se 7rapcpx r ] Ke 
Kal to pikv yeyovos eoTi to he yevrjoopievov. 

E 43. Kal pirjv avTol ye a^erAta iroielv tov 'Era- 
Kovpov Xeyovat Kal /3ta£ea#at to? evvoias, tcrora- 
X&s ra acojitara KivovvTa /cat paqoev drroXeiTrovTa 

1 itov 8* <av> -Bernardakis. 

2 7T€pl -Wyttenbach ; iripas -E, B. 

3 Kypdcfxm' kolI> -added by Kronenberg {Mnemosyne, 3 Ser. 
x [1942], p. 44). 

4 <ct> -added by Pohlenz. 

6 Dubner ; yevofxevov -E, B. 

6 Kolfhaus (Plutarchi Be Comm. Not., p. 59) ; yeyei^/xeVou 
-E, B. 

7 ouS^o? ovv arr\u>s -Basil. 

8 <ow> -added by Dubner. 

This does not follow, however, for the " infinitely many 


" Socrates is dead." a And yet what terminus could 
a deed have and where could that terminate which 
is being done if as often as it is true to say "it is 
being done it is true also to say " it will be done " ? 
For one who says of Plato writing and arguing that 
Plato will at some time stop <( writing and]) arguing 
will be making a false statement if it is never false to 
say of him who is arguing " he will be arguing " and 
of him who is writing " he will be writing/' Further- 
more, <^if)> of what is occurring no part is such as not 
either to have occurred or to be about to occur, i.e. 
to have gone by or to be coming on, and what has 
occurred and will be occurring, i.e. past and future, 
are not objects of sensation, 6 absolutely nothing is an 
object of sensation. For neither do we see what is 
past or what is future nor do we hear or get any 
other sensation of things that have occurred or will 
be occurring. Nothing^, then,) is perceptible, not 
even if anything is actual, if always of what is actual 
part is to come and the rest has gone by, i.e. part 
has occurred and the rest will be occurring. 

43. Moreover, the Stoics themselves say c that 
Epicurus does a shocking thing and violates the com- 
mon conceptions by making the velocity of moving 
bodies equal and denying that any is swifter than any 

parts of time " in question are together equal not to all 
time or all time to come but only to that part of the specious 
present of which they are divisions. Cf. the paradox 
(Alexander in Simplicius, Phys., p. 1296, 18-25 and Sextus, 
Adv. Math, ix, 269 and x, 34-6-350) : at what time did 
Socrates die, since it could have been neither when he was 
dving nor when he had died ? 

b Cf S. V.F. ii, p. 236, 1-3 and Aristotle, T)e Memorla 
149 b 13-15. 

c This passage is missing from S. V.F. 



(1082) fjLTjSevos raxvT€pov. TroXXtp 8e rovrov o-^erAtcure- 
pov €OTl kclI fiaXXov dTTrjpTrjTai, TLQV €WOld)V TO 
fi7]8ev vtto (JLTjStvos 77€p iKaTaXapL^dveo 6a i, fjLrjS' el 1 
XeXwvrjv, to rov Xoyov, [<^acrt,] 2 fieroTnade Siwkol 
'A8p7]OTov rayys lttttos. dvdyKTj 8e tovto ov\l- 
fiaiveiv, t&v fxev Kivovfievojv /caret to irpoTepov 
(jrpoTepov KivovfjL€va>vy 3 TOiV 8e SiaoTrjfidTOJV a 81- 
e^iaaiv els drreipov ovtojv fxepioTtov, wairep d£iov- 
oiv ovtol. el yap (jrpo<f>ddari) A ^Xedpcp \iovov rj 

X^XiOVrj TOV L7T7TOV, ol TOVTO [A€V CIS dueipoV T€~ 

to voTepov, ov8e7TOT€ Tip fipaSvTaTto TTpood^ovoi 
to 5 TaxLOTOv, dec tl ScdaT^pLa tov fipaSvTepov rrpo- 
XapifSdvovTOS els drreipa StaoTTy/xaTa /zeot£o/xevoy. 6 
to S' €K twos <f>idXrj$ rj kvXlkos v8aTos eKxeo[xevov 

fJL7)8€7TOT€ TTOV 4KXy6rjO€o6aL TTUJS OV 7Tapd TTjV €V~ 

voidv ioTiv rj Tra>s ovx eTx6\ievov ols ovtol Xeyovac; 
1083 Trjv yap /caT<x to TTpoTepov (rrpoTepovy tcov els 

1 fxijS* el -B ; /Lt7?8e -E. 

2 [<f>aot] -deleted by Madvig (Adversaria Critica, p. 671) ; 
retained by Pohlenz with note, " sc. Stoici " (contrary to 
sense if not to syntax also). 

3 <7rp6T€pov Kivovfi€V(ov> -H. C. (cf. Sextus, Adv. Math, x, 
128 [to Kivovficvov . . . Kara to irporepov rrportpov Kive?cr#cu], 
et saepe) ; <Kai to vorepov> -added by Leonicu . 

4 <,-npo<f)Baori> -H. C. (cf. Praecepta Gerendae Reipublieae 
80(5 e) ; et yap . . . vac. 8 -E ; vac. 9 -B . . . irMOpcp ; <(f>0alr]> 

6 to -E ; tov -B. 

6 Leonicus ; fte/n £o/z€fot> -E, B. 

7 <7rpoT€pov> -H. C. ; <8ta> -added by Pohlenz. 

This passage is missing from Usener's Epicurea ; but 


other a ; but it is much more shocking than this and 
further removed from the common conceptions for 
nothing to be overtaken by anything not even if a 
tortoise, as the saying goes, & should from behind be 
pursued by the swift steed of Adrastus. c Yet it is 
necessary that this be the consequence if, while the 
moving bodies (move antecedently) over the ante- 
cedent part, the distances which they traverse are, 
as these men maintain, divisible ad infinitum* For, 
if the tortoise (have got the start) of the horse by 
only half a dozen rods, those who divide this distance 
ad infinitum and make each of the two things move 
in sequence over the antecedent and subsequent 
parts will never bring what is swiftest up to what is 
slowest, since the slower is always getting ahead by 
some distance which is divided into an infinite number 
of distances/ And the notion that water being 
poured out of a bowl or a cup will never be all 
poured out, how is this not at odds with the common 
conception or how not a consequence of their asser- 
tions ? For motion (antecedent) over the antecedent 

cf. Epicurus, Epistle i, 61-62 and frag. 277 (Usener, Epicurea, 
p. 197, 14-16) ; Sextus, Adv. Math, x, 129 ; and Alexander, 
Quaestiones, pp. 45, 28-46, 21 (Bruns). 

b Corpus Fabularum Aesopicarum i, fasc. 2, pp. 130, 17- 
131, 21== Lib. Myth. 2 (Hausrath-Haas) ; cf Simplicius, 
Phys., p. 898, 30-33 and p. 1014, 5-6. See also Sextus 
(Pyrrh. Hyp. iii, 77 ; cf. Adv. Math, x, 154) who refers to 
the argument, however, not in refutation of the Stoic but in 
that of the Epicurean theory of motion. 

c /z€T07na#€ . . . i7T7Tos is adapted from Iliad xxiii, 346-347. 

d Cf. Sextus, Pyrrh. Hyp. iii, 76 and Adv. Math, x, 139- 
142 ; Alexander, Quaestiones, p. 35, 18-27 (Bruns). 

* Cf. Aristotle, Physics 239 b 14-20 (Zeno's " Achilles ") 
with Themistius, Phys., pp. 199, 23-200, 28 and Simplicius, 
Phys., pp. 1014, 9-1015, 2. 



(1083) CL7T€ipOV fiepiOTOJV KlV7]OlV OVK CIV TIS VOrjO£L€ TO 

rrdv Siavvovcrav, dAA' dec tl 1 piepiarov VTroXetrrovGa 
TToirjaei rrdoav fiev kKyyoiv rrdaav S' oAwrOr/aw /cat 
pvaiv 2 vypov /cat <f>opdv arepeov /cat fiapovs [ledei- 


44. Tlaplrjpu Se 7roAAa? aroirias avroov tlov rrapd 
T7)V evvoiav icpaTTTopLevos. 6 roivvv ire pi av^rjaecos 
Xoyos earl pcev apxolos- rjpcoTr)Tai yap, cos <f>r)Gi 

y^pVOlTTTTOS, V7T* 'ETTt^a/D/XOU ' TCOV 8' €V 'A/CaS^- 

/Lteta 3 olofievcov pLrj rrdvv pdoiov /x^8' avroOev eVot- 
p,ov elvai ri]v aTroplav 7roAAa KarrjTidcravB' (ovtol 
/cat) 4 Karefiorjoav cos rds TTpoXijifj^cs dvatpovvTcov 
B /cat rrapd rds ivvotas (cj)iXocjocf>ovvTcov' avrol 8' ov 
fiovov ovoe rds evvoiasy ^vXarrovacv dXXd /cat rrjv 
aiaOrjoiv rrpoGStaaTpecpovaiv, 6 pcev ydp Xoyos dix- 
1 Leonicus ; dXXa c? n -E, B. 2 Aldine ; pvatv -E, B. 

3 ef * AKahrjfietas -Bernardakis (but cf. De Sera Numinis 
Vindicta 549 E : tlov iv 'A/caS^/xcia. lJ>l\ooo(J)ovvtlov). 

4 Pohlenz ; KaTnridadai . . . vac. 4 -E ; vac. 7 -B . . . /care- 
Po7]oav; KaTrfTidoavTo </cat> -Wyttenbach (after Amyot's ver- 

5 Bernardakis (after Rasmus, Prog. 1872, p. 23 : <<£iAo- 


avrol 6° ovx ort tols fwotW> -Pohlenz ; lacuna suspected by 

a Cf. Alexander, Quaest tones ', p. 35, 27-28 (Bruns) : t? 
ytveTOLt fxkv /caret to irporepov fiopiov tov ficyedovs irportpov 7} 
kLvtjols . . . 

6 Cf. Be Stoic. Repug. 1042 f and 1049 « supra. Such 
statements by reminding the reader that the essay restricts 
itself to one kind of absurdity insinuate that the Stoics are 
guilty of many other kinds also. 

c S. V.F. ii, frag. 762 (p. 214, 20-24), probably in his work 
TTepl Av^avofievov (S. V.F. ii, p. 131, 6-8). 

d Cf. De Sera Numinis Vindicta 559 a-b and Anon, in 
Platonis Theaetetum (Pap. Berl. 9782), col. 71, 12-40 (p. 47 
[Diels-Schubart]) ; Epicharmus, frag. B 2 (D.-K.)=170 



part of parts a that are divisible ad infinitum could not 
be conceived as getting through the sum of the parts, 
but by always leaving some divisible part remaining 
it would render incomplete all effusion and all sliding 
and flowing of a liquid and locomotion of a solid and 
falling of a weight that has been released. 

44. I pass over many of the Stoic absurdities and 
hold to those that are at odds with the common con- 
ception. 6 Well then, the argument about growth is 
certainly ancient, for, as Chrysippus says, c it was 
propounded by Epicharmus d ; and yet the members 
of the Academy, because they think that the question 
is not a very easy one and not to be disposed of out 
of hand, have been severely accused (by the Stoics 
and) decried on the ground that they annihilate the 
preconceptions and are at odds with the common 
conceptions <(in their speculations, whereas by the 
Stoics themselves not only are the common concep- 
tions not) observed but even sense-perception is dis- 
torted to boot/ For the argument is simple/ and 

(Kaibel)=152 (Olivieri) ; and L. Berk, Epicharmus (Gron- 
ingen, 1964), pp. 90-92. 

* For the charge and countercharge see 1058 e-f, 1060 a, 
1061 a and d, 1062 a-b supra. At 1080 d supra the Stoics 
are characterized as tovs ras koivols ivvotas fir) ^vXarrovraSy 
and at 1081 b-c supra the preconceptions are said to be 
annihilated by them. 

f For the argument '* in the schools " cf. De Tranquillitate 
Animi 473 d ; Theseus xxhi, 1 (10 b-c) ; and the title of 
Plutarch's own lost discussion of the theme, Tlepl rod firj tovs 
olvtovs 8ia/zeVetv rjfids, aei rrjg ovaias peovorjs (Quaest. Conviv. 
741 c), which is used in De E 392 d {cf. Plato, Symposium 
207 n 2—208 b 2 ; Aristotle, Politics 1276 a 34 -b 13). The 
sceptic argument against avg-qots is given by Sextus in Pyrrh. 
Hyp. iii, 82-84 ; for Aristotle's discussion of the problem cf. 
De Generatione 320 a 8—322 a 33. 



(L083) Aovs ion Kal to, Xijfifiara ovy^iopovoiv ovroc ras 
iv 1 fiepet TTaoas ovoias pelv Kal <f>ep€odai, ra 2 ueV 
i£ avTcov fjiedieiaas rot 3 84 rcodev imovra TrpooSex " 
fxevas, ots 8e Trpooeioi Kal drrecatv apidpbols t) ttXtj- 
0€ol ravra 4, pjr) Siafievtw dXXd ere pa yiyveadai, rats 
elprjfxevais rrpoo68ois {/cat a^oSots 1 ) 5 4f;aXXayr)v 
rfjs ovoias XafJLpavovarjS' av^rjoecs 8e Kal <f>9Lo€is ov 
Kara 8lkt)v vtto ovvqQtias eKveviKr\o8 at ras fiera- 
jSoAa? ravras XeyeoOat, yeveoeis [Se] 6 /cat <f)9opds 
fjL&XAov avras ovofid^odai rrpoorJKov on rod Ka9- 
C tOTtQTos els erepov e/c/3i/3a£owt 7 to S' av^eo9ai Kal 
to fieiovodat rrddrj aaiuaros' 4otiv V7Tok€ljjl€vov Kal 


Tidcpiivajv, ri a^iovaiv ol irp68iKoi ttjs evapyelas 8 
ovtol Kal Kavoves twv evvoicjv ; eKaoTov rjticjv 81- 
8vfMov elvac Kal 8i(f>vrj Kal 8lttov — oi>x woirep ol 
7Toir]Tal tovs MoAtovtoa? otovTai, tols uev 9 rjvajfJLe- 

1 ras iv -E, B, Basil. ; ras fji€v -Aldine ; ras (±ev ev 

2 ra -Wyttenbach ; ras -E, B. 

3 ra, -Wyttenbach ; ras -E, I). 

4 ravra -Kronenberg (Mnemosyne* 3 Ser. x [194:2], p. 44 
[implied by the versions of Amyot and Xylander]). 

5 <xai d(f>6oois> -added by van Herwerden. 

6 Se -B, and superscript in ligature -E 1 ; deleted by 
Bernard aids. 

7 Wyttenbach (cf. Animadvert! iones on 243 u) ; £Kfiidt,ovoi 
-E, B. 

8 Leonicus ; ivepyelas -E, B. 

y olovrat, rots fx€v -Pohlenz ; oi6[1€vol -E, B ; rois fiev -Basil. 

a S.V.F. ii, frag. 762 (p. 214, 24-36). 
b See note c on T)e Stoic. Repug. 1047 c supra ; and for 
the contention that the Stoics neglect or subvert this prin- 



the Stoics admit the premises : that all particular 
substances are in flux and motion, sending off from 
themselves some parts and receiving others that come 
to them from elsewhere, that the numbers or amounts 
which such parts join and leave do not remain the 
same but become different, the substance under- 
going transformation with the aforesaid accessions 
{and withdrawals), and that by customary usage it 
has become the fashion for these changes to be in- 
correctly called cases of growth and decay, although 
the appropriate names for them are rather genera- 
tion and destruction because they make a thing pass 
out of its existing state into another, whereas growth 
and diminution are modifications of a body that per- 
sists and is their substrate. Something like this 
being the position taken (by the Academics) and the 
way in which it is stated, what, then, do the Stoics 
maintain, these advocates of clear apprehension b 
and standards c of the common conceptions ? That 
each of us is a pair of twins and biform and double — 
not as the poets think the Molionidae d are, unified 

ciple which they advocate see 1084 b infra and 1074 n, 
1079 f, and 1082 a supra. 

c This is meant to be sarcastic, for the Stoics maintained 
that the common conceptions are the objective criteria of 
truth (8. V.F. ii, p. 154, 29-30) and the natural origin of their 
system (see 1060 a supra). A similar ironical use of Kavwv 
occurs in Philo Jud., De Specialibus Legibus iii, 164 (v, p. 195, 
22-23 [Cohn]), where the nomothetes who have looked to 
opinion rather than to truth are said to be themselves 
oi tcov hiKaiojv Spot Kai Kavoves. Cf. also Quomodo Adolescent* 
Poetas Audire Debeat 25 e, where Plutarch warns the young 
reader against taking the great heroes of poetry as Kavovts 
dp€T7Js dndaws Kai opdorr^ros. 

d Cf. De Fraterno Amore 478 c and Apollodorus, Biblio- 
theca ii, 7, 2 (with Frazer's note, L.C.L. i, p. 248, n. 2). 



(1083) vovs fxepeoi tols S' drTOKpLVOpLevovs, dXAd 8vo ad)~ 
fiara tclvtov k\ovTa XP^f^ a Tavrov he oxr^ia rav- 
t6v 8e fidpos Kai tottov (tov olvtov oficos 8e 8l7tA& 


pov dAAa ovtol jjiovot 2 el8ov rrjv ovvdeoiv ravrrjv 
Kai ScTrAorjv /cat dfja^L^oAiav , ws 8vo rjfiayv eKaoros 
D iartv VTTOKeLjjLeva, to puev ovaia to 8e (ttolott]^ , 3 
Kai to fiev del pel Kai <j>epeTai y pJyr* av^ojievov 
pfryve fieiovfievov \iv)ff oAa>9 olov icrTt 8iap,evov y to 
8e 8iapLevei Kai av^dveTai Kai fieiovTai Kai irdvTa 
irdoyei TavavTia OaTepco, GvpLTTecfyvKos Kai ovvrjp- 
{jioopLevov Kai ovyKeyypievov teal tt]S 8iacf)opas ttj 
aloOiqaei pnq8apiov napeypv ai/jaoOai. KaiTOi Aeye- 
Tat fjiev o AvyKevs eKelvos 8id rreTpag Kai 8td 8pvos 
opavy id) pa 8e tls diro GKonrjs ev HiKeAca Kade^o- 
fievos ras" Yiapxr\8ovLa)v €K tov Aipievos vavs Ik- 

1 <. . .> -supplied by H. C. ; tottov . . . vac. 10-f 11 -E ; 
vac. 10+9 -B . . . vtto ; <kcu TavTa> -Wyttenbach ; <tou 
ai)rdv, Kai rau#'> -Bernardakis ; <tov olvtov, ottoV rjv> -R. G. 

2 fiovov -Bernardakis. 

3 <7rotor^?> -supplied by Wyttenbach ; to 8e . . . vac. 7 
-E ; vac. 6 -B ; <ttol6v> -Zeller (Phil. Griech. ill/ 1 , p. 96, 
n. 4 [on p. 97]) after <ttol6s> -Wyttenbach (in J. Bake's 
Posidonii Rhod'ti Reliquiae, p. 266) ; <ov> -C. Petersen 
(Philosophiae Chrysippeae Fundamental p. 51). 

a Cf. TCL $€ €T€pa TtVCJV XcyOfJLtVCL &€IV Kai TOTTCp KexajpiadaL 

in the explanation why the ibtios ttolov is not other than the 
ovoia even though they are not the same (Stobaeus, Eel. i, 
20, 7 [pp. 178, 21-179, 5, Wachsmuth] = Dox. Graeci, p. 463, 
l-4 = Posidonius, frag. 96, 20-24 [Edelstein-Kidd]). 

b TTOlOTrjSy i.e. TO ISlCJS TTOLOV (cf. TO)V l&LOJS TTOlGiV aild TJ]V 



in some parts but separated in others, but two bodies 
with colour the same and shape the same and weight 
the same and place <(the same a but nevertheless 
duplicates, although) discerned by no human being 
before ; but these men alone caught sight of this 
combination and duplication and ambiguity, that 
eacli of us is two subjects, the one substance and the 
other ^quality), 6 the former being always in flux 
and motion, neither growing nor diminishing nor 
remaining of any character at all, and the latter per- 
sisting and growing and diminishing and being 
affected in all respects contrary to the other, c though 
coalescent with it and conjoined and commingled 
and nowhere affording sensation a perception of the 
difference. Yet it is said that the famous Lynceus d 
would see through rock and tree, and someone from 
a look-out in Sicily where he sat saw the ships of 
the Carthaginians distant a run of a day and a night 

€k(iotov TTOLOT-qTa in Dox. Graeci, p. 462, 22-23 = Posidoni us, 
frag. 96, 12-14 [Edelstein-Kidd]), the individuation of the 
ovoia i.e. of vX-q (see notes/ and c, pages 799-800 supra). 
The Stoic assertion that this -n-oior-qs is itself acofia (see 1085 e 
and De Stoic. Repug. 1054 a-b supra) gave opponents the 
opportunity to object that they made every individual two 
indistinguishable bodies ; but they did apparently, like the 
Peripatetics, themselves assert that each is a double vtto- 
k€lix€vov (S. V.F. ii, frag. 374 and Porphyry in Simplicius, 
Categ., p. 48, 11-16 [Kalbfleisch]). 

c Cf. Stobaeus, Eel. i, 20, 7 (p. 178, 10-21 [Wachsmuth]) = 
Dox. Graeci, p. 462, 20-27 = Posidonius, frag. 96, 10-20 
(Edelstein-Kidd). This Stoic doctrine is scarcely more than 
a rewording of Aristotle's (De Generatione 321 b 22-34 ; 
cf. Alexander, Quaestiones, p. 13, 9-32 [Bruns]). 

d Cf. De Capiendo, ex Inimicis Utilitate 87 b ; Pindar, 
Nemean x, 61-63 with Scholia Vetera in Pindari Carmina 
iii, pp. 179, 4-180, 14 (Drachmann) ; and Aristotle, De 
Generatione 328 a 14-15. 



(1083) irXeovoas, rjfjiepas /cat vvktos drre-^ovoas 8p6fxov, ol 
E Se 7T€pl KaAAiKpdrrj /cat M.vpfJLrjKiSrjv 1 Xeyovrat 8rj- 
paovpyelv apfiara pLvlas Trrepols KaXynropieva /cat 
8iaropeveiv iv oiqodixcp ypd\i\xaaiv emrj tcov 'Ou^- 
pov ravrrjv 8e rrjv iv rjpuv erepor^ra /cat (Sta)- 
(f>opdv 2 ov8el$ 8telXev ov8e 8ieorr]oev , ov8e* ^uets 
fjodopLeda Strrot yeyovoreg /cat tco jxev del peovres 
fiepei rep S' a77o yeveoecos &XP 1 T € ^ € vrrjs ol avrol 
ScapLevovres . drrXovorepov 8e TroiovjjLac rov Xoyov, 
€7T€l reaaapd ye ttoiovglv VTTOKeipieva ire pi eKaorov, 
/xaAAov Se reacrapa 4 eKaorov rjfiajw dpKel 8e /cat rd 
Svo 7rp6s" rrjv droTTtav. el ye rod fiev TlevOeoJS 
aKovovTes iv ttj rpaycpSta Xeyovros cos 8vo fiev 
F rjXiovs opq Sirrds 8e ®rjf3as oi>x opdv avrov dXXd 
7rapopdv Xeyofiev, eKTpeTrofxevov /cat TrapaKivovvra 
roZs XoyiopLoiSy tovtovs 8 ov fuav ttoXlv dXXd irdv- 
ras dvOpconovs /cat £a>a /cat 8ev8pa rrdvra /cat 
GKevrj Kat opyava /cat Ifidria 8irrd /cat 8tcf)vrj Ti9e- 
fievovs ov yaipeiv icofiev, cos napavoelv rjpL&s 5 ptdX- 
Xov 77 voelv dvayKa^ovras ; ivravda piev ovv tocos 
1084 aureus 1 ovyyvcoord 6 TrXdrrovoiv erepas cfcvoeis vtto- 

1 Bernardakis ; fivpfi^KtSr) -E, B. 

2 Wyttenbach (implied by Xylander's version) ; <j>opav -E, 
B (" fortasse servandum " -Westman f Pohlenz-Westman, 
Moralia vi/2, p. 233]). 

3 ov&* -Bernardakis ; ovre -E, B. 

4 reVrapa -E, B (though both have reavapa in the pre- 
ceding line). 

5 E ; 7Tapavofj,€Lv tj as -B. 

ovyyvwara -E ; ovyyvcjora -B (with alpha superscript over 
the initial signia); avyyvcjariov -Wyttenbach (but rf. Adv. 
Colotem 1117 c). 

« Cf. Strabo, vi, 2, 1 (267); Aelian, Var. Hint, xi, 13; 



sailing out of their harbour, and Callicrates and 
Myrmecides and their fellows are said to fashion 
carriages canopied with the wings of a fly and to 
engrave in letters on a sesame-seed lines of Homer's 
poems b ; but this diversity and difference within us 
none determined or distinguished, and we did not 
perceive either that we had come to be double and 
are ever in flux in one part but in the other remain 
the same from birth to death. I am simplifying the 
theory, since they postulate four subjects in the case 
of each one or rather make each of us four c ; but 
even the two suffice to show the absurdity. If, in 
fact, when we hear Pentheus in the tragedy d stating 
that two suns he sees and double Thebes we say 
that he is not seeing but, being deranged and out of 
his wits, is seeing amiss, shall we not dismiss these 
Stoics as forcing us into misconception rather than 
conception with their supposition that not just a 
single city but all human beings and all animals and 
trees and furniture and instruments and clothes are 
double and biform ? Well, in this case perhaps it is 
excusable for them to fabricate diverse kinds of sub- 

and especially Pliny, N.H. vii, 8,5 (where the works of 
Callicrates and Myrmecides and a different version of the 
microscopic writing are also given) with F. Miinzer, tteitriige 
zur Quellenkritik der Natur geschichte des Plinius (Berlin, 
1897), pp. 172-174. 

b Cf. Pliny, N.H. vii, 85 and xxxvi, 43; Aelian, Var. 
Hist, i, 17 ; J. Overbeck, Die antiken Schriflquellen zvr 
Geschichte der hildenden Kiinste bei den Griechen (Leipzig, 
1868), Nos. 2192-2201. 

c i.e. make each a vTroKeifievov in the third and fourth 
of their categories as well as in the first and second already 
mentioned (cf. A. Trendelenburg, Geschichte dfr Katwjorien- 
iehre [Berlin, 1846], pp. 220-221). 

il Euripides, Bacchae 918-91!). 



(1084) KeifjLevojv aAA^ yap ovSefiia <f>alv€rai fiTjxavrj <f>iXo- 
tl[jlov(j,€vols otooai, Kal hia<f)vXdt;ai ras av^rjaets. 
45. Ev Se rfj ifwxfj tL rradovrts 77 rivas rrdXiv d'X- 


Ttov oia<f)opds Kal loeas dXiyov oeco elireiv drreipovs 
to TrXfjdos ovk dv exoi rt? eirrelv dXXd on ras Koivas 
Kal ovvrjOeis e^otKt^ovreg evvoias fxaXXov 8e oXa>s 
dvaipovvres Kal hia<j)deipovres irepas lireiodyovoiv 
olXAokotovs Kal ^cVas*. dronov yap ev /xaAa ras 
dperas Kal ras KaKcas TTpos Se ravrats ras r€X vas 
/cat ras* (JLv^pLas rrdoas en he (jiavraoias Kal Trddr) 
B Kal opjias Kal avyKaraOeaeis awfxara Troiovfievovs 
ev fjLrjSevl (frdvac 1 Kelodai [xr]8e VTrdpxeiv rorrov (Sc) 2 
rovrocs eva rov ev rfj Kapola iropov onypnalov ano- 

Xi7T€LV, 0770V TO TjyepLOVlKOV GVOT€?^XoVOL T7)S fax^S ', 

1 Stephanus ; <f>dvaL -E, B. 

2 <Sc> -added, here by Amyot ; tottov tovtols eva <he> 

a See page 695, note a supra. 

b Cf. 1070 c supra. 
' c S. V.F. ii, frag. 848 (p. 230, 1-9). 

d Since they are all dispositions or states of the soul or 
of the rjyefiovLKov, itself a disposition of the soul (cf. S. V.F. 
ii, frag. 823 and frag. 132 [p. 42, 23-26] with Sextus, Pyrrh. 
Hyp. ii, 81 and Plutarch, De Virtute Morali 441 c-d and 
446 f—447 a [S. V.F. iii, frag. 459]), and the soul itself is 
corporeal (see 1084 d-e infra [S. V.F. ii, frag. 806] and 
S. V.F. ii, frags. 443 [p. 146, 17-25], 467, 773, 774, 780, and 
807), they are all bodies. See 1084 f infra for ^avTaoia ; 
1085 a-b infra for /xvtJ/zcu; S.V.F. ii, p. 23, 20-24 for <f>av- 
tcuticu, fjivrjiMCLL, and t^vcu. And cf. Plutarch's De Superstitlone 
165 a ; S. V.F. iii, frag. 305 ; and especially Seneca, Epistle 
cvi, 4-10 (S. V.F. iii, frag. 84) and Epistle cxvii, 2. That the 
virtues, vices, and affections were held by the Stoics to be 
perceptible has already been stated in 1062 t and De Stoic. 
Repug. 1042 e-f supra. For the Stoic doctrine attacked in 



jects, for no other contrivance presents itself to their 
ambition to save and maintain the phenomena a of 

45. What made them manufacture within the soul, 
however, differences and kinds of body infinite, I had 
almost said, in number or what other assumptions in 
turn they are dressing up thereby, this one could not 
say but could say that they evict or rather altogether 
abolish and destroy the common and customary con- 
ceptions and import in their place others that are 
strange and foreign. 6 For it's pretty absurd of them c 
to take the virtues and the vices and all the skills 
and memories besides and mental images, moreover, 
and affections and impulses and acts of assent for 
bodies d and say that they do not reside or subsist 
in any subj ect (but) to have left these things a single 
place e no bigger than a point, the duct in the heart, 
into which they cramp the soul's ruling faculty/ 

the present chapter see Pohlenz, Zenon und Chrysipp, 
pp. 183-185 and Goldschmidt, Le systeme stoXcien, pp. 22-23. 

• Cf S. V.F. ii, pp. 220, 42-221, 2. 

f According to most of the evidence the Stoics located 
the rjyciioviKov " in the heart " without further qualification 
(cf. S. V.F. ii, frags. 837, 879 [p. 235, 20-21], 885, 886, 898) ; 
and in [Plutarch], De Placitis 899 a (S. V.F. ii, frag. 838) it 
is said that all of them located it in the whole heart or the 
11 pneuma " of the heart, although this is controverted by 
the evidence of Diogenes of Babylon (S. V.F. iii, p. 217, 18-20 
[cf. Pohlenz, Stoa ii, pp. 51-52]). Chrysippus himself, how- 
ever, at least once specified its location as in media sede 
cordis (S. V.F. ii, p. 236, 15) ; and, since he also asserted 
that the left ventricle of the heart is rilled with " psychic 
pneuma " (S.V.F. ii, p. 246, 13-14), it is most probable that 
the Diogenes said in [Plutarch], De Placitis 899 a ( = Aetius, 
iv, 5, 7 [Dox. Graeci, p. 391, 15-16]) to have located the 
fjyciJLoviKov in that ventricle is his pupil, Diogenes of Babylon, 
who is known to have written on the subject (cf S. V.F. iii, 



(1084) V7TO roaovrcov oiopLarcov Kare^ofievov ocrajv 1 rovs 
irdw Sokovvtcls da^opii^ecv /cat diroKplveiv erepov 
erepov ttoXv ttXtjOos Sianeayevye . ro he pbrj \iovov 
aiofiara tclvtcl iroielv dXXd /cat £a)a Aoyt/cd /cat 
^tpcov roaovrcov 2 ap^vos ov (f)iXiov 3 ovhe rjfiepov 
dAA' oxXov avTiordrriv (ev) /caoStats 4 /cat TroXtpuov 
ovve-xovras* drrocfxiLveiv ekclgtov rjfxcjov Trapdheioov 
77 fjidvSpav 77 hovptov* lttttov — rj tl dv ris a nXdr- 
tovolv ovtol hiavorjOeir) /cat Trpoaayopevaetev ; — 
VTrepfSoXr) rls eariv oXiycopias /cat vapavofjitas els 
ttjv evdpy eiav 1 /cat rrjv ovvrfieiav. ol S' ov \.iovov 
rds dperds /cat ray /ca/ctas £a)a etvat Xeyovcnv ovhe 
rd TrdOrj jjlovov, opyds /cat <j)66vovs /cat Xviras /cat 
€7Tt^aip6/ca/ctas', ovhe /caraA^ets" /cat (jyavraoias 
/cat dyvotas ovhe rds T€^vag £<£a, rr)v okvtotojil- 
ktjv rrjv ^aA/corum/c^v, dAAa 77009 tovtois en /cat 
rd? eve py etas aoj/xara /cat £a>a ttolovol, rov irepl- 


ayopevoiv rrjv Xoihoplav. errerai he tovtols /cat 

1 Wyttenbach (implied by Xylander's version) ; ooov -E, B. 

2 togovto -Rasmus (Prog. 1872, p. 23) ; togovtov -Bernar- 

3 E: <£Aov-B. 

4 <eV> Kdpotais -H. C. ; KaKiais -E, B ; /cat {tiaras [/cat] 
-Madvig (Adversaria Critica, p. 671) ; [/ca/ciats-] -Rasmus 
(Prog. 1872, p. 23); /cat jSi'atov -Bernardakis; <eV aperals 
/cat> /ca/ct'ats -Pohlenz. 

6 auj/c^ovTa? -Sandbach (unpublished notes) ; vow t^ovraj 
-E, B ; vovv €x OVTa <*cu> -Rasmus (Prog. 1872, p. 23) and 
Bernardakis ; vovv exovra <o>ot'> -Pohlenz. 

6 E, B (so L\ Q in Sertorius i, 6 [5<>S c] ; Aristophanes, 
Birds 1128); oovpciov -Bernardakis. 

7 Wyttenbach ; ive py eiav -E, B. 

8 Amyot (" le chausser ") ; vnodeoiv -E, B. 

p. 21.5, 28-29), and not Diogenes of Apollonia (Diels-Kranz, 


filled with so many bodies that their great multitude 
has eluded those who are highly reputed for dis- 
tinguishing and separating one thing from another. 
But to make these things not merely bodies but 
rational animals as well b and by confining <(in) our 
hearts not a tame or friendly hive c but an adverse 
and hostile mob of so many animals to make each of 
us out to be a game-preserve or byre or wooden 
horse d — or what thought and name could one give 
the fictions of these Stoics ? — , this is about the last 
degree in scorning and outraging clear apprehension 
and common experience. 6 They assert, however, 
that not only are the virtues and the vices animals 
and not only the affections, cases of anger and envy 
and grief and spiteful joy, or apprehensions and 
mental images and cases of ignorance or the skills — 
shoemaking and smithing — animals but besides these 
they further make f the activities bodies and animals 
— taking a walk an animal, 9 dancing, putting on 
one's shoes, greeting, reviling. It follows that laugh- 

Frtig. Vorsok. 6 , ii, p. 57, 3-4 ; cf. F. Solmsen, Mits. Ilel- 
veticuniy xviii [1961]), p. 158, n. 21) or a scribal error for 
" Diodes " (Do.v. Graect, p. 204, n. 1). 

rt This is probably another thrust at the Stoics themselves, 
whose elaborate distinctions {e.<j. S. V.F. iii, frags. 264-276 
and 39 1-488) are called casuistry by Plutarch and Galen 
(S. V.F. iii, frags. 439-441). 

b Cf. Seneca, Epistle cxiii, 1-26 (printed in part as S. V.F, 
iii, frag. 307) and 8. V.F. iii, frag. 306. 

c Cf. De Virtute Moral i 441 r (referring to Plato's 
Meno 72 a as does also De Amicorum MuUitudine 93 if). 

d Cf. Plato, Theaetetus 184 d. 

e See 1083 c (with note b) and 1073 c-d (chap. 29) supra. 

' S. V.F. ii, frag. 848 (p. 230, 9-10). 

9 Cf. Seneca, Epistle cxiii, 23— S. V.F. i, frag. 525 and 
ii, frag. 836 (p. 227, 40-42). 



(1084) ylXojra ^tpov etvou Kal KXavOpov ei Se ravra, Kal 
fif\x a KCiL irrapiiov Kal arevayfiov tttvglv t€ irdv- 
tojs Kal aTTOfjLV^iv Kal ra Xolttol' evSrjXa yap eVn. 
Kal fjLTj &vox € P aLV €TO)oav irrl ravr ayopevoi Tip 
Kara puKpov Xoyto, \pvoL7mov LivrjpovevovTes iv 
D ra) TrpwTto rd)v Qvoikcov Z^r^/xarcov ovrto rrpoo- 
dyovros' tl oi>x rj pev vi)i; ocbp? eorlv r) Se ecrrrepa 
Kal 6 opOpos Kal to pueoov rrjs vvktos otoiiaT* ovk 
karcv ovSe rj pev rjpepa atop iarlv ov^l Se Kal rj 
vovfJLTjVia atopa Kal rj SeKarr] Kal TTevreKaiSeKarrj 
Kal r) rpiaKas Kal 6 lltjv atop? earl Kal to dtpos Kal 
to fydivontopov Kal 6 eViauro?." 

46. 'AAAa raura p,ev rrapd tcls kolvols /3ia£ovrcu 
TTpoXrufjtts €K€lva S' rjSrj Kal irapa tcls iSias, to 
OepiioTaTov Trepujjv^ei Kal ttvkvojg€l to XcnTopepe- 
GTaTov 1 yevvci)VT€s. rj ydp tftvxV OeppoTaTov ioTi 


E TTepajjv^ei Kal 7tvkvo)G€c tov crcu/xaro? 2 olov gtolioj- 

G€L TO 7TV€VfXa ptTafUXXoVTOS €K (f)VTLKOU l/or^lACOV 

ycv6p,evov. z yeyovevac Se Kal tov tjXiov epifjvxov 

1 K ; X€7TTOfJi€p€(7T€pOV -B. 

3 onepfjiaTos -Pohlenz. 

3 tov 7ru€Vfj.aTog . . . i/jvx^kov ytvofxevov -Rasmus (Protf. 187-2, 

1>. rfs) 1 __ 

n S. V.F. ii, frag. 665 ; cf. Zeller, Phi/. Oriech. iii/1, p. 1 24. 

h ovT(x)= Kara piKpov, i.e. eV npocrayajyrjs (rf. Aristotle, 
Politics 1306 b 14-15 and 1315 a 13) ; for the use of rrpoadyciv 
rf. Aristotle, De Caeh 304 a 13 and De Gen. Animal. 765 b 

" See 106i? a-b supra (chap. 8 sub fine m). 

,l to OeppioraTov . . . nCp vo€pov= S. V.F. ii, frag. 806 (p. ?23, 
4-9). See De Stoic. Repug. 1052 e -1053 d (chap. 41 ) supra, 
to the content of which, though not necessarily to that passage 
itself, the eWVa here refers (cf. M. Pohlenz, Hermes, Ixxiv 
[1939], p. 18). 


ing is an animal and weeping ; and, if these, cough- 
ing is also and sneezing and groaning and, certainly, 
spitting and bloAving the nose and the rest, for they 
are manifest. And let them not be vexed about being 
led to these things by the argument which advances 
little by little but remember that Chrysippus in the 
first book of the Physical Questions a draws to his 
conclusion in this fashion b : It is not so that the 
night is a body and the evening and the dawn and 
midnight are not bodies ; and it is not so that the 
day is a body and not the first day of the month and 
the tenth and the fifteenth and the thirtieth and the 
month and the summer and the autumn and the 

46. But, while in their insistence upon these 
notions they are at odds with the common precon- 
ceptions, they are already at odds with their own as 
well c when they insist upon those others, generat- 
ing d what is hottest by a process of chilling and what 
is most subtile by a process of condensation. So they 
do, for the soul is surely most hot and most subtile 
and they produce it by the chilling and condensation 
of the body e which by tempering, as it were, changes 
the vital spirit that out of vegetable is become 
animal. But they also say that the sun has become 

e Pohlenz to support his change of ocoiicltos to arrepfiaros 
refers to S. V.F. ii, frags. 805 and 741 ff. ; but the tempering 
occurs when at birth the articulated body meets the external 
air (S. V.F. ii, frag. 805 [p. 222, 14-16] ; Hierokles, Ethische 
Elementarlehre ed. H. von Arnim, col. 1, 20-30 ; Plutarch, 
De Stoic. Repug. 1052 f and 1053 c-d supra and Be Primo 
Frigido 946 C [to irvtvfia Xiyovotv eV tois aatfiaai tojv f$p€<f>a>v 
rfj 7T€pnl)v^€t oTOfAovodcLL . . .]). If the text needed emendation 
at all, the simplest expedient would be to read /xerajSaAAovrf? 
instead of /lera^aAAo^o?. 



(1084) Xeyovcn, rod vypov jJL€Taj3dXXovTOS els rrvp voepov. 
wpa 1 /cat top rjXtov 8iavo€Lo6ou Trepapv^et yevpco- 
fievov. 6 fi€V ovv Etevocfxxvrjs , SirjyovfJLevov twos iy- 
X^Xecs ecopcLKevai iv vSan deppLtp i^axjas, " ovkovv " 
elrrev " its ipvxpw avras eifjrjoofjLev." rovrots 

Se €TTOlT &V, €1 7T€pHpV^€t T(X OepfJiOTOLTOL ytVVCOOL 

Ta ifjvxpoi /cat Staxvaec 2 to\ ttvkvol /cat Sta/cptaa 
tcl j8a/oea yevvav, dXoyias tlvcl 3 (J>vX<xttovoiv dva- 
Xoyiav /cat (6p,oXoy tav.) 4 
F 47. Evvota? S' ovoiav avTrjs /cat yeveaiv ov rrapd 
tols ivvolas vnoTidevTcu ; <j>avTaoia yap tls rj eV- 
vota eart, <f>avTaoia 8e TVTraxjis iv ipvxfj' fax^s 5 
8e <f>vais dvaOvfxlauLS, rjv TVTWjdfjvai fiev epyajSes 

1 E ; opa (with to superscript over 6) -B. 

2 Kaltwasser (see 1053 a-b supra) ; cruyxvaei -E, 13. 

3 Sandbach (Class. Quart., xxxv [1941 J, p. 116), and im- 
plied by Xylander's version ; twos -E, B. 

4 <o/xoAoytav> -H. C. ; dvaXoyiav Kai . . . vac. 8 -E ; vac. 
7 -B . . . eVvotas; avaXoyiav Kai <ctKoAoi;0iav> -Pohlenz : 
avaXoylav. Kai ivvolas -Stephanus (Amyot?). 

6 *l>vx?js -Bernardakis ; $vxfj -E, B. 

a Cf. Non Posse Suaviter Vlvl 1107 b; [Plutarch], De 
Placiils 890 a( = S. V.F. ii, frag. 655) ; S. V.F. i, frags. 120 
and 501. b Xenophanes, frag. A 17 (D.-K.). 

c There is probably a pun intended in aXoyias . . . ava- 
Xoyiav, and Plutarch may well have added a direct thrust at 
the " consistency " of which the Stoics boasted (see 1062 i: 
supra [. . . iv rots ooyfiaoi ttjv ofxoXoyiav . . . | and De Stoic, 
Repug. 1033 a). 

d <f>avTaaia yap . . . ndXtv efiovro? = 8. VF. ii, frag. 817 
(p. 229, 35-41). 

e evvoia— iva7TOK€Lfj.ivq vorjois (1085 a infra and note e 
there), and vorjois = XoyiKr) <j>avraoLa (S.V.F. ii, p. 24, 21-23 
and p. 29, 31). 

' Cf. S.V.F. ii, frags. 53, 55, and 56 (with the whole of 
Sextus, Adc. Math, vii, 227-242, 372, 376-377 ; viii, 400- 



animate by the change of liquid into intellectual 
fire. a Then it's time to think of the sun too as being 
generated by a process of chilling. Now, Xeno- 
phanes, when someone told of having seen eels living 
in hot water, said : " Well then, we'll boil them in 
cold " b ; and it would be consequent for these 
Stoics, if they generate the hottest things by chilling 
and the lightest things by condensation, conversely 
to generate by heat the things that are cold and by 
diffusion the things that are solid and by rarefaction 
the things that are heavy, thus preserving in their 
irrationality some ratio and {consistency. )> c 

47. And in what they suppose to be the essence 
and genesis of conception itself are they not at odds 
with the common conceptions ? For d conception is 
a kind of mental image, e and a mental image is an 
impression in the soul f ; but the nature of soul is 
vaporous exhalation,^ on which it is difficult to make 

402 ; and Pyrrh. Hyp. ii, 70). For the '* interpretation " 
of tv7tojols as €T€polu)ois by Chrysippus cf. Pohlenz, Stoa i, 
p. 61 and ii, p. 36 ; and for its ineffectiveness cf. Bonhoffer, 
Epictet and die Stoa, pp. 149-151. 

9 Of. S.V.F. i, frags. 139 and 141 ( = 519 and 520) ; iii, 
p. 216, 18-25 ; Marcus Aurelius, v, 33 (dvaOv^laois d<f> y aifiaros) 
and vi, 15 (17 dcf> y atfiaros dva0t>/u'aais /cat rj ck rov depos 
ava-nvtvois). Elsewhere the Stoics are said to define the 
soul as TTvcvfia ovfjL<f)V€S kcli avadvfJLiaots aladrjTiKr) eV twv rod 
acofiaros vyptov dva8tSofj.€v^ (S.V.F. ii, frag. 778 and [Plut- 
arch], De Vita Homeru 127 = vii, p. 400, 18-20 [Ber- 
nardakis]) ; but what are probably more accurate accounts 
represent it as essentially " pneuma M which is nourished and 
sustained by the vaporous exhalation of the blood and the 
air inhaled in respiration (S. V.F. i, frag. 140 = 521 ; ii, frags. 
777, 779, 782, and 783), and it is critical interpretation which 
reduces this " psychic pneuma " either to dvaBvuiaois at/xaro? 
(S. V.F. ii, frag. 781) or to a mere " blend " of fire and air 
(S. V.F. ii, frags. 786, 787, and 789). 



(1084) 8id fiavorrjra 8e^apLevr]v 8e rrjprjoai tvttojoiv dSv- 
varov, 7] re yap rpo(f>rj /cat r) yeveois avrrjg e£ 
1085 vyptbv ovaa avve^rj rrjv e7Ti<j>opav ^x €l KaL T V V ^va- 
Aa>cm>, rj re rrpos rov depa 1 rrjs dvaTrvorjs eiripu^ia 
Kaivrjv del iroiel rrjv dvadvjxiaoiv, e^torapLevrjv Kal 
TpeTTOfjLevrjv vtto rov dvpaOev epu^aXXovros ox^tov 
kcll 7rdXiv et;i6vTOS. pevpa yap dv ti? v8aros </>e- 
pofievov fJbdXXov 2 Siavojjdelrj oxrjpiOLra Kal tvttovs 
Kal e'l8rf 8ca<f>v\drrov rj irvev\xa <f>ep6pevov evros* 
drools Kal vyporrjav erepto S' e^wdev ev8e\ex&S 
olov dpytp 5 Kal dWorpicp rrvevpLari Kipvdpevov . 
aAAa ovro)s irapaKovovai* eavrcov wore ras evvoias 
(evyairoKeijievas 1 rivas opi^ofxevot vorjoeis fjLvrjfia? 
B 8e pLOvLpiovs Kal a^crt/cd? rvnajoeis ras 8' emorr}- 
/xa? Kal navrdiraoi rnqyvvvres d>s to dpLerdTnuy- 

1 acpa <8ta> -added by von Arnim (S.V.F. ii, p. 229, 39). 

2 E ; TLS fJidXXoV V&OLTOS <f>€pOfX€VOV ~B. 

3 Kal elSr) -B ; added superscript after tvttovs -E. 

4 €vt6$ -Kronenberg (Mnemosyne, Hi [1924], p. 107) ; iv 
toZ? -E, B. 

6 vtovpyw -Wyttenbach (but cf. S.V.F. ii, p. 218, 27). 

6 Wyttenbach ; irapaKOVovres -E, B ; TrapaKovovris <€icr<> 

7 Pohlenz (cf. Plutarch, De Sollerila Animallum 901 
c-d) ; dnoKeifieva? -E, B. 

a For this objection cf Sextus, Adv. Math, vii, 374-375, 
who, however, emphasizes the tenuousness and fluidity of 
the " pneuma " rather than its being in constant flux and 
who after this (376) introduces the interpretation of tvttcjois 
in the sense of €T€polwoLs as if this had been intended as an 
answer to the objection. 

b Cf S. V.F. ii, p. 228, 39-40. 

c As Alexander says (S.V.F. ii, frag. 785), if soul is 
" breath," it is breath with a certain rovos (see De Stoic. 
Re-pug, 1034 d supra) and not any and every inert breath, 
such as the circumambient is when it is inhaled. 



an impression on account of its subtility and for which 
to receive and retain an impression is impossible. 
Liquids being the source of its nourishment, i.e. of 
its genesis, this is in process of continual accretion and 
consumption ; and its mixture with the air of respira- 
tion is for ever making a new thing of the vaporous 
exhalation as this is altered and transformed by the 
current which rushes in from without and withdraws 
again. For one could more easily suppose shapes and 
imprints and forms being kept by a stream of running 
water than by a moving breath a which is perpetually 
being blended with vapours and moistures within b 
and with another, an inert and alien breath as it were, 
from without. The Stoics, however, are so heedless 
of themselves d as to define conceptions as a kind of 
conserved notions e and memories as abiding and 
stable impressions f and to fix absolutely firm the 
forms of knowledge as being unalterable and stead- 

d S. V.F. ii, frag. 847 (p. 229, 42-46). 

e Cf. Plutarch, Be Sollertia Animalium 961 c-d and 
Philo Jud., Quod Beus Sit Immutabilis 34 (ii, p. 63, 16-17 
[Wendland]). These passages, neither of which is in S. V.F., 
confirm Pohlenz's change to evaTTOKeifievas here and Pear- 
son's of imvoia to evvoia in S.V.F. ii, frag. 89 (Class. Rev., 
xix [1905], p. 457 ; cf. Helmbold, Class. Rev., N.S. ii [1952], 
pp. 146-147). 

/ Cf. Epictetus, Diss, i, xiv, 8 ; Cicero, Tusc. Disp. i, 61 
(". . . esse memoriam signatarum rerum in mente vestigia") ; 
and the definition of memory as drjoavpiaiios <t>avraoL(hv 
(S. V.F. i, frag. 64). That these impressions are " abiding 
and stable " does not mean that they all have to do^aAe? 
Kal Pefiaiov ascribed to every memory of the sage (1061 c-d 
supra) ; but \Lvr\ivr\ was connected with ^ovrj at least as early 
as Plato (Cratylus 437 b 3 ; cf. Aristotle, Anal. Post. 99 b 
36—100 a 5 and Topics 125 b 6 ; Plotinus, Enn. iv, iii, 26, 
lines 52-54). 



(1085) rov /cat fiefiaiov e)(ovoas elra tovtois VTrorldeoOat 
fidoiv /cat kSpav ovaias 6Aio~6rjpa$ /cat oKeSaorfjs 
/cat (frepofievrjs del /cat p€ovor)s. 

48. Srot^etoi; ye pLrjv /cat dp^7j? eWota 1 Kotvrj 

770U7tI> 0>9 €7T05 eluelv dvdpOJTTOLS €{17rd(f)VK€V , CO? 

aVAow /cat aKparov elvai /cat dovvderov ov yap 

CTTOt^etOV Ol)S' a/>^ TO jJL€fltyjJL€VOV ClAA' €^ toV U6" 

voepov /cat vo£»v eV vAt? iroiovvres ov Kadapov ovSe 
drrXovv ovd* dovvdeTOv aAA' e£ 2 erepov /cat ota 
erepov 3 a7TO(f)aLvovcnv . ^ oe uA^ /ca#' avrrjv aXoyos 
C ouaa /cat clttoios to dnXovv e'xei /cat to d/ox o€t Ses* • 
o #cos* oV, 4 etWo ot3/c eoriv daa>uaro9 ovb' dvXos, 

1 K ; /Z17V cvvoia kol apxys ~J5. 

2 d/\Aa <ovv8€tov> ££ -Wyttenbaeh. 

a E, H (fxcrt Pohlenz) ; drepov -Aldine, Basil. 

* hrj -Pohlenz. 

a Cf, S. V.F. ii, p. 29, 37 and p. 30, 23-25 and 3 J -35 ; iii, 
pp. 26, 41-27, S. 

b C/. Sextus, Pyrrh. If up. iii, 188 {=--8. V.F. ii, frag. 06). 
c Cf. epL^vroc 7rpoArjift€is in note /> on /V Stoic. Repiig. 

1041 E. 

d 0/. Aristotle, Metaphysics 1014 b 5-6 and 1059 b 34-35 ; 
Sextus, ^r/r. i¥o*fc. i, 104 (p. 622, 15-18 [Bekker] and 
Pyrrh. Hyp. iii, 152 (p. 156, 17-18 [Bekker]); (mien, De 
Elementis i, 1 (i, pp. 414, 9-415, 3 [Kiihn]) ; [amhlichtrs, 
I)e Comm. Math. Scientia, p. 17, 12-13 (Festa). 

• 8. V.F. ii, frag. 313. 

* Cf S.V.F. i, frag. 85 and ii, frag. 300. The Stoics 
differentiated dpxrj from otoixclov {S.V.F. ii, frags. 299 [cf. 
A. Schmekel, Die Positive Philosophic i, Berlin, 1938, p. 245. 
n. 4], 408, and 409) ; but Chrysippus distinguished three 
senses of aroLx^Tov, and the third of these (St. V.F. ii, pp. VM^ 



fast a and then to place beneath these things as base 
and foundation a substance that slides and scatters 
and is always in motion and flux. 6 

48. Well anyway, of element or principle there 
has been bred in c practically all men a common con- 
ception, that it is simple and unmixed and incom- 
posite, d for element or principle is not what has re- 
sulted from mixing but the ingredients of the 
mixture. Yet these Stoics e by making god, while a 
principle/ an intellectual body,^ that is intelligence 
in matter, 71 make him out to be not pure or simple or 
incomposite but from something else and because of 
something else.* Matter, however, being in itself 
without rationality and without quality , ; has sim- 
plicity and so the characteristic of a principle ; but 
god, if in fact he is not incorporeal and not im- 

34-137, 6) fits what is said of god (cf. S. V.F. ii, p. 113, 10- 
11 ; pp. 185, 43-186, 3 ; and p. 306, 20-21), one of the two 
Stoic dpxaL 

Cf S.V.F. ii, p. 112, 31-32; p. 299, 11-12; p. 306, 
19-20 ; p. 307, 1-3. 

h This explication emphasizes the two separate factors 
(cf, 1076 d supra [klv€l 8* avr-qv 6 Xoyos ivvTrdpxojv . . .J 
and S. V.F. ii, p. 112, 8 [. . . to 7tolt]Tlk6v oXtiov iv rfj vXrj elvac] 
but also 8. V.F. ii, p. Ill, 10 [t6v iv avrfj Aoyov, tov 6eov\) ; 
the ocbfAa voepov could also be interpreted as vXt) rrcas ex ov<7a 
(cf. Plotinus, S.V.F. ii, p. 113, 30 and p. 115, 22) or vovs 
vXlkos (cf. S. V.F. i, p. 42, 7-8 [vovv rrvpivov] and S. V.F. ii, p. 
306, 24-25 [vovv ivaidiptov of Stobaeus compared with vovv iv 
alOepc of Pseudo- Plutarch]). 

* to cf ov = vXrj, to Sid 6 = to t4Xos (cf. S. V.F. ii, p. 162, 
21-22). What is i£ hepov Is not an dpxrj (Aetius, i, 2, 2 
[Box. Graeci, p. 275 a 24-28], cf. Plato, Phaedrus 245 d 
2-3) ; and what is Std tTcpov ought not to be god, since accord- 
ing to the Stoics god is 6id ov tol ndvTa (S. V.F. ii, p. 305, 20 ; 
p. 312, 2S and 32-33). 

; See 1076 c-d supra and the references in note c there. 



(1085) cos" apxys fJLCTeax 7 )** T V$ vXtjs. el p,ev yap ev /cat 
tclvtov rj vXr) /cat 6 Xoyos, ou/c ev ttjv vXrjv dXoyov 
airohehajKaoiv el Se erepa, /cat 1 afufroTeptov ra/xta? 2 
aV rt? o ^€0? elr) /cat ou^; a7rAow aAAa ovvOerov 
rrpdyfia rep voepto to aajfiariKov e/c tt/s* vA^s* rrpoo- 

49. Ta ye /r^y reaaapa acop^ara, yfjv /cat vbcup 
aepa re /cat 77t}p, Trpcora OToiyeia TTpooayopevovres , 
ovk olSa enrols ra p.ev drrXd /cat Kadapa to, 8e ovv- 
6era /cat prepay p,eva 77oto£at. yrjv p,ev yap <£aat 3 
D /cat vSwp ov9' avra ovveyeiv ovd' erepa irvev- 
jj,aTLKrjs 8e peroxfj* f<al TrvpebSovs 8vvdpeajs rrjv 
ivoTTjra 8ia<f>vXaTT€iv depa 8e /cat nvp avrtbv r 
elvai St' evroviav 6/crt/cd 5 /cat rots' 8valv eKeivots 
iyK€Kpap€va rovov Ttapeyeiv /cat to pi6vip,ov /cat 
o?)at6j8es\ 77x09 o& ere yrj oTot^ctov 7) v8a)p, el 
prqf? dirXovv p/qre Trpcorov firfd' avrw otao/ce? aAA' 

1 \k<xI] -deleted by Wyttenbach. 

2 E ; dfjL<j>oT€pa)v av tls 6 deos €ir) lafziag -B ; hia<j>€povTa, puyas 
-Sandbach (Class. Quart., xxxv [1941], p. 116) ; [/cat] dpi<j>o- 
ripujv <jQ.p.i€lov, ov> rapblas -Pohlenz (llermes> lxxiv [1939], p. 
30, n. 4). 

3 <j>aoi -von Arnim (S. V.F. ii, p. 146, 32) ; laaot -E, B ; 
ciV aet -Bernardakis ; Ttfle'aat -Pohlenz. 

4 pLcroxfj -Wyttenbach (implied by versions of Amyot and 
Xy lander) ; ficTox'fjs -E, B. 

6 Iktikcl -von Arnim (S.V.F. ii, p. 146, 35) ; e/cTa-n/ca -E, 
B ; avv€KTLK(i -Pohlenz. 

° Cf. Plotinus in S. V.F. ii, p. 1 14, 6-7 (/cat d 0eds Se^rc/Do? 
avToZsTrjs v\r]S' /cat yap oa>p,a ££ vXtjs ov /cat ciBovs) and p. 113, 
28-30 (d yap Qeos . . . 77apa re r^s vAt?? €^a;y to ctrat /cat 
vvvdtTos Kal vorepos . . .) ; Alexander, /><? Mixtions p. 225, 
13-16 (Brims). 



material, has got a share of matter as a participant 
in a principle. For, if matter and rationality are 
one and the same thing, the Stoics have done ill in 
defining matter to be without rationality ; and, if 
they are different things, god would also have both 
on deposit as a kind of trustee b and would be not a 
simple but a composite object with corporeality 
from matter added to intellectuality. 

49. In any case, the Stoics, while calling d the four 
bodies — earth and water and air and fire — primary 
elements/ make some of them, I know not how, 
simple and pure and the others composite and mixed, 
for they say that earth and water cohibit neither 
themselves nor other things but maintain their unity 
by virtue of participation in a pneumatic and fiery 
power, whereas air and fire because of their intensity 
are self-sustaining * and to the former two, when 
blended with them, impart tension and permanence 
and substantiality. 1 * How, then, is earth still an 
element — or water — if it is not simple or primary or 
self-sufficient but for ever in want of something 

6 That is god's relation to both \6yos and v\r) would be 
that of a participant, and essentially he would be neither. 

c With Plutarch's argument in this chapter cf. the argu- 
ments of Sextus (Adv. Math, ix, 180-181), Alexander (De 
Mixtione, pp. 224, 32-226, 34), and Plotinus (Enn. vi, i, 
26 and 27). d S. V.F. ii, frag. 444 (p. 14(5, 29-36). 

e Cf Plutarch, De Primo Frigido 947 d-e ; S. V.F. ii, 
p. 112, 33-34 and p. 180, 4-7 ; and Sextus, Pyrrh. Hyp. iii, 
31. From S.V.F. ii, frag. 413, however, it appears that 
Chrysippus at least would not seriously have called all four 
bodies primary elements or elements in the primary sense. 

1 On eVrtKra, von Arnim's emendation which is here 
adopted, cf. Rieth, Grundbegriffe, pp. 67-69. 

9 Cf. S. V.F. ii, p. 144, 27-28 ; p. 145, 1-3 ; and p. 155, 
32-36 ; and see De Stoic. Repug. 1053 f — 1054 b supra. 



(1085) evSeks e^coOev elaael 1 rod ovvexovros iv rw elvai 
Kal uco^ovros ; ovSk yap ovoias avraw eVtVotav 
air oXeXoiiraoiv , dXXd ttoXXtjv k'yei rapayy\v Kal dad- 
(f>€tav ovtcos 2 6 Xoyos XeyofjLtvos t^s* yrjs \co? ov~ 
oias fikv firj awjiaros o' ovarjsY twos Kaff iavrrjv. 
etra 77009 ovaa yrj Ka9* eavrrjv depos Setrat aw- 
E lardvros avrrjv Kal avvexovros I ^AA* °^ K €° ri * yfj 
Kau eavrrjv ovoe voatp, aAAa rrjv vArjv o arjp code 
fjiev ovvayaytbv Kal rrvKVojoas yrjv erroirjoev coSe 
Sk TTaXcv 5 oiaXvOelaav Kal fxaXaxdetaav vSojp. ov- 
Serepov ovv tovtojv aTot^etov, ols k'repov ducfrore- 
pots ovaiav Kal yeveaiv irapio-yr^Kev . 

50. "Ert rrjv fikv ovaiav Kal rrjv vXrjv v^eardvac 
rals TrotoTTjai Xeyovai, co? 6 a^eSov ovtojs tov opov 
dnoSiSovai, ras 8k 7Toiorrjras av rrdXiv ovoias /cat 
oajjiara ttolovol. ravra 8k ttoAA^p' k'xet rapaxtfv. 
el (lev yap ISiav ovaiav at TToiorrjres k\ovoi /ca#' 

1 E, B ; els del -Aldine ; eorlv del -Wyttenbach. 

2 E, B ; ovros -Leonieus ; ovros 6 Xeyoixevos rrjs yrjs Xoyos 

3 <. . .> -supplied by H. C. ; yrjs . . . vac. 8+ 11 -E ; 
vac. 29 -B . . . tlvos ; <a>s" ovuj}s> -Wyttenbach ; <voovf.ievr)s 
ws ovoias) -Pohlenz. 

4 E ; en -B. 

5 Se 7raAiv -Wyttenbach ; irdXiv 6e -E, B. 

6 cos -Bernardakis ; /cat -E, B. 

a Cf. Alexander's argument, in De Mhfione, p. 224, 15-22 
(Bruns)-=S.T r .i'\ ii, pp. 145, 40-146, 7. 

b Its substantiality is derivative, as has just been said ; 
and yet, if it is of itself a definite body, it should be of itself 
a definite substance. So conversely in 1085 e-f infra, if 
qualities do not have their own substance but only share a 
common substance, they only participate in body and cannot 
be bodies. 

c S.V.F. ii, frag. 444 (p. 146, 36-40). 


external to itself that cohibits it and preserves it in 
being ? a For not even a notion of their substance 
has been left by the Stoics ; but there is great con- 
fusion and obscurity in the account thus given of 
earth {as being) of itself a definite {body, though 
not substance). 6 And then, how is it that, being of 
itself earth, it has need of air to consolidate and 
cohibit it ? But in fact c it is not of itself earth or 
water either, but matter is made earth when air has 
constricted and condensed it in a certain way and 
water when again in a certain way it has been 
softened and dissolved.** Neither of these is an 
element, then, since something else has imparted 
substance and generation to both of them. e 

50. Moreover, while they say f that substance, 
that is matter, underlies the qualities, so as practically 
to define them in this way,^ on the other hand again 
they make the qualities substances, that is bodies. 71 
This involves great confusion. For, if qualities have 

* Cf. S. V.F. ii, frag. 309 with ii, p. 136, 21-23 and p. 134, 
11-14. Plutarch's emphasis upon the agency of air in his 
interpretation here may have been influenced by 8i' dtpos 
in the original of such passages as S. V.F. i, p. 28, 17 and 
ii, p. 180, 1 and 18, where, however, it does not express 
agency (see Be Stoic. Repug. 1053 a supra = S. V.F. ii, frag. 

e So Plotinus says that even the Stoic " elements " are in 
fact v\t) ttcds exovaa (S. V.F. ii, p. 115, 17-21). 

> S.V.F. ii, frag. 380 (p. 126, 30-39). 

9 See De Stoic. Repug. 1054 a supra (ttclvtclxov r-qv vXt]v 
. . . v7TOK€ia0ai tcu9 TToioT-qoiv olttchJhilvovoi) ; cf. S. V.F. i, frag. 
86 and ii, frags. 317 and 318. 

h Cf. S.V.F. ii, frags. 377, 383, 410 (p. 135, 22-23), and 
467 ; see also 1084 a-r supra (page 855, note </■), and for 
qualities as " vital spirits or aeriform tensions " see Dp Stoic, 
Repug. 1054 b supra. 



(1085) rjv acofxara Xeyovrat /cat eloiv, ovx irepas ovoias 
•F Seovrac ttjv yap avrcov k'xovoiv. el Se tovto \lovov 
avrals v(f>€arr]K€ to koivov, 6Veo ovoiav ovtol /cat 
vXtjv KaXovoi, SrjXov ore acofiarog fierexovat oto- 
fjLara S' 1 ovk etar to yap 2 v<f>€OT(x)s /cat Sexofievov 
Siafiepeiv avdyKT) tcov a Se^erat /cat ols v<f>eaT7]K€v. 
ol Se to 7]jxiov pXeTTOVOL' TTfv yap vXiqv drrocov ovo- 
1086 fjid^ovoL, ra? &e TroiOTT^Tas ovkztl fiovXovTat KaXelv 
dvXovs. /catrot ttcos olov t€ acofxa ttoiotitjtos dvev 
vorjoai? TroLOTrjTa oujpiaTos dvev firj voovvtos ; 6 
ydp ovfjarXeKcov aco/xa rrdorj ttolottjtl Xoyos ouSe- 
vos ea pLTj ovv rtvt ttoiott^ti craS/xaTO? dipaoOai ttjv 
Stdvoiav. rj toLvvv rrpos to daaS/xaroy ttj? ttoio- 
ttjtos fiaxo/JLtvos ixdxeoOai /cat rrpos to aVotov ttJ? 

vXrjS €OlK€V Tj 6aT€pOV 6aT€pOV dlTOKpLVOJV Kal 

dfufyoTcpa ^a>pt^etv 4 dXXrjX(x)v. ov Se Tives avTtov 
irpofidXXovTai Xoyov, ojs drnoiov ttjv ovoiav ovo- 
{jbdt^ovTes ovx ° TL ^doris eoT€pr]Tav ttoi6t7)tos aXX 
otl iraoas ^X €L r ^ TToioTirjTas , fidXioTa irapa ttjv 
B evvoidv eoTiv. ovSels yap diroiov voel to fjarjSe- 
paas ttol6t7]tos dfJLOipov ov8 airaOes to irdvTa ud- 

1 S' -Wyttenbach (implied by Amyot's version) ; yap -E, 

2 yap -Wyttenbach ; Sc -E, B 

3 vorjoat, -Kronenberg (Mnemosyne, N.S. lii [1924<), p. 107) ; 

TTOLTJoai -E, B. 

4 Bernardakis ; xaj/ot£ei -E, B. 

a Cf. 8.V.F. i, frag. 87 (including ii, frag. 316) and ii, 
p. 115, 36-39. 

b Cf the argument of Plotinus (Enn. vi, i, 29, lines 1-6). 

c See 1076 c-d and note c there. 

d Cf. Albinus, Epitome xi, 1 (p. 65, 11-13 [Louis] = p. 166 
21-23 [Hermann]). 



their own substance, in virtue of which they are 
called and are bodies, they do not have need of 
another substance, for they have their own. But, if 
what underlies them is only this common thing that 
these Stoics call substance and matter, it is clear 
that they participate in body but are not bodies, for 
what is substrate and receptacle must be different 
from the things that it receives and underlies. 6 
These men, however, see by halves, for they give 
matter the epithet " without quality " c but will not 
go on and call qualities " immaterial/' Yet how is it 
possible to conceive body without quality if they do 
not conceive quality without body ? For the reason- 
ing that implicates body in every quality permits 
the mind to grasp no body unconnected with some 
quality. It seems, then, either that its opposition to 
quality's being without body is also opposition to 
matter's being without quality or that in severing 
the one from the other it also separates both from 
each other. d The reasoning advanced by some of 
them, 6 as giving substance the epithet " without 
quality " not because it is devoid of every quality 
but because it has all qualities/ is most especially 
at odds with the common conception, for no one 
conceives as without quality what is without part in 
no quality or as impassive what is naturally always 

• S. V.F. ii, frag. 380 (p. 126, 39-42). 

f Cf. Diogenes Laertius, vii, 137 = £. V.F. ii, p. 180, 7-8 : 
ret hrj rerrapa crot^eta etvat Ofiov ttjv arroiov ovoiav, ttjv vArjv. 
J. Westenberger thought that he had detected a refer- 
ence to the reasoning here rejected by Plutarch in [Galen], 
De Qualitatibus Incorporeis, p. 472, 3-5 and p. 477, 11-13 
(Kuhn) ; cf. Westenberger's notes on 8, 13 and 13, 8 of his 
edition (Marburg, 1906), pp. 26-27 and p. 31. 



(1086) oyeiv del tt€(J>vk6s ov8 olklvtjtov to iravrr] kivtjtov. 
€K€ivo 8' ov XeXvrai, kolv del jxerd 7toi6tt]tos rj vArj 
vorjraiy to eTepav avTrjv voelodai Kal Siafiepovoav 
Tr\s TTOiorqTos* 

° i.e. 1085 f supra : to yap vfeorajs . . . hiafytpeiv avayKrj 
Tcov . . . ots v<l>€orr}K€v. 



being affected in all respects nor as immobile what 
is everyway movable. And, even if matter is always 
conceived along with quality, the former statement a 
has not thereby been refuted, that it is conceived as 
other than quality and different from it. 




Academic, 441, 447 note c, 480 
note a, 529 note a, 601 and 
note b, 661 note b, 663 and 
note /, 669, 799 and note /, 
849. Older Academics, 663 

Academy, 419, 436 note a, 441 
note a, 514 note a, 661, 663, 
735 note d, 847 and note /. Old 
Academy, 701 note a, 738 
note b 

Acco (" Bogy "), 469 

Achelous, river god, 619 note a 

Acheron, 783 

Achilles, 707 

AcropoIi9 at Athens, 423 

Acusilaus of Argos, frag. 
(F.Gr.H.) 22 : 611 and note a 

Adrastus, 845 

Aegean Sea, 811 

Aeschines, In Ctesiphontem 16 : 

Aeschylus, Persae 337-343: 809 
note b. Frag. (Nauck) 156: 
709 and note d. 361 : 613 and 
note e 

Aesop, F alula (Perry) 135 : 725 
and note 6 

Ajax, son of Telamon, 117 

Alcaeus, 527 and note b 

Alcinous, 733 

Alexander the Great, 495 and 
notes b, d 

Alexikakos (" Averter of Evil "), 
epithet of Zeus, 791 and note / 

Alexinus of Elis, 445 note a. 
Frag. (Doring) 79 : 689 and 
note c 

Alphito (** Hobgoblin "), 469 

Amaltheia, 619 and note a 

Ameinias, father of Diodorus, 589 
note c 

Anacreon, frag. (Diehl) 85 : 727 

Anagyrus, Attic deme, 119 

Anaxagoras of Clazomenae, 215 
note a, 255 and note c. Frag. 
(Diels-Kranz) B 12 : 257 note g 

Antigonus II Gonatas, 809 

Antiochus of Ascalon, 739 note b 

Antipater of Tarsus, Stoic philo- 
sopher, 417 and note e, 421, 
561, 563, 595 note b, 601 and 
note b, 753 note a, 765 and 
note d, 783 note d. Frag. 
(S.V.F. Ill) 1-2 : 417 note e. 
4-6 : 601 note b. 11-12 : 417 
note e. 19 : 601 and note b. 
32 : 773 note /. 33 : 561. 
34 : 563 and note d. 52 : 751 
note^. 57 (p. 252, 37 ff.) : 734 
note b, 751 and notes a, b. 58 : 
735 and note b. 59 : 761-765 
and note c on p. 763. 63 
(p. 255, 22) : 748 note d. 66 : 
421. Work mentioned by title : 
On the Gods : 561 

Antiphon, tragedian, 559 and 
note e 

Antiphon, Attic orator, 559 note 

Antipodes, 547 

Antisthenes, Cvnic philosopher, 
frag. (Mullach) 121 : 465 and 
note d, 467 

Apollo, 535 

Apollodorus of Seleuceia, frag, 
(S.V.F. Ill) 6 (p. 259, 24-26) 
824 note a. 8 (p. 260, 22-23) 
838 note a 



Apollonius, teacher of Diodorus, 

589 note c 
Apollonius Rhodius, i, 57-64 : 610 

note a 
Arcesilaus, founder of the new 

Academy, 25 note d, 429 note 

a, 437 and note a, 439 note c, 
441 note a, 445, 529 note a, 601 
and note b, 663, 809 and note c 

Archedemus of Tarsus, Stoic phil- 
osopher, 837. Frag. (S.V.F. 
Ill) 14: 837 and notes b, c. 
2 1 : 735 note b 

Archilochus, frag. (Bergk, Ed- 
monds) 93 : 741 and note e 

Archimedes of Syracuse, Opera 
(ed. Heiberg) I, p. 8, 3-4 : 55 
note h. I, p. 74, 1 : 819 note g 

Areimanius, Zoroaster's name for 
spirit, 255 

Aristarchus of Samos, astro- 
nomer, 79 

Aristarchus of Samothrace, gram- 
marian and critic, 514 note b 

Aristocreon, pupil and kinsman of 
Chrysippus, 419 and note b 

Ariston of Chios, Stoic philo- 
sopher, 425 and note d, 509 
note a, 529 note a, 737 note e, 
757 and note d. Frag. (S.V.F. 
1) 346 : 561 note e. 347 : 799 
note/. 351: 759 note c. 351: 
531 note d. 360, 362 : 759 
note c. 373 : 425 and note d. 

374 : 425 notes c, d, 758 note b. 

375 : 425 notes c, d 
Aristophanes, Birds 722 : 789 

note d. Frag. 271 : 815 note b 
Aristotle, 97 and note c, 473-475, 
495 and notes b, c, 513-515, 
667 note a, 733 and note a, 739 
and note b. Anal. Post. 73 a 
40-b 1 : 283 note a. 99 b 36— 
100a 5: 863 note/. 100 b 2 : 
257 note h. Anal. Prior. 24 a 
16-17 : 107 note b. Categories 
10 a 23 : 819 note e. 12 a 13- 
20 : 701 note a. De Anima 
404 a 1-9 : 61 note c. 404 b 16- 
18 : 167 note e. 405 a 8-13: 
61 note c. 405 b 28-29 : 570 
note a. 407 a 15-18 : 215 note 

b. 407 a 20-22 : 239 note e. 
407 a 23-25 : 247 note/. 409 a 
3 : 165 note e. 409 a 3-7 : 187 


note b. 410 a 27-28, b 5-6 : 
79-81 and note a on p. S\. 
415 a 23-26 : 20 note a. 417 b 
22-23 : 237 note /. 422 a 20- 
26 : 687 note b. 422 b 23-25 : 
719-721 and notes passim. 424 
a 28-32 : 686 note b. 426 a 30- 
b 8 : 687 note b. 426 b 8-11 : 

719 note c. 428 a 25-26 : 239 
note g. 429 a 29-b 3 : 687 
note b. 432 a 15-17 : 237 notes 
c, e. 433 a 14-15 : 247 note/. 
DeCaelo 271 b 11-13: 42 note 

c. 279 a 23-28 : 683 note e. 

279 a 32—280 b 8 : 170 note a. 

280 a 28-32 : 176 note a. 280 
b 6-9 : 833 note a. 286 b 13- 
16 : 51 note d. 280 b 27-33 : 
52 note b. 286 b 33—287 a 2 : 
57 note d. 293 a 20-27 : 322 
note b. 293 b 20-32 : 79 note 

d. 293 b 31-32 : 77 note d. 
296 a 26-27 : 79 note d. 300 b 
16-18 : 176 note a. 304 a 13 : 
858 note b. De Generatione 

320 a 8—322 a 33 : 847 note /. 

321 b 22-34 : 851 note e. 326 b 
3-5 : 165 note e. 328 a 14-15 : 
851 note d. 328 a 26-28 : 810 
note a. De Gen. Animal. 736 
b 28 : 575 note c. 765 b 5-6 : 
858 note b. 788 a 13-17 : 42 
note c. De Incessa Animal. 
708 b 22-24 : 55 note d. De 
Memoria 449 b 13-15 : 843 note 
b. 449 b 22-30 : 240 note c. 
450 a 19-b 11 : 238 note c, 240 
notes a, c. 451 a 14-17 : 238 
note c, 240 note a. 452 b 28-29: 
241 note c. De Motu Animal. 
701 b 24-28 : 42 note c. De 
Part. Animal. 647 a 16-19 : 

720 note a. 652 b 17-19 : 103 
note /. De Sensu 437 a 2-3 : 
759 note e. Eth. End. 1219 b 
28-31: 95 note c. 1221 a 4. 
23-24 : 247 note e. Eth. Nic. 
1094 a 18-22 : 745 note /. 
1097 a 25-b 6 : 745 note /. 
1102 a 32-b 2: 20 note a. 
1102 b 25-31 : 95 note r. 1104 
a 18-b 8: 247 note e. 1104 b 
13-16, 24-26 : 246 note d. 
1109 b 30: 246 note d. 1111 b 
26-29: 745 note /. 1120 a 


8-9 : 725 note e. 1129 b 25-27 : 
477 note b. 1130 a 8-9: 473 
note b. 1130 a 10-13, a 32- 
b 5 : 477 note b. 1 138 a 4-b 3 : 
477 notes b, d. 1139 a 6-15 : 
248 note b. 1141 b 16 : 247 
note*/. 1143 a 32-33 : 247 note 
g. 1145 a 4-6 : 745 note /. 
1178 a 10-21 : 247 note d. 
1178 b 8-9: 561 note/. Hist. 
Animal. 535 a 1-4 : 767 note b. 
Metaphysics 981 a 15-24: 247 
note g. 985 a 18-21 : 255 note 
c. 986 a 10-13 : 322 note b. 
987 b 14-18 : 221 note b. 988 
a 28 : 255 note e. 997 b 35— 
998 a 4 : 60 note a. 1002 a 28- 
b 11 : 833 note a. 1014 b 5-6 : 
864 note d. 1016 b 24-31 : 56 
note b. 1028 b 19-21 : 221 
note b. 1044 b 21-29 : 833 
note a. 1051 b 24-25 : 215 
note b. 1053 a 25-26 : 39 note 

c. 1054 a 20-23 : 249 note d. 
1059 b 34-35 : 864 note d. 
1066 a 11 : 166 note a. 1069 b 
8-9 : 250 note c. 1071 b 37— 
1072 a 3 : 177 note a. 1072 b 
20-21 : 215 note b. 1072 b 28- 
30: 561 note/. 1075 a 30-32 : 
250 note c. 1081 a 14-15 : 40 
note a. 1084 a 34-35: 166 note 
a. 1088 b 28-35 : 40 note a. 
1091 a 4-5 : 40 note a. Meteoro- 
logy 342 a 12-16: 68 note b. 
359 b 27—360 a 13 : 713 note 

d. 369 a 17-24: 68 note b. 
386 a 1-7 : 55 note d. Parva 
Naturalia 472 b 6 : 63 note g. 
Physics 187 a 27-29, 34-35 : 
181 note e. 189 a 5-8 : 237 
note/. 190 b 33— 191a 1 : 250 
note c. 191 b 13-14 : 181 note 

e. 193 b 35—194 a 7 : 39 note 
d. 201 b 19-21 : 166 note a. 
215 a 14-15: 63 note g. 217 b 
32—218 a 6 : 839 note d. 218 a 
6-8: 837 note c. 218 b 13: 45 
noted. 219 b 1-2 : 85 and note 
a. 219 b 15-16 : 85 note g. 
220 a 18-22 : 837 note c. 220 
a 24-25 : 85 and note a. 220 b 
5-6 : 45 note d. 220 b 24-28 : 
85 note g. 220 b 32—221 a 1 : 
85 and note a. 221 b 7 : £5 and 

note a. 222 a 10-20 : 837 note 
b. 224 b 33-34 : 101 note </. 
231 b 2-6 : 829 note e. 233 b 
33—234 a 24 : 45 note c. 234 
a 11-14 : 837 note a. 239 b 14- 
20 : 845 note e. 251 b 17-19 : 
177 note a. 251 b 28 : 85 note 
g. 263 a 23-26, b 12- J 4 : S21 
note b. 267 a 1 5-20 : 03 note </, 
6$ note a. Politics 1276 a 34- 
b 13 : 847 note /. 1295 t> 4 : 
103 note/. 1306 b 14-15: 858 
note b. 1315 a 13: 858 note b. 
1333 a 24-25 : 247 note /, 248 
note b. 1341 b 33 : 662 note a. 
Rhetoric 1355 b 12-14 : 755 
note c. 1404 b 26-27 : 113 
note b. Soph. Eleuch. 177 b 6 : 
1 17 note d. Topics 101 b 5-10 : 
755 note c. 108 b 26-31 : 56 
note b. 116 b 22-26: 745 note 
/. 125 a 20-22 : 819 note d. 
125 b 6 : 863 note/. 139 a 4-8 : 
773 note g. 142 b 24-25 : 824 
note a. 146 a 22-23 : 773 note 
g. 147 b 4-6 : 817 note d. 148 
a 20-21 : 222 note b. 158 b 31 : 
819 note g. Frag, (liose) 86 : 
473 and note b. 201 : 85 note/. 
{De Lin. Insect.) 971 a 28-30 : 
829 note d. {De Mir. Aascul.) 
833 b 24-28 : 123 note /. {De 
Mundo) 394 b 31-32 : 93 note 
d. 396 b 28-29 : 255 note /. 
397 b 20-22 : 541 note b. 397 
b 24-26 : 91 note /. 401 b 8- 
22 : 596 note a. {Magna 
Moralia) 1185 b 21-32: 247 
note e. 1206 a 36-b 29: 247 
note d. {Mechanica) 847 b 23 — 
848 a 3 : 56 note a 

Aristoxenus of Tarentum, Elem. 
Harm. (Marguart) i, 2, 8-11 : 
304 note b. i, 15, 15-16 : 251 
note g. i, 15, 25-32 : 303 note 
h. i, 18, 16-19, 1 : 252 note b. 
i, 21, 20-24 : 304 note a. i, 24, 
9-11 : 304 note e. ii, 32, 10-33, 
2 : 305 note h. ii, 40, 25-26 : 
304 note b. ii, 46, 1-3 : 304 
notes a y b. ii, 56, 14-58, 5: 
304 note e. ii, 57, 11-12: 304 
note b. Frag. (Wehrli) 13 : 
164 note c 

Asclepiades, sons of Asclepius, 27 



Asclepiades of Bithynia, 67 note a 

Athena, 615 

Athens, Athenians, 421 and note 

a, 591 
Atlantic Ocean, 811 
Autobulus, son of Plutarch, 159 

Bosporus, 493 and note c, 533, 681 

Cadmus, 343 

Caeneus, a Lapith, 611 and note 
a, 613 

Caesar, Julius, 665 and note c 

Callicrates, 5th-cent. architect, 
853 and note a 

Callisthenes, relative of Aristotle, 
495 and note b 

Carneades of Cyrene, founder of 
the New Academy, 439 and 
note c, 503 note c, 601 note b, 
663, 734 note b, 738 note b, 
749 note g, 750 note c, 753 note 
a, 755 note c, 765, 783 note /. 
Frag. (Wisnievvski) 42 : 669 
note c 

Carthaginians, 851 

Cato the Younger, 665 and note c 

Cephalus, character in Plato's 
Republic, 469 and note a 

Chaldeans, 329 and note c, 331 
note g 

Cliaridotes (" Giver of Joy "), 
divine epithet, 535 and note a 

Chrysippus of Soli, referred to 
and quoted in Part II passim. 
In Part I : 343 note d. Frag. 
(S.V.F. II) 135, 143 : 107 note 
/. 147 : 121 note/, 127 note b. 
148 : 121 note /. 167 : 251 
note/. 203: 122 note a. 205 
(p. 66, 28-37) : 122 note a. 

207 : 121 note d, 122 note a. 

208 : 121 note d. 216 (pp. 70, 
36-71, 2): 122 note a. 217 : 
121 note d. 488 : 219 note b. 
509-510,515: 84 note c. 815: 
61 note c. 1044 (p. 308, 15-18) : 
32 note a. 1158 : 31 note c. 
1170: 193 note /. (S.V.F. 
Ill) 3S2 : 246 note c. 396 : 
99 note b. 456, 459, 461, 462 : 
246 note e. Works named in 
text : Against Common Experi- 
ence : 441, 443. Arts of 
Physics : 577. On Common- 


wealth : 501, 503, 505. On 
Decision: 511, 545. Demon- 
strations concerning Justice : 
475, 477, 479. On Dialectic : 
513. On Duty : 511, 531. On 
Exhortation(s) : 465, 481, 507, 
533, 675. On the Fair : 463. 
On Friendship : 461. On the 
Coal : 489, 687. On the Gods : 
459, 541, 545, 553, 677. On 
Good(s): 517, 531, 747. On 
Habitudes : 577. On Justice : 
467-471, 483, 539, 555, 747, 749. 
On Law: 451. On Moral Ques- 
tions: 519, 521. On Motion: 
575, 583. On Nature : 455, 483, 
497, 501, 503, 507, 533, 547, 553, 
571,701,703. Objects of Choice 
Per Se : 491. On Parts : 839. 
Physical Propositions : 433, 
445, 525. Physical Questions : 
577, 811, 859. Physical Works : 
597. On Possibilities : 581. On 
Providence : 565, 573. On 
Rhetoric: 423. On Right Ac- 
tions : 453, 725. On Sub- 
stance : 557. On Use of 
Discourse : 435, 443, 447. On 
the Void : 839. On Ways of 
Living: 417, 429, 443, 491, 
493, 531. On Zeus : 457, 459, 
Circe, 697 and note d, 733 
Citium, a town on Cyprus, 341 
Cleanthes, Stoic philosopher, 415- 
417 and notes passim, 421, 425- 
427, 745 note e, 747 note b, 
749 note d, 783, 787 and note c. 
Frag. (S.V.F. I) 484 : 570 note 
b. 490 : 662 note b. 497 : 
427 note b, 787 note b. 497 
(p. Ill, 25-28): 797 note d. 
499 : 787 note c. 501 : 860 
note a. 510-512 : 787 note b. 
513 : 427 note b. 514 : 427 
note b, 706 note b. 518 : 575 
note b. 519-520 : 861 note g. 
525 : 857 note g. 536 : 785 
and note b. 537 (p. 122, 6-7) : 
427 note b. 552 : 415 note g. 
555 : 433 note c. 563 (pp. 128, 
31-129, 2): 427 and note a, 
563 (p. 129, 3-5) : 427 note b. 
567 : 721 note c. 598 : 681 
note a. 619 : 671 note c. 


Work mentioned by title : 
Physical Treatises : 427 

Clearchus of Soli, 319 and note e. 
Frag. (Wehrli) 4 : 317 and 
note d 

Cleisthenes, Athenian statesman, 
421 and note a 

Cleon, Athenian politician, 707 
and note a 

Colotes, follower of Epicurus, 772 
note a 

Comica Adespota, frag. (Kock) 
189 : 801 note b. 464 : 755. 
1210 : 795 

Corinthus, son of Zeus, 761 and 
note c 

Cornucopia, 619 and note a 

Crantor of Soli, philosopher of the 
Old Academy, 171 note c, 173 
note c, 213 note b, 215 note e, 
219 note g, 225 note a, 267 note 
a, 271 note g, 278 note b, 303 
and note a, 319 and note c. 
Frag. (Kayser) 2 : 171 and 
note a. 3 : 163 and notes c, e. 
4 : 167 and note b, 168 note d, 
171 and note a. 5 : 301 and 
note b. 6 : 317 and note d. 
7 : 265 and note e 

Crates of Athens, successor of 
Polemo in Academy, 436 note a 

Crates of Thebes, Cynic philo- 
sopher, 465 note d 

Cretan Sea, 811 

Critolaus, Peripatetic philosopher, 
739 note d, 741 note a 

Ctesios (" Steward of the House- 
hold "), epithet of Zeus, 533 
and note a on p. 534 

Cyclops (Polyphemus), 121 

Cyloneans, partisans of the 
Athenian aristocrat Cylon, 559 
and note c 

Cypria, frag. 1 : 541 note c 

Detaneira, wife of Heracles, 684 

note b 
Deiotarus, Calatian tetrarch, 543 

and note a 
Demades, Athenian politician, 

frag. (Baiter-Sauppe) 13 : 123 

and note c 
Demeter, 497, 501, 505 
Demetrius of Phalerum, frag. 

(Wehrli) 196 : 109 note d 

Democritus of Abdera, Greek 
philosopher, 821 and notes a, b, 
823 note b. Frag. (Diels- 
Kranz) A 114 : 821 and notes 
a, b. B 21: 116 note b. B 
155: 8J 9 and notes <?,/. B156: 
821 and note a 

Demosthenes, Or. 5. 5 : 119-121 
and note a on p. 121. 21. 72 : 
119 and note d. 21.110: 119- 
121 and note a on p. 121. 
21. 200 : 119-121 and note b 
on p. 121 

Demylus, tyrant of Carystus, 559 
and note d 

Diagoras of Melos, " The Athe- 
ist," 783 and note e 

Diodorus " Cronus," a member 
of the Megarian school, 445 
note a, 589 and note c, 591 note 
d. Frag. (Doring) 130-139: 
744 and note e 

Diodorus Siculus, i, 95, 2 : 23 
note g 

Dion (" Tom "), 681 and note a, 

Diogenes of Apollonia, 5ih-cent. 
Greek philosopher, 855 note /. 
Frag. (Diels-Kranz) A 19 : 25 
note b 

Diogenes of Babylon, Stoic philo- 
sopher, 417 and note e, 765 
note d. Frag. (S.V.F. Ill) 1-4 : 
417 note e. 5 : 417-419 and 
note a on p. 419. 20 (p. 213, 
18-21): 251 note/. 22 (p. 213, 
27-31) : 127 note b. 22 (p. 214, 
1-2) : 121 note /. 29 (p. 215, 
28-29): 855 note/. 29 (p. 215, 
35-36) : 107 note/. 30 (p. 216, 
18-25): 861 note fir. 33 (p. 217, 
10-12): 801 note e. 33 (p. 217, 
18-20): 855 note/. 44 (p. 219, 
11-18, 45-46) : 734 note b, 750 
note a. 117 : 420 note a 

Diogenes of Sinope, Cynic philo- 
sopher, 465 note d, 501 and note 
d, 695 note c 

Dionysius the Elder, tyrant of 
Syracuse, 559 

Dionysius of Heraclea, Stoic 
philosopher, frag. (S.V.F. I) 
434 : 517 note a 

Dionysius Thrax, grammarian, 
Ars Grammatica (Uhlig) 11 : 



105 note d. 12: 110 note a. 
15 : 125 note d 

Dionysus, 534 note a 

Dioxippus, physician and fol- 
lower of Hippocrates, 527 and 
note b 

Egyptians, 255 

Eleans, 23 and note g 

Empedocles, frag. (Diels-Kranz) 
A 32, 38, 45 : 253 note h. 
B 48: 83 and note a. B 115, 
1-2 : 253 note h 

Ephorus of Cyme, Greek histor- 
ian, 495 and note d 

Epicarpios (" Guardian of Har- 
vests "), epithet of Zeus 533 
and note a on pp. 535, 789 

Epicharmus, 5th-cent. comic 
writer, frag. (Diels-Kranz) B 2 : 
847 and note d 

Epicureans, 183 note d, 417 note 
d, 423 and note d, 457, 471, 509 
and note a, 524 note c, 547 note 
b, 825 note c 

Epicurus, 193, 491 and note a on 
p. 492, 559 and note a on 
p. 561, 565, 581, 787, 843. 
Epistles (Usener) i, 56-57 : 813 
note b. i, 58-59 : 825 note c. 
i, 60-61 : 580 note b. i, 61-62 : 
844 note a. i, 67 : 773 note g. 
i, 76-77 : 492 note a. ii, 97 : 
492 note a. iii, 123 : 782 note 
d. iii, 132 : 519 note c. Sent. 
Sel. ( = K.A.) i : 492 note a. 
v : 519 note c. Frag. 13, 169 : 
423 note d. 276 : 581 note b. 
277 : 845 note a. 278 : 825 
note d. 281 : 193 and note e, 
580 note b. 293 : 69 note d. 
299 : 581 and note b. 368 : 
787-789 and note /on p. 787. 
378 : 549 and note c. 386-387 : 
423 note d. 426 : 417 and note 
a. 515 : 519 and note c 

Eratosthenes of Gyrene, head of 
the Library of Alexandria, 527 
and note b 

Eretrian School, 443 note c 

Ethiopians, 699 

Eubulides of Miletus, philosopher 
of the Mega ria-n School, 589 
note c, 666 note a 

Euclid, Elements i, Axiom 7 : 827 


note d. i, Post. 3 : 55 note e. 
vii, Def. 22 : 278 note c. xi, 
Defs. 18 and 21 : 55 note f. 
xi, Def. 28 : 53 note j, xii, 
Prop. 18 : 325 note d, xiii, 
Prop. 18, Lemma: 53 note L 
Scctio Canon is 13 : 309 note d. 
16 : 304 note c 

Eudemus of Lihodes. pupil of 
Aristotle, frag. (Wehrli) 40 : 
195 and note e 

Eudorus of Alexandria, eclectic 
philosopher, 165 note c, 21 s 
note g, 267 note a, 295, 301 
and note b 

Eupolis, poet of Old Comedy, 527 
and note b 

Euripides, 115, 501, 527 and note 
b, 541. Andromache 448: 771 
and note b. Baecfme 01 8-9 19 : 
853. Cyclops 225 : 121 note e. 
Elcctra 1282-1283 : 541 note c. 
Helen 38-40 : 541 note i\ 
HeraclidaeXi<)-$63: 613. H.F. 
111-112: 713-715 and note a 
on p. 714. 1245 : 539 and note 
a, 693. 1316-1319, 1341-1344 : 
569 note a. 1345-1346: 560 
and note a. Orestes 1639-1 642 : 
541 note c. Hap pi ices 734-736 : 
595. Troiades 454 : 789 note 

d. 886 : 255 and note e. 887- 
888 : 87 and note b. Frag. 
(Xauck) 254, 2 : 545 and note 

e. 285, 8 : 733 and critical 
note 3. 202, 7 : 545 and note 
d. 892: 497 and note c, 501, 
505 and note <1. 990 : 329. 
991 : 469 

Evenus of Paros, 5th-ecnt. poet 
and sophist, frag. (Bergk) 10: 
115 and note b 

Fragmenta Adespota (lyric) 15 
(Diehl) : 723 and note a 

Genethlios (" Guardian of 

Birth "), divine epithet, 780 

and note d 
Genetor (" Sire "), epithet of 

Zeus, 541 and note b 
Glaucus, grandson of Bellorophon, 

Greek, 25, 800 

Hades, 92 note «, 543, 701 
Helios, 91 note a 


Heracles, 539, 619 and note a, 
685 and note b, 707 and notes 
b, c 

HeraclituB, 253, 255 note a, 697 
and note c. Frag. (Diels- 
Kranz) B 30 : 179 and note h. 
B 51 : 253-255 and note a on 
p. 254. B 54 : 257. B 100 : 
91 and note b. B 1.17: 723 
note c. B 119 : 21 and note d. 
B 125 : 547 note b 

Herillus of Carthage, Stoic philo- 
sopher, 746 note b 

Hermes, 534 note a 

Hermippus of Smyrna, Peri- 
patetic biographer, frag. (Muel- 
ler, FHG) 76 : 699 note b 

Herodotus, ii, 64 : 507 note b. ii, 
160 : 23 note g. viii, 123 : 24 
note a 

Hesiod, Works and Days 78 : 707. 
242-243 : 469 and note e. 299 : 
529. 524 : 669 note c. 757- 
758 : 507. Theogony 901-902 : 
541 note b. Frag. (Rzach) 271 : 
427 and note d. 427 and note 
d. (Scutum) 157-158: 119 and 
note c 

Hieronymus of Rhodes, philo- 
sopher, frag. (Wehrli) 1 1 : 417 

Hipparchus of Nicaea, Greek 
astronomer, 325 notes b-e, 527 
and note c 

Hippo, 5th-cent. natural philoso- 
pher, frag. (Diels-Kranz) A 8: 
783 and note e 

Hippocrates, 527 and note b 

Hipponax of Ephesus, frag. 
(Knox, LCL) 56 : 619 and note 
d, 727. 58 : 613 and note e 

Homer, 117, 853 and note b. 
Iliad i, 5 : 549 and note b, 597 
note b. i, 8 : 709. i, 185 : 
105, 129 note b. i, 343: 433. i, 
544, etc. : 29-31 and note a on 
p. 31. ii, 219: 707. v, 442: 
783. vi, 234 : 697. 253, etc. : 
113. 407 : 439. viii, 14 : 701 
and note b. 31, etc. : 93. 
xi, 64-65 : 101. xiv, 315-316 : 
771 and critical note 1. 459- 
460: 117 and note e. xv, 109 : 
595. xviii, 536-537 : 119 and 
note c. xx, 147 : 117 and 
note /. xxiii, 346-347 : 845 

and nolo v. Odyssey i, 45, etc. : 
93. 366 : 769 and critical 
notes 7-8. iv, 392 : 695 and 
note e. vi, 46 : 781 and note e. 
229-235: 615. viii, 408-409: 
113. 438-448: 733. ix, 427 : 
121. x, 210-243 : 697 and note 
d. xvi, 172-176 : 615. 273 : 
619. xvii, 337, 365 ff. : 619 
and note c. xviii, 213 : 769 
and critical notes 7-8. xxiii, 
156-162: 615. 183: 113. 
xxiv, 473 : 93 note b 

Homeric Hymns ii (Be meter) 62 : 
91 and note a 

Ilorus, 257 

ldanthyrsus, Scythian king, 493 

and note e, critical note 6, 495, 

Iolaus, character in Euripides' 

Heraeleidae, 613 
Isocrates. Adv. Sophistas 19 : 

121 note c. (Ad Dentonimm) 

28 : 725 note e 
Ithacans, 619 

Jews, 561 

Jupiter, planet, 324 note a. 333 

Lacydes of Cyrene, head of the 

Academy, 441 note a 
Lais, courtesan, 461 and critical 

note 8, 677 and critical note 2 
Lapith, 611 and note a 
Leonidas of Tarentum, Anth. Pal. 

vii, 35 : 343 
Leuco, king of Pontus, 493 and 

note c, 495, 681 
Lichas, attendant of Heracles, 

685 and note b 
Lycurgus, Spartan legislator, 421 

and note a, 707 and note b 
Lynceus, mythical figure famous 

for his keen sight, 851 and 

note d 

Manteios (" Oracular "), divine 
epithet, 789 and note d 

Mars, planet, 324 note a, 333 and 
note d 

Megara, 591. Mcgarian ques- 
tions, 443. Megarian School, 
443 and note c 

Meidia8 of Anagyrus, Athenian 
politician, 119 



Meilitkios (" Gracious "), epithet 
of Zeus, 791 and note / 

Meletus, one of Socrates' ac- 
cusers, 705 and note e 

Menander, frag. (Koerte-Thier- 
felder) 64, 749: 21 and note c. 
78G : 793 

Menedcmus of Eretria, Greek 
philosopher, 443 and note c 

Menedcmus of Pyrrha, a follower 
of Plato, 495 and note d 

Mercury, planet, 323 and note (/, 
331 and notes c, d t 333 and 
notes c, f 

Molionidae, mythical twins, 849 
and note d 

Muses, 337-339 and notes passim 

Myrmecides, sculptor and en- 
graver, 853 and note a 

Xessus, Centaur, 685 note b 
I>lew Testament : II Cor. 4, 8-9 

and 6, 10 : 613 note b. Eph. 

5, 4 : 685 note d 

Odeum, at Athens, 419 and note 
a, critical note 1 

Odysseus, 121, 615, 619, 697, 733 

Olympic Games, 23 and note g 

Olynthus, 495 and note b 

Order, 541 and note b 

Oromasdes, Zoroaster's name for 
god, 255 

Qrphei Argonautica 170-174 : 610 
note a. Orphicorum Frag- 
menta (Kern) 21, 21a : 780 
note a. 91 (B 6 Diels-Kranz) : 
343 note d, 780 note a 

Facan (" Healer "), divine epi- 
thet, 789 and note d 
Panticapaeum, city in the Taur- 

ian Chersonese, 495, 497 note a 
Parmenidean Stranger, character 

in Plato's Politicus, 211 
Parmenides of Elea, 559 note d. 

Frag. (Diels-Kranz) B 8, 53-61, 

B 9 : 255 and note b 
Peace, 541 and note b 
Peloponnesian War, 541 and 

note e 
Pentheus, 853 
Pericles, 707 and note a 
Peripatetics, 247 notes d, f, 417 

and note d, 430 note a, 437 


note a, 515 note a, 701 note a, 
738 note b 

Persaeus, pupil of the Stoic Zeno, 
443 note c 

Perses, brother of Hesiod, 529- 

Persian War, 541 and note e 

Phaednis, character in Plato's 
dialogues, 3i 

Phalaris, tyrant of Acragras, 707 
and note d 

Phanias, follower of Posidonius, 
217 note g 

Pherecydes of Athens, genealo- 
gist. Fragment (F.Gr.Hist.) 38 : 
665 note b. 42 : 619 note a 

Pherecydes of Syros, early prose- 
writer, 697 and note c 

Philistion, Greek physician, 527 
and note b 

Philocrates, archon of Athens 
276/5 B.C., 515 note a 

Philolaus, a Pythagorean. Frag- 
ments (Dieis-Kranz) A 16-17 : 
323 notes b, d. A 26 : 287 
note e. B 6 : 287 note e, 305 
note / 

Phocylides (pseudo-), early ele- 
giac and hexameter poet, 
Sententiae (\oung) 87 : 427 
and note d 

Phryne, courtesan, 461 and cri- 
tical note 1, 677 and critical 
note 2 

Pindar, 343, 611-613. Nemean 
vii, 105 : cf. 76 1 and note c. 
x, 61-63 : cf. 851 and note d. 
Fragments (Turyn) 22 : 343 
and note c. 24: 85. 66: 711 
and note b. 71 : 619 note tf. 
147 : 783 and note b. 204 : 
611 and note a 

Plato, 19-365 passim, 425 and 
note a, 429, 430 note a, 459, 
465, 467 and note b, 469, 471 
and note c, 475, 477, 513-515, 
525 and note d, 527 and note b, 
749, 843. Clitophon 408 A 4-7 : 
465. Cratylus 399 D 10-E 3 : 570 
note a. 437 B 3 : 863 note /. 
Crito 50 C 9-D 1 : 417 note /. 
Euthydemus 280 C-E : 725 note 
e. 292 E : 761 note c. Gorgias 
452 a-b: 471 note d. 467 E 6— 
468 B 1 : 701 note a. 499 E : 


745 note/. 504 c : 471 note d. 
520 C 5-6 : 730 note a. 524 B 
2-4 : 586 note a. Hippias 
Major 293 a 9-10 : 563 note a. 
Laws 631 C : 471 note d. 061 
a-d : 471 note d, 704 note a. 

728 D 6—729 B 1 : 704 note a 

729 C 5-8 : 789 note d. 793 C : 
669 note e. 816 D 9-E 1 : 715 
note e. 816 E : 723 note b. 
903 B 4-D 3 : 552 note b. 963 
C 5—964 B 7 : 424 note a. 
Lysis 216 D 5-7 : 701 note a. 
218 E— 219 A : 471 note d. 
219c— 220b: 745 note/. Meno 
72 A : 857 note c. Parmenides 
150 D 5-E 5 : 819 note d. 161 
c 7-8 : 817 note d. Phaedo 
60 b-c : 555 note a. 65 E 8 : 
833 note c. 66 C 5-D 2: 544 
note a. 67 D 4-5 : 566 note a. 
79 c 6-8 : 723 note c. 96 E 3-4 : 
81 9 noted. 112 a : 701 note b. 
Phaedrus 240 E 6 : 551 note a. 
245 D 2-3 : 865 note i. 246 D 
1-2 : 561 note /. Protagoras 
361 E 5-6 : 771 note /. Re- 
public 330 D— 331 B : 469 and 
note a. 351 D— 352 a : 477 
and note a. 357 c : 471 note d. 
373 D-E : 544 note a. 380 a : 
709 note d. 398 C 7-8 : 563 
note a. 427 E— 435 B : 424 
note a. 430 C 4-5 : 771 note/. 
434 B-c : 491 note c. 441 c— 
444 a : 424 note a. 489 B 4 : 
662 note a. 505 B 6-C 5 : 761 
note b. 528 a 6 : 728 note c. 
Sophist 226 B 6 : 815 note b. 
247 D 8-E 3 : 773 note g. 258 
D— 259 B : 772 note a. Sym- 
posium 202 B 1-5 : 701 note a. 
207 D 2—208 B 2 : 847 note /. 
TJieaetetus 176 A 5-8 : 555 note 
a. 184 D : 857 note d. 209 D 
8-E 4 : 761 note d. Timaeus 
33 c 7-D 3 : 567 notes c, d. 47 
E 5—48 A 2 : 557 note d. 58 a 
1 : 813 note c. 63 E 8-10 : 813 
note d. 64 a : 720 note a. 75 
a 7-c 7 : 553 note b. [Ery- 
xias] 395 B : 727 note/. Works 
named in text: Account of At- 
lantis (^Critias) : 211. Laws : 
43, 187, 197. Phaedrus: 63, 

199. Philebas: 185,189. Politi- 
cus: 191, 195, 211. Republic: 
35, 83, 211, 335. 429. Sophist : 
175. Oh the Soul ( = Phaedo): 
175. Symposium: 31,47. The- 
aetetus: 19. Timaeus: 159,189, 
199,211, 351 

Platonists, 159, 351 

Plutarch, son of the author, 
133 f., 159 

Plutarch, tyrant of Eretria, 121 
and note a 

Polemon of Athens, head of the 
Academy, 515 and note «., 739 
and notes a, b, 741 note d 

Pontus, kingdom in Asia Minor, 

Posidonius, 186 note c, 217 and 
note g, 219 notes b, c, 223 notes 
g, h, 225 notes b, e, 351. Frag. 
(Edelstein-Kidd) 96 : 851 and 
notes a, b, c, critical note 1. 
98 : 835 and notes d, f. 187, 
26-27 : 750 note b. F 141 a : 
217-223 and notes passim (esp. 
g on p. 217 f.). F 141 b : 351- 
353 and notes passim 

Protagoras, 833 note b. Frag- 
ment (Diels-Kranz) B 7 : 820 
note a 

Pythagoras, 85 and note /, 86 
note c, 111, 165 and note c, 306 
note a, 343 note d, 559 and note 
c. Pythagoreans, 269, 273 and 
notes b, c, 285, 287 and note d, 
289, 303-305 and notes passim, 
306 note a, 323 and notes b, d, 
328 note c, 331 note g, 341 and 
note g, 539 and note b, 540 
note a 

Roman language, 115 and note c 

Salamis, battle of, 809 and note b 
Sardanapalus, king of Assyria, 

707 and note c 
Saturn, planet, 324 note a, 333 

and notes e, f 
Sceptics, 441 note a 
Scythian, 493 and note c, 497 

and note a, 681 
Seleucus, astronomer, 79 and 

note b 
Sicily, 8